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DEDICAT10N 
"... Even if you deny us everything else, you cannot take away the 
fact that we are human beings, that we too thirst for liberty and hope 
one day to recover a fitting place in the concert of nations; ... 
Even 
assuming that you can deny us everything, you cannot rob us of our 
right to live - and life and liberty are one and the same. " 
Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyed 
(1872-1963) 
I dedicate this humble work to all those striving for freedom and 
progress. 
PREFACE 
The contradiction between the general acceptance of internationally 
recognised basic human rights and the conditions of political life in most 
Arab countries led me to undertake this study of the ability of the legal 
order to protect political human rights. Violation of the rule of law has 
led naturally to suppression of the people's rights and freedoms. 
Governments, be they monarchist or republican, conservative or radical, 
have been criticised by one of the leading intellectual figures of 
contemporary Arab world: 
"Common sense tells us that we have no interest in seizing the rights 
of the individual and turning them over to a government in which we have no share and over which we can exercise no control. " 
Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyed 
Naturally, as an Arab advocate, I have aimed to present an 
independent, accurate and balanced picture of the contemporary position 
of political human rights in that region, nevertheless, I am personally 
responsible for any consequences of this standpoint as well as any 
controversial opinions in what follows. 
Some inconsistencies have inevitably occurred in the use of quotations 
and different translations. Translations of the Qur'an are from The 
Koran, (N. J. Dawood, 1983), for Constitutions, historical and ideological 
documents, I have drawn heavily on Constitutions of the Countries of 
the World (A. Blaustein and G. Flanz), the document sections of the Middle 
East Journal, and The Arab States and the Arab League (Muhammad 
Khalil, 1962), which was of great help in several parts of the research. 
In the case of other national legislation, it is important to note that 
translations of provisions are largely drawn from the States Periodic 
Reports under article forty of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, as well as the Reports submitted by States Parties 
under Article nine of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Reports prepared by the 
International Labour Organisation Committee of Experts and the 
Committee on Freedom of Association. 
The provisions of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights 
are taken from a translation supplied by the Organization of African 
Unity, while the translation of the draft Arab Covenant on Arab Human 
Rights is the author's responsibility. Likewise, any inaccuracies in 
translation in the text or Courts' merits, especially in the section 
dealing with constitutionality in Chapter Three, are the responsibility of 
the author. 
For information on administrative practices in Arab countries, the 
reader is directed to reports prepared by non-governmental 
organizations, such as Amnesty International, Article 19, International 
Commission of Jurists, Minority Rights Group and Index on Censorship. 
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Summary 
International legal standards in respect of political human rights are 
established through analysis of key texts and the interpretative work of 
international bodies, making possible an analysis of political life in Arab 
countries from a legal perspective. 
A brief historical survey of the emerging legal order highlights the effect 
of the Ottoman and colonial periods on Arab political development, as well as 
the impact of Arab nationalism on the developing constitutional order. The 
phenomena of nationalism and identification with nationalist aspirations as 
vital legitimising factors for political forces in and out of power 
areillustrated, along with the role of the military in relation to radical 
nationalist movements. 
The emerging constitutional order and its response to political change are 
examined as essential background both to the assessment of the efficacy of 
the Arab legal order in protecting political human rights and the question 
of how legislators tried to achieve the twin goals of reform and legality. 
The impact of ideology on the supreme legal text of each state is examined 
along with the constitutional path to independence in North Africa, 
highlighting the new order's recognition of principles of the rule of law, in 
particular, the revolutionary legislators' approach to the principle of 
legality. The extent and nature of constitutional review, a vital factor in the 
efficacy of the legal order in upholding constitutional provisions, 
is 
assessed in an examination of the range of approaches to control of 
constitutionality, focusing on the Egyptian experience. 
The degree of recognition of political rights within Arab legislation, at the 
constitutional level, in legislation which regulates the scope of their 
exercise, and finally in light of the restrictions which may be imposed on 
them, is evaluated in the light of the criteria identified earlier. 
Recommendations for legal reform at a number of levels are made, including 
proposed amendment of Constiutions and other legislation, focusing on 
principles of legality in general and protection of political rights in 
particular. Additional recommendations are made concerning Arab 
governments' activities with regard to international and regional human 
rights instruments. 
INTR0DUCT10N 
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'The last 30 years have witnessed the complete disappearance of democratic freedoms in the Arab world. This suppression of democracy has been justified in 
various ways and under different pretexts. It sometimes was justified by the 
need to build socialism and to pursue economic development, sometimes by the 
need to establish Arab unity, and at other times by the requirements of 
defending independence and in the name of struggle against Israel, when in fact 
none of these objectives could be achieved without democracy. Democracy and the 
fundamental freedoms it implies are not merely means of achieving vital goals, but constitute a fundamental goal in themselves. Freedom is a supreme value for 
all Arabs because they are deprived of it. The Arab people are deprived of the freedom of thought and expression, of the right to participate in decision- 
making; they are exposed to imprisonment, torture and murder - including 
collective murder; their honour is trampled upon, their highest values violated; 
and silence and submission are imposed upon them everywhere. The Arab people are 
today desperate and without hope, without faith in themselves or in their 
regimes ... Authority in the Arab countries is today based on intimidation, 
subjugation, and cooptation. This has led to confusion in values and standards, 
to the absence of critical thought, to the decline of reason. Thus the single, 
closed viewpoint has dominated, putting an end to intellectual and political 
diversity and rendering mass movements and popular organizations useless and 
impotent. Cultural and intellectual life, as a result, have been effectively 
destroyed in the Arab world. The participants in this conference strongly 
emphasize the necessity of securing basic human rights for the Arab people, 
particularly the rights of individual freedom and personal belief, of freedom of 
thought and expression, and of political participation, including the right to 
form political organizations and workers' unions. We also stress the need to 
insure the rights of women and minorities, and to safeguard the independence of 
the judiciary. The conference participants underscore the need to allow a 
democratic society to emerge in all Arab countries, a democracy rooted in 
popular participation, expressed in freely-forced political parties, and based 
in sovereign law and the power of the people, the only true source of power and 
legitimacy, to elect their own representatives. ' 
-Ha. manat. April 3.1983 { Signed by ]' 
The stagnation of political life in the Arab world is a well-known and 
well-documented phenomenon. This study will examine the proposition 
that the contemporary Arab legal order is unable to provide a 
framework in which political rights may be freely exercised, in order to 
permit Arab states and peoples to shift from their present position to a 
stage of effective and stable development. 
Michael Hudson describes the problems of Arab political life as a "crisis 
of legitimacy". He identifies "a complex set of historical, social, and 
cultural conditions, aggravated by imperialism and modernization", as a 
part of this problem= and constitutions and codes of law too, reflect the 
complex set of circumstances from which the contemporary legal order 
emerged. 
1. In these words, Arab intellectuals, meeting in 1983 at the Hauawat cultural center in Tunis, described the crisis of human rights and democratic freedoms in the Arab world'. The participants in this conference failed to secure an Arab venue for their second meeting due to the refusal of several Arab governments includinj Egypt, Kuwait and Jordan. At the meeting, which took place in Liwassol, Cyprus, a permanent Organization for the Protection of Human Rights in the Arab World was set up to 
monitor human rights violations. 
Hawwawat Declaration, Merip Reports, January 1984, p. 23. 2. Michael C. Hudson, Arab politics . the search for legitivacy London, 1977 p. x 
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The failure of the contemporary legal order to provide a secure 
framework for political life may be found within the legal order itself, 
with limitations and weaknesses in legal texts as well as both the 
diminishing of the principles of the rule of law, and administrative 
practices. Even where the legal order gives expression to political 
freedoms, it is unable to provide the mechanism by which they may be 
freely exercised. 
The legacies of the past as well as the contemporary effects of secular' 
and religious ideology have contributed to the weakness of legal 
protection of political freedoms, which is also undermined by the 
suspension of the normal legal order in favour of states of emergency. 
Most serious and far-reaching is the use of the legal order as the tool 
of Governments in the maintenance of authority, clear in the use of law 
and constitutional institutions to control political life. 
Two principal assumptions run throughout this study. The first is that 
to be effective in sustaining political participation, the legal order must 
be based on the principles of the rule of law, and give expression to 
political freedoms, such as the rights to associate freely and to take 
part in decision-making. According to the preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, "it is essential, if man is not to be 
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against 
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the 
rule of law. " In other words, political liberty must be preserved and 
safeguarded by the law in order to allow political development. The 
implication, found elsewhere in international human rights instruments, 
is that human rights are best safeguarded in a "just and democratic 
society", sustained through the rule of law-4 
3. Principles of 'socialist legality' seem to have been widely ad pted in the postcolonial radical 
republics of the region. The doctrine of 'revolutionar legality' (the use of the coercive power of the State against bourgeois and capitalist elements) was first proclaimed by Lenin after the 
revolution of 1917, and in 1936, Stalin proclaimed the new Soviet Constitution, and principle of 'socialist Iegality', the doctrine which allowed the Soviet state not only to retain but to 
strengthen the law, previously dismissed as a bourgeois tool, as a means of state control. Andrei Vyshinsky, the principal exponent of 'socialist legality', described law as a socialist normative order, a tool in the struggle to achieve socialism in the face of the capitalist threat. However, Vyshinsky's legal thought was little more than a front for the Soviet leadership, who wished to retain the coercive machinery of the state for their own ends. A recent evaluation of 'social 'st legality' may be found in Richard Kinsey "Karl Renner on socialist legality' in David Sugarman (ed. ), Legality, ideology and the state, 1983 pp. 11-42. The revolutionary Constitutions of most radical republics use the terminology of socialist doctrine, 
with provisions which draw heavily on socialist models. Despite the use of socialist terminology, most Arab Constitutions also stress that states derive their democracy and socialism from the Arab heritage 
and the spirit of Isla. 
4. Although at the national level, the concept of the Rule of Law way stand for an important legal doctrine : that government should be conducted according to law, the actions of governments should have legal authority and legal fore, disputes being settled by judicial decision, internationally, 
lawyers have sought to extend the meaning of the Rule of Law beyond the simple principle of legality. The Rule of Law has been described as a dynamic concept which should be used to protect and enhance 
political and civil rights. 
The International Commission of Jurists Declaration of Delhi enumerated traditional elements / ... 
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The second assumption emphasises that without the establishment of a 
political and legal framework based on the rule of law which allows the 
people to express their aspirations, it will continue to be impossible for 
states to achieve their goals for development, as events confirm that 
without adequate protection of human rights, whether civil or political, 
no real development can be achieved or sustained. 
Despite the point of view that the fragile structures of many 
developing countries might oblige States to impose restrictions on 
political freedoms to prevent disintegration, nevertheless, national 
legislation must conform to minimum standards. While it may be argued 
that the demands of development in Arab countries might justify an 
extension of the scope of regulatory powers, nevertheless, the legislative 
and judicial authorities must not, under any circumstances, be weakened 
in their powers nor stripped of their right to exercise effective checks 
on executive acts, in order to ensure respect for the rule of law and 
human rights, 
A dominant theme in Arab countries since independence has been the 
desire for development of the population's conditions, long denied them 
by Ottoman and European colonialism. If Governments are to be able to 
so move their societies as to achieve this goal, they must address what 
has been accurately described as "the complete disappearance of 
democratic freedoms in the Arab world", in an effort to overcome the 
political instability and incoherence which has marked the post- 
independence era in the region. 
This thesis will argue that reform and legality must go hand in hand, 
and the degree of development achieved will depend upon the success of 
balancing these two necessities. 
.. 
in the Rule of Law as adequate controls of Executive abuse of power, essentials of fair criminal 
procedure, independence of the judiciary. In addition, it stressed the need for the democratic 
organisation of the legislature, safeguards for freedom of belief, speech and assembly, and safeguards 
a ainst legislation discriminating against minority groups. international 
Commission of Jurists The Rule of Law and human rights : principles and definitions, 
1966. 
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The effect of the contemporary Arab legal order on human rights has 
received little attention despite the increased concern of international 
bodies. 5 
In general, it must be said that there have been few documentary 
studies of the contemporary Arab legal order, ° which continues to make 
it difficult not only to find readily available source material, but also 
for researchers to stimulate and develop debate based on critical 
examination of the problems, allowing a shift from solely political 
analysis by traditionalist and moderate alike. With a few exceptions, ' 
studies on Middle Eastern law by Western scholars tend to concentrate 
almost exclusively on the . Shari'ah (Islamic law). ' The lack of 
comprehensive studies of modern Middle Eastern law has been pointed 
out along with "the great need for comparative and socio-historical 
studies in this field ". 9 Work on the contemporary Arab legal order has 
tended to focus on the emerging national legal systems of individual 
countries, and reflects the varying stages of their development, as S. H. 
Amin points out in the introduction to his Middle East Legal Systems 
5. For example, Amnesty International has submitted information under the UN procedure for confidentially reviewing communications about human rights violations, stating that the evidence 
revealed warranting UN investigation in Libya, (Report 1985, p. 330 The intervention of the representative of the Arab Lawyers Union at the 39th Session of the United Nations Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1987. Review of International Commission of Jurists 39/87 pp. 33-35. The participants in the Hauuasat Declaration of 1983, meeting in Limassol later that year called on 
all Arab governments to acknowledge human rights and freedoss specified in the UONR'. They called for the defence of all individuals whose human rights are violated, demanding that all political prisoners in the Arab countries be released or immediately brought to trial, that all illegal courts and 
emergency legislation be abolished, and the illegal activity of the security forces be ended. Merip Reports January 1984 14 1 23. 
6. For example, Helen Miller Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties in the Near and Middle East, 1953; Muhammad Khalil, The Arab states and the Arab League :a documentary record. 2 vols. 1962; Herbert Liebesny, The Law of the Near and Middle East, 1915; Abid A. Al-Marayati, Middle eastern 
constitutions and electoral laws, New York, 1968; Saba Habachi 'Law, Bench and Bar in Arab lands' Journal of the International Comuission of Jurists, 1959; Hishas B. Sharabi, Nationalise and 
revolution in the Arab world, 1966 (part two contains documentary material, including statements, ideological documents and excerpts from Constitutions). 
7. For example, Herbert Liebesny The Law of the Near and Middle last, 1975, 'Comparative legal history 
: its role in analysis of Islamic and modern Middle Eastern legal institutions' in American Journal of 
- Comparative Law, 38 1972' 
B. As Herbert Liebesny, whose The Law of the Near and Middle East (1975) is one of the few 
comprehensive contemporary studies, writes 'cwprehensive discussions of Islamic law are available ... while no such comprehensive presentations exist for legal developments since the early nineteenth 
century'. 
Herbert Liebesny The Law of the Near and Middle East, 1975, p. ix. For example, N. J. Coulson, A history of Islamic law, 1964; J. N. D. Anderson Law reform in the Muslim 
world, 1976, 'Modern trends in Islas " legal reform and modernisation in the Middle East' International Comparative Law Quarterly 20, no. l, 1971, pp. 1-21 M. Cherif Bassiouni 'Protection of diplomats under Islamic law' American Journal of International Law Vol 74 1980 pp. 609f; Herbert LiebesnY 'Stability and change in Islamic law' Middle East Journal, 21,1967, pp. 16-34; Cyriac Pullapilly, Islas in the contemporary world, 1980; Joseph Schacht, 'Islamic law in contemporary states' American Journal of Comparative Law 8,1959 pp. 133-47. 9. Enid Hill 'Comparative and historical study of modern Middle Eastern law' in American Journal of Comparative Law, 26,1978, pp. 279-307. 
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(1985). 10 
Studies on Arab political life are more numerous, " though they 
naturally utilise the methodology of political science analysis, and often 
display marked ideological perspectives. 12 Their value for the present 
thesis lies in their focus on the development of Arab political culture in 
the post-colonial era. 
Approaches to problems relating to human rights in the region have 
focused on the question of the compatibility of modern human rights 
with Islamic doctrine, l3 emphasising the western origin of human rights 
law. Likewise, studies of the relation of Muslims to international human 
rights law are dominated by western cultural superiority, and views of 
international law from theological or ideological perspectives. 
Writers who have examined the human rights question from the 
perspective of international legal principles have been satisified to 
describe positive aspects of the Arab legal order's recognition of basic 
human rights 1' or participation in international instruments, l& without 
critical analysis of the factors which inhibit effective protection of these 
rights in the region. 
10. Other recent works by Amin examine the developing legal systems of the Gulf, for example, 
International and legal problems of the Gulf (1981); Law and justice in contemporary Yemen (1987). 
11. For example, Bruce Borthwick Comparative politics of the Middle East : an introduction, 1980; 
Michael Hudson Arab politics : the search for legitimacy 1977; Local politics and development in the 
Middle East, Louis J. Cantori and Iliya Harik (eds), 1684; Islam and politics in the modern Middle 
East Metin Heber and Raphael Israeli (eds), 1984; Contemporary Arab political thought Anouar Abdel- 
Malek (ed. ), 1983; I. William Zartman, Government and Politics in North Africa, 1963; Charles F. 
Gallagher The United States and North Africa, 1963; Government and politics of the contemporary Middle 
East, Tareq Y. Ismael (ed), 1970; Peter Mansfield, The Middle East and North Africa :a political and 
economic survey, 1973; 
12. Studies of the Arab world often display the assumptions of western and eastern ideological 
eerspectives. For example, Sa. ir Amin The Arab nation : nationalism and class struggle, 1978; Rachid 
Tlemcani, State and revolution in Algeria, 1986. 
13. For example, L. Adeybite 'Human rights in Islamic law" Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law, 1977 7 ppl-12; Magbul Ilahi Malik The concept of human rights in Islamic jurisprudence' Human Rights 
Quarterly 3.3 Summer 1981 pp56-67; Abdul Aziz Said "Precept and practice of human rights in Islam' 
Universal Human Rights, 1,1979, p. 63f; Zafrulla Khan Islas and human rights, 1967; Abul A'la Mawdudi 
Human rights in Islam, 2nd ed., 1980; David Hollenbach "Human rights and religious faith in the Middle East : reflections of a Christian theologian" Human Rights Quarterly 4.3 1982 pp94-109; Edward 
Mortimer "Islas and human rights" Index on Censorship 5 1983 p5f Adda B. Bozeman The Future of Law in 
a multicultural world, 1971; James Dudley 'Human rights practices in the Arab states ; the modern 
impact of Shari'a values, Georgia Journal of international and comparative law 1982,12, pp. 55-93; 
14. U. Al-Salih ('Human rights and guarantees :a comparative study of the Gulf states Constitutions, 
the Universal Declarations and origins of these rights in Islam"A 
(Arabic) Journal of Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies 5, no. 18,1979, pp. 37-81; A. Shaban, f'Civil rights in Arab Constitutions, part l'A (Arabic) Shu'un Arabiyyýh 49,1917, pp. 211-29; M. Lassaker E"Les garanties des droits des individus 
dans la legislation ... 'A 
(ArabicRevue Algerienne des sciences juridiques, econoniques et politiques 
1982 19 pp. 528-562. 
15. E. Al-Deen ["The law and treaties on human rights'A 
(Arabic) Revue egyptienne de droit 
international 39,1983, pp. 65-310; I. B. A1-Sheikh ("Egyptian view on the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights'A (Arabic) Revue egyptienne de droit international 39,1983, pp. 311-28 & 
E"The implementation by Egypt of the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discri. ination'A (Arabic) Revue egyptienne de droit international 38,1982, pp. 103-118. 
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Previous approaches, by individual and organization alike, have tended to 
focus on individual countries or specific issues. Notable exceptions include 
the Arab Lawyers Union who have called on many occasions for the rule of 
law to be upheld throughout the Arab legal order. le Individual contributors 
include Jamil Husayn, whose approach, in calling for the establishment of an 
Arab Court of Human Rights, l' also encompasses the legal order as a whole, 
as does the approach of Muhammad Usfur, who has written on the need for 
an Arab Bill of Human Rights. i" By contrast, Omar Bendourou's article on 
political rights in Morocco demonstrates the more common tendency of 
focusing on a single country. '° The contributions of non-governmental 
organizations also focus on particular issues. 2° 
One of the assumptions of this thesis is that the Arab legal order can be 
examined as a whole, in respect of the limitations imposed on free political 
life-. In all Arab countries, whether radical or conservative, the common 
theme of restriction in political life may be observed. While accepting the 
description of contemporary Arab legal systems as "nation-bound", this 
thesis assumes that Arab countries share common characteristics and 
deficiencies in respect of legal support for free political life. Thus the 
subject under examination is "the contemporary Aral) legal order". An 
important approach throughout the study will be the attempt to identify 
common phenomena and draw broad conclusions about the ability of the 
emerging legal order, in conservative or radical state alike, to provide a 
secure framework, upheld by the rule of law, in which political freedoms 
may be enjoyed. 
16. See, for exam le, A. `fnussoufi 'Hinan rights in Arab countries", the text of an intervention made by the 
organization at the 39th Session of the UN Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities in 1 87. Reproduced in Review of the International Commission of Jurists, 39,1987. 17. Jawil Husayn 
[Human 
rights in the Arab homeland . obstacles and applications'] (Arabic) al-Mustagbal 
al-Arab' 984 6 62; Jasil Husayn ['In favour of he establishment of an Arab-Court for Arab Hunan Rights'! (Arabic) al-Mustagbal al-Arabi April 1983; [Democracy and Arab human rights'] (Arabic) al- Mustagbal al-Arabi January 1983. 18. Muhammad Usfur 
I'An 
Arab bill of human rights :a fateful national necessity'] (Arabic) al-MustagbaI al- Arabi, September 1983. 
19. Omar eendourou 'The exercise of political freedoms in Morocco" Review of the International Commission of Jurists, 40,1988. 
20. For example, studies prepared by Al, Article 19, MPG ICJ. Studies prepared by the Minority Rights Group 
incl de reports on The Kurds (1985)- The Palestinians 
(198? ); Lebanon :a conflict of minorities (Rev ed. 1986); Migrant workers in the Gulf (1985). Amnesty studies include " Violations of human rights in the 
ibYa Arab Jawahirira (1984); Egypt . violations of human rights (1983) and Egypt : update to 1983 report 1984); Political killings by governments (1983); Report and recommendations of an Al Mission to the 
N overneent of the Republic of Iraq (1983); Report from Al to the Government of the Syria Ara Republic 
1983); Report of an AT Mission to the Kingdom of Morocco (1981); Torture in the eighties (1984); Syria : torture by the security forces (1987). In addition, the yearbooks and newsletters contain information on North African and Middle Eastern countries. Article 19 has prepared studies on freedom of information and 
expression in Iraq (198? ) and Tunisia (1987). Its yearbook, "Information, freedom and censorshi ' also 
contains material Prow Arab countries. Material on freedom of information in the region way also be 
found 
in 
Index on Censorship. The International Commission of Jurists has prepared for example, States of Emergency their impact on human rights :A study prepared by the International 
towwission 
of Jurists, 1983, p287; Raja Shehada, The West Bank and the rule of law :a study, [Geneva], 1980. 
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International legal standards, drawn from human rights instruments, 
the case law of international organs and special studies carried out 
under the direction of the UN, 21 will be heavily used throughout the 
study. These standards will serve as tools in identifying and clarifying 
issues in political life from a legal perspective. It must be said that the 
broader question of the validity and efficacy of international human 
rights law is beyond the scope of the present study. For this reason 
too, the examination of political human rights in international law is far 
from exhaustive, since the intention is to use 
international human rights 
standards simply as the criteria by which to measure and evaluate the 
scope of political freedoms within the contemporary Arab legal order. 
That the standards upheld by international texts are acceptable to Arab 
Governments as a measure of human rights 
is assumed in the light of 
the participation by the majority of Arab countries 
in international 
human rights instruments. ZZ 
The subject under examination must be restricted on grounds of time 
and place. In terms of time, the focus will 
be on the contemporary legal 
order, though the thesis also examines historical elements which 
have 
shaped the emerging legal order. 
In terms of place, the study will exclude states passing through 
extreme political change and armed conflict, such as 
Sudan, Mauretania, 
North Yemen, West Sahara and the Occupied Territories, Unfortunately, 
Lebanon too is beyond the scope of the present study, due to the 
continuing civil war. Although the crisis of 
Lebanon could illustrate 
important aspects of the Arab legal order, the complexity and rapidly 
changing nature of the political situation make a 
detailed study of the 
contemporary legal order impossible. The states chosen 
illustrate a 
sufficiently wide range of political and legal structures to enable certain 
conclusions to be drawn about the Arab 
legal order in general. Clearly, 
this study represents no more than preliminary work 
in a field which 
requires much further research. 
21. For example : Question of the human rights of persons subjected to any form of detention or 
imprisonment : Report of the working group on enforced or involuntary disappearances (1981); Question 
of the realisation in all countries of the economic, social and cultural rights contained in the UDHR 
and the Economic and Social Covenant, and Study of special problems which the developing countries 
face in their efforts to achieve these human rights, including : Popular participation in its various 
forms as an important factor in development and in the full realisation of human rights (1975); 
Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the world with 
particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories : Summary or arbitrary 
executions : report by Special Rapporteur (1984); Study of the implications for human rights of recent 
developments concerning situations known as states of siege or emergency (1982); Study on the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors and the independence of lawyers, 
(1981); The individual's duties to the community and the limitations on human rights and freedoms 
under article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights :a contribution to the freedom of the 
individual under law. Study prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the Subcommission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (1980). 
22. See page 176. 
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The aim of the first chapter is to establish the definitions and 
principles which will make possible an analysis of political life in the 
Arab countries, from the perspective of positive international legal 
standards. Therefore, its starting point is the instruments which set out 
the minimum standards recognised by the international community, 
examining the texts in the Universal Declaration, the International 
Covenants, and in the case of association, International Labour 
Organization Conventions. The next stage draws on interpretation of the 
instruments, apparent in the interpretative work of the Human Rights 
Committee and the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association. Since each 
organ also carries out a quasi-judicial role, their findings and case law 
are utilised. International case law is supplemented by the findings of 
regional organs. Regional instruments are also the subject of a 
comparative review, aiming to identify similarities and differences in 
approach, both with respect to the global standard, and in order to 
highlight the regional perspective. 23 
Since the guarantees of political rights are subject to derogation in 
time of crisis, it is of vital importance to examine the issue of state of 
emergency in international law, again through international legal 
provisions, supplemented by the case law of international bodies, and 
special studies. While some aspects of the adoption and use of temporary 
emergency provisions are common to both international and national 
legislation, they differ in important respects, and therefore are the 
subject of separate examination in this study. The present section 
concentrates on the international provisions which define and regulate 
the adoption and use of emergency measures, in this case, of derogation 
from certain obligations assumed under international law. The aim in this 
section, as in the Chapter as a whole, is to establish a clear picture of 
the international legal standards, with a view to using some of the 
principles thereby distinguished in Chapter Four. 
The second chapter, a brief survey of the emerging legal order in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, highlights the main issues and 
common factors significant for understanding the effect of the past on 
the contemporary Arab legal order, though it does not contain a detailed 
examination of the history of every country. The chapter focuses firstly 
on the legacies of the Ottoman and colonial periods and their effect on 
Arab political development, and secondly, on the emergence of Arab 
nationalism and its impact on the contemporary legal order. 
23. Making use of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the Arab Covenant on Human Rights. 
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The first part surveys the implications of Ottoman rule insofar as it 
shaped administrative and political organization, in order to provide the 
background for an examination of European colonialism in the region, 
identifying elements which led to European colonial expansion, and 
highlighting the different underlying philosophies and aims of the three 
colonial Powers who shared in the colonization of North Africa and the 
Arab Middle East. The different approach of each Power and the policies 
it adopted are examined with a view to drawing some conclusions about 
the impact of colonial rule, focusing on its effect on political life, the 
creation of the political order, and the impact on constitutional life 
which laid the ground for the growth radical of nationalist movements. 
The second section focuses on the implications of the growth of 
nationalism which is inextricably linked to the emergence of the 
contemporary Arab order. Nationalism in the Arab context, as we will 
see, has a particular character, since it may be defined in religious 
terms, or in terms of the secular ideologies of socialism and pan- 
Arabism. This section examines both tendencies in their historical 
context, and how they interact. Since nationalism and identification with 
nationalist aspirations remain vital legitimising factors for political forces 
in and out of power, the next section illustrates the legitimising role of 
nationalism in a number of contemporary radical regimes. This section is 
followed by an examination of the role of the military in relation to 
radical nationalist movements, which enables us to draw some conclusions 
about the role of the military in the wider context of the contemporary 
political and legal order, 
One of the principal concerns of the third chapter is to examine the 
emerging constitutional order and the impact of the transitional 
character of the contemporary Arab political order on the legal order, 
reflected, for example, in the constitutional framework. It is essential, as 
a background to assessing the efficacy of the Arab legal order in 
protecting political human rights to examine how the legislator tried to 
achieve the twin goals of reform and legality. 
The first section focuses on the impact of the ideologies which shape 
the legal order. In this section, the concern is to examine the degree of 
effect of the ideological framework on the supreme legal text of each 
state. The second section reviews the constitutional path to 
independence in North Africa, highlighting the recognition of the new 
constitutional order of principles of the rule of law. Continuing political 
change has naturally affected legal systems in the region, and this 
section also examines the revolutionary legislators' approach to the 
principle of legality. The focus moves next to the role of minorities in 
the contemporary legal order, briefly reviewing the position of some 
minorities in the region, and the response of the contemporary legal 
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order to the minority question, with special attention to a legislative 
approach to a minority seeking autonomy. Finally, this section reviews 
the recognition within the emerging constitutional order of principles of 
the rule of law, including a review of the relationship between domestic 
and international law. 
Since a vital factor in the efficacy of the legal order in upholding 
constitutional provisions is the extent and nature of constitutional 
review, the third section examines the range of approaches to control of 
constitutionality within the contemporary order, focusing on the 
Egyptian experience of developing judicial control. 
The final section examines the Arab legislative response to state of 
emergency, reviewing the legislation which regulates the imposition and 
conduct of a state of public emergency. With state of emergency in force 
in a number of countries for a long period, its impact on the legal 
order's ability to uphold aspects of the rule of law and political life is 
evaluated, with reference to discussions between certain governments 
and the Human Rights Committee, in the light of the principles 
established in Chapter One. 
Chapter four examines the degree of recognition of political rights 
within Arab legislation, at the constitutional level, in legislation which 
regulates the scope of their exercise, and finally in light of the 
restrictions which may be imposed on them. These are evaluated in the 
light of the criteria identified in the first chapter. 
In the first section, the focus is on freedom of opinion, expression and 
information, and the second examines the position of the right to 
assembly and association, including the right to form and join trade 
unions. Finally, the third section focusses on the right to political 
participation, reviewing the mechanism of participation in a number of 
countries, as well as electoral law and provisions which regulate public 
service. 
Chapter five briefly summarises and concludes the thesis before going 
on to make recommendations for legal reform at a number of levels. The 
recommendations include suggested amendment of constitutions and other 
legislation, focusing on the principles of legality in general and the 
protection of political rights in particular. The Chapter ends with 
recommendations in respect of Arab governments' activities with regard 
to international and regional human rights instruments. 
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There is a deep and fundamental link between the right of freedom of 
opinion and expression, described by the UN General Assembly as "the 
touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is 
concerned ", 1 and the political life of the nation. Since, in many 
countries, power is exercised in the name of the people and the words 
of the Universal Declaration, "the will of the people XisA the basis of 
authority of government", it is essential that this will finds free 
expression through the mechanism of ongoing participation in the 
political process. In this respect, freedom of opinion and expression 
must be extended to cover freedom of information, which is the 
foundation of any degree of true participation in political life by the 
population, and the cornerstone of democracy. 
The right to freedom of assembly is one of the manifestations of the 
right of freedom of expression in today's world. Organised 
demonstrations are used as a means of expression, of gathering support 
for various causes and increasingly making public feelings known. 
Several instruments and resolutions confirm the importance of the inter- 
relation between these rights, nationally2 as well as internationally. For 
example, the International Labour Conference has pointed out that the 
essential role played by employers' and workers' organizations in 
promoting human rights in the field of employment and labour could not 
have been achieved without the right of assembly and the freedom of 
opinion and expression, emphasising that these "... constitute civil 
liberties which are essential for the normal exercise of trade union 
rights... 11.3 
While the right of the individual to freedom of opinion and expression 
can manifest itself in political participation on an individual basis, there 
is no doubt that political parties and other groups have the major and 
effective role to play in organised political life. Whether in or out of 
power, political parties are in a unique position to convert hopes into 
concrete proposals in accordance with the people's aspirations. 
The world today is characterised by the existence of different socio- 
economic and political systems, ' in which trade unions play differing 
roles according to the different systems in which they operate, where 
they may play an important role in labour relations, ensuring respect 
for the rights of workers, playing their part in labour agreements and 
in conciliation in disputes. They serve also as channels of expression 
and organs of mediation between public authorities and citizens. 
1. G. A. Res. 59, A/64/Add. 1 (1946) p. 95. 2. The new Netherlands Constitution of 1983 recognises explicitly the value of organised demonstrations, describing the right of demonstration as a fundamental right alongside freedom of 
assembly and association. 
E/CN. 4/1984/12 Annex, para. 21 
3. International Labour Conference, Resolution concerning trade union rights and their relation to 
civil liberties, adopted at the 54th Session, 1970 
4. A Study by UNRISD has highlighted the importance of such factors as rural or ethnic origin, socio- 
economic class and religious affiliation, among others, in restricting the level of political 
participation in several parts of the world. 
UNRISD/79/C. 14 
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Finally, they may play an important role in the framing of development 
policies. 5 
Stable political life is reflected in a process of review and confirmation 
through the mechanism of periodic elections to the organs of 
government. No other process gives true expression to the will of the 
nation, which is the normal basis of legitimate government, or provides a 
mechanism of accountability of government to people. 
All these rights underlie the democratic process as they permit and 
encourage supervision of governments, and their protection has been 
seen as the criteria by which we judge whether a government is 
democratic, since "they can be recognised and enjoyed only in 
democracies and there can be no democracy in any real sense without 
them. Their recognition and enjoyment is therefore a test of whether the 
government of a country is democratic. "e The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights itself takes democracy as a vital factor in safeguarding 
the rights of individuals, in article 29, where restrictions on individuals' 
rights are prescribed "in the exercise of his rights and freedoms ... and 
the general welfare in a democratic society. " 
The methodology in this Chapter is examining separately, but adopting 
the same approach, legal texts, the supervision of associated organs and 
case law associated with the three rights, internationally and regionally. 
Each part begins with a detailed examination of the legal provisions 
contained in the instruments: at the international level., using the 
travaux preparetoires of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and at the regional level, making a comparative study of the 
provisions of the European, American and African instruments, and 
taking account of the proposed Arab Covenant. At each level, case law is 
examined to clarify the international legal understanding of the issues 
involved, before passing to the work of the supervisory bodies. At the 
international level, the focus is on the work of the Human Rights 
Committee, and to a lesser extent, the ILO bodies, the Committee on 
Freedom of Association, the Commission of Conciliation and Fact--Finding 
and the Committee of Experts, while at the regional level, the main focus 
will be on the findings of the European Commission and Court. 
For each right, the corresponding article in the Covenant (and in the 
case of trade union rights, ILO Conventions 87 and 98) is examined in 
detail, identifying the separate elements of the freedoms protected, and 
examining the scope and extent of possible restrictions separately. The 
main examination of restrictions for the sake of public order, national 
security, public interest and so on occurs within the examination of 
article 19 of the Covenant and is not repeated for articles 21 and 22, 
since these articles share identical or similar wording. 
5. For example, the preamble of the Constitution of the ILO declares 'recognition of the principle of freedom of association' to be a means of improving conditions of labour and of establishing peace. 6. John P. Huaphry 'Political and related rights" in Theodor Meron (ed. ) Human rights in international law : legal and policy issues Vol. 1 1984, p. 172. 
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While some aspects of the adoption and use of temporary emergency 
provisions are common to both international and national legislation, they 
differ in important respects, and therefore are the subject of separate 
examination in this study. The present section concentrates on the 
international provisions which define and regulate the adoption and use 
of emergency measures, in this case, of derogation from obligations 
assumed under international law. The aim is to establish a clear picture 
of the international legal understanding of aspects of the concept of 
state of emergency, with a view to using some of the principles thereby 
distinguished in a later section. The starting point at this stage is the 
Political Covenant as the instrument which allows and regulates these 
situations. As before, the methodology is to examine separately, but 
adopting the same approach, legislation and supervision associated with 
the state of emergency internationally and regionally. Each part begins 
with a detailed examination of the instruments, at both levels, examining 
case law to clarify the international legal understanding, including the 
work of the supervisory bodies. In the analysis of this issue, the 
approach adopted is that of the Special Rapporteur who prepared the 
Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments 
Concerning Situations known as States of Siege or Emergency, ' who 
identified in the international understanding procedural and substantive 
guarantees, as well as the implementation of surveillance. 
7. Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situations known as States of Siege or Emergency E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1982/15 of 27th July 1982. 
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The freedoms of opinion and of expression are among the rights 
safeguarded in the international and regional' instruments for their 
importance and fundamental value, acknowledged by all legal cultures. ' 
Another instrument, the Constitution of UNESCO, confirms the belief of 
States Parties "in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in 
the free exchange of ideas and knowledge". 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration, and of the Political Covenant 
both recognise the right to hold opinions without interference, as well 
as the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers. The structure of article 19 in both the 
Declaration and the Covenant follows a similar pattern : it begins with 
an explicit statement of the right and then goes on to elaborate some of 
the elements of the right. The Covenant goes on to set the acceptable 
restriction on its practice, while the Universal Declaration contains no 
restriction within the article, but only the general restriction of article 
29 which applies throughout the Declaration. 
Thus the articles begin by stating the right of freedom of opinion, io 
then go on to specify freedom of expression and the accompanying 
8. At the regional level protection of these rights found its place in the American Declaration and 
Convention, the African Charter and the European Convention, and the draft Arab Human Rights Covenant. 
9. This freedom has long been recognised in several legal traditions and retains its position today. 
As early as 1688, the English Bill of Rights proclaimed : 'that the freedom of speech and debate or 
proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament. ' The right of the ordinary citizen was first provided in 1799, when the French Declaration 
des droits de 1'houe et du citoyen proclaimed both the right and the responsibility which 
accompanies its exercise : "The unrestrained communication of thoughts or opinions being one of the 
most precious rights of ran, every citizen may speak, write and publish freely, provided he be 
responsible for the abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by law. ". In 1791, the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution echoed the French Declaration : "Congress shall take no law 
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the Press .... 
'. 
Soviet theorists consider freedom of speech and of the Press to be "among the most important 
political freedoms. ' For example, the Soviet Constitution of 1936, in article 125, provides : 'In 
conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the U. S. S. R. are guaranteed by law : {a) freedom of speech; 
(b) freedom of the Press; 
These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their 
organisation printing presses, stocks of paper, ... communications 
facilities, and other materials 
requisite for the exercise of these rights', and these freedoms have been upheld by later Constitutions. 
Freedom of opinion and expression is among the rights underlying Islamic law, and the principles are 
confirmed by the Shari'ah translated in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, in article 
xii. Various constitutional and legal systems translate Islamic doctrines in different ways, for 
example, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is one of the most recent Constitutions to draw heavily on Islamic jurisprudence in formulating positive law. The Constitution 
provides for freedom of opinion in article 23, which provides that the control of opinions shall be 
prohibited and no one may be ... censured 
for his opinions', and for freedom of expression in article 
24, which states : 'The Press and publications shall be free to write what they will unless the matter is detrimental to the principles of Islas or the rights of the people. The courts shall decide on the 
application of this article. 
10. Protection of freedom of opinion is provided for explicitly in the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, the draft of the Arab Human Rights Covenant and the European Convention, 
where it is described as a component of freedom of expression. In the American Convention on Human 
Rights, it is implicitly protected by article 12 which protects freedom of thought. The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights does not explicitly protect the right of freedom of opinion, 
though it could be argued that this may be implicit in its protection of the right of every individual 
to express and disseminate his opinions. 
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right of freedom of information. " In the Political Covenant, the 
limitation is described in terms of the "special duties and 
responsibilities" carried in the exercise of the right, and the 
restrictions on its practice are stated in general terms. 12 
In the travaux preparatoires of the Political Covenant, it was noted 
that these two rights differ in character: the first is "a private matter 
of the mind", whereas the second is a public matter "which should be 
subject to legal as well as moral constraint". For this reason, the 
Committee decided to treat the rights separately. " 
Originally, the paragraph dealing with freedom of opinion had contained 
the phrase "without interference by governmental action ". 1 ° Although it 
was argued both that the article should seek to protect the individual 
only from governmental restriction on the right, and that the individual 
should be free from all forms of interference, in the event, the phrase 
with wider meaning was adopted. " 6 
During discussion, the content of freedom of expression was found to 
include both. the right to express and to receive ideas and information. 
Though the latter might not immediately appear to be part of the right 
to freedom of expression, nevertheless, the value of that right is 
meaningless without the corresponding right to receive information. "' 
11. The American Declaration provides for the right to freedom of expression and dissemination of ideas, and the American Convention similarly protects freedom of expression and freedom to impart 
information and ideas of all kinds. The two American instruments, unlike the others, provide 
explicitly that freedom of expression may be enjoyed through any media, with the Convention specifying 
'orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any medium of one's choice". The African Charter provides for the right to express and disseminate opinions, while the draft Arab Covenant 
safeguards the right to express ideas orally. The European Convention provides for the right of freedom of expression, and freedom to impart information and ideas. The European Convention, like the American Convention states that the right may be exercised 'regardless of frontiers", while the other instruments contain no such provision. The European Convention alone specifies within the basic statement of the right of expression that it 
shall be free from 'interference by public authority'. The African Charter provides only that every individual has the right to receive information, while 
the right is not included in the draft Arab Human Rights Covenant. Like the American Convention, the 
European Convention provides that the right of freedom of expression includes freedom to receive and impart information and ideas. 
12. Cf., article 10/1 of the European Convention which, though it guarantees the right of individuals 
and sets forth the freedoms included in this right, nevertheless sets out extensive grounds on which interference with these rights is permitted, while paragragh 10/2, sets further conditions, that they 
oust be "prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society ... " 13. United Nations Official Records of the General Assembly, 10th session, Annexes 20th September - 20th December 1955 Agenda item 28 (part 2) p. 51 para. 120. 14. cf., EHR article 10 (1) which states 'without interference by public authority' 15. United Nations Official Records of the General Assembly, 10th session, Annexes 20th September - 20th December 1955 Agenda item 28 (part 2) p. 51 para. 125- 16. Although the principle of freedom of information is reflected in regional and global human rights 
treaties, efforts to sponsor a treaty on freedom of information failed in the 1950s. More recent 
efforts include UNESCO's conference in 1980 on the MacBride Commission Report "Many Voices, One 
Norld', aiming to promote 'a new world information and communication order", based on such principles 
as removal of internal and external obstacles to a free flow and wider and better balanced 
dissemination of information and ideas, freedom of the Press and information, freedom of journalists 
and all professionals in the communications media, respect for the right of all peoples to participate 
in international exchanges of information on the basis of equality, justice and mutual benefit and 
respect for the right of the public and of individuals to have access to information sources and to 
participate actively in the communications process. Information, freedom and censorship Article 19 world report, 1988, pp. 321-2. 
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In both the Universal Declaration and Political Covenant, there is 
consent to the practice of this right "regardless of frontiers". 17 With 
regard to what one should be able "to seek, impart and receive", a wide 
formulation of "information and ideas of all kinds" was adopted. 
As to the media of the expression, ' 8 original forms of the draft had 
included the phrases "legally- operated visual and auditory devices" and 
"duly licensed visual or auditory devices". 19 These phrases were 
objected to on the grounds that they "were susceptible of arbitrary2° 
interpretation and application which might. throttle channels of 
communication. " Again, a wide formulation was adopted. 21 
As for the interpretation of article 19 of the Political Covenant, the 
Human Rights Committee has pointed out that the right contained in 
paragraph 1, to "hold opinions without interference" is an absolute and 
"unqualified right" which may not be restricted - under any 
circumstances except within the terms of article 4 of the Political 
Covenant, and that paragraph 2 includes the right not only to "impart 
information and ideas of all kinds", but also freedom to "seek" and 
"receive" them "regardless of frontiers" and in whatever medium, 
"either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice -1.22 
17. Again, the European Convention, like the American, states that the right may be exercised 
'regardless of frontiers', while other regional instruments contain no such provision. It also 
specifies within the basic statement of the right to receive information and ideas that it shall be free from 'interference by public authority', however it goes on to provide that the state may require 
the regulatory licensing of broadcasting enterprises. 18. Once again, the two American instruments, unlike the others, provide explicitly that freedom of information  ay be enjoyed through any media. Though the European Convention, article 10, does not 
contain a phrase specifying the permissible media of expression as in the Covenant, nevertheless case law from several courts on this point indicates that freedom to circulate ideas in paper-back books, leaflets and circulars has been upheld as freedom of expression. 
19. This seems to have been drawn from the European Convention on Human Rights, article 10, which 
contains the sentence 'This article shall not prevent States fro, requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. ' 20. The meaning of the term 'arbitrary' will be discussed in detail in the next section within the 
general restriction on political rights. 
21. United Nations Official Records of the General Assembly, 10th session, Annexes 20th September - 20th December 1955 Agenda item 28 (part 2) p. 51, para. 126. 22. Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, Official Records: Thirty-Fifth Session, 
Supplement No. 40 (4/35/40). p. 29. 
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Since political rights - as any other - carry with them responsibilities 
and obligations, they are subject to limitation and restriction, with the 
aim of striking the balance between the individual's right and the rights 
of the community as a whole. 23 The restrictions which the international 
provisions contain fall into three categories, directly or indirectly 
imposing limitations or restrictions on rights. These are : provisions of a 
general character authorising limitations or restrictions on the rights 
for general reasons; provisions recognising a particular right or 
freedom, expressly stipulating the limitation or restriction to be imposed 
therein in certain circumstances; other provisions of a general nature 
limiting the application of restrictions authorised under the provisions 
of other articles. For example, article 5 of the Political Covenant, like 
article 30 of the Universal Declaration, sets an explicit and binding 
interpretative rule in the sense of an absolute guarantee of the 
substance of human rights, since it prohibits any unreasonable 
limitation, restriction or even interpretation of these rights. 
Since human rights taken together constitute an objective scale of 
values, any acts directed against this scale of values do not deserve the 
protection afforded by national, regional or international instruments. 
At the regional level, article 17 of the European Convention provides an 
example by denying : "... for any State, group or person any right to 
engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of 
any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein". The article goes on to 
set the scope of their limitations "... to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the Convention". It is important to recall the views 
expressed by the Commission in the Lawless Case24 highlighting the 
purpose for which rights are exercised, when it quoted the travaux 
preparatoires of article 17 declaring that the general purpose of the 
article is "to prevent totalitarian regimes from exploiting in their own 
interest the principles enunciated by the Convention. It does not seem 
to us to follow, that in order to achieve that purpose, it is really 
necessary to take away every one of the rights and freedoms contained 
in the Convention ... ". Thus, the principle 
is that no one should be 
able to invoke the provisions of the Convention "to engage in acts aimed 
at the destruction of rights and freedoms. "2 & The purpose of such a 
provision is to safeguard these rights, by and through the protection of 
the free functioning of democratic institutions. 
23. The Universal Declaration contains no limitation on the practice of these rights, other than the 
general restriction in article 29. However, as the article l of the Political Covenant states, the 
exercise of the rights fof freedom of opinion and expression ... carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions ... 
". 
United Nations Official Records of the 
subject 
Assembly, 10th session, Annexes 20th September - 20th 
December 1955 Agenda item 28 (part 2) p. 51 para. 127. 
24. 'Lawless Case" Publications of the European Court of Human Rights Series B: Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments and Documents, Strasbourg, 1960-61, pp-400,402. 
25. The Court upheld that the same article 'cannot be used to deprive an individual of his rights and 
freedoms permanently merely because at some given moment he displayed totalitarian convictions and 
acted consequently". 
"Be DBecker" Case Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series B: Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments and Documents, Strasbourg, 1962, pp. 137-138. 
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A study on the Limitations on Human Rights according to international 
provisions has emphasised that in general, restrictions or limitations 
must be legal, in accordance with the law, and "necessary in a 
democratic society ". 26 They should be justified by specific reasons, 
including recognition and respect for the rights of others, public order, 
public security, national security, public health or safety. 2' 
Though states may impose restriction, they are not obliged to do so, 
and any legislative limitation of human rights requires constitutional 
authorisation. Regional interpretation confirms that protection of freedom 
is the general rule, while its restriction is an exception. Limitations 
should not be resorted to except for the purposes for which they are 
prescribed and should not remain in force longer than the minimum 
period for which they are required. 
Thus, the starting point in examining the scope of these freedoms is 
the norms which impose limitations on them or any other conditions 
which in practice might affect the exercise of rights. These rules and 
norms should be "determined by law", "prescribed by law", 28 
"established by law", "in accordance with the law"29 or "provided by 
law". 
In this connection, it is important that the principle of publication be 
fully observed by states. By extension, any law which limits or restricts 
this principle is considered not only to undermine principles of legality, 
but to be an unjust law, whose maintenance is an abuse of power. 
Similarly, at the regional and national level, the European legislator 
stressed the importance of legality of legislation, both in form and in 
substance, in the Convention and its first and fourth Protocols. * 
26. Final Report on the Study of the Individual's Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human 
Rights and Freedoms under article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Agenda item 8 EICN. 4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 1 and Add. 1-7. 27. For example, though the African Charter specifies that the exercise of the right of freedom of 
expression must be according to law, and the American and European Conventions along with the draft 
Arab Human Rights Covenant specify that restriction of the exercise of the right must be according to law, the European Convention alone provides that restrictions should also be "necessary in a 
democratic society". 
28. 'Prescribed by law" implies that legislation should be accessible to the citizen, (for example, Silver v. United Kingdom), and that it should be clear enough to enable the citizen to regulate his behaviour accordingly, (for example, Sunday Times Y. United Kingdom). 
29. The Human Rights Committee considered that the phrase 'in accordance with the law" in article 13 
of the Covenant refers to provisions of domestic law, which maust in themselves be compatible with the 
provisions of the Covenant". The Committee considers that interpretation of domestic law is 
essentially a ratter for the courts and authorities of the State party concerned. It is not within 
the powers or functions of the Committee to evaluate whether the competent authorities of the State 
party in question have interpreted and applied the domestic law correctly ... unless it is established that they have not interpreted it and applied it in good faith or that it is evident that there has been an abuse of power". 
Communication no. 58/1979,9th April 1981 (twelfth session) 
Human Rights Committee, Selected Decisions Under The Optional Protocol, 1985 pp. 82-3. 
30. According to the European instruments, if the following conditions are met, limitations or 
restrictions are permitted : the first condition is that the limitations or restrictions must be 
legal; they must be in accordance with the law" [article 8/2 of the Convention and article 2 para. 3, 4 of Protocol No. 4A, 'prescribed by law' [articles 9/2,10/2 and 11/2 of the ConventionA, or 'subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law" [article 1 
of the first Protocol to the ConventionA. 
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An indication of the extent of this legality is found in the Commission's 
view that "in accordance with the law", in the Convention, refers to the 
"Rule of Law"31 or principle of legality in addition to domestic law. 3z 
A clear statement of the Court's view of "law" is found in the "Malone 
Case", where it stated that though referring primarily to domestic law, 
it also includes other requirments relating to the quality of the law, 
requiring compatibility with the rule of law. The requirements are 
"accessibility" and "foreseeability" . 
the citizen must have adequate 
indication as to the legal rules applicable in a particular case, and he 
must be able, if necessary, with legal advice, to foresee, to a degree 
reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences of a given action. The 
Court went on to state that "there must be a measure of legal protection 
in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities ... 
especially where a power of the Executive is exercised in secret, the 
risks of arbitrariness are evident". 33 
The questions which arise from the requirement of legality revolve 
around the nature of the legislation itself, the organs available, and 
what is the concrete interpretation of a law which imposes restrictions 
or limitations which could be described as "arbitrary", "unlawful" or 
even "unjust". In this connection, it must be said that the assessment 
31. The Israeli Supreme Court considered that refusing the petition against the administrative action 
of the minister would constitute reduction of 'the principle of the rule of last in this country to a 
mere platitude. The fundamental meaning of this principle is that limitations ... may 
be imposed by 
law, ie., by the opinion of society as reflected in the laws enacted by its representative 
legislature, and not by the executive authority whose duty is merely to enforce the imposition of these limitations according to such laws. The rule embodied in the principle considers that the liberties of the individual cannot be limited or denied by an official or minister just because he thinks - perhaps justly - that such a course is for the benefit of the state. It is his duty to 
convince the legislature that such limitations are necessary, and only after having obtained its 
consent say he proceed to put the limitations into effect". 
Sheib Y. Minister of Defence (1951), Selected ud9ements of the Supreme Court of Israel Final Report on the Study of the Individual's 
Duties 
to the Community ... E/ CN. 4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 2 p. 84. 32. Silver et al v. United Kingdom Application no. 5947/72 Report of the Commission, 11th October 1980. 
In this case, the Court, considering that Prison Rules relating tp prisoners' correspondence cannot be regarded as law, found that a breach of articles 8 and 13 had occurred. European Court of Human Rights Series A, Judgement of March 25th 1983. 33. Paragraph 68 of the Court's judgement goes on to state that legislation conferring discretion must indicate its scope and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, to give the individual 
adequate protection against arbitrary interference. 
"Malone Case" European Court of Human Rights, Judgement 2nd August 1984, paras. 66-68 In 1963, the Human Rights Commission adopted some definitions for the purpose of the Study of the 
Right of Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile where the term "arbitrary" in 
this phrase means : (a) "on grounds or in accordance with procedures other than those established by law", or (b) "under the provisions of a law the basic purpose of which is incompatible with respect for the right to liberty and security of person". Two views of meaning of "arbitrary" emerged during the travaux preparatoires of article 9 of the UDHR 
one that 'arbitrary' should be replaced by "except in the cases and according to the procedure 
prescribed by prior legislation", while the other, more comprehensive and a better safeguard, pointed 
out that an arrest or detention might be perfectly legal but nevertheless arbitrary. 
Study of the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile, p. 6. 
During drafting of Article 9 of the Political Covenant, the views were expressed that "arbitrary" 
Leant "illeyal" or "unjust" or 'both illegal and unjust'. 
E/CN. 4/SR. 47, paragraph 43. 
When the Third Committee of the General Assembly discussed this paragraph the views were expressed 
that arbitrary arrest or detention was that which was carried out , without any legal grounds' or 
"contrary to lau' or according to a law which was in itself "unjust" or "incompatible with the dignity 
of the human person" or 'incompatible with the respect for the right to liberty and security / ... 
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of national authorities in fixing the limits which may be imposed on these 
rights cannot be ignored, since the Political Covenant and other instruments 
allow States a margin of appreciation, which in turn remains subject to 
review by the competent national authority and to surveillance and 
supervision at both the regional" and international levels. 
Some clarification of the further qualification included in article 29 of the 
Universal Declaration and articles 21 and 22 of the Political Covenant, that 
restrictions be "necessary in a democratic society" may be drawn from the 
findings of the European Commission in the Handy-side Case. Taking as its 
model of democratic society the member States Parties to the European 
Convention, the Commission considered that limitations on rights were 
required to support the needs or objectives of a democratic society. 35 The 
Court, " has found that although individual rights must occasionally be 
subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not mean simply that the 
views of a majority 
of person'. 
In the light of these varying definitions of the term arbitrary it is clear that the term is more 
comprehensive in scope as well as meaning than 'illegal'. While for example, an arrest which is illegal is 
arbitrary, it is not the case that an arbitrary arrest must be illegal. It  ay be perfectly legal but 
unjust, and therefore arbitrary. This was, substantially, the conclusion of the Committee in the Study on 
the Right of Everyone to Be free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile. The Committee also considered 
this definition corroborated by article 29, paragraph 2 of the UDHR. 
Study of the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile, 1964, p. 7. 
One can argue that, for example, the Uruguayan Institutional Act No. 4 of 1 September 1976, where 'The 
Executive Power, exercising the powers conferred on it by the institutionalization of the revolutionary 
process' has issued the following 'Decrees: Art. 1. The following shall be prohibited, for a term of fifteen 
years, from engaging in any of the activities of a political nature authorized by the Constitution of the Republic, including the vote .. 
' which is unjust and therefore arbitrary. Communications no. 28/1978 6 33/078. Human Rights Committee, Selected Decisions .. 
1985, pp. 57-8,63-5. 
In Iraq, Law no. 78 of 1977, by which 'the President of the Republic may decide on the publication of laws, 
resolutions, texts of treaties, agreements, instructions and special numbers of al-Nagai al-Iragiya (Official Gazette), if the supreme interests of the State require so ... the 
President of the Republic may 
decide on the non-publication of laws, resolutions and regulations which concern the security of the State 
or which have nothing of public interest in their provisions', must also be reagrded as susceptible to 
abuse, again illustrating the potential for arbitrary Executive acts. 
34. At the regional level the European Commission has frequently concluded that, in cases in which it is 
established that a public authority has interfered with the exercise of the rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the European Convention, it has not only the right but also the duty to examine the question whether such 
interference, be it legislative or otherwise, is consistent with the terms of the relevant provisions of the 
Convention. 
35. The Commission's findings focused on the right to freedom of expression, which, in a democratic society 
involves a balance between the wishes of the individual and the good of the  ajorrity. In the Commission's 
view, democratic societies approach the problem from the point of view of the individual's right and the 
undesirability of restricting this. Thus, democratic societies, including member states of the European 
Convention, restrict freedom of expression in respect of libellous, blasphemous, seditious or obscene 
publications. The fact that legal codes in . ember states restrict the freedom in respect of indecent or 
obscene publications is also regarded as an indication of the need for such restrictions in a democratic 
society. 
'Handyside Case' European Court of Human Rights Series B, vol. 22 1976 (Strasbourg, 1979), pp. 44-46 
In Be Becker v. Belqius, the European Commission expressed the opinion that paragraphs (ei, (f) and (9) of 
article 123 sexies of the Belgian Criminal Code were not fully justified in the light of the Convention, 
whether they were regarded as instituting criminal penalties or as preventive measures relating to public 
safety, since the deprivation of freedom of expression for which they provided in other than political 
matters was imposed rigidly and for life, without regard to the possibility of  itigatin that punishment 
if, in time, national moral and public order were restored and the maintenance in force of that particular 
disability ceased to be a measure 'necessary in a democratic society' within the meaning of the article. 'De Becker Case' European Court of Hunan Rights Series B. 1962, pp. 167f. See also, the Report of the 
Commission in Torsten Leander Y. Sweden (17th My 1985) Application no. 9248/81. 36. James, Young and Webster v. United Kingdom 
(7601/76; 
7806/7? 
) 
Judgement 13 August 1981. 
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB LEGAL ORDER Page 13 
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
must always prevail. The balance must be achieved which ensures the 
fair treatment of minorities and avoids abuse of a dominant position. 
The Court has also considered, in the "Handyside Case", that although 
the national authorities have the right to assess the necessity for 
interference, the "margin of appreciation", its decisions are subject to 
review. The scope of the "margin of appreciation" varies according to 
the nature of the aims being pursued in restricting an individual right. 
Further, a restriction on a right cannot be regarded as "necessary in a 
democratic society" if it is not proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued. 3' 
However, this requirement would remain meaningless if this prescription 
were not qualified in the text as well as in effect, as states could then 
avoid their national and international obligations 
by promulgating laws 
or otherwise limiting individual or the community rights, 
despite 
recognition in the supreme law. The International Labour Organization, 
in tackling this requirement of legality, specified more explicitly than 
other instruments the need for just and 
fair legislation and 
administrative policy, in Convention 87, "the 
law of the land shall not be 
such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to 
impair, the 
guarantees provided for in this Convention". 
Restrictions in respect of the rights and reputations of others are 
based on the principles that : firstly, the individual must 
be protected 
against the violation of his right by others, and secondly, 
that the 
individual should not undermine the rights of others, 
by abuse of his 
right. Restriction to protect the reputation of others clearly refers 
primarily, if not exclusively, to freedom of expression. For example, 
laws 
concerning defamation or incitement to racial 
hatred are clearly intended 
to strike the balance between the individual's right to 
freedom of 
expression and the rights of the community. The "Mephisto" case 
illustrates the interpretation of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
of restriction on the grounds of the reputation of others. 38 
It is notable that article 19, unlike the other articles in the Political 
Covenant, outlines not only the right it seeks to protect but also the 
duties which accompany its exercise. 80 During its drafting, there was 
37. For example, in 'G. v the Federal Republic of Germany', the Commission considered that "precisely 
because of the cardinal importance to be attached to the preservation of the rule of law and the 
democratic system, the Convention requires a clearly established need for any interference with the 
rights it guarantees" before it can be justified on that basis. 'This is especially true in the 
context of freedom of expression which is the cornerstone of the principles of democracy and human 
rights protected by the Convention'. 
Report of the European Commission of 11th May 1984, para. 110. 
38. The Court decision of 24th February 1971, on the question of whether distribution of Klaus Mann's 
'Mephisto, the novel of a career' constituted a serious encroachment on the private life of Gustav 
Grundgens and his adopted son, as protected by article 1, para. 1 of the Basic Law, so as to justify a 
court order prohibiting the reproduction, marketing and publication of the novel, irrespective of the 
freedom of artistic expression guaranteed under the Basic Law, was that 'a clash between the guarantee 
of artistic freedom - which in itself is free fro" any limitation and the constitutionally protected 
right to privacy should be resolved by reference to the scale of values contained in the Basic Law. " 
The Individual's Duties to the Community ... 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 2A, pp. 80-81 
39. Two views were expressed during drafting: one, that this article should not be an exception to the 
general principle that the Covenant sets forth rights to be guaranteed and protected, rather than 
laying duties on individuals; the other, that the right was 'a precious heritage as well / ... 
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some disagreement about how restrictions should be written into the 
article, as some believed that the limitation clause should be brief and 
of general nature, on the grounds that a list of specific restrictions 
would be better incorporated into a convention on freedom of 
information, since such a list would be too long for inclusion in the 
Political Covenant'40 
The draft adopted confirms that governments prefer instruments of a 
general nature, whose vagueness permits interpretation of these 
obligations in line with their ideological views °La feature which limits 
as a dangerous instrument', and that because of the influence of the modern media, its special 
nature should be emphasised. The latter view prevailed, and the phrase "special duties and 
responsibilities' was incorporated into the article. 
At the regional level, neither the American Declaration nor the African Charter specify any 
restriction on the exercise of these rights. The draft Arab Human Rights Covenant imposes restriction 
only on the grounds of protecting the rights of others. The American Convention however, while 
specifying that the exercise of the right shall be subject to no prior censorship (except for that 
expressly provided in article 13, para. 4), specifies the grounds on which subsequent liability May be imposed. The grounds include respect for the rights or reputations of others and the protection of 
national security, public order, or public health or morals. Article 13 goes on to specify, in para. 3, 
some means by which the exercise of the right may not be restricted. 
The European Convention stipulates that the exercise of these freedoms carries with it duties and 
responsibilities. It therefore specifies that it may be subject to 'formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties' on more extensive grounds than are specified in the American Convention. The additional grounds include the interests of territorial integrity, preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. In view of the provision mentioning the impartiality of the judiciary, in Sunday Times V. United 
Kingdom the Court affirmed both the freedom of the media to report matters of pybTic interest and-the 
r`19-hT of the public to receive such information. The Attorney General had sought and obtained an injunction (upheld by the House of Lords) on the grounds that, in publishing information about the facts of the case against the Distillers company before the case was settled, the newspaper would be 
in contempt of court. The case was brought by the Sunday Times to the Commission, alleging that the injunction against then obtained by the Attorney General and upheld by the House of Lords, was an 
infringement of their right to freedom of expression. The Commission held the opinion that there had 
been an infringement of article 10, and this view was upheld by the Court, because the restriction was 
not considered 'necessary in a democratic society for maintaining the authority of the judiciary' It is worthwhile to note the views of the Law Lords in upholding the injunction. hree Law Lords 
agreed on the principle that issues which are the subject of court proceedings should not be tried in 
advance by the newspapers, while two considered that pressure which might influence a person to 
abandon or settle his case was intolerable. All agreed that the article was in contempt because it 
posed an unacceptable threat to the administration of justice. Europ can Court of Hunan Rights Series A. vol. 30. Strasbourg, 1979. 40. They argued that no list could be comprehensive because of the different political and legal 
systems which exist, and therefore a working common formula was an urgent necessity. Those in favour of specific limitations however thought that a general formula was 'susceptible of arbitrary interpretation and application', and that if the Covenant were to be an acceptable legal document, 
restrictions in the article should be phrased in unambiguous language. They also argued that a wider degree of freedom wou d be ensured if restrictions were given in detail. Suggestions for specifi- limitations included: (a) matters which must remain secret in the interests of national safety; (b 
expressions which invite persons to alter by violence the system of government; (c) ex ressions which directly incite persons to commit criminal acts; (dl expressions which are obscene; 
re) 
expressions tn urious to the fair conduct of legal proceedings; (f) infringements of literary or artistic rights; 
gý expressions about other persons, natural or legal, which defame their reputations or are otherwise injurious to them without benefiting the public; (h) the systematic diffusion of deliberately false or distorted reports which undermine friendly relations between peoples and States; (i) disclosure of 
professional secrets; (j) disclosure arising out of arital or professional relations; (k) expressi9n 
about public authorities and high personages; (ii communications with foreign governments; (aý 
blasphemous or treasonable statements. These seem to have been drawn from the work of the Third Committee on the text of the draft Convention on Freedom of Information in 1959-60. 
United Nations Official Records of the General Assembly, 10th session, Annexes 20th September - 20th December 1955 Agenda item 28 (part 2) p. 51, para. 128. 
41. In the light of restrictions on the grounds of 'respect for the rights and reputations of others' 
and even for the 'protection of national security, or of public order, a member of the Human Rights 
Committee has commented that the imposition of the death penalty for an insult to the President / ... 
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the effectiveness of international human rights instruments. 62 Another is 
the vagueness of the clause which provides that restrictions on the 
right of freedom of expression should be only "as are provided by law 
and are necessary (1) for respect of the rights and reputations of 
others, (2) for the protection of national security, or of public order 
(ordre public), or of public health or morals". 
The Human Rights Committee has commented, in the light of articles of 
a Press Code, that to extend the concept of defamation to include an 
established body, "would seem to prevent any criticism of the actions of 
governmental organs or bodies ... 
". "' Unless otherwise justified on the 
grounds mentioned in the article such as, in the interests of national 
security, this clearly represents unreasonable restriction on the right. °4 
Another comment has been made in the light of a constitutional provision 
which refers to "supervision and constructive criticism ... that will 
safeguard the soundness of the domestic and nationalist structure and 
of the Republic is "difficult to justify in the light of the Covenant' 'CCPR/C/SR. 746 of 22nd July 1987, p. 2. In addition, the comment has been made that a regulation in the Penal Code, according to which 
defamation constitutes any public allegations or imputation concerning a fact which impugned the 
honour or reputation of a person or an established body' could be interpreted as meaning that any 
criticism of, for example, the functioning of a Parliament or a bill under consideration would be 
deemed an offence. It is important to point out that although the Covenant permits restrictions on the 
grounds of protecting the rights or reputations of others, the word 'others' should not be taken to 
mean a legal entity, government body or the State itself. 
C, CPR/C, /SR. 715 of 11th July 1987, p. 5. In many countries, restriction on the right of freedom of expression among others, may be imposed on 
grounds such as being 'prejudicial to the spirit of national unity'. Other terms used may be seen in 
an Act which regulates censorship, forbidding the propagation of 'reactionary ideas, chauvinism, 
racism or regionalism, 'defeatist' ideas or ideas serving imperialism, zionist and their supporters, 
or ideas which did not serve the objectives, interests and aspirations of the nasses' CCPR/C/SR. 748 of 22 July 1987, p. 5. Members of the Committee have questioned which organs are competent to interpret such terms, since there is clearly a risk that such a vaguely worded restriction might lead to abuse. Report of the Human R}'ghts Committee, General Assembly, Official Records; Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/39/40), p. 57. 42. As I argued in my previous research, 'certain governments wish their obligations to go so far and 
no further'. 
The Arab human rights position in the light of international law pp. 39-40, and conclusion, p. xl. Examples include reservations by Iraq on the Optional Protocol and United Kingdom for the rights of 
members of the colonies and dependencies as well as the United States of America to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice till recent times. At the regional level the European Commission has frequently concluded that even though a State has a 
certain 'margin of appreciation' in fixing the limits which  ay be imposed on freedom of expression, nevertheless in cases where a public authority has interfered beyond this margin the Cossission has the right of supervision. The concept of margin of appreciation will be part of the examination of state of emergency. 43. The Press Code goes on to stipulate that defamation constitutes any public allegation or imputation concerning a fact, directly or by reproducing such allegations or such imputations, even if the defamation was expressed with an element of doubt or if it was directed against a person or an 
established body that was not expressly named, but that could be identified. To extend the concept of defamation to defamation of an established body, 'mould seem to prevent any criticism of the actions 
of governmental organs or bodies. If a scrupulous and ethical journalist disseminated information 
which proved to be false, perhaps because the authorities had refused to give his the correct information that might constitute dissemination of false information ... 
'. 
CCPR/C/SR. ý115 of 11th July 1987, p. 5. 44. The work of the Third Committee on the text of the draft Convention on Freedom of Information in 1959-60 indicate that restrictions 'shall not be deemed to justify the imposition by any state of 
prior censorship of news, comments and political opinions, and may not be used as grounds for 
restricting the right to criticise the government*. Uuotein United Nations Study o iscrimina t in the Ratter of political rights, 1962, p. 18 
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will strengthen the socialist system". The Committee, while accepting that 
the right of freedom of expression may be limited in the legitimate 
interests of the community, itself undertakes to determine whether 
national legislation restricting the exercise of rights transgresses the 
limits laid down by the Political Covenant. a6 
As for the interpretation of article 19 of the Political Covenant, the 
Committee has commented that the right contained in paragraph 1, to 
"hold opinions without interference" is an absolute and "unqualified 
right" which may not be restricted under any circumstances except 
within the terms of article 4 of Political Covenant", and that paragraph 
2, includes the right not only to "impart information and ideas of all 
kinds", but also freedom to "seek" and "receive" them "regardless of 
frontiers" and in whatever medium, "either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice". 47 
The Committee has considered the possible harmful effect of imposing 
restrictions on the exercise of the right in the light of the duties and 
responsibilities it carries. In its General Comment, it reiterated that 
certain restrictions might be acceptable if they relate either to the 
interests of other persons °e or to those of the community as a whole, on 
condition that they do not jeopardise the right itself. 49 
In any case, in order to evaluate the position of this right, the criteria 
to be applied is not only whether the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression is guaranteed in the Constitution or law of a State, but also 
in examining the rules which define the scope of the freedom or which 
set forth restrictions" as well as any other conditions which in practice 
affect the exercise of the right, 61 including constitutional institutions 
45. CCPR/C/SR. 26 of 18th August 1977, p. 6. 46. Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, Official Records: 35th Session, Supplement 
No. 40 (4/35/40), p. 29. 
47. See General Comments under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the Covenant adopted by the Committee at its 461st and 464th meetings (19th session) held on 27 and 29 July 1983. CCPR/C/12/Add. 2 of 24th August 1983, p. 2, paras. 1-2. 48. The European Commission upheld this principle, by finding that an Act promulgated by the Federal Republic of Germany on 9 July 1953, on the dissemination of publications liable to corrupt young 
people, in no way exceeded a certain margin of appreciation or constituted restrictions on freedom of 
expression as authorized under article 10/2 of the European Convention, since, first, they were 
prescribed by a law and, secondly, they constituted measures necessary for the protection of morals of 
young people. 
The Council of Europe communication of 12 January 1976. Comments relating to limitations on the exercise of certain human rights and fundamental freedoas, to the Special Rapporteur. " In contrast, the European Court's consideration of the Aandyside Case extends the protection of the 
right not only to favourably received or inoffensive ideas or information, but even to those which may 
offend, shock or disturb. The publisher of 'The Little Red Schoolbook' was convicted under the Obscene Publications Acts, but pursued his right to freedom of expression to the European Court. 49. CCPR/C/12/Add. 2 of 24th August 1983, p. 2, para. 4. 50. Mr Tarnopolsky has commented that the Human Rights Committee is less concerned with the provisions 
of Constitutions and other laws which set forth fundamental freedoms than with the laws which restrict 
those freedoms, since `those laws indicate the actual extent of freedoms ... ". The Committee's concern is whether such restrictions are in keeping with the Covenant. 
CCPR/C/SR. 327 of 9th November 1981, p. 10. 
51. The Committee has expressed the opinion that the right is violated when, under a country's 
Military Penal Code, persons may be detained, charged, and convicted for subversive association or 
assistance to subversive associations apparently on no basis other than their political views and 
connections, since the government concerned has submitted no evidence to show that this was / ... 
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which review legislation and monitor administrative practice. As the 
Committee rightly put it, it is the "interplay between the principle of 
freedom of expression and such limitations and restrictions which 
determine the actual scope of the individual's right ", s2 
In this connection, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has 
stressed the necessity of freedom of opinion and expression to other 
rights as well, since it attaches importance to the right to express 
thoughts freely, as an integral part of the freedom which trade union 
organizations should enjoy, considering that the right to express 
opinions through the press or otherwise is one of the essential elements 
of trade union rights, and that the right would be seriously undermined 
if the administrative authorities decided to interfere by, for example, 
censorship of means of communications and publications of associations' 
views. 63 
Another issue affecting freedom of opinion and expression is the 
obligation undertaken under article 20 of the Political Covenant, 
according to which States Parties must adopt certain legislative 
measures restricting the right of freedom of expression, where it might 
constitute advocacy of hatred or discrimination or propaganda for war. ' 
The Committee considered that these required prohibitions are fully 
compatible with the right of freedom of expression as contained in 
article 19, in the light of the "special duties and responsibilities" it 
carries. States' obligation under paragraph 1 extends to all forms of 
propaganda, whether threatening or resulting in an act of aggression or 
threat to peace contrary to the U. N. Charter, while paragraph 2 outlaws 
any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, whether such advocacy 
or propaganda has aims which are external or internal to the State 
concerned. Naturally these conditions do not prohibit advocacy of the 
sovereign right of self-defence or the right of peoples to self- 
determination and independence. The Committee suggested that relevant 
national legislation must confirm that such activities are contrary to 
public policy, and provide for appropriate sanction in the case of 
. necessary 
for any of the purposes specified in the article. It also considers that it is violated 
when the real grounds for such prosecution are that the person concerned has taken part in trade union 
activities, or spread information about such activities. Burgos v. Uruguay Communication no. 52/1979 29th July 1981 (13th esSion) Weinberger Y. Uruguay Communication no. 28/1978 29th October 1980 (11th session) Human Rights Committee Selected decisions under the Otional Protocol, 1985 tCCPR/C/0P/lA, pp. 88-92, 
pp. 57-60. 
52. CCPR/C/12/Add. 2 of 24th August 1983, p. 2, para. 4. 53. See in this respect : ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, 241th and 131st Reports, Cases 
No. 1021, para. 124,683, para. 201. 
54. For example, see the Human Rights Committee's consideration of State report (CCPR/C/1/Add. 45) and 
(CCPR/C/37/Add. 3) with regard to the extensive powers granted to the Censorship Coaaittee* under Act No. 64 of 1973, which instituted censorship for certain documents and filas, and forbidden to propagate 
'reactionary ideas, chauvinism, racism or reyionalisa, 'defeatist' ideas or ideas serving imperialism, 
zionisa and their supporters, or ideas which did not serve the objectives, interests and aspirations 
of the masses'. 
CCPR/C/SR. 748 of 22 July 1987, p. 5. 
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violation. The travaux preparatoires for article 1.9 indicate that a clause 
specifying that freedom of expression should not be "exploited for war 
propaganda, for incitement to hatred among peoples, for racial 
discrimination and for dissemination of slanderous rumours" was rejected 
along with a proposal that the freedom should be subject to "such 
restrictions as were necessary for the maintenance of peace and good 
relations among States" on the grounds that they were susceptible of 
misinterpretation and further, might give grounds for the establishment 
of a system of censorship. 56 
During the drafting of the Political Covenant, it was realised, though 
not acted upon, that the wording of general restrictions of the rights 
protected by a number of articles was similar, but not uniform. Since 
articles 19,21 and 2258 each contain the term "public order (ordre 
public)", and since they are often used as the grounds for legal 
restriction of the exercise of these political rights, it is particularly 
important to illustrate the international legal understanding of these 
concepts and their concrete interpretation. It is vital because the 
efficacy of the instruments may be undermined on these grounds, 
particularly in developing countries, where the national understanding 
of concepts such as "public order" or "public interest" "national 
security" and so on, might be subject to widely differing interpretation 
which might in turn lead to unlawful or unjust restrictions. However, 
neither in the drafting of the Covenant nor in consideration of the 
provisions of the Political Covenant by the Human Rights Committee has 
there been an attempt to define precisely the proper scope of 
exceptions, although their possible effect is of the greatest significance 
in assessing "how much freedom EisA left to individual once those 
exceptions had been applied ". 5" 
The use of the expressions "public order" and "ordre public" led to 
extensive discussions during drafting of these articles. It was suggested 
at the time, that the use of these terms in the limitation clauses might 
create uncertainty and give rise to far-reaching derogations from the 
rights which the articles guarantee. However, the proposal that the term 
public order should be replaced by the English legal concept, the 
prevention of public disorder, was not adopted. 6° 
It may be noted that the English expression "public order" does not 
have the same meaning as the French term "ordre public" as far as the 
two legal concepts in civil law and common law countries are concerned. 
55. CCPR/C/SR. 26 of 18th August 1977, p. 6 56. The grounds coul be: national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or 
morals' (article 19); `national security or public safety, or public order (ordre public), the 
protection of public health or morals' (21); national security or public safety, or public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals' 
(22). 
57. A member of the Human Rights Committee has commented that 'the concepts of 'public order' or 
'national security' might be interpreted somewhat differently in different countries'. 
CCPR/C/SR. 103 of 3rd August 1978, p. 7 58. United Nations. General Assembly, 10th session, 20th September 1955. Official Records Annexes- 
Agenda item 28 part 2), p. 52, para. 132. 
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While the English term, in common law countries, means the absence of 
public disorder, "" the French term, in civil law countries, is a legal 
concept used as a basis for negating or restricting private agreements, 
the exercise of police power or the application of foreign law, and in 
general, regulating and balancing the relationship between the 
administration and the public. 
The common law equivalent of "ordre public" is "public policy", rather 
than "public order". The right likely to be restricted on the grounds of 
public order (or public safety"') is that of freedom of assembly. There 
is a clearly a danger that the right to hold peaceful meetings and 
demonstrations is subject in some societies to prohibitions and 
limitations which would not be permissible in a democratic society. 
Limitation of freedom of assembly on these grounds tends to be 
expressed through regulations or police powers to supervise 
demonstrations or processions and take action should public order or 
public safety be threatened. Clearly, police powers in this respect 
should be organised by law in advance and only exercised in the 
manner intended. Police powers, for example, to prevent the obstruction 
of traffic should not be used to impede political demonstrations. 
The Report on Limitations on Human Rights has rightly stressed the 
difficulty in establishing a precise definition of the concept of public 
order in the international context, since the world legal order 
encompasses several interpretations, and even within a given society it 
is not an unchanging concept. °1 By reviewing some governments' 
comments relating to limitations on the exercise of rights, one may see 
aspects of these difficulties. For example, within the Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the relation between the socialist state and citizen is "... 
imbued with a spirit of mutual respect, trust and co-operation, as well 
as mutual responsibility ... 
In possible conflict between social and 
personal interests, the conscientious citizen will give preference to 
social interests". D2 The provisions of article 36 of the Iraqi Provisional 
Constitution seem to be interpreting the concept of ordre public, when 
they prohibit any activity that runs counter to the objectives of the 
people, while the term public order has been used in the Pakistani 
Constitution, in its general meaning, not necessarily the absence of 
59. English common law regulates assembly according to aspects of 'public order", namely, breach of 
the peace, riot and 'unlawful assembly'. As regards riot, a definition of the term is derived from 
Field v. Metropolitan Police District Receiver, where necessary elements" of riot were found to 
comprise :aa number u persons, three-dt least; (b) common purpose; (c) execution or inception of 
the common purpose; (d) an intent to help one another by fo ce if necessary against any person who may 
oppose ther in the execution of their common purpose; 
je) 
force or violence not merely used in 
demolishing, but displayed in such a manner as to alarm at least one person of reasonable firmness and 
courage 
60. 'Public safety', as a ground for restriction of individual rights, has been defined by the 
Moroccan government as .. 
intended to ensure, within the country the public pear: e, social harmony 
and respect for the decisions of the public authorities'. 
The Individual's Duties to the Community 
... 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 2, p. 87. 
61. Final Report of the Study of the Individual's Duties to the Community ... 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 1 
and Add. 1-7. 
62. The replies of the Governments of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic are identical in relation to this point. 
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disorder. According to the High Court of Lahore, a man may commit an 
act which may not cause disorder, but which may adversely affect 
human safety. The term covers the concepts of protection of persons 
and property, the safety of human life, public peace and tranquillity, "' 
The Supreme Court of India has emphasised that contravention of law 
must affect the community or the public at large before it can be said 
to affect public order, which includes acts which disturb public 
tranquillity and are breaches of the peace, but not acts disturbing only 
the serenity of others. 6" 
The Federal Republic of Germany declined to say whether the 
expressions public order and ordre public, given equal status in the 
Political Covenant, are completely identical, though it stated that in any 
event, ordre public should not be interpreted as an abstract concept 
but in the light of the purpose of the right which is restricted by the 
reference to ordre public. It went on to confirm that only a democratic 
society provides adequate guarantees that the permissible reasons for 
limitations are not misused to oppress persons or suppress opinion and 
meetings, making reference to the permissibility of various limitations on 
rights in "democratic societies"86. West Germany also commented, with 
regard to the terms public interest, national or public security and 
public order (ordre public), that these concepts "... are only too easily 
confounded in a dictatorially governed society with an interest in 
maintaining a dictatorship". 
The Special Rapporteur suggests as a definition of public order . "the 
sum of the rules which ensured the security of a society or the set of 
fundamental principles in which the interests of a given society were 
founded, violation of which might imply only partial illegality of a legal 
act or foreign law, the application of which was permitted in the 
national territory, "68 
The study goes on to mention the qualification included in the comment 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. e7 
"National security", according to the Moroccan government, relates to 
"measures enacted with a view to safeguarding territorial integrity and 
national independence against any external threat". "' Likewise, in 
63. The Individual's Duties to the Community ... E/CN. 4/Sub. 
2/432/Rev. 2 pp. 84,89. 
1. L hia v. State of Bihar [1966) 1 SCR 709 and Madhu Liuaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr 119711 2 SCR 711. 
65. The Individual's Duties to the CouuunitY 
... 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/132/Rev. 2, pp. 79-81. 
66. This definition seems to be drawn largely from the comment of the Moroccan government on 
limitations on the exercise and fundamental freedoms, collected during preparation of the Study. This 
definition provides that public order is : the whole set of fundamental principles on which the 
supreme interests of a given society are founded, which can be neither evaded or modified, but 
violation of which Bay imply only partial illegality of a legal act or 
foreign law, the application of 
which is requested in the national territory'. 
Ibid, p. 87. 
6?. The Special Rapporteur adds : 'the nature of the legal rules which for reasons of morality or 
essential security were necessary in a social relation, public order or ordre public should, however 
be interpreted not as an abstract concept but in the light of the purpose of the human rights 
concerned which were restricted by the reference to public order'. Ibid p. 79-81. 68. Ibid, p. 86-88. 
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Pakistan, the term national security is used in connection with the 
security of the State as a whole, being "menaced by any activity 
prejudicial to the existence of the State". 89 
These definitions indicate that the issue of national security, as 
grounds for restriction of rights may be regarded as similar in scope to 
the circumstances giving rise to the imposition of a state of emergency. 
Since this issue will be examined in the last section of this chapter, at 
this stage it is sufficient to indicate that several of the principles 
elaborated there apply to the imposition of restrictions on the grounds 
of national security in normal times, in particular, the principles of 
exceptional threat and proportionality. Above all, it is important to note 
that, as the Human Rights Committee pointed out in its General Comment 
on article 19 of the Covenant, restrictions should not "put in jeopardy 
the right itself". 70 The European Commission too, has confirmed that 
restrictions may not be applied in a sense that completely suppresses 
the freedom, but only insofar as is necessary for preserving the values 
1 which the instrument enumerates and protects. " 
In several countries, restriction on the right of freedom of expression 
among others, may be imposed on grounds such as being "prejudicial to 
the spirit of national unity", and members of the Human Rights 
Committee have questioned which organs are competent to interpret such 
terms, "' since there is clearly a risk that such a vaguely worded 
restriction might lead to abuse. ' 3 
It is only in the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant 
on Economic and Social Rights in article 4, that "general welfare" 
constitutes a basis for imposing limitations on human rights. Apart from 
the exemptions in the event of a public emergency provided by article 
4, the Political Covenant does not contain a comparable general clause. 
This is significant within this research in the light of the fact that this 
term might be used to restrict the practice of human rights because of 
its vagueness and "... the concomitant danger of abuse" it carries with 
it, since it is not clear what human rights in this Covenant could be 
69. Ibid, p. 88-89. 70. General Comments under article 40, paragraph 4, of the Covenant adopted by the Committee at its 
461st and 464th meetings (nineteenth session) 27th and 29th July 1983 
(CCPR/C/21/Add. 
2) 24th August 
1983, p. 2. 
71. In Handyside v. United Kingdom, the Commission, considering the relationship of a restrictive 
clause to the right which it qualifies, found that it was that of an exception to a general rule. In 
other words, the protection of the freedom is the general rule, while the restriction is an exception. The restriction may not be used to suppress completely the freedom, but only to the extent necessary 
for preserving the values protected by the provision. 
"Handyside Case" European Court of Human Rights Series B, vol. 22 1976 (Strasbourg, 1979), p. 43, 
ara. 137. 
72. Other terns  ay be seen in an Act regulating censorship, forbidding the propagation of 
reactionary ideas, chauvinism, racism or regionalism, 'defeatist' ideas or ideas serving imperialism, 
zionisi and their supporters, or ideas which did not serve the objectives, interests and aspirations 
of the lasses". 
CCPR/C/SR. 748 of 22 July 1987, p. 5. 73. Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, Official Records: 39th Session, Supp. 
No. 40 (A/39/40), p. 57. 
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restricted for the widely used term in developing countries and 
transitional societies of "economic and social development ". " 
So far as the protection of "public health" is concerned, it is notable 
that the Political Covenant provides, in several articles, for imposing 
restrictions for the protection of the health of the community. ' b 
However, public health in the sense of articles 19,21 and 22 of the 
Covenant would seem likely to refer to the spread of infectious disease, 
for example, which might constitute a reason for restricting free 
assembly, or regulation of health. information. At the regional level, the 
European Commission has also pointed out that the term "protection of 
health" according to article 8/2 of the European Convention covers not 
only the general protection of the health of a community as a whole, but 
also the protection of individual members of the community. 
The European Commission's consideration could shed light on another 
important aspect of this topic when it notes that other rights might be 
subject to restrictions which - in accordance with the law - constituted 
measures necessary in a democratic society for the protection of public 
health or morals. ' e 
With regard to limitations or restrictions on moral grounds, the 
Commission has also expressed the view that the term "protection of 
health or morals" according to the same article of the Convention, 
covers not only the general protection of the morals of a community as 
a whole, " but also the protection of individual members of the 
community, and like the term "health" covers both the psychological as 
74. This interpretation is shared by the Food and Agriculture Organization, which suggests that such 
criteria could be invoked to justify restrictions on individuals' right to own property imposed by legislative and other measures taken by the authority "with a view to promoting or protecting the interests of the community, in particular for furthering economic and social development'. The Individual's duties to the community ... , 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 2, p. 97. 
75. Though the preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organization defines "health' as "a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of diseases or infirmity'. 
76. The European Commission considered that the expression "protection of health" might reasonably 
apply to measures taken for the prevention of disease in cattle. It was in the interest of the 
community and consequently, necessary in a modern society, that appropriate measures to that end, including affiliation with the health service, should be taken by the Government. There was therefore 
no violation of article 9 of the Convention and the application was accordingly declared inadmissible 
as being manifestly ill-founded. In the case in point, article 4 of the Netherlands Act of 1952 
relating to the prevention of tuberculosis in cattle, which makes it mandatory for cattle farmers to be affiliated with the health service, does not violate article 9 of the European Convention, as was 
alleged by an applicant. He maintained that article 4 of the above-mentioned Act placed his in a 
situation in which his religious conscience as a member of the Netherlands Reformed Church conflicted 
with the general obligations imposed on cattle farmers. The Commission considered in this respect that 
the right to freedom of religion night be subject to restrictions. Quoted in The Individual's ýuties to the Community ... E/CN. 
4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 2,1983, p. 101. Another example is X v. United Kingdom, Application no. 7992/77, where the Commission accepted the 
requirement of all motor-cyclists to wear a crash-helmet, including those whose religion requires them 
to wear a turban, as justified on the ground of protection of health. 77. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany has commented that : "as individuals do not live in isolation, they must not only respect the rights and freedoms of others. but also take into account 
the generally accepted moral code". 
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well as the physical well-being. It is clear that the substance of public 
morals differs from one community to another° e and in the various 
regions of the world, being subject in addition to the process of 
change. ' ° 
Limitations on human rights in regard to morals therefore, must be 
restricted because of the danger of abuse of such vague terms. 
In general, the observation could be made that these terms in the 
articles are both inconsistent and not sufficiently precise to be used as 
a basis for restriction of the rights. In the present development of 
international institutions to supervise individual states' interpretation of 
the provisions of human rights law, the use of such terms does little to 
safeguard the protection of the individual's rights against governments 
which may seize several pretexts to restrict further the rights of their 
opponents. 8 ° Concepts such as "public order", "national security", 
"democratic society", "public safety" and "morality" have meaning only 
within a particular ideological and theoretical context. 
The Human Rights Committee has considered that restrictions on such 
grounds as "the compatibility- of such enjoyment with the ideological 
principles and foundations of the political system and its prevailing 
plans and prog-ranrrnes" incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant, 
since they could be used to justify the imposition of measures 
contradicting its spirit. 81 In particular, the description "democratic 
society" has been applied to a wide range of political systems, 
encompassing a system of parties, proportional representation, one-man 
one-vote, direct popular democracy and constitutional monarchy. 82 
78. As an example from the Muslim community, restrictions on the grounds of 'public morality' in Pakistan are governed by the 'Principles of policy' set out in the Constitution of 1976, according to 
which the State is required, in respect of Muslims, to promote collective observance of Islamic moral 
standards. The Pakistani government's response to the Study on The Individual's Duties to the Community gives as examples, the elimination of prostitution, gambling and obscenity, prohibited 
according to Islamic principles. 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 2, p. 87. 79. This is confirmed by the findings of the European Commission in the Handyside Case, where it noted 
that it is impossible to impose uniform standards of morality within the European Community, but that 
moral standards prevailing in any country must be considered in order to determine whether the action 
taken was necessary to protect those standards. The Court confirmed that a uniform European conception 
of morals cannot be found in the domestic law of European states. The views of their respective laws 
of the requirement of morals varies in time and in place. 'Handyside Case' European Court of Human Rights Series B, vol. 22 1976 (Strasbourg, 1979), p. 46, 
para. 154. 
80. Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, Official Records: Thirty-Fifth Session, 
Supplement No. 40 A/35/40), p. 26. 
See also CCPR/C/ R. 26 p. 3, para. 10. 
81. According to Unesco's reply to the Study on the Individual's Duties to the Community ... E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 2, p. 99. 
82. According to the Moroccan reply "there sas no need to require in the Constitution that limitations 
on human rights should be permissible only within a democratic society, since under article 1, of the 
Moroccan Constitution, 'Morocco is a constitutional, democratic and social monarchy". 
The Individual's Duties to the Community ... 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 2, p. 87. 
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THE RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY, 
ASSOCIATION AND TRADE UNIONS 
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The rights of assembly8 3 and association6 ° are to be found in 
international and regional instruments, $& particularly those of the 
International Labour Organization. 88 
Beginning with the UN Covenants, and the Universal Declaration, while 
the Universal Declaration combines the right of assembly with the 
closely related right of association, in the travaux preparatotres of the 
Political Covenant the rights of assembly and association were divided 
between two articles. 
Although there was general agreement that the right of peaceful 
assembly should be included in the Political Covenant, elements 
constituting that right were the subject of discussion, concerned with 
whether freedom to hold assemblies, meetings, processions and 
demonstrations were part of the right. 87 
83. Liberal thought has long recognised the right of assembly as a means of expression. In 1791, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution provided Congress shall make no law ... abridging the right of the people to assemble'. 
Soviet theorists consider freedom of assembly to be among the most important political freedoms. For 
example, the Soviet Constitution of 1977 provides, in article 50, provides : In accordance with 
interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom ... of assembly, meetings, street processions and 
demonstrations. The 
exercise of these political freedoms is ensured by putting public buildings, streets and squares, at the disposal of the working people and their organizations ... 
". 
All the regional instruments save the African Charter protect the right to assemble peacefully, and the American Convention adds 'without arms', while the African Charter simply specifies the right to 
assemble freely. 
84. The right of association is safeguarded by the Soviet Constitution, subject to the ideological 
context of Communism, according to article 51, which provides that, 'in accordance with the aims of building Communism, citizens of the USSR have the right to associate in public organizations that 
promote their political activity and initiative and the satisfaction of their various interests. Public organizations are guaranteed conditions for successfully performing the functions defined in their rules. ' 
Islam too, recognises the right to associate and contemporary interpretations may be found in the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that : '(a) Every person is entitled to 
participate individually and collectively in the religious, social, cultural and political life of his 
community and to establi h instituti ns and agencies meant to enjoin what is right (ma'roof! and to 
prevent what is wrong 
(munkar). 
(b) Every person is entitled to strive for the establishment of 
institutions whereunder an enjoyment of these rights would be made possible. Collectively, the 
community is obliged to establish conditions so as to allow its members full development of their 
personalities", and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in article 26, which states : Parties, associations, political groups and trade unions and Islamic or recognised religious 
minorities, societies shall be free, provided that they do not violate the principles of independence, liberty, national unity and Islamic standards and the foundations of the Islamic republic. No person 
shall be forbidden or forced to participate in any of these. ' 85. For example, article 8 of ICESR, article 22 of ICCPR and ILO Conventions nos. 11,84,87,91,94, 98,135,149. At the regional level, protection of this right found its place in the American Declaration and Convention, the African Charter and the European Convention, and the draft Declaration 
of Arab Human Rights. 
86. For example, the preamble of the Constitution of the ILO declares 'recognition of the principle of freedom of association' to be a means of improving conditions of labour and of establishing peace. 87. Some argued that the right might not include the right to hold processions in public places. This 
represents a restrictive view of the content of the right of peaceful assembly, since several Constitutions emphasise the right of peaceful demonstration. For example, the Soviet Constitution of 1977, in article 50, safeguards the right of assembly, specifying street processions and demonstrations, putting the streets and squares at the disposal of the working people and their 
or anizations'. 
The American Declaration alone among the regional instruments provides clarification, when it 
specfies in a formal public meeting or an informal gathering, in connection with matters of common interest of any nature'. 
Page 26 POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB LEGAL ORDER 
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Discussion also focused on the protection of the exercise of this right 
from governmental interference. The consensus was that the individual 
should be protected from all kinds of interference in the enjoyment of 
this right. The form of wording eventually adopted in the Covenant was 
the subject of some debate, since the question was raised of whether it 
was a right which should be granted under the Political Covenant or 
whether it was a fundamental right which should be recognised by 
States Parties. The latter view prevailed, and it was felt that this article 
need not contain the explicit requirement that the right be recognised 
by law, as we saw in article 20, since this was implied for all the rights 
in the Covenant by article 2. 
The travaui preparatoires record several views as to the nature and 
scope of restrictions on this right. One view was that the qualification 
"necessary in a democratic society" should be added to any restriction 
allowed on the exercise of the right. The proponent of this view argued 
that protection of this right cannot be effective outwith the framework 
of a democratic society. To the objection that "democracy" might be 
understood differently in various countries, the answer was given that a 
democratic country might be characterised by its respect for the 
principles of the U. N. Charter, the Universal Declaration, and the 
Covenants. The phrase "necessary in a democratic society" was finally 
adopted. 8e In this connection, it must be emphasised that since freedom 
of assembly is considered to be "a major part of the political and social 
life of any country, "89 one would have expected article 21, in regard to 
the use of the phrase "in conformity with the law" to be in line with 
the phrase used in article 22 of the Political Covenant, where it is 
specified that restrictions on the right of association should be 
"prescribed by law". 9 ° The former is a vague term, "" particularly in 
relation to the national legislation of certain states where the legal 
order cannot be described as in conformity with the basic requirements 
of international standards. This wording may allow administrative abuse, 
since it could leave the Executive with wider powers, opening the door 
for interpretation of the term "in conformity with the law", since 
restriction on the right would not necessarily require prior legislation. 
88.6AOR Annexes 20th September - 20th December 1955, p. 54, para. 143. Both the European and the American Conventions also specify that restrictions should be "necessary in 
a democratic society". 89. The European Commission, furthermore, considered it in the 'Greek Case' ' ., an essential part of the activities of poIiticaI parties... " and furthermore, " ._ 
in the conduct of elections under Article 3 of the First Protocol, which are to ensure the free expression of the opinion of the 
people`. 
Yearbook of the European Court of Human Rights, 12,1969, pp. 170-171, Report of the Commission, 
para. 392 
90. Although, the American Declaration does not restrict the exercise of this right, all the other instruments specify that restrictions must be by law and 'necessary', though there is a distinction, 
as in the Covenant, in that the European and the African provide that restrictions must be "prescribed by" and "provided by' law, while the American Convention, like the Covenant, provides for 
restriction 'in conformity with the law'. 91. One can say that the characteristic vagueness of those concepts - despite their justification - 
gave rise to fears that they might lead to abuse if not further defined. It was suggested that the 
words 'reasonable and' should precede 'necessary', but this was not adopted. 
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The restrictions in article 22 represent a more precise safeguard of the 
right since the rule is that everyone should have the right to assemble 
peacefully and the exception is the restriction, which should be clearly 
and explicitly prescribed by the legislature. 
Some thought that only one fundamental restriction should be 
incorporated in the article, that: "All the activities of societies, unions 
and other organisations of a fascist or anti-democratic nature shall be 
forbidden by law, subject to penalty. " This opinion was, rightly, in 
favour of emphasising and assuring that this right be recognised in the 
interests of democracy. It was pointed out that were the right of 
peaceful assembly to be exercised by anti-democratic groups all the 
rights recognised in the Covenant might be jeopardized. Although it was 
argued that denying certain groups freedom of assembly on account of 
their opinions would be contrary to the principles of freedom of opinion 
and expression, it was rightly pointed out that terms such as "fascist" 
or "anti-democratic"' are not clearly defined and might lead to abuse. 
If any group's activities became a public danger, laws concerning public 
order, national security and the rights of others could be applied to 
safeguard the public interest. 
The Freedom of Association Committee in emphasising these basic 
principles, has considered in several cases that the right to assemble is 
a fundamental element of trade union rights, 93 and thus that the 
authorities should not interfere in the exercise of the right of trade 
union assembly in a way which could restrict the right, such as in the 
case of holding meetings. The lawful exercise of this right should be 
protected from any arbitrary presence of the public authorities, the 
need for previous authorisation and control by the authorities. 
The Committee has considered that "although the right to hold trade 
union meetings is a basic requisite of freedom of association, the 
organisations concerned must observe the general provisions relating to 
public meetings, which are applicable to all. " The Committee has 
considered that the qualifications enjoyed by this sector of the 
population could become the subject of restrictions by the authority 
concerned with the maintenance of public order, to decide in the 
exercise of its "corresponding powers whether meetings may in certain 
special circumstances, endanger public order and security and to take 
the necessary steps. " This exceptional power again should not be used 
to suppress the right, that is to say that if the authorities for example, 
92. As in the case of national legislation, where terms such as anti-democratic, Zionist, imperialist, 
reactionary..... (Subversive) could lead to confusion and abuse. 
As during the discussions of articles 18 and 19, which was summarised above, the terms used in the 
list of limitations again raised doubts about the abuse of such vague concepts by States. Proposals 
were made to replace the term 'public order' with the phrase 'prevention of disorder', following the 
European Convention, and to add another ground to the list of restrictions 'in the general interest'. 
Both were rejected. 
93. 'Freedom of assembly for trade union purposes constitutes one of the fundamental elements of trade 
union rights. ' 
2nd Report, Case No. 21, para. 23; 7th Report, Case No. 56, para. 67; 14th Report, Case No. 104, para. 102. 
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decided to prohibit the meeting held in a public place, the authority 
should allow the meeting to take place somewhere where there would be 
no fear of disturbances, thereby maintaining the right of freedom of 
assembly. 9 
The European Commission has considered the right to peaceful assembly 
a fundamental right and one of the foundations of a democratic society, 
and found that, while public demonstrations may require prior 
authorisation, a complete ban on all demonstrations cannot be justified 
according to the Covention. A less complete ban on public processions in 
a capital city for a limited period may be justified if it is believed that 
serious disorder cannot be prevented by less strict measures. 96 
As we saw, the Universal Declaration combines the right to assemble 
and the right to association in a single article. The right to form and to 
join trade unions is provided in article 23, paragraph 4. The Covenant, 
by contrast, divides assembly and association between two articles, but 
includes trade union rights as an aspect of the right of association. 
In a pattern familiar from article 19, article 22 in the Political Covenant 
begins with an explicit statement of the right and then goes on to an 
aspect of it, namely the right to form and to join trade unions. The 
article goes on to set the acceptable limitation and restriction on its 
practice. As we saw, the article in the Universal Declaration contains no 
specific restriction, but only the general restriction of articles 2 and 29 
which apply to all the rights. The right to association is recognised in 
regional instruments, including the European Social Charter, 9e in which 
the term "association" refers to a grouping of a specific nature and 
with a certain function. 97 
94. The Committee held the view that "Workers' and employers' organisations should have the right to hold congresses without previous authorisation and to draw up their agendas in full freedom. * 4th Report, Case No. 38, para. 180; 204th Report, Case No. 962, para. 254 and 255 95. Christians against Racism and Fascism v. United Kingdom Application no. 8440/78. 96. All state the right to freedom of association, but only the American instruments go on to specify the scope of possible groupings. Each specifies the permissible purposes of associations as political, 
economic, religious, social, cultural and labor, while the Declaration adds "professional" and the Convention adds "ideological" and 'sports'. In addition, both instruments add a phrase extending the 
scope of the article : the Convention adds 'or other purposes", the Declaration "or other nature". Thus, these instruments contain no limitation on the scope of associations. In contrast, the African Charter states that an individual  ay only exercise the right "provided he abides by the law". 97. It should be a voluntary grouping pursuing certain common goals. The European Commission has 
commented on the artic e in e European Convention, which i. s ! wbst ially the same as that in the Covenant, that the term "association" should be understood as referring to private organizations, and that a public institution cannot be regarded as an association in this sense. - The Court's judgement in Association X v. Sweden was that the right of association was not violated by the government if they compelled all medical practitioners to join a professional organization, formed by or under the law, the object of which was in the general interest, to protect the health of the community. The right was not violated because this organization was not an association in the 
sense of the article, and the doctors remained free to form and to join associations of their choice to protect their professional interests. 
Association X v. Sweden Application no. 6094/73 Additionally, one can say that the contractual relationship between employer and employee cannot be 
an association in the sense of article 22. Young, James A Webster v. United Kingdom Applications 7601/76 and 7806/77 Report: 14 December 1979. 
The Commission did not consider a medical organization formed by the State to ensure the observance 
of medical ethics an association because of its legal nature and public functions. Le Coopte, Van Leuven and De Meyer v. Belgium Applications 6878/75 and 7238/75 
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It seems that the European Convention and the Covenant include the 
right to form and to join trade unions as a special aspect of the right 
of freedom of association. The European Commission has observed that 
there is no legal distinction between the "freedom" and the "right" in 
this context, and so the right to freedom of association is the overall 
concept and the right to form and to join trade unions is an element in 
that concept, and not a separate right. °8 
The travaux preparatoires of the Political Covenant indicate that there 
was some debate about whether article 22 should make a cross-reference 
to the ILO Convention concerning Freedom of Association, (ILO 87). Some 
argued that it was not necessary, since according to an established 
principle of international law, the two treaties would each bind States 
Parties, thus a State Party to the Convention would continue to be 
bound by the obligations it assumes on signature and ratification of the 
Covenant, although in the event the proposed cross-reference was 
adopted. 
Substantial differences in the rights led the drafters of the Political 
Covenant to give each an article, unlike the Universal Declaration , 
which combined the rights of assembly and association in a single 
article. It was agreed that the exercise of this right should contain the 
freedom of choice as to forming associations as well as joining them. The 
sentence "No one may be compelled to join an association", contained in 
article 20 of the UDHR, was rejected, since, although it stressed an 
important aspect of freedom of association, it was felt that its 
application might not always be in the interests of trade unions. °° 
Clearly this represents a weakening of the legal protection of freedom of 
choice which would have been provided had the provision from the 
Declaration been retained. The right to choose not to join an association 
as well as the right of joining are equally important. The importance of 
safeguarding freedom of choice may be illustrated by instruments, 
including ILO 87, which emphasises workers' and employers' rights to 
form and join organizations "of their own choosing", and by the case 
law of supervisory1 "' and judicial bodies. 
In the case Young, James & Webster v. United Kingdom, ' °1 the issue 
98. Young, James I Mebster v. United Kingdom Applications 7601/76 and 7806/77 Report: 14 December 1979. 
99. General Assembly Official Records Annexes 20th September - 20th December 1955, p. 56, Para 145. 
100. The Human Rights Committee in reviewing States reports under article 40, occasionally commented 
on apparent contradictions between national legislation and the provisions of ILO Conventions, where 
the country concerned has acceded to the ILO instrument. In particular, it has commented on the single 
trade union structure found in several countries which contradicts the provisions in ILO Convention 87 
protecting the right of freedom of choice in forming and joining trade unions, for example, CCPR/C/SR. 500 of 4th April 1984, p. 6. 
101. In this case, the Court considered the issue of whether article 11 of the Covention was breached 
when 3 employees were threatened with dismissal by British Rail, when they refused to join a trade 
union, following a 'closed shop' agreement between British Rail and railways unions. 
The Court commented that one of the purposes of freedom of association as guaranteed by article 11 is 
the protection of articles 9& 10 of the Convention, that is, freedom of thought and conscience, and 
freedom of opinion and expression. Therefore, they considered that to compel someone to join an 
association contrary to his convictions 'strikes at the very substance' of this right. 
Young, James d Webster v. United Kingdom Applications 7601/76 and 7806/77 Report: 14 December 1979. 
Page 30 POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB LEGAL ORDER 
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
was raised of whether article 11 guarantees not only the positive right 
to form and to join trade unions, but also, by implication, the right not 
to be compelled to join an association or a union. The Court recalled 
that the right to form and join trade unions is a special aspect of 
freedom of association, adding that the notion of freedom implies some 
measure of freedom of choice as to its exercise. 
The Court commented that although during the drafting of Convention 
article 11. - as during drafting of the Covenant, article 22 - the 
sentence "No one may be compelled to belong to an association" was 
deliberately omitted from the article, the negative side of the protection 
of the right could not be dismissed. The Court emphasised that it was 
not its intention to review the system of the closed shop in respect of 
the Convention, but to examine the effects of that system on the 
applicants in the present case. In this negative sense of the article, the 
breach of the right was considered to be clear. However the Court 
assumed that the negative aspect of the freedom of association was not 
guaranteed by article 11 on the same footing as the positive, and 
therefore held that compulsion to join a trade union may not always 
breach the Convention. The Court's view was that a threat of dismissal 
constitutes a serious form of compulsion which "strikes at the very 
substance of the freedom" guaranteed by article 11, and so there was 
an interference with the freedoms of the applicants. The Court also 
mentioned another aspect of the limitation of the applicants' freedom of 
choice as regards the unions they could join of their own choice, saying 
"the individual does not enjoy the right to freedom of association if 
in reality the freedom of action or choice which remains available to him 
is either non-existent or so reduced as to be of no practical value". 
The African Charter, alone among the regional instruments, provides 
that no one shall be compelled to join an association, though it is 
subject to an obligation not found in any other regional instrument, 
"the obligation of solidarity", provided for in article 29. This duty of 
"solidarity" is not clearly defined and thus represents a serious threat 
to the enjoyment of this right, opening the door to abuse. Although this 
instrument is the only text besides the Universal Declaration which 
explicitly protects the right not to be compelled to join an association, 
the protection is seriously undermined by the vague "obligation of 
solidarity ". 
During drafting, there was some discussion as to whether it was 
necessary specifically to mention the right to form and to join trade 
unions in the draft Political Covenant, since it was recalled that article 
8 of the draft Economic Covenant dealt with this right. It was felt that 
if the right to form and to join trade unions were mentioned in both 
Covenants, then this right would be subject to two sets of restrictions. 
On the other hand, it was pointed out that if this right were not 
mentioned in the draft Covenant, a misconception about the nature of 
the right might arise, namely, that it was economic and social rather 
than civil. Therefore, this right was incorporated in article 22. 
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This is important for the reasons put forward in the travaux 
preparatoires but in my opinion, the final form of the article serves two 
purposes : conserving civil protection of the right, and since ideological 
influence might lead states to ratify only one Covenant, this right could 
remain protected in both. 
Concerning the phrase "for the protection of his interests", the view 
was expressed that such a general formulation was preferable to that 
used in the draft Economic Covenant, "for the protection of his economic 
and social interests", since trade unions are not exclusively concerned 
with economic interests, l0z but have also a vital role to play in securing 
civil rights for their members. 103 As in article 21, though it was 
suggested that the phrase "governmental interference" be incorporated 
in the article, a wider formulation, protecting the right against any 
interference was rightly preferred. 104 
The articles which specify the right to form and to join trade unions 
in the regional instruments vary quite widely' 06 in their scope, and the 
detail in which they outline related rights, such as the right to 
collective bargaining and the right to strike. This is natural in the light 
of the differing purposes of the instruments: the American Declaration 
and Convention, like the European Convention, are simply statements of 
rights to be safeguarded, while the European Social Charter sets out to 
provide conditions in which such rights may be exercised. As such the 
first group of instruments simply sets out legal rights to be respected 
and ensured, while the European Social Charter binds Contracting 
Parties to take steps to attain conditions in which rights may be 
enjoyed. Thus, the European Social Charter contains provisions dealing 
with such issues as the right to consultation, collective bargaining, 
conciliation and arbitration, and the right to strike, while the other 
instruments contain no such detailed provisions. 
102. The Soviet Constitution of 1977, for example, broadens the scope of trade union activity to 
encompass 'managing state and public affairs, and in deciding political, economic, social and cultural 
matters. ' 
103. For example, the Solidarity trade union in Poland, and the National Union of Mineworkers in South 
Africa. A such broader formulation of the scope of union activity is envisaged by ILO Convention 
no. 87, in article 10, which defines organization in the sense of the instrument "any organisation of 
workers or of employers for furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers". 
104. Article 1 of ILO Convention 98 provides for the protection of workers and trade union leaders 
against acts of anti-union discrimination on any grounds. Paragraph 2 (a) protects against acts 
calculated to : 'make the employment of a worker subject to the condition that he shall not join a 
union or shall relinquish trade union membership" and (b) : 'cause the dismissal of or otherwise 
prejudice a worker by reason of union membership or because of participation in union activities ... 
' 
Article 2 establishes that workers' and employers' organizations shall enjoy adequate protection 
against acts of interference by one another, described as being 'designed to promote the establishment 
of workers' organizations under the domination of employers or employers' organizations or to support 
workers' organizations by financial or other means, with the object of placing such organizations 
under the control of employers or employers' organizations'. 
105. The American instruments contain least detail about the right to form and to join trade unions, 
since this right is not explicitly granted, but appears only as an aspect of the right of association, 
which as mentioned, may be for purposes of `professional, labor union or other nature" in the American Declaration, or 'economic, labor ... or other purposes' 
in the American Convention. 
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Like ILO 87 and 98,106 it confines the protection of the right to 
employers and employees, although only this article explicitly extends 
the right beyond national to international organisations. This instrument 
stresses the purpose of association as "for the protection of their 
economic and social interests". 
The article protecting trade union rights in the European Convention, 
like the article in the Political Covenant, is wider in scope than that in 
the European Social Charter, since the article in the Convention 
provides that anyone may form and join trade unions "for the protection 
of his interests", while the Social Charter restricts the purpose to 
"economic and social interests". 
This mirrors the difference between the two international Covenants, 
where one implicitly extends the scope of trade union protection to the 
area of civil and political rights whereas the other restricts its scope to 
the area of social and economic rights. 
Restrictions on the right of association"" in the Political Covenant are, 
in general, the same as those included in article 21, with the exception 
that the phrase "imposed in conformity with the law" was replaced with 
the phrase "prescribed by law". Therefore, imposition of restriction on 
this right is more tightly controlled than on the right of assembly. 
106. ILO Convention No. 98 protects the rights of workers and employers to organize, not to be 
discriminated a ainst by acts of anti-union nature, and against interference in each other's affairs, (articles 1& 2). It also promotes voluntary collective bargaining, in article 4, which provides that 
'measures appropriate to national conditions' shall be taken to encourage and promote the development 
and use of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers and employers' organisations and 
workers' organizations to regulate terms and conditions of employment 'by means of collective 
agreements'. In providing that measures should be taken by governments in this respect, the autonomy 
of such machinery and organisations is implied, and should be protected from governmental interference 
through, for example, restrictive legislation on collective bargaining or the effects of governmental 
economic policy measures. 
107. The regional instruments vary in the scope of restrictions which  ay be imposed on the right of 
association, since the American Declaration does not restrict its exercise, while the American 
Convention and the European Convention specify that restrictions must be by law and "necessary", 
though as with assembly, there is a distinction, in that the European Convention provides that 
restrictions must be 'prescribed by law', while the American Convention provides for restriction 
'established by law'. Both the European and the American Conventions specify also "necessary in a 
democratic society'. 
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The limitation on the exercise of the right of freedom of association is 
unlike the limitation on the right of assembly in that it specifies 
particular groups in society, and explicitly restricts their exercise of 
this right. ' °8 Some argued, in the travaux preparatoires, that there 
were no grounds for additional restriction with regard to certain 
groups, such as, the armed forces, police and administrative personnel, 
save perhaps, a restriction on the right to strike, since a general 
limitation in the interests of national security, public order and so on, 
would be sufficient. 
Others, however, argued that such provisions were to be found in the 
domestic law of many states and that it should not be regarded as 
denying this right to certain groups, but merely limiting their choice of 
association and the extent to which they may participate in union 
activities. A general restriction on the rights of members of the armed 
forces and the police, but not administrative staff"', 9, was incorporated 
in the article. llo Articles in the European Convention and the American 
Convention specify that the rights of particular groups may be 
additionally restricted. In this respect, the American Convention is close 
to the Political Covenant though the American instrument goes beyond 
restriction to allowing deprivation of these groups of their exercise of 
the right. The European Convention again goes further than the 
Covenant in including a third category, "members of the administration 
of the state". The European Social Charter, like ILO Conventions no. 87 
and 98, leaves the task of regulating the exercise of the right of 
association by the police and armed 
forces to national laws or 
regulations. 
This restriction on the right of certain categories must be viewed with 
some concern, since although when used in the public interest it should 
not unduly restrict the right, in certain countries, where the scope of 
"public service" is extremely wide, ""' it might be misused to restrict 
the rights of large sections of the population. It is also of concern that 
the police and security forces may not be allowed to participate in free 
trade union activities or in those of some kind of professional 
associations, since in countries where state organs may be involved in 
the use of illegal means against, for example, political opposition, a free 
trade union or professional organization could provide a stronger 
safeguard for human rights than individuals who would otherwise be 
subject to threats and coercion. 
108. These instruments provide restrictions on the grounds of national security, public safety, public 
health, public morals, and the rights and freedoms of others. As before, the European Convention adds 
'from the prevention of disorder or crime, which is equivalent to `public; order" in the American 
Convention. 
109. cf. European Convention on Human Rights article 11, para. 2, which allows the imposition of 
lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members ... of the administration of the State' 
, 110. GAOR Annexes 20th September - 20th December 1955, p. 56, Para 151. 111. This point has been discussed by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association who have stressed, 
as we will see, that the scope of 'public service' must not be unreasonably wide. 
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In view of the fact that the Political Covenant explicitly mentions the 
groups whose exercise of the right of association may be lawfully 
restricted, the Human Rights Committee has questioned from time to time 
the extension of restriction to other categories, for example, in the case 
of an Act regulating political parties, which stipulates that citizens 
"have the right to form political parties provided that ... 
their 
membership is not restricted to a particular social class, category, sect 
or geographical area ... . 
In this case, a member of the Committee 
questioned whether this would restrict the right, for example, of farmers 
to form a political movement. 112 In addition, a member has commented 
that a law restricting the right of association on the ground that it is 
"designed to impair ... 
the monarchical form of the state" is not justified 
under any of the restrictions in article 22, unless such an association 
would be a threat to national security, bearing in mind that the Political 
Covenant is neutral on questions of ideology and forms of state or 
government. 113 
As for the right to form and to join trade unions, the Human Rights 
Committee has held, in its judicial capacity, that article 22, paragraph 1 
was violated in connection with article 19, paragraphs I and 2, in a case 
where a trade union leader was detained and tortured, and convicted of 
unspecified "subversive activities" under the Military Penal Code, 
"because Lopez Burgos has suffered persecution for his trade union 
activities ". 1 1' 
Restrictions envisaged by ILO Convention no. 87 on the rights of 
workers and employers are twofold : that 
in exercising their rights, 
they shall respect "the law of the land"; and that the rights of only 
certain groups may be restricted by the authorities. As in the 
Political 
Covenant, these are the armed forces and the police, but unlike the 
Political Covenant, the Convention stipulates that the extent of the 
exercise of the rights of these groups shall 
be "determined by national 
laws or regulations". Balanced against these possible restrictions as we 
saw, is the provision that "the law of the land" should not itself be 
such as to impair, nor should it be applied so as to impair the rights 
protected in the Convention. Likewise, article 
3, para. 2 provides that the 
public authority should refrain from any interference in the enjoyment 
of the right. 
ILO Convention 87, unlike other international instruments, does not 
explicitly envisage the possibility of restriction on any discriminatory 
grounds - since the fundamental principles and guarantees of civil 
liberties are already enshrined in all international instruments including 
the ILO Constitution on the one hand, and the rights and guarantees 
provided for in every aspect of freedom of association can be neither 
112. CCPR/C/SR. 499 of 6th April 1984, p. 7. 
113. CCPR/C/SR. 327 of 9th November 1981, p. 11. 
114. Communication no. 52/1979 29th July 1981. 
Human Rights Committee, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol (Second to sixteenth 
sessions), 1985 ECCPR/C/OP/1A. 
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exercised nor enjoyed without respect for basic human rights on the 
other. Thus, the Convention contains no article providing explicitly the 
principle of non-discrimination, with the only restriction envisaged that 
of article 9, on the armed forces and police. The provision in article 2, 
that the rights may be exercised "without distinction whatsoever", has 
been understood to include workers in private industries, and public 
servants. Any discrimination against the rights of categories of workers 
such as public servants 11s, managerial staff, non-nationals and 
agricultural workers"' is contrary to the Convention. During the 
travaux preparatoires, it was made clear that the right of workers 
should be guaranteed "without discrimination as to race", and this is 
confirmed by the case law of the Freedom of Association Committee. ' 17 
With regard to discrimination on the grounds of political affiliation or 
activities, the 1LO Committee has considered that measures taken under 
national law, whereby an individual is deprived of his right to become 
or remain a trade union member on the grounds that he professes 
certain political opinions, or engages in legitimate political activities in a 
manner unconnected with his participation in an occupational 
organization would constitute an infringement of the right to organize, 
as specified in article 2 of the Convention. The Committee stated that 
workers should have the right, without discrimination on the basis of 
political opinion, to join the union of their choice. 1118 
Finally, the right to public assembly and association should not be 
restricted or impeded except within the limits examined, otherwise these 
restrictions or limitations are considered to run contrary to the 
provisions of the Covenants and ILO Conventions, and in such cases the 
exercise of administrative authorities in any State requires urgent 
judicial review and amendment. ' 1 
115. The denial of the right of publicly employed workers to set up trade unions, as may privately 
eaployed workers, with the result that their associations' do not enjoy the same advantages and 
privileges as do 'trade unions', involves discrimination in the case of governnen t -employed workers 
and their organizations, as compared with privately-euployed workers and their organizations. . Such a 
situation gives rise to the question of compatibility of these distinctions with article 2 of 
Convention no. 87, according to which workers 'without distinction whatsoever' shall have the right to 
establish and join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorisation, as well as with 
article 3 and 8(2) of the Convention. " 48th Report, Case No. 193, para. 52. 
116. 'A law which lays down that not less than 6O. of the members of a trade union must be literate is 
incompatible with the principle established in Convention no. 87 according to which workers, without 
distinction whatsoever have the right to establish organisations of their own choosing. Article 1 of Convention no. 11 confirms this principle and lays down that each Member of the ILO which ratifies this 
Convention undertakes to secure to all those engaged in agriculture the same rights of association and 
combination as to industrial workers. ' 24th Report, Case No. 144, para. 237. 
117. A law which removes the right of African workers to establish trade unions which can register 
and participate in the industrial councils which may be set up for the purpose of negotiating 
agreements and settling disputes which constitutes a fora of discrimination is inconsistent with the 
principle accepted in the majority of countries and embodied in the Convention adopted by the IL! ) that 
workers without distinction whatsoever should have the right to establish and subject only to the 
rules of the organization concerned, to oin organizations of their own choosing without previous 
authorisation ... 
'. 15th Report, Case No. 102, para. 141. 
118. Norkers should have the right, without distinction whatsoever - in particular without discrimination of any kind on the basis of political opinion - to join the organisation of their own 
choosing. ' 125th Report, Case No. 638, para. 25. 
119. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining : General Survey by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. International Labour Conference, 69th, 1983, 
pp. 21-22. 
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The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
provides, in article 8, for the right to form and join trade unions in 
terms which are similar and at times identical to provisions found in the 
ILO Convention no. 87. For example, the Economic Covenant secures, in 
article 8 (a), "the right of everyone to form trade unions and to join 
the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the 
organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic 
and social interests, " while article 2 of the ILO Convention protects the 
rights of workers and employers to establish and to join (subject only 
to the rules of the organization) organizations of their choice, without 
previous authorisation. 12 0 
As we saw, in the comparison of the two Covenants, the article in the 
Economic Covenant, which specifies the role of trade unions as "the 
promotion and protection of ... economic and social 
interests" is 
comparatively restrictive, unlike the ILO Convention, which in its 
definition of "organization" in article 10, broadens its scope to 
"furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers". 
The Economic Covenant goes on to secure the right of trade unions to 
establish national federations and confederations and the right to form 
or join international trade-union organizations, which corresponds to 
article 5 of the ILO Convention which provides that organizations 
should be free to establish and join federations, and to affiliate with 
international organizations. 
Again, the Economic Covenant safeguards 
"the right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations 
other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public order 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others", 
while the ILO Convention provides, in article 3, that organizations 
should have the right to draw up constitutions and rules, that they 
should be free to elect their representatives and organise their 
administration and activities, formulating their own programmes, and in 
article 4, that organizations should be protected against dissolution or 
suspension by the public authorities. 
Finally, in paragraph 1 of article 8, the Economic Covenant secures 
"the right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the 
laws of the particular country", while the ILO Convention protects this 
right implicitly in article 3, we shall see the legal interpretation of this 
provision in the following section. 
Both instruments provide for the imposition of lawful restrictions on 
the rights of certain categories of workers, and the Economic Covenant 
contains a cross-reference to the ILO Convention. 
120. Article 2 provides : 'Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right 
to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join organizations of 
their own choosing without previous authorisation. " 
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Since the rights safeguarded by the two instruments are similar in 
intent and wording, and since more case law is available for the ILO 
Convention through the work of the Committee on Freedom of 
Association, the examination of the international legal understanding of 
the right to form and to join trade unions focuses on this instrument, 
and its interpretation by ILO bodies. 
The main element in which the Economic Covenant and the Convention 
differ is in the extent of lawful restriction which may be imposed by 
governments on the rights safeguarded in the instruments. 
As we saw, article 2 of the ILO Convention protects the rights of 
workers and employers to establish and to join organizations of their 
choice, without previous authorisation. Besides this first component, the 
Convention has three other aims : that organizations should have the 
right to draw up constitutions and rules, that they should be free to 
elect their representatives and organise their administration and 
activities, formulating their own programmes; that organizations should 
be protected against dissolution or suspension by the public authorities; 
and that organization should be free to establish and join federations, 
and to affiliate with international organizations. The Convention contains 
a broad implementation article, which states in positive terms, the duty 
of Member States to take "all necessary and appropriate measures" to 
ensure the free exercise of the right to organise. 1z1 
As we saw, article 2 provides that workers and employers have the 
right to establish organisations "without previous authorization". 
In the 
travaux preparatoires of the Convention, it was felt that countries 
should remain free to establish formalities in law as appropriate to 
ensure the normal functioning of industrial organisations. Formalities 
imposed by national law concerning the constitution and operation of 
workers' and employers' organizations are not incompatible with the 
Convention, as long as they do not impair the guarantees it specifies. 
Since these formalities may be linked to the acquisition of legal 
personality, requirements for this should not impair the right to 
establish organizations according to article 2.1 az 
One of the requirements may be that the rules of or other details about 
the organization be filed with the public authority. 
121. 'In its report to the 1948 International Labour Conference the Committee on Freedom of 
Association and Industrial Relations declared that 'the States would regain free to provide such 
formalities in their legislation as appeared appropriate to ensure the normal functioning of 
industrial organisations'. Consequently, the formalities prescribed by national regulations concerning 
the constitution and functioning of workers' and employers' organizations are compatible with the 
provisions of that Convention, provided, of course, that the provisions in such regulations do not 
infringe the guarantees laid down in Convention no. 87. " 
For example, Ist Report, Case No. 4 para. 47. No. 696 para. 13. 
122. "In one case where a long period had elapsed between the request for recognition of legal 
personality and the obtaining of such recognition, the Committee recalled that, while it is true that 
the founder of a trade union gust comply with the formalities prescribed by lejislation, these 
formalities should not be of such a nature as to hamper freedom to fora organizations. 
For example, 128th Report, Case No-675 para. 20. 
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Another requirement may be registration with the appropriate public 
body. Ordinarily, this would not infringe the Convention, but clearly if 
registration was refused for a reason incompatible with the aims of the 
Convention, this would violate the Convention. The rules of registration 
should, of course, be clear, and the procedure of registration should not 
be unreasonably prolonged. A necessary safeguard against unlawful or 
arbitrary decisions is a litigation process through which trade unions 
may appeal to an independent court against an administrative decision 
regarding registration. Objectivity is best ensured through judicial 
process, rather than through an appeal to another administrative 
body. 123 
As we saw, article 2 of the Convention provides for the right of 
workers and employers to establish and to join organizations of their 
own choosing. Implied in this is the free determination of the structure 
and membership of trade unions. Certain legal restrictions may be 
incompatible with the Convention, for example, where questions arise 
over the minimum number of persons12a and restriction of membership 
on grounds of branch of activity of the organization. l2s Regulations 
which stipulate that different organizations must be established 
for each 
category of public servant, for example, are incompatible with the 
provision. Where governments favour or discriminate against particular 
unions, this is considered to inhibit workers' and employers' freedom of 
choice. l2e Discrimination on the grounds of political opinion which 
restricts the right of workers to join organizations of their own 
choosing also violates the Convention. 127 
As far as the rights guaranteed by the Convention are concerned, 
there is grave cause for concern in countries where the law imposes a 
single trade union system at all levels, and prohibits pluralism locally 
and nationally. Only one national trade union may be established for 
each category of workers, or for each region. 
123. 'The Committee has drawn attention ... 
to the principle that appeals against the refusal or 
cancellation of registration of organizations by trade union registrars should lie to the courts (and 
not to the executive or administrative authority). * 
For example, 47th Report, Case No. 194, para. 111; 58th Report, Case No. 251, para. 611 124. The figure must be reasonable so that this restriction does not impair the establishment of 
organizations. 
The Committee has recalled that the establishment of a trade union may be considerably hindered or 
even rendered impossible when legislation fixes the minimum number of members of a trade union at 
obviously too high a figure, as is the case, for example, where legislation requires that a works 
union must have at least fifty founder members. ' 
For example, 48th Report, Case No. 191, para. 72. 
The Committee has considered that the requirement of a minimum number of twenty members fixed by 
legislation does not sees excessive and therefore does not in itself constitute an obstacle to the 
formation of a trade union. 
For example, 90th Report, Case No. 335, para. 194. 
125. If this restriction is stipulated, then such organizations oust be free to join federations or 
confederations of their own choosing. 
126. freedom of Association and collective bargaining : general survey by the Committee of Experts on 
the application of conventions and recommendations, ILO Conference 69th session, 1983, p. 49 
127. Morkers should have the right, without distinction whatsoever - in particular without 
discrimination of any kind on the basis of political opinion - to join the organisation of their own 
choosing. ' 
For example, 125th Report, Case No. 639, para. 25. 
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB LEGAL ORDER Page 39 
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, ASSOCIATION AND TRADE UNIONS 
Such organizations are often compelled to join a single national 
confederation, designated by law. Such systems may be linked to 
different socio-economic and political principles, ' 28 though the imposition 
of such a system may be achieved through explicit legislation or 
through a set of provisions. 
Such law makes it impossible to establish other organizations to 
represent workers' interests, which is a clear violation of the provision 
in article 2 that organizations should be of workers' and employers' own 
choosing. lze Likewise, an obligation to federate with a single national 
federation in order to operate lawfully constitutes a further violation of 
articles 5 and 6, as we will see. 
The widespread practice, in cases where the single trade union system 
operates, of linking trade unions to the ruling party1 ' violates the 
principle of freedom of choice, (as does the single trade union system in 
general) as well as the important principles governing the political 
activities of unions. While it was never the intention of the Convention 
to make diversity of unions an obligation, nevertheless the possibility of 
diversity must be safeguarded. "' Voluntary association in a single 
organization is quite acceptable, while laws or practices which impose 
such an association clearly violate the Convention. The Committee has 
pointed out that even where a de facto monopoly exists as a 
consequence of voluntary action by workers, this should not be 
institutionalized, and the freedom of workers to form additional 
organizations must be safeguarded. ' 32 The rights of workers who do not 
wish to join existing trade unions should be protected. The unity of 
trade unions which is imposed by law, a common tendency in Arab 
countries, clearly violates the principles of the Convention. 
Article 3 of Convention 87 recognises the following : organizations 
should have the right to draw up constitutions and rules; the right to 
129. This is the case in several Arab countries, including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Yemen. 
129. ... 
in view of the fact that measures of a political nature may have an indirect effect on the 
exercise of trade union rights, the Committee drew attention to the views which it has expressed with 
regard, first, to the principle that workers, without distinction whatsoever, should have the right to 
join organisations of their own choosing and, secondly, to the importance of due process in cases in 
which measures of a political nature may indirectly affect the exercise of trade union rights. ' 
For example, 12th Report, Case No. 63, para. 276. 
130. For example, in Libya, Syria, Algeria, Egypt. 
131. The Committee has stressed that, while both workers and employers generally have an interest in 
preventing the multiplicity of the number of competing organizations, consideration does not in itself 
seen sufficient to justify direct or indirect intervention by the state, and that, while it fully 
understands a government's desire to promote a strong trade union movement, trade union unity imposed 
by the government runs counter to the principles of Convention no. 87. 
For example, 149th Report, Case No. 732, para. 37. 
132. The Committee has recalled that, while it may be to the advantage of workers to avoid a 
, multiplicity of trade union organisations, unification of the trade union movement imposed through 
state intervention by legislative means runs counter to the principle, embodied in article 2 and 11 of 
Convention no. 87. The Committee of Experts of the ILO on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations has emphasised on this question that 'there is a fundamental difference with respect 
to the guarantees of freedom of association and protection of the right to organise, between a 
situation in which a trade union monopoly is instituted or maintained by legislation and the factual 
situations which are found to exist in certain countries in which all-We Trade onion organizations 
join 1oge her voluntarily in a single federation or confederation without this being the direct or 
indirect result u egi. s ative provisions applicable to trade unions and to the establishment of / ... 
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elect representatives in full freedom; the right to organise their 
administration and activities; the right to formulate their own 
programmes, without interference. Legislation regulating trade unions 
may contain detailed provisions on such aspects as eligibility for office, 
election, management of funds and so on. While such regulations may be 
in the interests of trade union members, they may in some cases restrict 
the right in a way contrary to the Convention. 
Although there may be a requirement that rules comply with a national 
statutory requirement, the principle that unions should be free to draw 
up their own constitutions and rules remains important. ' 33 
Requirements governing eligibility to stand for office in organizations 
include 
. occupational requirements, nationality, political views or 
activities, penal record and re-election. 
In the opinion of the Committee, such provisions may prevent qualified 
persons from carrying out union duties, for example, a requirement of a 
number of years in a particular occupation may disqualify an individual 
from holding office. ' 34 This would infringe the right safeguarded by the 
Convention. The rights of migrant workers might be infringed by strict 
requirements of nationality in eligibility. 
In the view of the Committee, solely political grounds for restriction on 
eligibility may infringe the Convention, 136 though clearly, if political 
grounds were coupled with a threat to security or subversion, then the 
trade union organisations. The fact that workers and employers generally find it in their 
interests to avoid a multiplication of the number of competing organizations does not, in fact, appear 
sufficient to justify direct or indirect intervention by the state, and, especially intervention by 
... 
the Committee has drawn attention to the fact that it is more the state by means of legislation. ' 
desirable in such cases for a government to seek to encourage trade unions to join together 
voluntarily to form strong and united organisations than to impose upon then by legislation a 
compulsory unification which deprives the workers of the free exercise of their right of association 
and thus runs counter to the principles which are embodied in the international labour conventions 
relating to freedom of association. ' 
For example, 67th Report, Case No. 303 paras. 260 & 264. 
133. "A requirement that union rules shall comply with national statutory requirements does not 
constitute a violation of the principle that workers' organizations should have the right to draw up 
their constitutions and rules in full freedom, if such statutory requirements themselves do not 
infringe the principle of freedom of association and if approval of the rules by the competent 
authority is not within the discretionary powers of such authority. " 
For example, 65th Report, Case No. 266, para. 29. 
"Where the approval of union rules is within the discretionary powers of a competent authority this 
is not compatible with the generally accepted principle that workers' organizations should have the 
right to draw up their constitutions and rules in full freedom. * 
For example, 58th Report, Case No. 168, para. 78. 
134. "Provisions that require that trade union leaders should, at the time of their election, have 
been engaged in the occupation or trade for more than a year are not in harmony with the Convention. " 
For example, 129th Report, Case No. 514, para. 113. 
135. The Committee took the view that a law is contrary to the principles of freedom of association 
when a trade unionist can be barred from union office and membership, because in the view of the 
Minister, his activities Right further the interests of communism. " 
For example, 85th Report, Cases Nos. 300,311 & 32, paras. 107 & 109. 
"A law which debars from trade union office for a period of ten years 'any person taking part in 
political activities of a communist character' and which list a number of legal presumptions whereby 
any person can be held to be 'responsible for taking part in political activities of a communist 
character' could involve a violation of the principle laid down in Convention no. 87, which states that 
employers' and workers' organizations have the right 'to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and activities' and that the public authorities shall refrain from 
any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof'. For example, 24th Report, Case No. 146, para. 273. 
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Convention would not necessarily be infringed. 
The Committee has considered that laws which disqualify persons from 
standing on the grounds of any conviction, may infringe the Convention, 
since convictions which have not called into question the integrity of 
the person concerned should not debar a person from standing for 
trade union office. Legislation imposing such a restriction is considered 
incompatible with the principles of freedom of association. 13 ° 
With regard to legislation regulating in detail the election procedures 
of trade unions, this may be incompatible with the rights in the 
Convention since it may limit the free exercise of the right by unions, 
and may even open the door for interference by public authorities in 
the voting process. '" The Committee has considered that provisions 
which allow the intervention of public authorities in the voting process, 
even though this may be with good intent, may allow interference 
incompatible with the Convention. Impartial supervision provided by a 
competent judicial body is considered preferable. 138 Likewise, in the 
opinion of the Committee, in order to avoid violation of the Convention, 
the dismissal of trade union officers should be through and subject to a 
competent judicial body. 13 ° 
With regard to the right of organizations to organise their own 
administration, the Committee considers that although the general 
principle is that organizations should be free to administer their own 
affairs, the Convention does not exclude the possibility of external 
control where there is reason to believe that the law or the 
organization's rules have been violated. l4° Legislation allowing the 
public authority entire discretion to investigate the internal affairs of a 
136. The Committee has pointed out that conviction, on account of offences the nature of which is not 
such as to be prejudicial to the proper exercise of official trade union functions, should not 
constitute grounds for disqualification for trade union office and that any legislation providing for 
disqualification for any type of criminal offence might be regarded as inconsistent with the 
principles of freedom of association. ' 
For example, 133rd Report, Case No. 668, para. 298. 
137. The following provisions are incompatible with the right to hold free elections, namely, those 
which involve interference by the public authorities in various stages of the electoral process, 
beginning with the obligation to submit the candidates' names beforehand to the Ministry of Labour, 
together with personal particulars, continuing with the presence of a representative of the Ministry 
of Labour or the civil or military authorities at the elections and culminating with the approval of 
the elections by ministerial decision, without which they are invalid. " For example, 86th Report, Case No. 451, paras. 135 & 136. 138. control of union elections should rest with the judicial authorities. ' For example, 143rd Report, Case No. 771, para. 11?. 
139. The removal from trade union office of trade union leaders ... should be effected through the courts. 
For example, 128th Report, Case No. 651, para. 56. 'In the Committee's opinion, it is of paramount importance that measures for the dismissal, 
suspension or disqualification of trade union officials as a penalty provided by law should not become 
enforceable except on the basis of a firm sentence on the part of the competent judicial authority 
For example, 114th Report, Case No. 510, para. 62. 140. The principles established in article 3 of Convention no. 87 do not prevent the control of the internal acts of a trade union if those internal acts violate legal provisions or rules. Nevertheless, 
in order to guarantee an impartial and objective procedure, this control should be exercised by the 
relevant judicial authority. " 
For example, 73rd Report, Case No. 348, para. 114. 
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union would however violate the Convention. 1°1 
The complete freedom, according to the Convention, of trade unions to 
organise their activities and formulate programmes may in practice be 
restricted by legislation which severely controls union involvement in 
political activity, ranging from a complete ban on any political activity 
to establishing close links between trade unions and the ruling party, 
considered incompatible with the Convention. ' °a 
With respect to the right to striker ° 3, the Committee considers this one 
of the essential means available to workers to promote and protect their 
economic and social interests. ' as Right to strike may be prohibited 
directly by legislation or indirectly through. legislation which provides 
that disputes must be settled through compulsory arbitration leading to 
a final. binding decision, for example, by a Labour Court, or by a 
decision at the discretion of the public authority. The law may impose 
reasonable conditions, including the fulfilment of certain procedures, to 
make a strike lawful, which may not conflict with the Convention. l46 
Restrictions on the right to strike may be related to a particular 
category, for example, government employees, or imposed in the light of 
the purpose of the strike or the methods used. 
The Committee's view is that the right to strike of public or essential 
service workers may become meaningless if public or essential service is 
defined broadly. The Committee has stated that the restriction should be 
141. 'Legislation which accords to the Minister the right, in his entire discretion, to investigate 
the internal affairs of a trade union merely if he considers it necessary in the public interest, is 
not in conformity with the principles that workers' organizations should have the right to organize 
their administration and activities without any interference on the part of the public authorities 
which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof. 
For example, 95th Report, Case No. 448, paras. 143,145. 
142. The International Labour Conference in Resolution 1952 Concerning the Independence of the Trade 
Union Movement stated that trade union relations with political parties, or trade union political 
action should not compromise the continuance of the trade union movement. 
"If trade unions are prohibited in general terms fror engaging in any political activities, this may 
raise difficulties by reason of the fact that the interpretation given to the relevant provisions in 
practice may change at any moment and considerably restrict the possibility of action of the 
organizations. It would therefore seen that states should be able without prohibiting in general terns 
political activities of occupational organizations, to entrust to the judicial authorities the task of 
repressing abuses which night, in certain cases, be committed by organizations ... . For example, 84th Report, Case No. 423, para. 77. 
Likewise, the Committee has reaffirmed the principle expressed by International Conference in 
Resolution Concerning the Independence of the Trade Union Movement that ' ... governments should not 
attempt to transform the trade union movement into an instrument for the pursuance of political aims, 
nor should they attempt to interfere with the normal functions of a trade union movement because of 
its freely established relationship with a political party. ' 
For example, 21st Report, Case No. 19, para. 29. 
143. The right to strike is provided explicitly by article B of the Economic and Social Covenant, and 
as we will see, in the European Social Charter. 
144. According to the Freedom of Association Committee, the right to strike by workers and their 
organizations is generally recognised as a legitimate means of defending their occupational interests. 
The right to strike is one of the essential means through which workers and their organizations may 
promote and defend their occupational interests. ' 
For example, 2nd Report, Case No. 28, para. 68. 
145. It is necessary for the conditions that have to be fulfilled, under the law, in order to render 
it strike lawful, to be reasonable and in any event not such as to place a substantial limitation in 
the means of action open to trade union organizations. " 
For example, 37th Report, Case No. 170, para. 41. 
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confined to public employees acting as agents of the authority, or to 
services the interruption of which would endanger life, personal safety 
or health of the whole or part of the community. "" If strikes are 
restricted or prohibited, guarantees must be provided to protect the 
interests of workers who lack this defence, through impartial and swift 
arbitration procedures. l °' With regard to the purposes, the Committee 
considers that the possibility of strike action in protest against 
government's economic and social policies does fall within the scope of 
the Convention, while strikes for purely political reasons do not. 14 8 
Article 4 of Convention 87 provides that organizations should be 
protected against dissolution or suspension by the public authorities. 
Thus, a law or decree suspending or dissolving an organization 
constitutes an administrative measure contrary to the same article, and 
likewise incompatible with article B. 
Cancellation would fall into the same category. i' 9 The safeguard of the 
right protected by article 4 requires more than a right of appeal 
against an administrative decision. lso Decisions should not enforced 
before an appeal may be lodged or prior to confirmation by the judicial 
authority. Again, a simple right of appeal does not safeguard this 
principle, for example, where the public authority has a discretionary 
power in reaching such a decision. The Committee on Freedom of 
Association, on examining the practice of several countries, considered 
that dissolution of workers' and employers' organizations should be 
carried out by the judicial authority, which alone guarantees the right 
of defence. This applies even during a state of emergency, l 51 as we will 
see in more detail in the discussion of the effect of state of emergency 
on human rights protection in international law. 
146. Freedom of Association and collective bargaining : general survey by the Committee of Experts on 
the application of conventions and recommendations, ILO Conference 69th session, 1983, p. 66 
147. The Committee has emphasised the importance which it attaches, where strikes are prohibited or 
subject to restrictions, to ensuring adequate guarantees to safeguard to the full the interests of the 
workers thus deprived of an essential means of defending their occupational interests, and has pointed 
out that the restriction should be accompanied by adequate impartial and speedy conciliation and 
arbitration proceedings in which the parties concerned can take part at every stage. 
For example, 60th Report, Case No. 274, para. 266. 
148. "The Committee has taken the view that strikes of a purely political nature and strikes decided 
systematically long before the negotiations take place, do not tall within the scope of the principles 
of freedom of association. ' 
For example, 139th Report, Cases Nos. 737 to 744, para. 124. 
149. According to the Freedom of Association Committee, legislation which accords to the Minister the 
power to order the cancellation of the registration of a trade union in his entire discretion and 
without any right of appeal to the courts, is contrary to the principles of freedom of association. 
For example, 95th Report, Case No. 448, paras. 143 & 145. 150. 'If the principle that an occupational association nay not be subject to suspension or 
dissolution by administrative decision is to be properly applied, it is not sufficient for the law to 
grant the right of appeal against such administrative decisions, but that the latter should not take 
effect until the expiry of the statutory period for lodging an appeal or until the confirmation of 
such decisions by a judicial authority. ' For example, 74th Report, Case No. 363, para. 224, Case No. 308, para. 86. 151. The Committee has pointed out that any measures of suspension or dissolution by administrative 
authority, when taken during an emergency situation, should be accompanied by normal judicial 
safeguards, including the right of appeal to the courts against such dissolution or suspension. For example, 31st Report, Case No. 683, para. 200. 
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The right of organizations to establish and join federations and 
confederations, and to affiliate with international organizations is 
safeguarded in article 5 of the Convention, lsz which implies that 
organizations should be allowed to form federations free from 
restrictions based on occupation or geographical area, thus law which 
requires an unreasonable minimum number of trade unions to establish 
federations, or which prevents federations of unions which represent 
different occupations is incompatible with the Convention, as is a 
requirement for prior authorisation of such a federation. The Committee 
has pointed out that laws, often associated with the provisions we 
examined leading to a single-union system, which allow the establishment 
of only one federation for an occupation or region, or a single national 
confederation also violate the Convention. ' 53 
As before, the rights of certain workers' and employers' unions to form 
federations and confederations may be restricted by law, and in some 
cases, this may violate the Convention. lb° 
Restrictions which may be imposed by countries on the activities of 
higher-level organizations include restriction on the right to strike or 
to bargain collectively. Such restriction may hamper the development of 
industrial relations, at the expense of small or weak unions, and is 
incompatible with article 5 of the Convention. Restrictions such as 
making affiliation to international organizations subject to prior 
authorisation's 6 or preventing national bodies from receiving funds from 
outside the country are considered by the Committee to be prejudicial to 
the guarantees provided in article 5, since the right implies the 
opportunity for national organizations to benefit from affiliation with 
international organizations. " 56 
152. Article 6 provides that the safeguards provided in articles 2,3 and 4 also apply to bodies 
established under this provision. 
153.85th Report, Case No. 274, para. 286. 154. According to the Freedom of Association Committee, while the prohibition of a single trade union 
catering for industrial and agricultural workers is not necessarily contrary to the Convention, a 
government's refusal to permit agricultural unions to affiliate with a national centre of workers' 
organizations comprising industrial unions is incompatible with article 5 of the Convention. 
For example, 108th Report, Case No. 506, para. 226. 
155. According to the Freedom of Association Committee, legislation which requires the obtaining of 
government permission for the international affiliation of a trade union is incompatible with the 
principle of free and voluntary affiliation of trade unions with international organizations. For example, 6th Report, Case No. 50, para. 854. 
156. The Committee has considered that legislation prohibiting the acceptance by a national trade 
union of financial assistance from an international organization of workers to which it is affiliated 
would violate the principles concerning the right to affiliate with international organizations of 
workers, and that legislation which provides for the banning of any and all organizations where there 
is evidence that they are under the influence or direction of any outside source and also for the 
banning of any and all organizations where there is evidence that they receive financial assistance or 
other benefits from any outside source unless such financial assistance or other benefits be approved 
by and channelled through government, is incompatible with the principles set out in article 5 of 
Convention no. 87 in so far as these provisions apply to the right of trade unions to affiliate with 
international workers' organizations. 
For example, 148th Report, Case No. 794, para. 22. 
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Though the phrase "democratic society" appears only once (in article 
29) in the Universal Declaration, it is implicit throughout this text, as in 
the other instruments which secure political human rights, that they are 
exercised and may be enjoyed only within the framework of a democratic 
society. 16? Article 29 makes explicit the principle that human rights are 
subject to restriction inter alia for the purpose of securing general 
welfare in a democratic society. 
The meaning of the term "democracy" has been the subject of much 
debate, though it has been used more or less consistently to mean a 
form of government in which the demos or "people" rule. 158 Though the 
term demos is usually translated as "the people", it is clear that in 
classical Athens, this term was in fact more restrictive than this 
translation implies. " The restriction on the definition of the term "the 
people" has continued throughout every manifestation of democracy, 
until the present day. Throughout history, restrictions have been based 
on citizenship, sex, colour, status and wealth. Contemporary liberal 
political thought continues to maintain restrictions on democracy, though 
nowadays, restriction is more likely to be only on the grounds of 
citizenship and residence, age and legal capacity. 
The mechanism of democracy has evolved from that of the Athenian 
polis of the fifth century B. C., ' °° through western"' and eastern 
157. In the travaux preparatoires of the Universal Declaration, Rene Cassin stated that he did not 
consider that article 27 of the draft Declaration, which mentioned 'democratic society", occupied a 
sufficiently prominent position, suggesting that a more suitable position would have been immediately 
after the preamble. This would give due prominence to the principle in the Declaration affirming that 
law could have no other source than the will of the people. 
General Assembly Official Records Third Session, Part 1, Third Committee, p. 62. 
158. Jack Lively has listed the range of meanings of 'rule of the people' as: (1) That all should 
govern, in the sense that all should be involved in legislating in deciding on general policy, in 
applying laws and in governmental administration; (2) That all should be personally involved in 
crucial decision making, that is to say in deciding general laws and matters of general policy; (3) That rulers should be accountable to the ruled; they should, in other words, be obliged to justify 
their actions to the ruled and be removable by the ruled; (4) That rulers should be accountable to the 
representatives of the ruled; (5) That rulers should be chosen by the ruled; (6) That rulers should be 
chosen by the representatives of the ruled; (7) That rulers should act in the interests of the ruled. Jack Lively, Democracy, 1975, P. M. 
159. Athenian citizens alone were eligible to participat by voting and holding public office. 
Citizens, in this context, excluded women, slaves and  etics 
(e resident aliens). 
160. J. K. Davies Democracy and classical Greece, 1978, chs. 2-4 161. The question of the mechanism of democracy was examined by Rousseau in his discussion of the 
principle of the 'general will", and in particular the composition of the legislature, which raised the issue of the relationship between the government and people, in particular, the people's 
participation in government. 
In his view, the Constitution was based on the supremacy of parliament : all laws might be revoked or 
enacted by the legislature, and the decision of the majority in the legislature was to be binding on 
all. The legislature, he seems at times to argue, is an assembly of the whole people, based on the 
classical Athenian model : 'Sovereignty does not admit of representation ... deputies of the people 
are not and cannot be its representatives; they are merely its stewards and can carry through no 
definitive acts. ' At other times, this is rejected as impracticable and unreliable there being no 
guarantee that the assembly's decision 'would be the expression of the general will", therefore, he 
suggested, a "well-intentioned" government should act according to the general will. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Social Contract and other discourses, 1973, pp. 89-250. 
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political thought"' to the contemporary systems which range from 
"liberal" or "western" to "peoples"' or "socialist" democracy. "°3 
The definitions submitted by the government of Senegal for the study 
on The Individual's Duties to the Community and the Limitations on 
Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal 
Declaration, help to clarify the distinct nature of "liberal" democracy 
and "people's" democracy. The former is characterised as permitting the 
existence of more than one ideology and party, with emphasis placed on 
the vote and elections for power contested by the various parties. 
"People's" democracies are described as societies in which the means of 
production are socialised. Such societies, homogeneous by force of 
circumstances, have a single ideology represented by one party, and 
elections, since not contested, are described as "unanimous". ' °° Several 
Arab countries have adopted the latter system. 
Jack Lively has identified three elements, corresponding to factors in 
the international legal provision, ' °6 which allow a measure to be made of 
the degree of democracy in a given political community. These are : the 
extent to which all constituent groups are incorporated in the 
162. According to the Islamic Council, political power is neither valid nor exercisable except by and 
on behalf of the community, through the process of Shura (mutual consultation). No one  ay arrogate to 
himself the right to rule by personal discretion, since it is the obligation and the right of every 
Muslim to participate in the political process, and political authority is to be entrusted to those 
who are the true representatives of the nation. Political power, whether legislative, executive or judicial may only be exercised within the Islamic context. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran provides for political participation, or Shura, in 
article 58, which provides that . 'Legislative power shall be exercised through the Majlis which shall be a consultative assembly of representatives elected by the people. ' 
163. '. Socialist democracy' is characterised as granting to the workers the widest rights and liberties 
on the basis of equality, without discrimination. These rights are assured and guaranteed by the 
socialist structure and by the society as a whole, with which the individual is indissolubly linked in 
all fields and spheres of his activity. Information supplied by the Soviet Union to the Special Rapporteur who prepared the study on the 
individual's duties to the community. 
The Individual's duties to the community and the limitations on human rights and freedoms under 
article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1983 E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432fRev. 2, P. 93 
Article 2 of the Soviet Constitution stresses that all power in the USSR belongs to the people, who 
exercise State power through Soviets of People's Deputies, which constitute the political foundation 
of the Constitution of the USSR. The powers of the People's Deputies, and the relation between 
electors and deputies are specified in the Constitution. Article 113 guarantees the right of public 
organizations to participate in the administration of state affairs, which grants these or anizations, 
through their all-union bodies, the right to initiate legislation in the Supreme Soviet. 
The 
right of 
individuals to take part in the conduct of public affairs is also guaranteed in the Constitution. 
Elsewhere in the eastern bloc, in Yugoslavia, for example, the principle of 'socialist self- 
management' is enshrined in the Constitution, and it is applied in the political sphere and all other 
aspects of socio-economic relations. A network of self-management institutions has been established 
which involves every individual in the running of labour associations, local communities and central 
political and economic organs. 
164. Ibid, pp. 89-90 165. The first, the extent to which all constituent groups are involved corresponds to 'without 
unreasonable restrictions' in para. (a) of article 25 of the Covenant; the extent to which 
governmental decisions are subject to popular control corresponds to the requirement for periodic 
elections, as we will see, while the opportunity to participate in public administration clearly 
corresponds to para. c) of the article. 
Jack Lively, Democracy, 1975, p. 51 
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The right to political participation is to be found in the Universal 
Declaration which expresses the importance of the right of all citizens to 
participate, freely and actively, in the affairs of their political order. 
The text states explicitly that "the will of the people shall be the basis 
of authority of government", implying that the exercise of the right is 
envisaged within a democratic structure. 
The travaux preparatoires indicate agreement that the draft Political 
Covenant should contain an article enshrining political rights to 
translate the principles of article 21 of the Declaration into a legal 
obligation. Ways proposed included one text emphasising the obligations 
of the state - "every citizen shall be guaranteed by the state ... the 
right and the opportunity ... 
". 188 However, an alternative stressing the 
right of the individual - "every citizen shall have ... the right and 
the 
opportunity ... 
", was adopted in article 25.10' 
According to international texts, 1-711 including the Political Covenant, the 
right of taking part in the conduct of public affairs should be practised 
"either directly or through freely chosen representatives". Some 
proposed that a direct role should be the general rule, but the majority 
considered both direct and indirect suffrage admissible. 
166. This principle is in line with the Human Rights Committee's interpretation that the exclusion of 
any group from the governing process on political grounds is incompatible with the democratic 
principles embodied in international instruments. 
167. The Individual's duties to the community and the limitations on human rights and freedoms under 
article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1983 E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 2, p. 128 
168. United Nations General Assembly Official Records Annexes 20 September - 20 December 1955 p. 59, 
para. 171 
169. Article 23 of the draft Covenant contained the phrase "to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs'. A more specific formula 'to take part in the government of the State' comparable to the 
phrase in the Universal Declaration "to take part in the government of his country" was not adopted. 
170. Although the American Declaration and Convention, the African Charter, European Convention and its First Protocol provide protection of the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or indirectly, without unreasonable restrictions, the wording of the provisions differs as to 
the degree of citizen participation, whether directly, by referendum, or through representatives. 
While the American Declaration and Convention, and the African Charter contain the recognition of the 
right of everyone to participate in the government of his country, this is not explicitly provided by 
the European Convention itself, nor by the article in the First Protocol to the Convention, which sets 
out conditions for the election of the legislature. Each article which provides this right specifies that the mechanism of political participation may be 
direct or indirect, as in the American Convention and African Charter, through "freely chosen 
representatives". 
The proposed Arab Covenant does not contain any direct reference to this right. 
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Most modern states provide for direct participation through referenda, 
though the rule is that participation. is indirect, through petitions or 
mass meetings for example, with the people's authority tending to be 
exercised through representatives. Indirect participation through 
representatives is in line with the international principle as long as 
they are able to exercise power in the state. However, where real power 
is held by an individual such as an hereditary ruler, or ruling group 
not chosen by the people, and the proposals, decisions and legislation 
put forward by the elected representatives may be vetoed, the people 
cannot be considered to exercise their political rights. Equally, when no 
representative assembly exists or no mechanism for change of leadership 
is available, the people must be considered unable to exercise political 
rights. 
With regard to the right to vote and to be elected, the travaux 
preparatoires of the Covenant show that there was a more specific 
proposal that "every citizen shall have the right to vote and to be 
elected to all organs of authority", but the proposal was rejected 
because in most countries, not all organs of authority are elective. 
Neither article 21 of the Universal Declaration nor article 25 of the 
Political Covenant specify whether election to public office should be by 
direct or indirect vote. The comment may be made that the indirect 
mechanism, in which votes are cast for members of an elective body who 
in turn select candidates, may not truly represent the voters' will. 
The requirement of the article that elections be periodic, is intended to 
ensure that persons who have lost the confidence of the electors should 
not remain in office. Elections should be held with sufficient frequency 
to allow the electorate to play an effective role by exercising control 
over their representatives. As we saw above, this may be regarded as a 
measure of the degree of democracy within any political system. 
It goes without saying that elections held to choose representatives 
must be "genuine", but this requirement extends to any public 
consultation, by referendum, for example. "Genuine" in this context, 
means that the will of the people is honestly and accurately ascertained. 
An election may not be described as genuine if there has been 
dishonesty, corruption or coercion, whether by the electors, the 
candidates or the authorities. Electoral laws governing the procedures, 
conditions and safeguards of the electoral process are the mechanism by 
which genuine elections are ensured. An important element in securing 
genuine elections is the principle of secrecy in voting, which guards 
against coercion or intimidation. 
With respect to the requirement that election must be "by universal 
and equal suffrage", the travaux preparatoires indicate that the opinion 
was expressed that the word "universal" was unnecessary in view of the 
introductory wording "every citizen... ", and the term "equal" was again 
redundant in view of the provisions of article 2 concerning non- 
discrimination. However, the majority considered that the principle of 
"universal and equal suffrage" was important, while leaving countries 
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free to regulate their own elections, so the wording was retained. 
Regional instruments regulate the right in similar terms. "' 
Bearing in mind that this thesis examines the political rights of a 
population who, as we will see in the next Chapter, have only 
comparatively recently achieved independence, the question may be 
raised of whether universal and equal suffrage should be granted 
immediately in this context, or introduced gradually because of the 
comparative political immaturity of the population. Such an approach 
must be rejected, since it is contemplated neither by article 21 of the 
Universal Declaration nor article 25 of the Political Covenant. 
Furthermore, in the light of the Declaration by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations on the granting of independence to colonial countries 
and peoples, ' °2 where it is stated, inter alia, that "inadequacy of 
political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never 
serve as a pretext for delaying independence" and steps are to be 
taken immediately to transfer all powers to the peoples of territories not 
yet independent, it is quite clear that the General Assembly does not 
regard political or educational development as acceptable grounds for 
restricting the exercise of political rights by all peoples. 
"Equal suffrage" implies "one man, one vote", that all should 
participate on equal terms and each vote should have the same weight. 
Regulations which establish the voting system, electoral boundaries, 
counting and proclamation of votes have a vital role to play, since 
failure in any of these mechanisms undermines the genuineness of 
elections. Arbitrary establishment of electoral district boundaries, for 
example, may distort the true expression of the will of the people. "' 
171. In all regional instruments, the right belongs to citizens alone, though the European Convention is explicit in allowing States to restrict the political activity of aliens, and the American Declaration goes further in stating that 'It is the duty of every person to refrain from taking part 
in political activities which are restricted exclusively to the citizens of the state in which he is 
an alien. ' Otherwise, the only restriction placed on the right appears in the American Convention, 
where restrictions are specified on the Irounds of age, residence, lan nage education, civil and 
mental capacity or criminal convictions. Only the American instruments expIicitly protect the right to 
vote and be elected. Along with the article in the First Protocol to the European Convention, they 
provide that elections be genuine and periodic, though other terms such as 'honest, 'free' and 'at 
reasonable intervals' are used. They provide that elections be held by secret ballot, and both the 
American Convention and the Protocol to the European Convention specify that the elections should 
ensure % free expression of the 'will of the voters' (American Convention) or 'the opinion of the 
people' (Protocol to the European Convention). Neither the African Charter nor the proposed Arab 
Covenant contain provisions specifying the conditions of elections, while the American Declaration 
alone contains the right of petition. he European article specifies that it is the people's choice of 
the legislature which should be ensured. This article seems to be giving legal expression to the belief outlined in the preamble of the European Convention that fundamental freedoms are best 
safeguarded by 'effective political democracy'. The European Commission has stated, in the Greek case, 
that the article in the Protocol 'presupposes the existence of a representative legislature, elected 
at reasonable intervals, as the basis of a democratic societp'. 
Yearbook of the European Commission on Human Rights 12, p. 179. 
172. Resolution 1514 (XV) quoted in United Nations Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Political Rights, 1962, p. 11. 
173. The American Supreme Court's judgement in Baker v Carr (1962) established the principle that the 
courts are competent to decide in apportionment cases, giving rise to a number of other cases in which federal and state courts have ruled on unfair apportionment. Discussed in Journal of International Commission of Jurists IV, 1-2 1963, pp, 323-7. 
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No international or regional legal provision specifies a particular 
system of voting, 17 ° but the necessity to ensure the free expression of 
the will of the electors is the criterion to judge whether the election is 
"genuine". In its interpretation of article 3 of the First Protocol to the 
European Convention in a case where it was claimed that only a system 
of proportional representation could secure the right expressed in the 
article, i' S the Commission explained that "free expression of the opinion 
of the people" primarily means that elections cannot be held under any 
form of pressure in the choice of one or more candidates, and that in 
this choice, the elector must not be unduly induced to vote for one 
party or another. In addition, the word "choice 11170 means that different 
political parties must be assured a reasonable opportunity to present 
their candidates at elections. 
Genuine elections imply freedom of choice, to ensure that free 
expression of the will of the electors may take place. This principle was 
applied by the European Commission, in the Greek case, when it found 
that banning of political parties violated this right. 17 
However, this 
does not imply that all such bans violate the right, since parties whose 
programmes are to undermine the freedoms of others secured 
in 
international law have been considered an exception. The Commission, 
in 
consideration of an application by the German Communist 
Party, quoted 
from preparatory work for the Convention the statement that : 
"the 
object was to prevent adherents to totalitarian doctrines from exploiting 
the rights guaranteed by the Convention for the purpose of 
destroying 
human rights". 1 °e This is parallel to a restriction that might 
be placed 
174. The European Human Rights Commission has found that the article in the Protocol to the European 
Convention does not impose a particular kind of electoral system, ensuring that the total number of 
votes cast for each candidate or group is reflected in the composition of the legislative assembly. 
Xv United Kingdo. Application no. 7140/75. 
175. In Xv United Kingdom, a candidate for parliament complained that he was deprived of 
his right 
to a just and fair representation of his opinion in the House of Commons by virtue of the 
'first past 
the post' electoral system which existed in the United Kingdom" and contended that only an electoral 
system which contained at least an element of proportional representation could ensure conformity with 
the article in the European Convention. 
176. The Commission adopted the same notion with regard to the word "choice' in this article, as had 
the Court in their consideration of "Freedom of choice" in the right of association. See above. 
177. Yearbook of the European Court of Human Rights 1, p. 224. 
178. The German Communist Party applied to the European Court on the grounds that its rights under 
articles 9,10 and 11 of the Convention were violated by the declaration of the German 
Federal 
Constitutional Court that it was anti-constitutional, its dissolution and seizure of its property. The 
Commission agreed that the aims of the Party were incompatible with the Convention, since it sought to 
establish a communist society by means of a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of 
the 
proletariat. Therefore, even if it sought power by constitutional means, dictatorship would 
be 
incompatible with the Convention, by involving the suppression of a number of rights. 
The Irish government also invoked article 17 of the Convention in the Lawless case, claiming that 
Lawless, since supporting the aims of the IRA, was not entitled to rely on articles 5,6,7 or any of 
the rights in the Convention. However, the Commission expressed the view that article 17 was not 
applicable, that the aim of article 17 was to prevent totalitarian groups exploiting the rights 
safeguarded by the Convention, but that to achieve this aim, 
it was not necessary to deprive those 
persons of all the rights in the Convention. Thus, a person engaging in subversive activities does not 
thereby lose the right to a fair trial, for example, according to article 6, while he would lose 
political rights, such as those of organising political meetings or associations, since the criterion 
upheld by the Commission is that "no person may be able to take advantage of the provisions of the 
Convention to perform acts aimed at destroying the aforesaid rights and freedoms". 
Yearbook of the European Court of Human Rights, 4, p. 438 
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on the right contained in article 25 of the Political Covenant on the 
grounds that it was incompatible with article 5. 
The meaning of the phrase "without unreasonable restriction"' '9 in 
article 25 of the Political Covenant has been clarified to some extent by 
the findings of the Human Rights Committee in the Wein burger v. 
Uruguay case, where it expressed the view that article 25 is violated by 
a national decree which prohibits, for a term of 15 years, the 
participation "in any of the activities of a political nature ... 
" by certain 
persons. ' eo The Committee commented that it could not see why, even in 
a state of emergency, to restore peace and order, it should be 
necessary to deprive all candidates of some political groups at certain 
elections of all future political rights, for a period as long as fifteen 
years. 
It is of particular importance to this thesis, to point out the serious 
implications of the State's penal policy in either developing or retarding 
the political life of its community, deepening the crisis of representation 
and further alienating citizenly feelings. The Committee, in Wein burger 
v. Uruguay, has expressed its awareness of the fact that under national 
legislation of several countries, there is a tendency that "criminal 
offenders" may in many cases be deprived of all or certain political 
rights. Although the Political Covenant merely prohibits "unreasonable" 
restrictions in article 25, nevertheless, in no case may a person be 
subjected to such sanctions solely because of his or her political opinion 
in line with articles 2 (paragraph 1) and 26. Furthermore, the Committee 
stated that "... in the circumstances of the present case there is no 
justification for such a deprivation of all political rights for a period of 
15 years. "L I1 
The Committee has commented on a statement made by a State Party 
under article 40 of the Political Covenant, that the enjoyment of the 
rights proclaimed therein was subject, inter alia, to "the compatibility of 
such enjoyment with the ideological principles and foundations of the 
political system and its prevailing plans and programmes"182, that the 
provision was not compatible with the Political Covenant, and could be 
179. During drafting of the article, a proposal was made that a clause abolishing "property, 
educational or other qualifications" which restricted electoral rights be included. Since, in many 
countries, certain categories of persons are denied the right to vote, and the right to public office 
and access to public service are subject to certain restrictions, including citizenship, nationality 
and age, the clause 'without unreasonable restrictions' was adopted. 
180. They are : (1) candida%s-Tctive office at certain elections on the list of Marxist or 
pro-Marxist political parties or groups which were declared illegal by decrees made some time after 
those elections; (2) candidates for elective office at those elections on the lists of political 
organisations which were 'electorally associated' Kith those parties or groups, 'under the same 
coincidental or joint slogan or subslogan'; (3) "tried for crimes against the nation"; (4) "tried for 
offences against the public administration committed during the exercise of their political 
functions". 
Provisions of Institutional Act No. 4 of 1st September 1976, quoted in Human Rights Committee Selected 
Decisions under the Optional Protocol (Second to sixteenth sessions), 1985, p. 42 
181. Weinburger Y' Uruguay ibid. pp. 57-60 
182. See the initial report (CCPR/C/1/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979) 
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ORDER Page 53 
RIGHT OF POLITICAL. PARTICIPATION 
used to apply harsh measures in contradiction with its provisions, "' 
With particular reference to the right to participate in political life, a 
member of the Committee has commented that to exclude persons from 
the political process on political grounds would be a violation of the 
principle of equality provided in the Covenant. 184 
European case law also provides clarification of the "reasonableness" of 
restrictions on the exercise of political rights, based on the criterion we 
saw above, that such restrictions must not interfere with "the free 
expression of the opinion of the people". The European Commission has 
found that conditions commonly imposed on the right include citizenship, 
residence185 and age. '86 
The Commission has held that a law depriving persons convicted of 
"uncitizenlike conduct" from practising their political rights is not a 
violation of the principle in the Protocol to the European Convention, 187 
and that prevention of convicted prisoners from voting does not affect 
the "free expression of the opinion of the people", and therefore does 
not violate the Protocol. ' e8 It has confirmed that deprivation of 
individuals' rights of voting or participating in elections on the grounds 
of incompatibility with article 17 of the European Convention is not a 
violation of their rights. ' 89 
183. Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, Official Records: Thirty-Fifth Session, 
Supplement No. 40 (A/35/40), P. M. 
184. The exclusion of "all individuals who adopted a political, economic or intellectual position that 
was hostile to the Revolution and its programme .. 
from the democracy may be seen as a clear 
violation of the principle of access without unreasonable restrictions to the political process. 
CCPR/C/SR. 748 of 21st July 1987 P. M. 185. The Commission has also found that requirements of residence applied to this right were not 
unreasonable, considering that reasons might be: 1. the assumption that a non-resident citizen is 
less directly or continuously interested in, and has less day-to-day knowledge of, its problems; 2. 
the impracticability for parliamentary candidates to present the different electoral issues to 
citizens abroad so as to secure the free expression of opinion; 3. the need to prevent electoral 
fraud, the danger of which is increased in controlled postal votes; 4. the link between the right of 
representation and the parliamentary vote and the obligation to pay taxes. 
Application no. 7566/76 p. 121. 
186. In the case of X, Y and Z Y. Belgium, the Commission considered that the minimum age of 25 years 
for those wishing to stand for election cannot be regarded as unreasonable or arbitrary. X, Y6Zv Belgium, Application no. 7566/76. 187. The Commission upheld a law depriving persons convicted of uncitizenlike conduct during the 
Second World War of their right to vote for life, since the purpose of the law was to prevent persons 
who had grossly misused their right to participate in public life in war-time from misusing their 
rights in future. 
Xv Netherlands, Application no. 6573/74 p. 87. 
188. Xv Federal Republic of Germany, Application no. 2728/66, p. 38; Xv Federal Republic of 6eraany, 
4984/71 p. 28. 
189. Glimmerveen A Hagenbeek v Netherlands, Applications 8348/78 and 8406/78 p. 187. 
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During drafting of the Political Covenant, the provisions concerning the 
right of access to public service on general terms of equality did not 
give rise to much debate, save for the question of the qualifications 
required :a proposal was made that every citizen should have political 
rights "irrespective of race, colour, national origin, social position, 
property status, social origin, language, religion or sex", but this was 
rejected, and the clause "without any of the distinctions mentioned in 
article 2 of this Covenant" was adopted. 
Discrimination in access to elective public service occurs when a 
candidate who meets other legal requirements, such. as those based on 
nationality, residence, age and requirements of the office, is excluded 
solely on the grounds specified in article 2 of the Political Covenant. 
Non-discrimination in the context of public employment means that such 
employees be chosen impartially and without regard to their political 
belief. It has been noted that the filling of high-level "policy-making" 
posts by candidates who share the political views of the administration 
in power is not deemed to be discriminatory, though problems arise from 
the absence of objective criteria to determine which posts may be 
regarded as "policy-making". "' 
Remedy for alleged discrimination in acess to both elective and 
appointive public office should be made available, according to article 2, 
paragraph 3 of the Covenant. Although, in the first instance, recourse 
may be made to administrative organs, ultimately the appeal should be 
made to the judiciary. 
Regional instruments safeguard the right of access to public service on 
general terms of equality, ' 91 and go on to mention political duties. Both 
the American Declaration and the African Charter specify such duties, 
with the American instrument stating the duty to vote and to hold 
public office, while the African Charter, in article 29, specifies the 
duties of service to the national community and preservation and 
strengthening of "social and national solidarity". The concept of the 
duty of the citizen to the community, which finds expression in article 
29 of the Universal Declaration, is to be found within the legal order of 
many developing countries, in particular those Arab countries which 
have adopted radical political programmes, as we will see in Chapter 
4.192 
190. United Nations Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Political Rights, 1962, p. 13 
191. In the regional instruments, only the African Charter and the American Convention protect the 
right of access to public service. Like the Political Covenant, in the American Convention, it is 
subject to 'general conditions of equality', while the African Charter guarantees the right to all 
citizens. The proposed Arab Covenant guarantees the right of every national to have access to public 
service in his country. 
192. For example, in Iraq, the Provisional Constitution stipulates that : 'Public office is a sacred 
trust and a social service based on faithful and conscious devotion to the interests, rights and 
freedoms of the masses in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the law. ' 
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This section examines the provisions according to which the obligation 
of States Parties to international human rights instruments to safeguard 
and ensure the rights we have examined, and others, may be modified in 
time of crisis, for example, when a State adopts special powers and 
takes legislative steps to restrict those rights in the name of the 
protection of its community. 19 3 The scope of state of emergency 
situations is wide, for example, the term is used to cover natural 
disasters, force majeure events, political crises or other threats to the 
nation. The characteristic they share is their exceptional and temporary 
nature. In the present discussion, the focus will be on measures of a 
temporary character, taken to deal with a situation having a political 
nature, involving a threat to the nation. While it is true that a crisis 
situation may also result from international or non-international armed 
conflict and wars of national liberation, and it is the case that these 
elements are present in the Middle East today, since these situations are 
more properly the subject of humanitarian law and not the main focus of 
concern in the present research, the concentration will be on situations 
of internal disorder or crisis, of a political nature. 
International human rights instruments acknowledge the existence of 
such exceptional circumstances by containing provisions which allow 
States Parties to derogate from obligations undertaken under 
international law, but this concession to States represents an exception, 
and so the adoption and use of the measures of derogation which the 
instruments envisage are specified and regulated by the instruments 
themselves. While some aspects of the adoption and use of temporary 
emergency provisions are common to both international and national 
legislation, they differ in important respects, and therefore are the 
subject of separate examination in this study. 
The present section concentrates on the international provisions which 
define and regulate the adoption and use of emergency measures, in this 
case, of derogation from obligations assumed under international law, ' 9e 
with the aim of establishing a clear picture of the international legal 
understanding of the concept of state of emergency in the strictly 
defined sense already mentioned, with a view to using some of the 
principles thereby distinguished in a later section, as a measure both of 
the content of national legislation regulating the use of emergency 
powers, and of the extent to which certain governments meet their 
international obligations, as well as assessing the effect of the use of 
emergency powers on the legal order in general, and the human rights 
protected by international law in particular. 
193. The name given to these circumstances varies from country to country : the situation may be 
described as state of emergency, state of siege, imposition of martial law and so on. Since, in 
general, these situations could be categorised as estate of emergency*, only this term will be used 
in this discussion. 
194. This analysis adopts the approach of the Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent 
Developments Concerning Situations known as States of Siege or Emergency, which identified in the 
international understanding procedural and substantive guarantees, as well as the implementation of 
surveillance. They comprise the principles of proclamation, notification, exceptional threat, 
proportionality, non-discrimination, inalienability of certain rights. 
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The view was expressed, during the travaux preparatoires of article 4 
of the Covenant, ' e6 that a provision allowing for derogation from the 
obligations imposed by the Political Covenant was unnecessary, by those 
who argued for a general limitation clause on all the rights, as well as 
those who considered that the circumstances for which the article was 
designed, and the rights to which it might apply were sufficiently 
controlled by the limitations contained in several other articles. ' 9° It 
was also considered that such an article might lead to complex problems 
in interpretation and give rise to abuse. The view which eventually 
prevailed was that it was necessary in the Political Covenant to foresee 
conditions of emergency during which states would be forced to restrict 
certain rights. It was argued that in war-time, for example, States could 
not be strictly bound by all the obligations assumed under a convention. 
Other times of extraordinary danger or crisis should also be envisaged, 
when derogation from certain obligations might be essential for both the 
safety of the people and the existence of the nation. 
These situations were not adequately covered by the restrictions which 
appeared in several articles of the Political Covenant. Nor, it was felt, 
could this be achieved in a general limitations clause. 
It was considered important that States Parties were not left free to 
decide for themselves when and how to exercise emergency powers, in 
order to avoid States abusing their obligations under the Political 
Covenant. ' 97 Therefore, article 4 of the Political Covenant as adopted 
requires the state of emergency to be officially proclaimed in order to 
reduce the number of de facto situations. The importance of this 
principle also lies in the international legislature's intention to draw the 
attention of States to respect the procedure normally outlined in their 
domestic legislation. The view was expressed, in the travaux 
preparatoires, that the existence of a public emergency should be 
"officially proclaimed" by the state concerned. Proclamation was 
considered an essential guarantee, to prevent states from derogating 
arbitrarily from their obligations: It was noted that in most countries a 
public emergency could be declared only under conditions defined by 
law, and that this guarantee would be lost unless the international 
instrument retained the requirement of public proclamation. 
195. UN General Assembly Official Records, 10th session 20 September - 20 December 1955 Annexes General problems relating to the draft Covenants p. 7f. 
196. It was felt that the concept of 'national security" or of public order' in several articles 
would suffice for situations which might arise in time of war or national emergency. In addition, 
those specified limitations appeared only in the articles where they were considered "indispensable", 
while a general clause tight be misused to justify wider restrictions. 
197. UN General Assembly Official Records, 10th session 20 September - 20 December 1955 Annexes, p. 20 
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It seems that the principle of proclamation was not encoded by the 
legislator in the regional instruments, 198 nevertheless case law at this 
level appears to take it into account. 199 
Another important principle examined during the travaux preparatoires 
was the principle of notification, Z°° when some expressed the opinion 
that the importance of the fact of derogation from the obligations of the 
Covenant justified the publication of notifications to the U. N. by the 
Secretary-General. This proposal was rejected on the grounds that it 
might be dangerous to allow to States which were not parties the 
opportunity to express opinions on how States Parties were fulfilling 
their obligations under the Political Covenant. In spite of the political 
implications of this suggestion, had it been adopted it would clearly 
represent an additional safeguard of the rights secured in the Political 
Covenant. On the other hand, it might have had the undesirable effect 
of inhibiting States from fulfilling the obligation at all, or even from 
ratifying the Political Covenant. 
198. None of the regional instruments seems to take explicit account of the principle of proclamation, 
since neither the American Convention, Declaration nor the European Convention, the European Charter 
nor the African Charter require States Parties officially to proclaim the existence of state of 
emergency. 
199. For example, in the merits in the Lawless case, the European Court considered "that the principle 
of proclaiation, however justified it might be for preventive purposes, should not constitute a 
prerequisite for the control of the competent bodies. " Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4, pp. 482f (para. 47) 200. At the regional level, States Parties to the European Convention and Charter, and the American 
Convention undertake the obligation to inform the Secretary-General of their respective organisations 
of the measures taken under emergency powers. Only the American instrument is explicit that this 
information will be communicated to States Parties, while the European instruments do not mention 
notification to Contracting Parties. However, this deficiency was rectified in practice by a 
resolution of the Council of Ministers, which gave the Secretary-General this role. Thus, both the American and the European Convention remain equal in terms of practice in their compatability with the Covenant in this respect. 
Resolution (56) 16 of 26th September 1956 relating to the interpretation of article 15, para. 3 of 
the Convention. 
Again, in determining the object and the extent of notification procedure, unlike the American 
instrument, neither the European Convention nor the Charter specifies that notification should take 
place immediately, though in practice the Commission and the Court, in the Lawless case, considered 
that this formality included 'a time element' as an important factor to be taken into account. 
Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4 Judgement of 1st July 1961 
The two European instruments require the State Party availing itself of such derogation to continue 
informing the Secretary General of the Council fully of the "measures' and 'the reasons' untiTEh 
time when the provisions of the Convention are once more being 'fully executed", while t, he American 
Convention merely requires Parties to the Convention to inform other States Parties through the 
Secretary General of the Organization of American States of the reasons, the suspended provisions and 
the proposed date for their termination. The European obligation to continue to inform the Secretary- 
General does not appear in other regional instruments, or in the Covenant. 
The European Convention again goes further than other regional instruments in requiring states to 
inform the Secretary-General of the nature of the measures taken, and the reasons for them. 
The normal practice of the Council of-Urope is as follows :a note verbale is sent to the Secretary- 
General briefly outlining the nature of the political crisis, a list of provisions to be restricted or 
suspended, if applicable, the expected period of derogation and its geographical extent; the 
Secretary-General acknowledges receipt; he then notifies the derogation to other States Parties via a 
copy of the note verbale; he transmits a copy of the note for information to the President of the 
Commission, the Court and the Parliamentary Assembly. 
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An additional guarantee containing a strict procedure for cases of 
derogations was suggested, though not adopted. It was put forward that 
this might be done by requiring States to submit information on the 
circumstances which had led to the suspension of provisions of the 
Covenant to the Committee or another suitable organ which would decide 
the compatibility of such action with the Covenant provisions. 
This procedure, had it been adopted, would have provided an additional 
safeguard for supervision of States' actions in the light of the Political 
Covenant, though its successful operation would of course depend on 
States complying with the requirement to notify derogations to the 
United Nations. In practice, as we shall see, the Human Rights Committee 
has, on occasion, commented on the legality of derogations, though their 
right to do so is not made explicit in article 4 or article 40 of the 
Political Covenant. However, according to article 4, the legal fact remains 
that States which find themselves exercising such power and derogating 
from certain obligations should observe the principle of notification, by 
informing the other States Parties immediately, through the Secretary- 
General. The evaluation of that notification depends again on the object 
as well as the extent, since both elements are very important in 
determining the nature of that procedure, as to which provisions the 
State intended to derogate from, the reasons and the date by which it 
was actuated and when it intends to terminate such derogation. 
The only kind of emergency situation envisaged in article 4 of the 
Political Covenant is a "public emergency". According to paragraph 1, 
this occurs only when "the life of the nation" is threatened, and only 
when its existence has been "officially proclaimed". 
From the t. ravaux preparatoires it is clear that many other proposals 
were considered. zo1 The intention was to provide an indication of the 
kind of public emergency during which a state would be entitled to 
make derogations from obligations assumed under the Political Covenant. 
The wording adopted reflects the view that the extent of the public 
emergency should be such as to threaten the life of the nation as a 
whole. z°2 Although it was recognised that the outbreak of war 
constituted one of the most serious emergencies threatening the nation, 
it was felt that the Political Covenant should not envisage the possibility 
of war, even by implication, since one of the principal aims of the 
United Nations was to prevent war. Some felt, however, that "public 
emergency" was too restrictive a term; it would not cover natural 
disasters, for example, which almost always justified derogation from at 
least some of the obligations assumed under the Political Covenant. 
201. These included the expressions "in tine of war or other public emergency', "in time of war or 
other public emergency threatening the interests of the people" and in the case of a state of 
emergency officially proclaimed by the authorities or in the case of public disaster'. Also suggested 
were "public emergency threatening the security, safety and general self are of the people" and in 
case of exceptional danger made evident by public act or public disaster". 
General Assembly Official Records 10th session 20 September - 20 December 1955 Annexes 
202. As we will see, this formulation is based on both the provision in the European Convention, and 
the rase law of the European Court and Commission. 
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It was considered that the qualification "which threatens the life of the 
nation" would make it clear as to whether the provision referred to all 
or some of the people, although it was suggested that a reference to 
"the interests of the people" was more appropriate and that such a 
phrase would also prohibit governments from acting against the 
interests of their people. The final text of the article cannot be 
understood outwith the legal boundaries, that is, the circumstances 
invoked must constitute an exceptional public danger threatening the 
existence of the nation. 
At the regional level, unlike the Covenant, the instruments mention time 
of war and threat to the sovereignty of the state as grounds for the 
imposition of state of emergency. zo3 
Examination of the international legal understanding of the meaning of 
"exceptional threat", for example, on the basis of the criteria generally 
applied by the Human Rights Committee in considering the reports of 
governments as well as the findings of regional organs, comprises 
several elements. Firstly, the threat must be present or imminent, and 
the use of derogation is subject to a time-limit. 2O4 Secondly, the threat 
must be such that normal measures no longer suffice to maintain public 
order, and the situation must affect the whole of the population. Lastly, 
there must be a threat to the very existence of the nation, whether as a 
threat to physical integrity of the population, threat to territorial 
integrity, or to the functioning of the organs of the state. 
The principle of exceptional threat conveyed in the use of the terms 
"public emergency threatening the life of the nation" and "public 
danger" may be understood by reference to the merits and findings of 
regional bodies. In particular, the findings of the European Court and 
Commission in the Lawless Case and the Greek Case shed light upon the 
regional understanding of the factors which comprise the existence of a 
"public emergency ... '. As we have seen, 
in the merits of the Lawless 
Case'", the European Court considered that : 
"the natural and customary meaning of the words 'other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation'206 is _sufficiently clear; 
.. 
they refer to an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which 
affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised 
life of the community of which the State is composed", 
203. While the two European treaties use the term 'public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation', the American Convention uses the term 'public danger' and or other emergency that threatens 
the independence' or 'threatens the security of a State party'. 
204. In their discussion of the merits of the Landinelli case, the Human Rights Committee drew 
attention to two important principles concerning state of emergency: firstly, that measures taken 
during state of emergency must be of the shortest possible duration; and secondly, the important 
principle that, in the opinion of the Committee, the doctrine of National Security which underlies 
extended states of emergency, should be rejected. 
Human Rights Committee Selected decisions under the optional protocol (second to sixteenth sessions), 
1985 [CCPR/C/OP/1] p. 65-66 
205. Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1961 No 4 Paragraph 28 
206. 'Nation' was defined by the majority opinion of the Commission in the Cyprus Case as 'the people 
and its institutions, even in a non-selfgoverning territory, or in other words, the organised society, 
including the authorities both under domestic and international law for the maintenance of law and 
order". 
Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2 (1958-59) 
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and the Court found that in the Lawless Case, the existence of a public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation was reasonably deduced by 
the Irish government. 207 
As for the opinion of the Commission in the Greek Case on the question 
of whether there was on the 21st April 1967, a public emergency in 
Greece threatening the life of the nation, the Commission stated that 
such a public emergency comprised a number of characteristics. These 
were : 
"1. it must be actual or imminent; 2. its effect must involve the whole 
nation; 3. the continuance of the organised life of the community must 
be threatened; 4. the crisis ox' danger must be exceptional, in that the 
normal measures or restrictions permitted by the Convention for the 
maintenance of public safety, health and order are plainly 
inadequate. ' a 
The principle of the "margin of appreciation", which will be examined 
more fully in the discussion of surveillance of states of emergency by 
regional bodies, was applied by the Commission in the Greek Case. 20 9 
The measures which a State Party may take in derogation of its 
obligations under the Covenant after a public emergency has been 
proclaimed are subject to the principle of proportionality, specified in 
paragraph 1 of the article. They must be "to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation ", and they must not 
be 
"inconsistent with [the state party's) other obligations under 
international law". 
It is worthwhile to mention the comment of the Human Rights Committee 
with regard to derogation that measures taken under article 4 are of an 
exceptional and temporary nature, and should last only as long as the 
life of the nation is threatened. z1o The principle of proportionality is 
based on the concept of the strict limits required by any emergency 
situation. It finds its roots in the theory of self-defence, according to 
which a threat must be imminent, and the measures taken against it 
have to be proportionate to the threat. 
Case law at the regional level gives a clearer view of the scope and 
application of this principle, though some discussions of the issue by 
the supervising bodies at the international level are discussed in the 
later section on surveillance. 
207. The factors which led to the state of emergency were : the existence of a secret army in Ireland 
which was carrying out unconstitutional activity by violent means; the fact that this army was also 
acting outside Irish territory, thus threatening Irish Relations with their neighbour; and the 
increase in terrorist activity in 1956 and 1957. 
208. Factors adduced by the Colonels for the state of emergency were : the threat of a Communist 
takeover involving force; the state of public order; the constitutional crisis preceding the general 
election in May 1967. In spite of these factors, the Commission found that there was not, on 21st 
April 1967, a public emergency in Greece which threatened the life of the nation. 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands v. Greece Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
1969 No 12 p7lf 
209. During the travaux preparatoires, there was general agreement on these qualifications, though 
with regard to the second element, the proposal was made, though rejected, that in order to avoid 
misinterpretation of the words 'international law', a reference to the 'principles of the Charter and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights` should be included. Some felt that reference to the Charter 
would show that war was recognised only for reasons consonant with the Charter. 
210. General Comment 5/13, Human Rights Committee General Comments 13th Session, 28th July 1981 
(CCPR/C/21 of 19th August 1981] pp. 4-5. 
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The European Convention and the American Convention each contain the 
same phrase as the Covenant prescribing the principle of 
proportionality, providing that measures taken must not contradict other 
obligations under international law. 
Again, for regional legal understanding of the phrase "to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation", the findings of 
the European Court and Commission in the Lawless Case and Ireland v. 
United Kingdom are the principal source. In the case of Lawless v. 
Ireland"', the European Court found that the bringing into force and 
operation of part 2 of the Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 
1940 was strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. 212 The 
Commission agreed with the contention of the Irish government that the 
measures taken under the Act were strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation. 213 It seems that the Commission and Court considered 
the safeguards contained in the Act important factors. 
In the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom214, the Commission and Court 
examined allegations which included the charge that Article 5 had been 
violated by special powers brought into operation by the Northern 
Ireland government. z1s The Court found it was not established that 
derogations from Article 5 exceeded the extent required by the 
exigencies of the situation. 
The principle of non-discrimination 2 18 also met with general approval 
211. Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, No. 4.1961, pp. 474-8 
212. This act provided, with certain safeguards, for detention without trial of individuals suspected 
of intending to take part in terrorist activities. The safeguards included the following : the 
application of the Act was subject to constant supervision by Parliament; the Act provided for the 
establishment of a 'Detention Commission* comprised of an officer of the Defence Forces and two 
judges; any person detained under the Act could refer his case to the Commission whose decision was binding on the Irish government. 
213. The Court judged that ordinary law had been unable to meet the necessity of the situation and 
that special courts which could have been set up under Offences against the State Act (1939) or 
military courts could not 'suffice to restore peace and order' in Ireland in 1957. They also 
considered that the sealing of the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland would 
have had extremely serious repercussions on the population as a whole beyond the extent required by 
the exigencies of the emergency. Therefore, as the Court considered that none of these means would 
have made it possible to restore peace and security, they found that administrative detention as 
provided by the Offences against the State Act (Amendment) 1940 appeared to be a measure required by 
the exigencies of the situation. 
Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, No. 4.1961, Lawless Case (Merits) 
214. Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, No. 21.1978. 215. These involved the arrest, detention and/or internment without trial of large numbers of people. 
These powers took the form of (a) an initial arrest for interrogation; (b) prolonged detention for 
further investigation; and (c) preventive detention for a period unlimited in law. The powers were 
based on regulations under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers Act (N. I. ) 1922. 
D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials in International Law, 3rd ed, 1 83, p. 483 
216. Apart from the American Convention, no other regional instrument contains a clause comparable to 
that in the Covenant which safeguards the principle of non-discrimination during state of emergency. 
The provision in the American Convention stipulates explicitly that derogation shall not be permitted 
on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. These grounds are less 
extensive than those contained in article 1 which has in addition political or other opinion, national 
origin, economic status, birth or other social condition. 
Though the principle of non-discrimination in time of public emergency is not made explicit in the 
European Convention, within the context of the Convention, the general provision of non-discrimination 
which appears in article 14 of the Convention may be understood to . over this omission. 
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during the travaux preparatoires, although the use of the word "solely" 
was discussed, in the phrase "discrimination solely on the ground of 
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. " It is clear that a 
state might take measures that appear discriminatory simply because the 
persons concerned belong to a certain race, religion, and so on, but 
that the actual. reason for the derogation might be otherwise. For 
example, in the case of an action threatening public safety, such as a 
riot, it might well be the case that the participants belonged to a 
particular category of the society or other identifiable group. 
It was considered important to emphasise in the article that the 
intention was to avoid discrimination solely on the grounds mentioned. It 
was agreed that reference to the various grounds for non-discrimination 
set forth in article 2, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration would 
not be appropriate, since the provision has a wide scope, and it was felt 
that legitimate restriction might in some cases be imposed on some of 
the categories it contains. It is hard to see why the wider scope of the 
provision in the Universal Declaration should have been considered 
inappropriate, since even in a public emergency it cannot surely be 
considered justified to discriminate against persons solely on such 
grounds as political or other opinion, national origin and so on. In my 
view, the use of the word "solely" in the provision means that the wider 
scope of the provision in the Declaration could have provided a stronger 
legal safeguard for the rights of individuals without unduly undermining 
the sovereign right of states to impose justifiable restrictions in 
emergency conditions. 
In the event, guidelines as to the nature and extent of such derogation 
were incorporated in the first paragraph of the article, which specifies 
that any measures derogating from the Covenant should be : 
"to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other 
obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination 
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social 
origin. ". 
Article 4 lists the provisions of the Covenant from which no derogation 
may be made, the rights which may be considered "inalienable""'. It 
was agreed in principle during the travaux preparatoires that certain 
obligations could not be derogated from even in times of public 
emergency, but the question of which provisions should be regarded as 
non-derogable was the subject of some debate. 
21?. During the drafting of the two Covenants, the proposal was made that the preambles contain the 
statement that the rights they safeguard are 'inalienable and derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person'. The description of rights as 'inalienable' was not agreed to while the second element 
of the description was generally accepted. 
General Assembly Official Records, 10th session 20 September - 20 December 1955 Annexes, General 
problems relating to the draft Covenants, pp. 0-9. 
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Some were happy with the wording of the draft, which was in fact 
adopted, although it was pointed out that the provision relating to 
manifestation of religion or belief, article 18/3 might be subject to the 
same degree of derogation as articles 19 or 20. Others thought there 
was a need, before the drafting of the Covenant was completed, to make 
a thorough study of the articles that allowed of no derogation. Several 
articles (5,9,12,13,14,19,20 & 21) were mentioned, as wholly or in 
part describing rights that should appropriately be listed in paragraph 
2. While it is clear that such additions to the list of non--derogable 
rights would be a welcome safeguard of individual freedoms, and in the 
case of a right like freedom of opinion there seems no reason why the 
right should not be regarded as inalienable, it must be conceded that in 
the case of a right such as that of assembly it might be argued that 
the provision which the article itself contains for reasonable restrictions 
on grounds of national security, and public order and so on, might not 
be sufficient to safeguard the rights of the community or the life of the 
nation. 
It was also pointed out that, while there was to be no derogation from 
certain provisions, derogations could be made from the rest of the 
Political Covenant, including measures of implementation, which might 
have far-reaching consequences. 
The text finally adopted made reference to a number of articles from 
which no derogation is permitted : "No derogation from articles 6,7,8 
(pares 1-2), 1.1,15,16 and 18 may be made under this provision. " 
In connection with article 8/3, the right to be free of slavery is not 
listed with the other non-derogable rights. Paragraph 3 provides that 
no one shall be required to perform forced labour. However, section (b), 
subsection (iii) provides that "any service exacted in cases of 
emergency or calamity threatening the life or well--being of the 
community" shall not be regarded as forced labour. 
At the regional level, provisions specifying the scope of derogations 
may be found in three instruments, though the list varies from one 
instrument to another. In the American Convention suspension of 
guarantees may occur, as is the case under the European Convention 
and Charter. 
The two Conventions establish a list of articles which States cannot 
derogate from under any circumstances, though, the American goes 
further in providing the judicial guarantees which are essential for the 
protection of such rights. However, in both instruments the principle of 
inalienability encompasses certain fundamental rights : right to life, 
prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery, prohibition of retroactivity 
of penal measures. The American Convention, like the Covenant, also 
safeguards the right to recognition of legal personality and freedom of 
conscience and religion. It adds the right to participate in public life, in 
article 27. 
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Since the basic list216 of non-derogable rights is common to several 
instruments, it may be argued that this amounts to a general principle 
of law accepted by the international community. Further, according to 
the Geneva Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 53, it seems that 
"a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognised by the international community of states as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted". It is clear that the core 
list of inalienable rights derived from the instruments falls into this 
category. Thus, the principle of non-derogation from these inalienable 
rights must be considered binding on all states, even though they may 
not be signatories of treaties which provide it. In the case of countries 
which have signed and ratified such instruments, they are doubly bound 
by international law. Of particular importance to the protection of 
inalienable rights in the Arab region is the further assumption that in 
time of war or in the case of armed conflict not having an international 
character, the Geneva Conventions on humanitarian law all prohibit "at 
any time and in any place whatsoever" the infringement of the basic set 
of principles considered inalienable. It must be the case that this will 
apply also in matters of internal disorder, since it is inconceivable - at 
the theoretical leve1219 - that the guarantees provided in time of war 
are not present in peacetime. 
The task of surveillance of the guarantees provided by the Covenant in 
time of emergency is divided between two agents : the U. N. Secretary- 
General and the Committee established by article 28 of the Covenant. 
Their respective roles may in turn be examined on two levels : firstly, 
that of the explicit role granted by the treaty to the Secretary-General 
as depositary and to the Committee in their examination of reports 
submitted under article 40 of the Political Covenant, and secondly, the 
discretionary role which either agent may play. 
As we saw in the examination of the principle of notification, article 4 
of the Covenant assigns to the Secretary-General of the U. N. the role of 
depositary, in that it is through him that States must notify other 
States Parties that they are making use of their right to derogate from 
their obligations under the Covenant. At both the international and the 
regional level, as we shall see, the surveillance role of the depositary 
has been enhanced. In particular, the International Law Commission has 
examined the role of the depositary, especially the extent of his role in 
ascertaining whether the signatures, instruments or reservations 
conform to treaties, in order, if necessary, to draw the attention of 
States Parties to deficiencies. 
218. Right to life; prohibition of torture; prohibition of slavery; prohibition of imprisonment for 
civil debt; prohibition of retroactive penal measures; right to recognition of legal personality; freedom of conscience and religion. 219. See Francis Boyle 'Upholding international law in the Middle East' Arab Studies Quarterly 4 no. 4, 1982 pp. 336-49. 
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In the Study of the Implications for Hunan Rights of Recent 
Developments Concerning Situations known as States of Siege or 
Emergency, the Special Rapporteur, approving the International Law 
Commission's findings, went on to comment, that, according to her 
understanding, the depositary has no discretionary power over the 
validity of reservations; however, if he doubts their regularity, he must 
inform the reserving State accordingly. In the result of a reply by the 
State Party concerned, the depositary is obliged to transmit along with 
the original reservation, the communication which has taken place on the 
subject of the reservation. The Special Rapporteur has suggested that 
this legal understanding should be examined for its application to the 
role of the Secretary-General in the procedure of notification under 
article 4 of the Covenant. The Special Rapporteur argues that to extend 
the discretionary role of the depositary' ao so that he might pass on 
communications with the State Party intended to ascertain these details 
if they were not contained in the original communication, would be a 
more effective element of international surveillance, which would not 
infringe the principle of state sovereignty. In support to the suggestion 
of the Special Rapporteur -- to extend the supervisory role of the 
depositary under article 4 of the Covenant - this would represent an 
additional opportunity for situations which threaten human rights to 
come to the attention of international public opinion in the forum of the 
United Nations. 
The supervisory role of the Committee on "Measures ... adopted which 
give effect to the rights recognised" in the Covenant is set out 
in 
article 40. Naturally, this supervisory role extends to examining the way 
in which state of emergency may affect the enjoyment of the rights, 
including if applicable, the manner in which the exercise of derogation 
affects the rights. The practice of the Committee in this respect is clear 
from an examination of their discussions with States Parties of reports. 
The Committee has examined the question of national legislation 
regulating emergency, and pursued the question of the possible effects 
on human rights in those circumstances with the state representatives 
concerned. We shall see this clearly in the examination of the national 
legislation covering the issue in Chapter three, where the questions and 
comments, where appropriate, of the Human Rights Committee in respect 
of the Arab countries is examined in detail. 
220. Drawing on the provision of the European Convention, article 15, she suggests that his role might 
be extended, according to the text which provides that the depositary should be kept 'fully inforNed', 
to in turn fully informing States Parties of derogation from obligations of the Covenant. The word 
'fully' does not appear in the Covenant, where the strict duty is merely 'to inform' States Parties 
"of the provisions from which it has derogated and the reasons by which it was actuated". 
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The comments of the Committee, on reports submitted by the 
government of Chilez 21 indicate that the Committee considers that its 
supervisory role extends to commenting on the validity of derogation 
exercised under article 4 of the Covenant. In this respect, the 
Committee's practice seems to be following that of the regional organs, 
for example, the European Court and Commission, which though 
recognising the principle of the "margin of appreciation", as we will see, 
reserves the competence and duty to comment upon the government's 
decision to derogate. 222 After considering the information supplied by 
the Chilean government, the Committee commented that this was 
insufficient, and some of its members went further in rejecting the 
arguments of the Chilean government of "national security" and "latent 
subversion", on the grounds that the derogations were not justified on 
those grounds, However, it seems that the Committee has not gone 
beyond its statement in its General Comment to establish an abstract 
assessment of the principle of proportionality, but instead proceeds by 
reviewing each derogation (whether official or not) in its context. 223 
This too will become apparent in the third chapter. 
A further statement made by the Committee in the light of Chile's 
report reflects the Committee's concern to deal with the actual situation 
in the country rather than an abstract picture of the not-mat legal 
framework. The Committee noted that the Chilean report failed to meet 
the requirements of article 40, paragraph 2, "since it merely provided 
an idealized and abstract picture of the legal framework which should 
ensure the protection of civil and political rights in Chile and ... made 
no reference to the practical enforcement of the legal norms" and 
"ignored the true situation in the country ... ". 2za This observation will 
be seen to be particularly apt to the reports submitted by some Arab 
governments applying state of emergency legislation, and the Committee's 
discussions with their representatives illustrate this area of difficulty. 
In addition, it is important to point out, that the statements and 
practice of the Committee contribute valuable guidance on how its 
supervisory and judicial roles should be understood. With regard to 
statements which illustrate the Committee's understanding of the state of 
emergency, one of the most important sources is its General Comments 
on article 4.22" 
221. CCPR/C/1/Add. 25; CCPR/C/1/Add. 40. 
222. Rosalyn Higgins 'Derogations under human rights treaties' British Yearbook of International Law, 
48 1976-77, pp. 281-320. 
223. For example, the Committee expressed concern about the United Kingdom's continued derogation from 
certain rights on the basis of article 4. The rights were those safeguarded by articles 9,10,17,21 
d 22. It requested justification for each of the derogations. 
General Assembly Official Records, 34th session Supp no. 40 
(A/34/40) p. 2. 
224. General Assembly Official Records, 34th session Supp no. 40 
(A/34/40j p. 18. 
2f5. General Comment 5/13, Human Rights Committee General Comments 13th Session, 26th July 1981 
CCPR/C/21 of 19th August 1981) pp. 4-5. 
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As we have already seen, the Committee has indicated that they 
consider that measures taken under Article 4 are of an exceptional and 
temporary nature, and should last only as long as the life of the nation 
is threatened. It has also commented that it considers that protection of 
human rights all the more important during the state of emergency, 
considering that it is equally important for States Parties, in times of 
public emergency, to inform other States Parties of the nature and 
extent of the derogations they have made, Z2e and of the reasons 
therefor, and in addition, that reporting obligations under article 40 
include that of indicating the nature and extent of each right derogated 
from, supplying relevant documentation. 
Likewise, in its judicial capacity under the Optional Protocol, the 
practice of the Committee has shed light on its supervisory role in 
respect of the effect of state of emergency on human rights. Comments 
by the Committee in the Landinelli Case, have clarified certain issues 
raised by Article 4. In previous cases, the Committee had dismissed 
invocations by States Parties of the right to derogate, with a standard 
reply. 227 In the L andinelli Case, the State Party (Uruguay) attempted to 
justify its restriction on the political rights of certain individuals, by 
referring to its notice of derogation sent to States Parties, and stating 
that it had "temporarily derogated from some of the provisions relating- 
to political parties". The response of the Committee was to suggest, for 
the first time, that the right to derogate "may not" depend on 
compliance with the requirement of notification, It also explained in 
detail why it was not able to recognise Uruguay's asserted right of 
derogation. 229 The Committee concluded that : "a State, by merely 
invoking the existence of exceptional circumstances, cannot evade the 
obligations which it has undertaken by ratifying; the Covenant". In their 
discussion of the merits of the case, the Committee drew attention to two 
important principles concerning state of emergency: firstly, that 
measures taken during emergency must be of the shortest possible 
duration; and secondly, the important principle 
226. The Committee also indicated that in some cases, it was not clear from reports of states not only 
whether a state of emergency had been officially declared but also whether rights from which the 
Covenant allows no derogation had not been derogated from. In addition, it was not clear if the 
required notification to other States Parties had taken place. 
Ibid. p. 5, para. 2. 
Again, we shall see some indication of this difficulty in the examination of the national level in 
Chapter 3. 
227. 'The Covenant (Article 4) does not allow national measures derogating from any of its provisions 
except in strictly defined circumstances, and the Government has not made any submissions of fact or law to justify such derogation. * 
Review of International Commission of Jurists 1980 No. 24 pp. 46-7. 
228. The response stated that Uruguay's notice of derogation 'confined itself to stating that the 
existence of the state of emergency situation was 'a matter of universal knowledge'; no attempt was 
made to indicate the nature and the scope of the derogations actually resorted to with regard to the 
rights guaranteed by the Covenant or; to show that such derogations were strictly necessary". Human Rights Committee Selected decisions under the Optional Protocol (second to sixteenth sessi)ns), 1985 [CCPR/C/OP/1] p. 65-66. 
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that, in the opinion of the Committee, the doctrine of National Security 
which underlies extended states of emergency, should be rejected. zze 
This point, is relevant to the situation of some Arab countries, where the 
doctrine of national security is often misused to establish or prolong 
states of emergency. 
As in the international instruments, surveillance at the regional level 
may be divided into two aspects : the role of the Secretaries-General of 
the regional bodies who act as depositary, but in some cases exercise 
wide discretionary powers in this respect (their respective roles may be 
explicitly granted by treaty, or discretionary to varying degrees); the 
role of the regional organs established by the instruments, whether in 
their judicial role or, as in the practice of the Inter-American 
Commission2 0 in reviewing reports submitted by States Parties under 
the American Convention, in a role similar to that of the Human Rights 
Committee under the Covenant. 
As we saw, according to the principle of notification, States Parties to 
the European Convention and Charter, and the American Convention 
undertake the obligation to inform the Secretary-General of their 
respective organisations of the measures taken under emergency law. 2 31 
As we saw, the two European instruments require the State Party 
availing itself of the right to derogate to continue informing the 
Secretary General of the Council fully of the "measures" and "the 
reasons", until the time when the provisions of the Convention are once 
more being "fully executed", while the American instrument merely 
requires States to inform other Parties through the Secretary General of 
the Organization of the reasons, the suspended provisions and the 
proposed date for termination. The European obligation to continue to 
inform the Secretary-General does not appear in other regional 
instruments, or indeed in the Political Covenant. At the level of the 
regional instruments, the role of the depositary is extended, since he is 
empowered to request information from States Parties. As we saw, the 
European Convention provides that the Secretary-General of the Council 
of Europe should be kept fully informed of measures of derogation. 
229. The Committee drew a strong distinction between those who promote their political ideas by 
peaceful means and those who advocate violence. Some governments, particularly those which do not 
provide lawful means for the transfer of political power, regard any criticism or opposition to their 
authority as a threat to national security. 
Niall MacDermot, Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, in his introduction to 
States of Emergency : their impact on human rights. A study prepared by the International Commission 
of Jurists, p. i. 
230. The supervisory role of the Inter-American Commission on the question of the manner in which ... domestic law ensures the effective application' of any provisions of the American Convention is set 
out in article 43 of the Convention, according to which States Parties undertake to provide the 
Commission with such information as it may request of them. 
231. Only the American instrument is explicit that this information will be communicated to States 
Parties, while the European instruments do not mention notification to Contracting Parties. However, 
as we saw, this deficiency was rectified in practice by a resolution of the Council of Ministers, 
which gave the Secretary-General this role. 
Resolution (56) 16 of 26th September 1956 relating to the interpretation of article 15, para. 3 of 
the Convention. 
Page 70 POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB LEGAL ORDER 
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In addition, according to article 57 of the Convention : 
on receipt of a request from the Secretar y--General of the Council of 
Europe any High contracting Party shall furnish an explanation of the 
manner in which its internal law ensures the effective implementation of 
any of the provisions of this Convention". 
This role is exercised by the Secretary-General at his own discretion, 
as confirmed by proceedings before the Consultative Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. The findings of the European 
Commission and Court have shed light on their supervisory role in 
respect of the effect of state of emergency on human rights. Throughout 
all the previous sections, we have used the case law of these two 
organs to examine both the international and regional understanding of 
the substantive guarantees in instruments at both levels, and so to 
avoid repetition, in this section, the focus will be on the way that these 
two organs have interpreted their competence when dealing with cases 
of alleged violation of the Convention taking place during states of 
emergency. Again, the principal sources are the findings of the two 
organs in the Greek case, the Lawless case and Ireland v United 
Kingdom, but in addition, it is essential to examine the doctrine of the 
"margin of appreciation "2 32 first used by the European Commission in 
their consideration of Greece v United KinSdorn. 233 In this case for the 
first time, the Commission made it clear that the fact of derogation did 
not exempt the matter from consideration by the Commission. The 
Commission stated its competence to comment on the existence of a 
public emergency, and further stated its competence to review the 
proportionality of measures taken by a State Party in the light of 
article B. The Commission introduced the idea of "measures of 
discretion ", saying that "the government should be able to exercise 
certain measures of discretion in assessing the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation ". 2 34 
Thus introduced, the concept of the "margin of appreciation" continued 
to he applied by the European Commission, and was extended in its 
consideration of the Lawless case, to cover the assessment of the 
existence of a public emergency 
" having regard to the high responsibility which a government has 
to its people to protect then against an, TT threat to the life of the 
nation, it is evident that a certain discretion -a certain margin of 
a preciation - must be kept to the government in determining' tar iet rer 
there exrý a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation 
11 295 
232. See Clovis Morrison "Margin of appreciation in human rights law" in Human Rights Journal 6,1973 
and Rosalyn Higgins "Derogations under human rights treaties" British Yearbook of International Law, 
48 1976-77, pp. 281-320. 
233. Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 2 (1958-9) p. 176. 
234. Ibid. 
235. Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 12 (1969) ppJ07-108. 
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In the same case, the President of the Commission stated: 
"the concept of the margin of appreciation is that a government's discharge of [its] "esponsibilities [for maintaining law and order during emer"gencyf is essentially a delicate problem of appreciating 
complex factors and of balancing conflicting considerations of the 
public interest; once the Commission or the Court is satisfied 
that the government's appreciation is at least on the margin of the powers conferred by article 15, then the interests which the 
public itself has in effective Government and in the maintenance 
of order justifies and requires a decision in favour of the legality 
of the government's appreciation ". z3° 
The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has taken a series of 
decisions which add useful interpretation of the international standards 
governing the protection of human rights during states of emergency. 
The suspension of legal safeguards of basic rights which accompanies 
the proclamation of a state of emergency severely undermines protection 
of the rights in the ILO Conventions 87 and 98, for example, the 
proclamation of a state of emergency frequently leads to restriction of 
trade union activity. Neither Convention contains a provision permitting 
derogation from obligations assumed under the instruments. The 
Committee considers that the suspension of the enjoyment of the civil 
liberties which underlie the effective exercise of trade union rights 
based on state of emergency may only be contemplated in situations of 
force majeur"e, that is situations of extreme gravity. 23 This is also 
subject to the condition that measures affecting the guarantees in the 
Conventions should be limited in extent and time to what is strictly 
necessary to deal with the situation. 29e While the Committee concedes 
that, in these circumstances, certain civil liberties might be suspended, 
it considers that, in the field of trade union activity, guarantees of the 
security of the person should be neither abolished, suspended or 
limited. 
The restriction on the freedom of action of trade unions and their 
members during emergency situations often includes a ban on the right 
to strike. While this may be necessary in the light of exceptional 
circumstances, the Committee's view is that such a restriction should 
only be imposed as a temporary measure. z3 
236. Lawless v Ireland Verbatim report quoted in David Bonner Emergency powers in peace time, 1985, 
p. 86 237. 'IMder the wartiae legislation of a country engaged in hostilities it say be necessary for trade 
unions, like other collectivities or individuals, to accept the placing of greater restrictions on 
their freedom of action than is normally the case under peacetime legislation. 
For example, 17th Report, Case No. 73, pare. 72. 238. The Coaaittee has taken the view that it would be desirable that wartime legislation should, as 
soon as practicable after the conclusion of hostilities, be replaced by legislation which allows a 
greater measure of freedom, to trade unions. ' 
For example, 17th Report, Case No. 73, pare. 72. 239. 'Since a general prohibition of strikes is an important restriction of one of the essential means by which the workers and their organizations can promote and defend their occupational interests, such 
a prohibition could be open to criticism unless it had been imposed exclusively as a transitory 
measure in a situation of acute national emergency. 
For example, 78th Report, Case No. 364, para. 84. 
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Unlike other supervisory bodies, apart from statements of a general 
nature24O, the Committee on Freedom of Association has not found itself 
competent to comment upon the grounds for imposing a state of 
emergency adduced by States Members, considering that it has no 
jurisdiction to comment on what it describes as political matters . 
24 1 
The Committee has stressed that trade union activities suspected of 
being unlawful during emergency time may well be subject to the 
imposition of restrictions, though there should remain judicial control of 
any such measures. z°2 
In contrast to the Committee, which does not have competence to 
examine the justification of the imposition of state of emergency, but 
restricts its consideration to the possible effects of emergency measures 
on the rights safeguarded in the Conventions, the Commission of 
Enquiry set up to examine complaints about Greece's observance of ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98 stressed the fact that international supervisory 
bodies weighing the plea of a state of emergency on grounds such as 
legitimate self-defence, have without exception made an independent 
judgement as to whether the circumstances justified the imposition of 
state of emergency. The ILO Commission examined complaints against the 
Greek government concerning violation of the Conventions during the 
years of the Colonels' rule. The Greek government submitted that the 
measures had been taken in the light of exceptional circumstances, 
which it was for the government alone to evaluate, however on the basis 
of information received, the Commission decided that none of these 
factors was such as to enable it to conclude that there had existed in 
Greece in 1967, a state of emergency or exceptional circumstances that 
could justify temporary non-compliance with the Conventions. 
Accordingly the Commission rejected the argument of "justificatory fact" 
adduced by the Greek government. 2a3 
240. "Although it is recognised that a stoppage in services or undertakings such as transport 
companies, railways, telecoRuunications or electricity might disturb the normal life of the community, it can hardly be admitted that the stoppage of such services is by definition such as to engender a 
state of acute national emergency. The Committee therefore, considered that the measures taken to 
mobilise workers at the time of disputes in services of this kind were such as to restrict the 
workers' right to strike as a Beans of defending their occupational and economic interests. For example, 93rd Report, Cases Nos. 470 & 481, para. 274,275. 
241. 'Measures of a purely political nature, such as a state of siege, are matters which are outside 
the Committees terms of reference except in so far as they may have an impact on trade union rights. For example, 103rd Report, Case No. 514, para. 215. 
242. 'Measures taken in a state of emergency may constitute serious interference by the authorities 
in trade union affairs ... except where such measures are necessary 
because the organizations 
concerned have diverged from their trade union objectives and have defied the law. In any fase, 
such measures should be accompanied by adequate judicial guarantees which may be invoked with 
reasonable facility. ' 
For example, 120th Report, Cases Nos. 572,581,586,596,610 & 620, para. 43, 243. Official Bulletin of ILO, vol. 54,1971 no. 2. 
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Any realistic evaluation of the contemporary legal order in the Arab 
countries should take into account the Arabs' common historical background. 
This historical inheritance, both from the Ottoman empire's domination and 
the period of European colonialism, must be examined in order to identify its 
impact on the contemporary order. The legacies of foreign domination may 
be considered responsible for a wide range of serious problems in the Middle 
East and Africa. ' One can say in addition that the geopolitical dimension 2 
was and remains a crucial factor. 3 
This brief survey of the development of the Arab legal order in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries does not contain a detailed examination of 
the history of every country. The purpose is to highlight the main issues and 
common factors that are of significant impact in the creation of the 
contemporary order. 
This chapter focuses firstly on the legacies of the Ottoman and colonial 
periods. Secondly, the question of minorities is examined since it plays a role 
in the stability of the political order, as national and international events 
have proved. Lastly, the focus is on the implications for the Arabs of the 
impact of nationalism in the achievement of independence and the 
development of the contemporary order. 
Throughout the chapter, a number of themes, which continue to influence 
events in the region and shape the development of the contemporary order, 
are evident. The focus is on characteristic dimensions according to their 
effect, namely the kin-based and tribal nature of traditional society, and 
most important and pervasive, the religious factor. 
The traditional context is essential for understanding the contemporary 
socio-political dynamic, as are the varied responses of modern Arab political 
thought. Similarly, the response to the Arabs' cultural heritage has ranged 
from secular modernism to religious conservatism. The two extremes, as well 
as the range of opinions which fall between them, have played and continue 
to play a vital role in the diversity of the contemporary legal order. 
1. For example, 'Many of Africa's problems today are legacies of colonialism. The political boundaries, to a large extent, sake little sense from the African social or political point of view. They were often drawn by the European powers for reasons of commerce or of European politics during 
the nineteenth century. In many areas, they cut across tribal lines, separating peoples and creating 
problems of national identity and national unity. In other areas, artificial unity, created for 
purposes of administration by the former colonial power, has caused problems. ' J. F. A. Ajayi 'A Survey of the cultural and political regions of Africa at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century', in J. C. Annex and G. N. Brown, Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
1966 p75, 
2. The strategic dimension was vital through the ages, especially to maritime nations, as the Gulf of Aquaba and the Red Sea represented a bridge to the European colonialism, to their colonies in Africa, the Middle and Far East. Today, the strategic military interest to the Superpowers persists, as 
demonstrated by the Suez crisis and the Gulf war. 3. '... in history we must not neglect the importance of geography. We need to emphasise the extent to 
which our culture, our way of life, our social and political institutions are influenced by our 
geographical environment. ' 
ibid. 
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Besides groupings within Arab society based on political or religious 
affiliation, it is a fact that the military continue today to be the strongest 
arid most important organized grouping, playing a prominent or even dominant 
role at almost every stage. 
Traditionally, the basic unit of social organization in Arab society is the 
kinship group. In the political sphere, strong kinship groupings have assumed 
some aspects of the role of the political party. Political life in some areas 
is dominated by kinship, and patronage is an element of Arab politics which 
cannot be ignored. Even though the individual may have restricted access to 
decision--making bodies, he may be able to influence administrative decisions 
by making use of nnahsubiyyah (favouritism) in the public domain through the 
network of kinship connections which dominates Arab bureaucracy. A striking 
example of how kinship dominates power politics at the national level is the 
Sa'ud family which gives its name to the territory it has ruled since the 
formation of Saudi Arabia. ' Kinship has also dominated national leadership in 
recent times in Morocco, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon and the Gulf states. 
Within the kinship group, the rule is one of deference to the senior 
members. This is different from the wider social grouping at the clan or 
tribal level, where there has been a tradition of consultation. It has been 
rightly suggested" that the strength of kinship and tribal groupings in Arab 
politics has restricted political development through organizations, parties and 
trade unions. Even where highly committed political parties exist, they have 
been described as a facade behind which lie powerful tribal. loyalties. ' 
In some areas, where the dominance of kinship groupings is the basis of 
authority, the idea of an objective rule of law may require special promotion. 
The economic situation in some Arab countries until recent times has been 
described as quasi-feudal, with land and resources concentrated in the power 
of the elite, while the land was worked by a large landless peasant 
population. 
Until the fall of the Ottoman empire, as we will see, such land was held 
under a concession from the state. Thereafter, it remained in the hands of 
leading families who dominated rural politics. Only with the social and 
economic reforms of post-war radical governments has the power of ruling 
families in rural areas been largely transferred to the central government and 
ruling party. Economic developments which, as we will see, have their roots 
in the colonial period, have altered the balance between rural and urban 
society. The decline of agricultural prospects, sometimes precipitated by the 
seizure of land for European settlers, as well as the emergence of industry 
and the discovery of oil, has led to the growth of urban populations. 
4. Royal Decree No. 1716 of 18th September 1932 provided, in article 1, that : "The name of «The 
Kingdom of Hijaz, Najd and its Dependencies)> shall be changed to that of <(The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia», and our title shall henceforth be «The King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia». 
Muhammad Khalil The Arab states and the Arab League :a documentary record Vol. 1 : Constitutional 
develoP ents, 1962, pp. 242-3. 
5. Michael C. Hudson Arab politics : the search for legitimacy, 1977, pp. 84-5. 
6. S. H. Amin Law and justice in contemporary Yemen, 1987, p. 22. 
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Within the cities therefore, large groups lacking traditional political loyalties 
have grown up, which represent a potential challenge to political stability, ' 
since such groups are subject to manipulation by the state and by sometimes 
extremist political and religious organizations. 
As noted, religion continues to be a fundamental element in the national 
identity of the Arabs, and as such it is crucial in affecting the political and 
legal order. Throughout the Arabs' history, Islam has remained of great 
influence. Under this pretext the Ottomans ruled the Arab world for 
centuries, while the response of religious leaders ranged between revolt and 
submission, even to an unjust authority. 8 Resistance to European colonialism 
often took a religious characteristic, particularly in response to European 
policies of cultural assimilation. Nationalism too took an Islamic character in 
opposing foreign domination and remains a vital legitimising factor, for both 
ruler and opposition, as the following chapter indicates. 
In most Arab countries, the military became and has remained the strongest 
organization, representing almost the only mechanism for obtaining political 
power. It has remained the vehicle of political advancement and, for the 
poorer and weaker sectors of the population, a source of education, training 
and employment. Western military technology and organization was crucial 
in 
disrupting traditional Arab society. As early as the Ottoman period, the 
leadership of several Arab countries realised that only Western military 
technology could protect them from European encroachment, and therefore 
purchased European military equipment, sent officers for training in France 
and England, and established military schools with European instruction. 
While 
the import of European military technology did not prevent the Europeans 
colonising the Middle East, it enhanced the political power of the military 
sector. The historical role of the military has 
been particularly important in 
the period of resistance to foreign domination, and in the post-independence 
period. At the national and regional level, the military have partnered 
civilians in opposing foreign aggression, since Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi and 
Abd al-Kader. Early nationalist revolts led by military officers, like 'Urabi in 
Egypt, were the fore-runners of national movements, which later continued 
this mixed civilian and military character, as for example, with the FLN in 
Algeria, and the Free Officers in Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Yemen. 
In view of the geographical legacy of European colonialism, highlighted by 
Ajayi, the creation of minority groups in the region has been attributed to 
some extent to the policies of colonial rulers and the boundaries they left, ' 
and it is important to point out that the minority issue has been and 
remains a factor contributing to the instability of the political order. 
7. Cairo, in particular, contains a large low-paid or unemployed population, who have challenged the 
stability of the government on several occasions, when reduction of government subsidies on basic 
foods led to riots. Other cities in the Arab world have witnessed a similar phenomenon in recent 
years, particularly in Sudan, Tunisia and Algeria. 
B. In the absence of developed Islamic jurisprudence, through Ittihad, some Muslim rulers, at one 
stage or another, used the Shari'ah to legitimise their authority and decisions. For example, the 
Qur'an (1: 59) Obey Allah, and the Apostle (Prophet) and those in authority among you'. 
9. J. F. A. AJayi "A Survey of the cultural and political regions of Africa at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century", in J. C. Annex and G. N. Brown, Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
1966. 
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Foreign powers often used minorities as a political tool or as partners in 
securing their interests. This had implications for the creation of the 
contemporary order, creating the potential for instability, either because the 
minority came to exercise power, or sought to achieve autonomy. Minorities 
in the region fall into a number of categories and exist at a number of 
levels, holding power in several states, revolting from the political order in 
others and subject to the process of assimilation in others. The approaches 
of governments in the region to the minority question have taken a number 
of forms, and it continues to impose itself on the region's development. 
The first part of this chapter briefly surveys the implications of Ottoman 
rule in the region, insofar as it shaped the political organization and 
economic structure. This provides the background to an examination of 
European colonialism in the Arab world, which begins by identifying 
elements which led to European colonial expansion in the region, focusing on 
the different underlying philosophies and aims of the three European Powers 
who colonized North Africa and the Arab Middle East. 
The approach of each Power and the policies it adopted in different 
territories and at several stages of its presence are examined with a view to 
drawing some conclusions about the impact of colonial rule on several aspects 
of society in the region. The main focus is on the effect of this period on 
the political and administrative structure, including its effect on political 
authority, national institutions, and the creation and development of the 
nationalist movements, again with a view to drawing some conclusions about 
the implications of colonial rule for the contemporary political order, which 
affects the development of the constitutional order today. 
The next part of this chapter focuses on the question of the role of 
minorities in the contemporary Arab legal order, examining the issue of 
minorities from an international legal perspective, briefly tracing the 
evolution of international protection of minorities from early ideas of self- 
determination to contemporary approaches based on integration and non- 
discrimination, It briefly reviews the position of some minorities in the 
region, illustrating both minorities at different levels, and the range of 
governmental response to the minority question. Minorities in power, in 
secession and in assimilation in the region are examined, with the focus on 
the legal mechanisms adopted. Finally, the Kurds allow an examination of an 
Arab government's approach to a minority seeking autonomy. The Iraqi 
legislative response to Kurdish separatism is examined to illustrate how the 
legislature has sought to grant a degree of legislative and administrative 
authority to a minority within the national context. 
Inextricably linked to the emergence of the contemporary Arab 
constitutional order is the development of Arab nationalism, and this forms 
the subject of the second main part of the chapter. Nationalism in the Arab 
context as we will see, has a particular meaning and nature, which may be 
defined in religious terms, or in terms of secular ideologies, such as 
socialism and pan-Arabism. Beginning with a theoretical discussion of the 
special nature of Arab nationalism, this section examines its historical 
context, from the secularization of Turkey and abolition of the Caliphate 
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with the consequent growth of nationalism as an expression of Islamic 
nationhood to the secular nationalism which grew in response to foreign 
rule, with the twin themes of socialism and Arab unity, expressed in 
Nasserism, Ba'thism and their variants. Besides secular nationalism, 
independence movements also took a religious dimension, as for example, in 
Morocco, Sudan and Libya. 
Since nationalism and identification with the nationalist movements which 
achieved independence from foreign political domination continue to be 
important factors in legitimising political authority, whether secular or 
religious, radical or conservative countries, the next part of this section 
illustrates the continuing role of nationalism in a number of countries. The 
focus is on examples of contemporary radical nationalist regimes. This 
section is followed by an examination of the role of the military in relation 
to radical nationalist movements, which should enable us to draw some 
conclusions about the role of the military in the wider context of the 
contemporary legal order. 
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Not surprisingly, features of the contemporary Arab order may be 
traced in the Arab past, as we see for example, when we compare 
certain events of the Ottoman period and aspects of the contemporary 
situation in the Middle East. Then as now, conflict persisted between 
religious and secular authority. Then as now, governments faced 
problems with minority groups and local loyalties which undermined the 
effectiveness of centralised government. Geographical, linguistic and 
religious elements played a major role in this dislocation. The Ottomans 
could not maintain or extend their authority over Kurdistan and Basra, 
due to the rough terrain and the distance from Istanbul. Elsewhere in 
the Ottoman empire, authority did not extend far into the bilad al-sibs, 
with the bilad al-makhzen of the North African coast marking the extent 
of Ottoman legal control. Tribesmen in bilad al-siba were exempt from tax 
burden, because of the balance of power between the Ottomans and 
tribesmen, representing the division between religious and bureaucratic 
authority. The empire was only nominally in control of Syria and 
Palestine, Jordan and the Gulf states. " ° The mountainous regions of 
Lebanon and Syria, and the Atlas mountains in North Africa formed a 
natural barrier, isolating rural and tribal peoples. The deep 
conservatism and local loyalties of the rural and tribal population of 
these countries inhibited the spread of Ottoman control. Linguistic 
minorities too, like the Kurds and Berbers, played a part in this 
dislocation. Religious communities based on Sufi orders, like the Sanussi 
Zawayya in Libya and the Marabout in the Maghrib, also contributed. 
The division between the urban and rural communities was deep, and 
remains in Arab society today. Against this background, the inherent 
weaknesses of the Ottoman administration were magnified, as problems of 
communication contributed to lack of control over distant administration. 
Individual governors were weak or corrupt, though some contributed to 
development, for example, with the Qaramanli dynasty in Libya. In 
general, however, their concern was to maintain power to gather taxes 
for the Sultan and everywhere, changes of governor were frequent. 
Since the Ottomans were Muslims, the political organization of the 
empire may be identified as a compromise between theocracy, limited by 
Shari'ah and consultation with the Sheikh al-Islam, and the monarchical 
power of the Sultan. "] Ottoman administration"' used the 
10. In Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, tribes controlled the desert, exacting tribute from traders and 
travellers, affecting the security and stability of the region. The Bedouins maintained their loyalty 
to tribal chiefs and remained isolated from the civic administration. 
11. See, for example, Norman Itzkowitz Ottoman empire and Islamic tradition, 1J72; S. H. Alin Middle East legal systems, 1985 (several chapters contain sections on the Ottoman period . 12. The secular administration included the Sultan and his family, the grand vizier and officers of the government, members of the court and the standing army, Janissaries. All of the officers of the 
empire, both administrative and military were slaves. According to Armajani, 'as slaves ... 
(they] 
mere under the direct control of the sultan and not under the Shari ah. In this way the sultan had 
complete control of the army and a&inistration without interference from the Ulana. ' The divan was the decision-waking council, presided over by the sultan, the grand vizier, the two commanders from Europe and Anatolia, two judges, treasurers and the chancellor. Later, the leaders of the armed forces, both naval and military, joined the council. The army was the dominant institution in society 
and in time of war, the provincial governors joined the Janissaries with levied forces. 
Yahya Aruajani Middle East : past and present, 1970 pp. 153-4. 
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Irano-Turkish tradition, which gave lawmaking authority to the Sultan, 
with the Ulama's consent. -' 
In all the Ottoman provinces of the Arab world, the administration was 
headed by a direct appointee of the Grand Porte, the Wali or Pasha, who 
reported directly to the Internal Ministry. The provincial administration 
also contained a consultative council, made up of local notables, the 
Pasha's Diwan, which normally contained the Mufti, the chief judge, the 
Daftur-dar and the Maktubji. In effect, it reflected the structure of the 
organization in Turkey. l° 
The administration faced practical problems in the control of such a 
large empire, and so added other sources of law to the . Shari'ah, 
including Addat, the customs of the local community, differing in the 
various parts of the empire, Urf, the non-religious law, often the will of 
the sultan or the judgements of the leaders of the community. Qanun 
was the official decree of the sultan, superseding other laws. The Ulama 
opposed all three, since they did not come from the Shari'ah, and in any 
case, these laws gave more powers to the sultan to contradict the 
Shari'ah. Two chief judges were charged with the administration of the 
Waqf, managing religious lands and funds. Their principal duty however, 
was to study cases and give their Fetwa on their relation to Shari'ah. 
Due to the extent of the empire, the Ottoman judicial system dealt with 
the separate status of non-Muslims under Shari'ah according to the 
Millet system. 16 Despite the claims of some historians 1e that the 
organization of the Millet system, under which non-Muslims enjoyed a 
considerable element of autonomy, was simply the method by which Islam 
solved its minority problem, nevertheless the relation between the 
Islamic community and linguistic, ethnic and religious minorities took a 
different character in different periods of history. The Ottoman land 
tenure system contained a division between three types of land, Mulk, 
Habous and Arth, ' 7 and land ownership was regulated by Azel and 
Makhzen estates. A proportion of azel was individually granted by 
Ottoman authority to its officials, while the rest was granted to 
13. The Ulaaa (learned men) was made up of religious men, mosque officials, muezzins, readers of the 
Qur'an, judges (Qadis) and Muftis. The Ulaaa studied the Shari ah, and the Dadis or Muftis might core 
into conflict with the secular administration if the latter acted in contradiction with Shari'ah. The 
chief of the Ula. a was known as the Sheikh al-Islaa, and he acted as adviser to the sultan. 
14. I. Mirza [Constitutional law :a comparative study between the Libyan Constitution and 
Constitutions of other Arab countries], 1969, pp. 142-9. 
15. The Millets, or "People of the Book", case under the jurisdiction of their own religion. The 
Ottoman administration considered all the non-Muslim subjects of the empire, from Armenians to Jews, 
the subject of the jurisdiction of their own religion and its laws. They lost this privilege only when 
they became objects of suspicion as a result of external interference. 
16. P. Hitti A History of the Arabs, 10th ed. 1970 p. 161 17. The sulk designated private property, though it was different from private property in the western 
system as conditions accompanied its exchange, for example, the shuf'a prohibited its acquisition by 
aliens, that is, people who were not members of the Uara. Family land was bound by customary 
regulations, such as indivisibility. Collectivity predominated over individuality, so that the 
tribesman did not need to hold land as an individual, and private property hardly existed. The habous 
included educational and religious buildings, workshops and land. Arth property was the collective 
assets of the tribesmen. Brih arth and habous were inalienable, and the community used the land 
collectively for agriculture. 
Rachid Tleicani State and revolution in Algeria, 1986, pp. 23-26. 
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tribesmen holding Ottoman office. Beylic or inakhzen lands were the 
collective inalienable property of share-croppers. Land under state 
control was also restricted. 
The weakness of the late Ottoman empire encouraged Western and 
Eastern ambitions for its Middle Eastern and North African territory, as 
economic and strategic interests led to the struggle of the Great 
Powers. 18 This struggle, which lasted two centuries, is relevant to the 
present narrative because the vital strategic areas at which these 
interests aimed were the Arab countries of the Middle East and North 
Africa, where the aim was to protect European trade routes to the 
East. lB 
Great Power rivalry played its part in the division of territory in the 
Arab region. The British and French at first contested control of Egypt, 
particularly control over Kanat al-Suez, and economic, besides strategic 
considerations, led them to establish dual control over Egypt in 1880.20 
Ultimately, Britain occupied Egypt to secure payments of Egypt's debts, 
and to protect its own and other European business interests, as well as 
to secure the Kanat al-Suez from local or rival European control . 21 In 
the Fertile Crescent, the Sykes-Picot agreement represented the 
compromise reached by the two Powers in dividing the region, which 
was later recognised in the League of Nations mandates, granted to 
Britain for Iraq and Palestine, and to France for Syria-Lebanon. 
In North Africa too, Great Power rivalry led the French and Italians to 
compete for control of Tunisia, 22 and British interest at an early stage 
18. While Russia had begun her attempts to break through to the Mediterranean, Napoleon's plan to 
establish a military base in Egypt had been only the first move in a continuing struggle between 
France and Britain to secure naval command in the Indian Ocean, by holding Egypt. 
19. British interest in Egypt began in the 19th century, when the British East India Company made a 
treaty with the Mamluk leader of Egypt, securing Red Sea shipping. Napoleon's attempts to interrupt 
Britain's trade route to India by securing a base in Egypt were unsuccessful, as the Porte's forces, 
led by Muhammad Ali, repelled the French army in 1801. Britain's colonial involvement in the Gulf 
states was also aimed at protecting its southern and western sea routes to India. This led to the 
capture of Aden by the British East India Company during the nineteenth century. After the first world 
war, the British sought to consolidate their position in the Persian Gulf because of newly discovered 
oil in Iraq and Iran, American oil company exploration in Saudi Arabia and Mussolini's colonialism in 
the Horn of Africa. 
See, on this period, J. Glubb A Short history of the Arab peoples and J. B. Kelly "The legal and 
historical basis of the British position in the Persian Gulf" Middle East Journal 1958, pp. 119-140. 
20. With the collapse of Egyptian cotton prices at the end of the American civil war, Isma'il borrowed from European bankers and by 1875, Egypt was heavily in debt. Isma'il raised taxes to fund his 
spending, selling his shares in the Suez Canal to Britain. Egypt's creditors persuaded the Porte to 
dismiss Ismail, and foreclosed on their loans. French and English controllers were imposed on Egypt, 
to collect taxes and control expenditure, passing the Law of Liquidation in 1880. Yahya Armajani Middle East " past and present, 1970 pp. 216-7. 
21. Riots in Alexandria, 'Urabi's uprising, and the killing of some Europeans provided the pretext for 
the intervention Britain, beginning with the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882 and the defeat of 
Urabi at Tel al-Kabir later that year. 
22. European occupation of North Africa began with French troops landing in Algeria in 1830, which was 
welcomed by the Tunisian bey as a counter to the threat from the east. French interests in Tunisia did 
not immediately lead to colonization, but one factor which encouraged the French invasion was the 
danger of the spread of British and Italian influence in Tunisia, the latter, for examele, through the 
purchase of the Tunis-Goulette railway. Although the British and Germans indicated to France that they 
should feel free to pursue their interests in Tunisia, the Italians too became more aggressive in 
seeking control through a growing Italian population, the acquisition of economic interests and the 
spread of Catholic missions and schools. 
Wilfrid Knapp Tunisia, 1970, pp. 97-9. 
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threatened to limit the control exercised by Italy in Libya. Prestige as 
well as economic factors encouraged Italy 23 to seek territory in North 
Africa, particularly after the rise of Mussolini, when the fascists sought 
"five shores" in an effort to revive the glory of empire. Libya 
represented both a convenient easy target and a route to other colonies 
in the Horn of Africa. 
France too sought prestige in the acquisition of North African colonies, 
and like the Italians, the French sought territorial expansion, both to 
extend the African "Francophone political community led by the French 
republic"24 and to provide land conveniently close at hand for French 
settlers. The international order, particularly after World War One, 
allowed these Powers to harmonise their ambitions through international 
agreements, such as the treaties signed at the Paris Peace Conference 
and the San Remo agreement, as well as the League of Nations 
Trusteeships, 2S which allowed the Powers to divide Arab territory in 
harmony with their own economic and strategic interests. The process 
had begun in the previous century, when the Treaty of Berlin divided 
Africa into colonial territories and spheres of influence. Secret 
diplomacy, in particular between the French and the British, sought to 
prepare the ground by which the expected Arab uprising against the 
Ottoman empire would benefit European interests. 2a One such agreement 
was the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot agreement, which secured the two 
Powers' interests, despite undertakings made at international 
conferences. Others include the Husayn-MacMahon correspondence and 
the Balfour Declaration, which indicate the policy of the Powers. 
23. The twin purposes of Italian colonialism were to maintain Great Power status, and find a fertile 
overseas territory for the growing rural population of Italy. Commercial interests also sought markets 
in North Africa, from Eritrea and Ethiopia to the Somali coast. Since the Congress of Berlin, when 
Italy had been given a promise of non-interference by the other colonial powers, she was merely 
waiting for a pretext to invade. Italian economic interest in Libya had begun with the activities of 
the Banco di Roma, in preparation for military incursions on the pretext of protecting their economic interests. 
Lisa Anderson The State and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya 1830-1980,1986 p. 111. See also, Claudio G. Segre "Italian development policy in Libya : colonialism as a national luxury' in 
G. Joffe and K. S. MacLachlan (eds) Social and Economic development of Libya, 1982. 24. J. Gus Liebenow African politics : crisis and challenges, 1986, p. 28 25. The Paris Peace Conference did not settle the question of the Fertile Crescent. President Wilson's King Crane Commission recommended that mandates be established in Iraq and Syria, the former 
to be assigned to Britain and the latter to the United States. Faisal was to be the constitutional 
monarch of Syria, whose territory was not to be divided. It predicted war if France received the 
mandate over Syria, but the report was ignored, and the Anglo-French agreement of 1919 prevailed. French troops marched on Damascus, and despite Syrian resistance, captured the city in July 1920. The French mandate over Syria-Lebanon and the British mandates over Iraq and Palestine were ratified by the Council of the League in 1922. The Mandate for Syria-Lebanon provides :. the Principal Allied 
Powers have agreed that the territory of Syria and Lebanon, which formerly belonged to the Turkish 
empire shall ... 
be entrusted to a Mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice 
and assistance to the population ... the Principal 
Allied Powers have decided that the Mandate for the 
territory 
... should 
be conferred on the Government of the French Republic, which has accepted it ... 
" 
Muhammad Khalil The Arab states and the Arab League ... , 
1962, pp. 93-98. 
26. Mark Sykes expressed the concerns of the two Powers : "It was clear ... 
that an Arab rising was 
sooner or later to take place, and that the french and ourselves sought to be on better terms if the 
rising was not to be a curse instead of a blessing ... 
". 
Quoted in Edward W. Said Orientalism, 1978, p. 221. 
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It is important at this stage to identify the philosophical background 
underlying the approach of each colonial power, which shaped their 
policies and hence affected the territory they occupied. While the focus 
is on the three main colonial powers27, the implications of colonial rule 
naturally vary according to time and place. 
The attitudes of the French towards their North African colonies were 
radical and had far-reaching implications. An objective of French policy 
was to incorporate overseas territories, occupied as a means of gaining 
land for settlers, into a greater political community, based on the 
French republic.? " French language, values and institutions were to be 
the mechanism by which these provinces would be incorporated into a 
greater republic. 29 Some argue that the French policy was based on 
apparent racial equality, since everyone could gain equal social, 
economic and political status, if he accepted French values, 30 however 
the practices fall short of this ideal. 
Like the French, the Italians were concerned to annex territory for 
Italian settlers, and to a lesser extent, to incorporate this overseas 
territory within the Italian kingdom. 31 Like the French again, they 
envisaged a form of "citizenship" for Libyans who spoke Italian or 
served in the Italian armed forces. Unlike the French, they did not 
envisage Libyan political participation within the Italian kingdom, nor 
even to a great extent, within Libya itself. 
The concerns of the British, unlike both the French and Italians, were 
entirely strategic and economic, with the result that the British did not 
settle on Arab land. British relations with their colonies in the Gulf 
began with treaties of friendship and cooperation, intended to protect 
their sea routes to the East, though their control over strategic areas 
later became direct and had a military dimension, as their interests were 
threatened. British policy, in the main, focused on using existing local 
political leadership and traditional forms of organization to safeguard 
and protect their concerns. Further interference tended to come only 
27. The focus is on French, British and Italian colonial policies, while Spanish colonisation of 
northern Morocco is not examined. 
28. French occupation began with the capture of Algiers in 1830. By the second world war, there were 
around a million European settlers from France, Spain and Malta in Algeria, ruled as a part of 
metropolitan France, with direct representation in the National Assembly in Paris, though with only 13 
seats, a disproportionately low number. Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy Nationalism and new states in Africa 1986, p. 123. 29. The 3rd, 4th and 5th republics left open the constitutional option of incorporating African 
territories into a greater republic. 
J. Gus Liebenow African politics : crises and challenges 1986, p. 28. 
30. French citizenship was granted to so-called evolues (evolved persons), those who had assimilated French values, French educated, served the empire, such as military or administrative duties. 
Ibid. p. 29. 
The Law of 1865 which regulated French citizenship for the Algerian colony considered "the Muslim 
native ... a 
Frenchman', but to gain citizenship, the Muslim had to renounce the Shari'ah and submit 
to French civil law. According to Hisham B. Sharabi, by 1934, less than 2,500 Algerians had done so. 
Hisham B. Sharabi Nationalism and revolution in the Arab world, 1966, p. 27. 
31. The Royal Decree of 1939 declared the annexation of Libya as part of the Italian kingdom. 
1. Mirza [Constitutional law 
... 
1 1969, pp. 157-B. 
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when necessary to secure these interests. The British government has 
never accepted the principle of integration of overseas areas beyond the 
British Isles into the British state. 
Colonial intervention in the Middle East and North Africa can be 
divided into three distinct stages. 32 The initial stage tended to consist 
of interference in the domestic economy to safeguard trade and sources 
of raw material. Though this was often carried out directly by the 
Power or through commercial concerns, it tended to be secured by 
treaty arrangement, which could be general, or favour a particular 
European Power. Treaties were concluded both with the central 
administration, 33 and with local leaders, often enhancing their prestige 
and strengthening their power at the expense of the central authority. 
In some countries, this stage also prepared the way for administrative 
intervention, with the "mortgaging" of the national economy by the 
central administration to pay, for example, for the development of the 
military or other national projects, with borrowing or investment 
involving Europeans, as with Ismail in Egypt and Ali Bey in Tunisia. 
The next phase often involved some form of military intervention, to 
secure political dominance, with economic and legal concessions to the 
colonial Power. This stage, when national sovereignty was surrendered 
to an external power and control of the economy was likewise lost, often 
led both to the undermining of the existing central administration and 
enhancement of the position of traditional ruling elites, who gained 
status through their cooperation with the newly dominant power 
in the 
state. In the long term, however, the use of traditional ruling structures 
as what David Seddon has described as the "substructure of imperialist 
exploitation"" discredited the old order. 36 A third stage in colonial 
intervention was the creation of a colonial bureaucracy or the settlement 
of colonists. 
32. Alongside these three identifiable stages, there exist four recognisable mechanisms of colonial 
rule, which can be susmarised as : direct control, as applied by 
Britain in Aden, France in Algeria 
and Italy in Libya; indirect control, through the Protectorate system, by Britain in Egypt and France 
in Tunisia and Morocco; the League of Nations Mandate which gave Britain the mandate in Transjordan, 
Iraq and Palestine, and France, Syria and Lebanon; lastly, the mechanist which is identified as the 
earliest phase of colonial intervention, the exclusive treaty relationship, which was maintained 
throughout the colonial period by Britain with the states of the Peninsula and the Gulf. 
33. For example, prior to their military intervention, the French concluded a number of treaties with 
Algeria, through the Dey. 
Mohammed Bedjaoui Law and the Algerian Revolution 1961, pp. 20-2. 
34. David Seddon "Tribe and state -. approaches to Maghrib history" in Maghreb Review v. 2, pt. 3,197? 
35. Two exceptions to this are the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, and the Alawite monarchy of Morocco, 
where despite close involvement with colonial Powers, the present leader of Jordan was able to 
disassociate himself from the policy of the previous leader, and the king in Morocco today has 
profited from his father's late conversion to the nationalist cause. In 1912, the Alawite sultan was 
forced to submit to the French protectorate, though he did not lose his own position. The sultanate's 
legitimacy was challenged in the eyes of many by this acquiescence. In 1927 however, the legitimacy of 
the monarchy increased as Muhammad sided with the nationalists in resisting the French. The decision 
to deport him in 1953 increased his popularity in Moroccan eyes as well as the unrest which had 
prompted it. On his return Muhammad had become a symbol of resistance and nationalist struggle. 
Michael C. Hudson Arab politics : the search for legitimacy, 1977. 
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British policy in the Gulf, Egypt and North Africa demonstrates an 
aspect of the first phase identified above, Initially, British influence was 
secured through treaty arrangements36 with local leaders, with the 
British favouring traditional and tribal leaders where this could secure 
British interests37 in an efficient and economic way. 38 
Treaties also established the position of British advisers, who became 
the main executors of British policy in the region. 39 The British adviser 
took responsibility for security and, in theory, relations between princes 
and tribes, though in practice, British protection, advice and support 
led to dependence, as sheikhs and rulers began to rely on British 
assistance. 
The second phase identified earlier, that of direct military intervention, 
was a characteristic of both French and Italian colonization. Since each 
shared the general aims of defeating the Ottoman administration, 
subduing the native population, and securing land for European settlers 
from the tribal system, military conquest was an early tool of colonial 
expansion in French and Italian North African territories. This was 
followed by the imposition of legislation which allowed the creation of 
land holding for European settlers. 
36. Provisions from the General Pacification Treaty between the Sheikh of Bahrain and Britain 
concluded in 1880 give an indication of the relationship between Britain and the local leadership : 
"1, Isa ibn Ali al-Khalifah, chief of Bahrain, hereby bind myself and successors in the Government of 
Bahrain to the British Government to abstain from entering into negotiations or making treaties of any 
sort with any state or government other than the British without the consent of the said British 
Government, and to refuse permission to any other Government than the British to establish diplomatic 
or consular agencies or coaling depots in our territory, unless with the consent of the British 
Government 
... . Other texts dealing with relations between Britain and Gulf states may be found in C. U. Aitchison A 
Collection of treaties, engagements and sanads relating to India and the neighbouring countries, 5th 
ed, 1933 Vol. xi. 
See also : J. B. Kelly "The legal and historical basis of the British position in the Persian Gulf" 
Middle East Journal 121958, pp. 119-140; Hussein al-Baharna The Arabian Gulf states : their legal and 
political status, 1978, 
37. For example, Britain incorporated Aden into her empire during the 19th century under the 
administration of the Indian government. They sought the cooperation of coastal tribes, by offering 
protection to tribal leaders in return for an undertaking not to enter into agreements with or cede territory to other foreign powers, and to inform the British of any interference in tribal territory b other powers. 
areq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael People's Democratic Republic of Yemen . politics, economics 
and society 1986, pp. 11-14. 
In 1820, treaties with the sheikhs, the Perpetual Maritime Truce, established peace in the 
sheikhdoms, and in 1853, Britain entered into agreements with Kuwait, Muscat and Oman, where she dealt 
directly with the ruling family of Abu Sa'id. Her involvement in Egypt also began through agreement with local leaders, as in the 18th century, the British East India Company made a treaty with Egypt's Mawluk leader, securing Red Sea shipping. The British also pursued commercial interests in North Africa by treaty arrangement with the sultan, for 
example, securing her trade with Morocco in an agreement of 1856 which regulated trade with several European states but granted Britain special advantages. David Seddon "tribe and state : approaches to Maghrib history" in Maghreb Review v. 2, pt. 3,1977. 38. The British relied on the semi-feudal social structure, an economical policy, as they paid a 
minimal amount for the loyalty of the tribal leaders, and avoided the costs of administration by using the tribal structure. 
39. The British pursued a similar policy in the Fertile Crescent. In Transjordan, where the British 
appointed Abdullah as emir in 1921, their influence was unchallenged. Le islative and executive powers 
were vested in the emir, who was assisted by an executive council. A 
legislative 
council was drawn from Bedouins and other groups, but administration was supervised by British advisers, who controlled the armed forces, budget and foreign affairs. 
Yahya Armajani Middle East : past and present 1970, pp. 311-2. 
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As we saw, Italian economic interest in Libs-a had begun with the activities 
of the Dance di Roma, in preparation for military incursion, ao and the 
derision was taken to make military conquest of Tripoli and Cyrenaica in 
1911. War Evas declared, and Italy in' ceded Libya, where Ottoman forces 
retre'. Jed after failing to repel the Italian attack. Turkey called on other 
European states to intervene, and signed the Lausanne iigveeulent4I in 1912. 
At this stage, the Italians occupied only the coastal area, and sovereignty 
continued to be contested between Italy and Turkey. Until the end of the 
First World War, the Italians had to compete with the Ottomans for the 
support of the Libyans, and neither was able to maintain a stable national 
administration. °2 The British became involved in Cyrenaica, initially opposing 
Ahmad al-Sharif and Nuri Bey, when they attacked the Egyptian border, but 
ending by supporting : Air Idris, later to become head of the Sanusiyyah 
ordet aa 
Amir Idris accepted negotiation with the British and Italians, which ended 
with aale agreement with the British, guaranteeing the Egyptian border, and 
an agrei-m< nt with Italy, ending the state of -w-ar, with each side maintaining 
authority of the territory it controlled. The withdrawal of the Ottoman 
challenge to Italy after the First World War left Libya once again open to 
Italian expansion. Italian policy followed the pre-'war scheme, while agreeing 
to British patronage of the Sanussi. The Italians granted political privileges 
to the populations of both provinces of Libya, far beyond concessions made 
in Egypt and Tunisia in this period by the British and French, `s who were 
very critical of 
40. When the Italian government received reports from their consulate in Tripoli that unrest threatened 
Italian interests, it warned the Ottoman government in September 1911 to put an end to the riots which swept Tripoli and Cyrenaica. 
Lisa Anderson The State and' social transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980 1986, p. 111. Useful background works include : Joffe and MacLachlän (footnote 23 above); Majid Khadduri, Modern Libya 
a study in political development, 1963; John Wright, Libya .a modern history, 1981. 
41. The agreement provided for a ceasefire and withdrawal of all Turkish civil and military personnel from 
Libya. Turkey abandoned its sovereignty and declared Libyan independence, by firean. The Porte maintained 
his religious authority over the Muslim inhabitants, and the Turkish authorities appointed Sayyid Ahmed al- 
Sharif as temporary governor. Some believe that the legitimacy of the Sanussi administration in Cyrenaica is 
based on this decree. 
1. Mirza [Constitutional law 
... 
], 1969, pp. 150-161. 
42. Italy had no officials experienced in Arabic-speaking countries, and lacked an efficient administrative 
structure to govern the province. Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were separated, and each assigned a governor 
with civil and military functions. Having opted for direct administration, the Italians adopted a policy of 
relying on local leaders whom they paid, rather than military conquest, which was fiercely resisted. This 
policy failed, as the Italians proved unreliable patrons with uncoordinated policies and unfulfilled 
promises. In addition, they faced opposition supported by the Ottomans, who though they had formally 
withdrawn, supported Libyan resistance to the Italians. 
Lisa Anderson The State and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980 1986. 
43. Jonathan Bearuan Qadhafi s Libya 1986, pp. 13-4. 
44. Interior trade and the Sanussi zawayya, falling within Italian territory, were re-opened with a 
guarantee that study of the Qur'an and implementation of Shari'ah would be maintained. Idris was allowed to 
maintain li ited authority, not undermining Italian security. 1. Mirza IConstitutional law ... 
11969, pp. 150-161. 45. A republic was declared in Tripoli 1918. Italy negotiated with its leaders, and the result was the 
conciliation agreement signed in April 1919, which led the Italian king to ratify the Tripolitanian law, 
which granted the parliament legislative authority, with its members elected by the population of Tripoli. 
Executive authority was to be exercised by a ruling council of 10 members appointed by the parliament, with 
2 members appointed by the Italians. It was headed by a governor-general, appointed by the Italian king, 
holding all civil and military authority. The constitution emphasised the implementation of Shari'ah with 
regard to personal status for Muslims and guaranteed religious observance. Freedoms of expression, assembly 
and education were provided, along with exemption / ... 
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the degree of local administration allowed by the Italians to the Libyans, 
which encouraged Tunisian and Egyptian calls for similar concessions. 48 
The Italians took few steps to widen their administrative control in 
Tripoli, while the nationalist movement gained ground '47 beginning in 
Cyrenaica, where the Italians had been persuaded by the British to 
work through the Sanusiyyah. In 1920, they reached a new accord with 
Amir Idris, known as the al-Raima agreement, 48 which allowed them to 
exercise a measure of regional administration. 
As we saw, in North Africa, Great Power rivalry led the French and 
Italians to compete for control of Tunisia. °9 French desire to control 
territory for settlement throughout North Africa meant that military 
conquest was followed by the need to deal with existing structures of 
land tenure, both traditional and those established under the Ottoman 
administration. 
French military occupation of Algeria, for example, in the nineteenth 
century, had the three tasks of overthrowing the Ottoman organization, 
subduing Algerian resistance and establishing control of the land, which 
was the partial object of French colonial expansion. It destroyed the 
traditional structure of tribal socio-economic and judicial order, 
substituting French ownership and laws. Land acquisition was pursued 
through military means, sequestration, expropriation, settling troops, and 
property legislation which broke up the existing land tenure system. 
The colonial legislature aimed to secure land by expelling the native 
population and dismantling the tribal economy. It established a judicial 
from military service for nationals. On 31st October 1919, Italy promulgated a law giving 
Cyrenaica a constitution, which guaranteed that the treatment of the population would be equal with 
that of the Italians, and established the right of the Italian king to appoint a representative 
controlling civil and military affairs in the province. It also provided for the establishment of a 
council of representatives, compose of delegates from the bedouins and the urban population. 1. Mirza IConstitutional law ... 
j, 
1969. 
See also L. Anderson "The Tripoli Republic, 1911-1922" in Joffe and Mactachlan, see footnote 23 above. 
46. Lisa Anderson The State and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980 1986, pp. 204-9. 
47. Leaders of the national movement in Tripoli resolved in 1920, in the Gharyan conference, that a 
single Muslim leader with religious, civil and military authority should rule the country. They sent a 
representative to Sirt to negotiate with the Sanusiyyah. The Central Committee in Tripoli nominated 
Idris as the amir for all Libya in 1922. He appointed this organ to administer the affairs of Tripoli, 
until the election of the provisional national council, although this did not take place due to the 
arrival of the fascists. 
48. This agreement shaped the Sanussi administration by recognising Idris as the hereditary Sanussi 
amir of Cyrenaica, with Ajadebiyyah as the capital. The accord established a representative council. A 
constitution was promulgated containing the principles of the Rajia treaty and according to it, Idris 
controlled the southern province of Cyrenaica. Legislative power was to be exercised by a legislative 
council, representing cities, villages and oases in proportion to the population. As for military forces, the amir was to have power only to maintain order and security, which should not exceed 1000 
soldiers, while in some areas, security and order was to be maintained with the Italians. The northern 
part of Cyrenaica, the coast and part of Jabal al-Akhdar, was to be under the control of an Italian 
governor who controlled civil and military affairs. 
49. French occupation of Tunis came to be viewed in France as confirmation of France's Great Power 
status, and a border incident provided the pretext for the French to invade from Algeria. They set no 
resistance and signed an agreement known as the Treaty of Bardot with the bey, whereby France had the 
right to military occupation and control over foreign affairs and defence. After two years, another treaty was concluded at al-Marsa, establishing the French Protectorate. In the years which followed, the French presence in Tunisia came to be seen as integral to the republic, through the creation of French institutions of government and the colonization of Tunisia by Frenchmen. Wilfrid Knapp Tunisia 1970, pp. 101-3. 
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framework which replaced the tribal legal framework. 50 
French occupation of Tunisia had similarly to deal with the existing 
system of land ownership. One of the first tasks of the French in 
Tunisia as in Algeria, was to establish a legal framework which allowed 
them to acquire land, through a series of acts, beginning with that of 
1885, based on the Australian Torrens Act. The problem of mainmort was 
removed by replacing yearly payments with a single lump-sum. The 
policy of colonization through land purchase was pursued by the French 
government, and despite increasing numbers of European immigrants, 
land ownership in Tunisia remained dominated by large estates. 
Like the French, the British too took military action at a certain stage 
to secure economic interests, as British military intervention followed 
the dual control established by France and Britain to secure payment of 
Egypt's debts. 'Urabi's protest led the British to invade to put down his 
revolt in 1882, and although the British promised to withdraw from 
Egypt "as soon as the state of the country and the organization of 
proper means for the maintenance of Khedival authority will permit it", 
British troops remained until 1956.61 
The British mandate over Iraq took a military character in the early 
stages as the rebellion of 1920, caused by the announcement of the San 
Remo agreement, led the British to intervene. On gaining control of Iraq, 
the British High Commissioner announced the intention of establishing a 
national Iraqi government. 5Z 
Britain's attitude to their mandate over Palestine however was quite 
distinct from their policies elsewhere. Britain was given the mandate by 
the Sari Remo conference in 1920, and the Balfour Declaration promised 
the land of Palestine to the Zionists. During the British mandate, the 
British tried to carry out the mutually contradictory elements of the 
Balfour Declaration, which were to help establish a "Jewish national 
home", while protecting the civil and religious rights of the Arabs. 
50. An 1844 Ordinance declared that all uncultivated lands in certain areas would be classified as 
vacant if no one could prove title of ownership. Another Ordinance of 1846 declared that title dating 
from after the French invasion was invalid. These ordinances allowed the expropriation of large areas 
of land by the French. In 1845, Algerian territory was divided into three zones : the civil, mixed and 
military. The first contained a majority of European settlers and French law was fully enforced in 
this zone. The second comprised territory where the settlers were in a minority, and here Shari 'ah 
remained until it was gradually replaced by colonial regulations. Other rural territory was under direct military control. In 1863, a number of laws regulating land tenure were promulgated, which also 
put an end to charity by zawiyyahs. Legislation in 1863 and 1873 aimed at privatising land, and 
bringing private property under French control, destroying the distinction between mulk and arth land. 
The laws restructured tribal territory, breaking it up and assigning the divided lands to part of 
tribes so that the overall tribal structure was fragmented, coming under separate communal 
jurisdiction. 
Rachid Tlemcani State and revolution in Algeria 1986, pp. 33-47. 
51. Direct and indirect British rule continued in Egypt until 1952. Dual control was abandoned, the Ottoman sultan remained the nominal ruler and his representative was the Khedive, but actual power was 
exercised by the British representative. 
See, for general background, Tom Little, Egypt, 1958; P. J. Vatikiotis The history of Egypt, 1980. 52. The Cairo conference of 1920 was intended to implement the Sykes-Picot agreement. The consensus 
was that Faisal should become king of Syria and Abdullah king of Iraq. However, the French expelled Faisal from Syria. In respone, Britain made Faisal king of Iraq, and Abdullah was given the emirate 
of Transjordan. 
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Since colonial policies tended to vary at different times and in 
different places in response to either national politics or regional 
developments, the following section briefly reviews shifts in the policy 
of the three colonial Powers to meet changes on the international and 
regional levels, as well as domestic developments. 
We have seen how the British pursued their interests by favouring 
traditional leaders, as well as by military intervention. After the First 
World War, as opposition to their rule grew, they responded by creating 
and developing administrative structures and national institutions 
through which to exercise control. 63 After the Second World War, the 
growth of Arab nationalism which threatened British interests, led to 
another shift in policy, with an attempt at federation in Yemen, 54 and 
administrative reforms elsewhere. 65 
In Egypt, Britain's interests were initially pursued by a British 
administration, in which Egyptians participated through a "legislative" 
assembly, whose role was in fact no more than consultative. be Following 
unrest in 1920, S' they responded in a way which was characteristic of 
British policy in the region, with the establishment of an investigative 
Commission. Lord Milner's Commission recommended the British give up 
53. For example, after the war, Britain attempted to consolidate her position in South Yemen. After 
Aden came under the supervision of the Colonial Office in 1937, the territories in South Yemen were 
organised into two Protectorates. The Western Protectorate comprised 18 sultanates, shaykdoms and 
tribal confederacies administered by the British governor in Aden, the Eastern, 5 sultanates and 2 
shaykhdoms, administered by a British political agent appointed by the governor. 
For useful material on the historical background of contemporary Yemen, north and south, see : Tareq 
Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael People's Democratic Republic of Yemen : politics, economics and 
society, 1986, Robin Bidwell The two Yemens, 1983; David McClintock The People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen, 1982; J. E. Peterson Yemen, the search for a modern state, 1981; B. R. Pridham Contemporary 
Yemen : politics and historical background, 1984. 
For legal background, see : S. H. Amin Law and justice in contemporary Yemen, 1987; Islam 6hanem Yemens 
: political history, social structure and legal system, 1981. 
54. They began a series of discussions, from 1954, with shaykhs and sultans, to form a federation of 
Arab emirates of the south. These autonomous bodies would be tied to Britain by treaty, and protected 
by the British army. The federation was formed by 6 treaties in 1959, and 11 other states and Aden 
joined during the next few years, and in 1962 it was re-named the Federation of South Arabia. 
55. In Aden, for example, Britain introduced a series of administrative reforms, including the 
establishment of a Legislative Council in 1947 to advise the British governor. Its members were chosen 
by the governor, half from the colonial administration, and it lacked any real power, and it was not 
until 1955 that a small elected element was added. 
These reforms were intended to foster the growth of the pro-British Adeni elite and involve it in the 
governing process. The first test of British policy came in 1959, when full elections to the council 
were held, under highly restrictive conditions, as most Adenis were disenfranchised, by strict 
property and residence requirements, and many candidates were denied permission to stand at all. The 
Arab population boycotted the polls, and the Aden Association won most of the available seats. The 
failure of the elections in 1959 and 1964 to create a local administration soon led the British to 
attempt to consolidate their influence in the city by linking it to the traditionally pro-British 
tribes and principalities of the hinterland. In 1962, they oversaw constitutional talks concerning the 
incorporation of Aden into an enlarged South Arabia Federation. In 1963, this took place despite 
intense popular opposition from Adenis, and in 1964, federal leaders and British officials agreed that 
the federation would become independent by 1968. 
J. Y. Brinton Aden and the Federation of South Arabia, 1964. 
56. Britain's representative, Lord Cromer, ruled through a "legislative` assembly of 30 members, 16 
elected and 14 appointed, which was actually consultative, as for each Egyptian minister there was a 
British adviser and for each governor, a British inspector. 
57. After the First World War, the British refused to consider Egyptian calls for independence but 
the Egyptians pressed their demands at the Paris Peace Conference, to which a delegation (Wafd) was 
led by Sa'd Zaghlul. Initially, the British had tried to prevent his from attending the conference, 
and the Prime Minister had resigned in protest. The Wafd party, led by Zaghlul, tried to prevent the 
appointment of a new Prime Minister. The British responded by exiling Zaghlul, resulting in / ... 
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the protectorate in favour of a treaty of alliance with an "independent 
Egypt", which was to have a constitutional monarchy, while Britain 
would maintain Egypt's defence, guide her foreign policy and control al- 
Kanat al-Suez. In 1922, the British unilaterally ended the protectorate, 
through General Allenby, and declared Egyptian independence, ', 8 under 
King Fouad who, in 1923, promulgated a Constitution which provided for 
a bi--cameral legislature, and granted power to the King to dissolve the 
Parliament or rule by decree, 69 British influence is clear on the 
structure, which despite providing a formal legislature and judiciary, 
gave over-riding power to the executive, which could thereby continue 
to act with their guidance. This became clear in 1929, when the King 
dissolved the legislature and revoked the Constitution in response to a 
Wafd victory at the polls. '* 
As suggested above, regional as well as national events had their 
impact on colonial Powers' policies. For example, Britain's gradual moves 
toward independence in Egypt"' and Irag62 came in response to 
. riots, strikes, and violent unrest. Ultimately, 
the British had to concede and allow Zaghlul to 
lead the delegation, though it did not achieve anything. 58. For a discussion of this period of constitutionalism in Egypt, see Elie Kedourie Arabic political 
memoirs and other studies, 1974, pp. 21-23. Allenby's Declaration of 28th February 1922 provided that : The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be free and independent sovereign state" (article 1) and that 
"The folloNing matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's government ... 
(a) 
The security of the communications of the British Expire in Egypt; (b) The defence of Egypt against 
all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect; 
Ic) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities; (d) The Soudan ... 
" (article 3). 
Muhammad Khalil The Arab states and the Arab League ... 1962, p. 459. 59. The Constitution, for example, granted the King legislative power (article 24), the power to 
sanction and promulgate legislation (articles 25 & 26). It granted his executive power (article 2$) 
and veto power over legislation which could only be over-ruled by a two-thirds majority (article 36). It gave his the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies (article 38), made his Commander-in-Chief of 
the armed forces (article 46), and allowed his to appoint and dismiss ministers (article 49). Royal Order No. 42 of 1923, Establishing a Constitutional Regime for Egypt Ibid. pp. 460-475. 60. He promulgated a new Constitution in 1930, giving him more power, and introduced a two-grade indirect voting system, which allowed him to rule without effective opposition. The Wafd led demonstrations and strikes as well as campaigns for sovereignty. It dominated Parliament, although the 
appointment of the Premiership, by the King, was normally to an anti-Nafdist, which meant conflict between the Parliament and the Cabinet, and the victor was normally the King or the British or both. Other political parties, such as the Liberal Constitutional Party, the Union Party and the People's Party, were more moderate than the Wafd and were prepared to cooperate with the British and the King. 61. The Wafdists still did not support the Constitution of 1930, leading to its suspension in 1935, on British advice. Despite their advice, he reinstated that of 1923, and elections were held in 1935, in which the Wafd won power again. In 1936 a treaty was signed, recognising Egyptian sovereignty, though this was limited by provisions that Britain remained responsible for her defence, that Egypt 
should make all the facilities and assistance ... 
including the use of ports, aerodromes and means of communication" available in case of war. Britain was permitted to defend the Suez Canal. The first article stated that the military occupation by the British forces was terminated, and the following 16 articles defined the nature of Egyptian independence. It appointed ambassadors between the countries, opened the way to Egyptian membership of the League of Nations, abolished the Capitulations, and opened unrestricted Egyptian emigration to the Sudan. The agreement was accepted by the Wafd party, and ratified by the Parliament in December 1936. The following year, the Capitulations 
were abolished and Egypt was admitted to the League of Nations. 62. A similar strategy was pursued in Iraq, where although between 1922 and 1930, several treaties were negotiated and discarded, as the Iraqi nationalists demanded more then the British were willing to concede, in 1930, Iraq was granted independence by a treaty which became the model for the Anglo- Egyptian treaty of 1936, as Iraq was declared independent, though the British retained strategic 
military bases, and Iraq agreed that its resources be at British disposal during war. Again, a discussion of constitutionalism in Iraq in this period can be found in Elie Kedourie Arabic 
political memoirs and other studies, 1974, pp. 21-25. For general background see : Ernest Main, Iraq from Mandate to independence, 1935. 
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domestic pressure combined with the need to maintain stability and a 
strategic presence in the region to counter the growing threat from 
European fascism. 83 Provisions of the treaty with Iraq of 1930 and the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 give an indication of the British concern 
to secure a military presence in strategic areas. Neither treaty had as 
its principal concern the real independence of the former protectorates, 
and this "semi-independence" had its impact on legal and political 
development, as we will see. 
As suggested above, an element of colonial policy at a certain stage 
was the creation of national institutions through which influence could 
be exerted to safeguard colonial interests. When the institutions created 
in this way failed, the two responses tended to be limited reform, 
military action, or a combination of the two. British policy in the 
creation of the Hashemite kingdoms of Transjordan and Iraq represents 
an example of the first stage. The British concern to maintain control, 
and at a later stage, a strategic military presence, guided their actions 
towards Iraq, where their policy contained the two mechanisms, of 
reform, in the granting of "semi-independence" by the treaty of 
19308 a 
and of military action-a" Another example of how the 
British pursued 
reformB" of the institutions they created until military action" 
became 
inevitable may be seen in the period 
leading up to South Yemen's 
independence. British policy in Palestine was guided initially by the 
undertakings of the Balfour Declaration. 8B The reluctance of western 
63. For example, with Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the threat of German influence 
in Iraq. 
64. Despite granting Iraqi independence, the British presumably expected to continue to exercise 
influence through Faisal, whom they had made king in 
1921. Iraqi nationalists opposed the treaty of 
1930 which had maintained Britain's military presence, and the administration divided into factions, 
supporting and opposing alliance with Britain. The Iraqi parliament was dominated by the National Brotherhood Party from 1932 until 1936, when the government was overthrown by coup d'etat, as 
the 
military entered Iraqi politics. Other coups followed until Nuri al-Sa'id was established as 
Prise 
Minister. He continued to cooperate with the British, and received 
loans from Britain, but did not 
declare war on Germany, because of Iraqi anti-British feeling and doubt over the eventual victor. 65. In 1940, Nuri al-Se'id was forced to resign in favour of Rashid al-Gailani. Iraq participated in the 1939 conference on the Palestinian question, and al-Gailani tried to persuade the British to 
abandon the Balfour Declaration and declare the independence of Palestine in return for Iraq's support 
against Germany. Britain's refusal led the Iraqi government to approach the German ambassador 
in 
Ankara. Though Gailani resigned under British pressure, when he led a coup in 1941 with German 
support, the British landed troops in Basra, and with the support of the Arab Legion, forced Gailani 
and his supporters to flee to Germany. 
Yahya Armajani Middle East : past and present, 1970, p. 339f. 66. The scale of guerilla resistance in South Yemen led the British to modify their approach at the 
constitutional conference in London in 1965, when to try to reach agreement with the nationalist 
forces, representatives of groups such as the South Arabian League and the People's Socialist Party 
were encouraged to participate alongside federal and tribal leaders. The conference also discussed a 
different constitutional arrangement granting greater power to Aden. The conference failed however and 
the deteriorating security situation led the British High Commissioner to suspend the constitution, 
dismiss the nationalist Adeni Chief Minister and to re-establish direct British rule over the colony. 
Tareq Y. Ismael 6 Jacqueline S. Ismael People's Democratic Republic of Yemen : politics, economics 
and society. The politics of socialist transformation, 1986 
67. British colonial policy in Yemen entered a military phase when, in October 1963, the National 
Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen launched its first armed attacks against the British. 
The uprising spread, and an assassination attempt against the British governor led the British 
administration to announce a state of emergency, imposing strict measures on political activists. 68. The British conceded the difficulty of reconciling the twin nationalist claims of the Arab and Jewish communities, as in 1936, Britain sent a fact-finding commission, -a familiar British response 
- which concluded that Britain could not 'both concede the Arab claim to self-government and secure 
the establishment of the Jewish National Nome', and recommended partition. 
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states to admit Jewish refugees after the war also gave impetus to 
support for the new state. 89 National interest prevented the British from 
dealing even-handedly with the two communities, ' ° and attempts at 
conciliation through conferences tended to exclude the Palestinians, in 
favour of interested Arab parties who might play a strategic role in the 
future. " As war approached, the British were prepared to reverse 
aspects of the mandate policy to win Arab support away from the Axis, ' z 
but in the face of organised hostility, which soon escalated to terrorist 
attacks on the British administration, their ultimate concern was to 
withdraw rapidly and hand over the Palestinian question to other 
parties, ' 3 the consequences of which must be regarded as one of the 
principal legacies for the region of the colonial period, which continues 
to aggravate regional tensions and inhibit regional stability and 
development. 
A striking example of how a change of government in Europe altered 
colonial policy occurred with the coining to power of Mussolini in Italy. 
In Libya in 1922, the fascists repealed all. the treaties which the Italians 
had made with the authorities in Tripoli and in Cyrenaica, which had 
given the Libyans a degree of political and administrative autonomy. 
They issued decrees in 1927,1929 and 1934, demolishing the existing 
ad ministration. 
69. "In part, in supporting Israel, we were rejecting responsibility and not facing up to the 
realistic need for a more liberal American immigration policy at the end of World Mar Two ... Joseph McCarthy The Limits of power : America's role in the world, 1967, p. 155f. 70. The mandate power allowed the establishment of the Palestinian Arab Executive Committee, as an 
unofficial spokesman of the Arab population, but the Palestinian community were comparatively little 
organized. Apart from the Supreme Muslim Council, which controlled the Muslim courts and wagf, the 
Arab Higher Committee coordinated sporadic and ineffective political activities. Both were headed by the Mufti who was strongly anti-Zionist and anti-British. By contrast, the Jewish community was 
organized in elected assemblies and enjoyed a degree of self-government. There were many Jewish 
political parties, representing a wide spectrum of political and religious views. The Zionists began 
industrial development in this period, but their most striking and disruptive programme was settlement 
and the acquisition of land, which had the clear aim of making the Palestinians a landless minority in 
their own country. The Zionists also encouraged East European Jewish migrants, who were excluded from 
settling in America or Western Europe, to settle in Palestine. The Jewish Agency commanded its own 
armed forces, many early settlements had armed guards, and ex-British army Jewish officers in Palestine formed the Haganah, which trained secretly and held arms illegally, though by 1936, it was tacitly recognised by the mandate authorities. 
71. For example, in response to continuing civil war in Palestine, Britain attempted to organise a 
conference in February 1939 including non-Palestinian Arabs from Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Transjordan and Jewish representatives from Palestine, the United States and Europe in London, which 
failed to produce any result. 
72. As war in Europe approached, British concerns in Palestine turned to seeking Arab support and in 1939, a White Paper was issued in which policy was reversed in the Arabs' favour, proposing the formation of a bi-national state within ten years, making continued Jewish immigration conditional on Arab support, and restricting land sale. 
David McDowall The Palestinians, New ed., 1987, p. 9. 
73. After the war, the new British Labour government invited the Americans to participate in the 
solution of the Palestinian problem, and an Anglo-American Commission was established. The Commission 
made its report in 1946, recommending that Palestine be neither Jewish nor Arab, warning against 
partition and favouring a bi-national, bilingual state, safeguarding Arab and Jewish rights. It 
recommended the continuation of the mandate, pending a trusteeship arrangement under the UN. It also 
recommended the immigration of 100 000 Jewish refugees. Truman asked for this last to be carried out immediately, but Attlee refused, on the ground that the whole report must be considered. Again, a 
meeting of Arab and Jewish representatives in London did not achieve results. In 1947, the British 
submitted the Palestinian problem to the United Nations. The General Assembly appointed a Commission, 
which produced a minority report recommending a federated Palestine, while the majority report 
proposed partition. The Zionists supported the latter, and the / ... 
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Most important was the Royal Decree of 1939 which declared the 
annexation of Libya, as part of the Italian kingdom. All political 
organization collapsed and the national struggle began again, when the 
Italians took Tripoli and Cyrenaica. Italian Policy in the "Riconquista" 
was violent military conquest. 74 This prepared the way for one of the 
aims of the Italian presence in Libya : the acquisition of land for the 
growing population of southern Italy and Tunisia. Unlike the French as 
we will see, the Italian policy of agricultural development was initially 
slow and uncoordinated, but as the Italians gained control, land was 
taken for settlement of colonists. ' 5A decree of 1935 provided that 
Cyrenaica and Tripoli be controlled by an Italian general governor with 
civil and military authority, through the Ministry of African Affairs. 7' 
The provincial administration was almost entirely Italian, and Libyan 
nationals were largely excluded from government. Despite Italy's 
ambitions to create "Libyan Muslim fascists""' by breaking down tribal 
structures, it maintained and used the tribal or kinship organizational 
structure, "' which served their administrative policies. 
In the third phase of colonial rule, identified at the beginning of the 
section, that of the creation of a colonial administration, French policies 
in the Maghrib took into account local conditions and French interests, 
... Arabs rejected both plans. The Political 
Committee of the UN considered partition, which was 
confirmed by the General Assembly. Pressure was brought to bear by the USA on countries who intended 
to vote aginst the plan before the final vote at the UN, and three of the five permanent members of 
the Security Council favoured the partition plan, while Britain and China abstained. 
74. The military operations which the Italians undertook to pacify Libya were long, costly and 
effective. They took north Tripolitania by the end of 1924, and in January 1928, the Sanusiyyah 
submitted to the Italians. By that time, north Fazzan too, was under Italian control, and by 19: 30, 
the provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica were united as a single colony under an Italian governor. 
6raziani was sent to pacify Cyrenaica in 1930, where he rounded up nomadic tribesmen and put them in 
concentration camps to cut them off from Uiar al-Mukhtar's rebels. By September a barbed wire fence 
along the Egyptian border cut off aid to the rebels. After Umar al-Mukhtar's capture and execution in 
September 1930, the Cyrenaican rebellion was over. The effects of the Italian action in Libya were 
severe, with agriculture devastated, and according to some estimates, the population halved by 1933. 
Jonathan Bearman Qadhafi's Libya, 1986, p. 15 
Some members of the Italian administration spoke openly of the desirability of expelling the native 
population. 
Lisa Anderson The State and social tranforeation in Tunisia and Libya, 1820-1980,1986 
75. After initial attempts to work with the Ottoman land codes and local customary land rights, Italy, 
in a series of decrees, set aside the Ottoman law, to provide land for Italians in Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica. Initial hesitation by Italians to emigrate led to credits being offered to those prepared 
to settle in Libya, and this increased the number of colonists. Later, Italians were settled directly 
by state-run organizations, in particular, on the Jabal al-Akhdar, to pacify the area. 
See also P. Lombardi "Italian agrarian colonisation during the fascist period" and G. L. Fowler "The 
role of private estates and development companies in the Italiaan agricultural colonisation of Libya" 
both in Joffe and McLachlan, see footnote 23 above. 
76. This was confirmed by the decree of 193?, when Italy took Ethiopia, beginning another stage of Italian colonization. Colonists began to arrive in their thousands to take up land plots, with 
accommodation built by Libyan forced labour. 
77. A decree of 1934 provided special citizenship for Libyan Muslims who satisfied certain criteria, 
such as reading and writing Italian. They were able to serve in the Italian army, join the Libyan 
fascist party, and exercise administrative functions in areas with Libyan populations, or act as 
advisers in mixed districts. 
78. In some areas, the population was administered by Libyan "ruhtars', appointed by the Italians, 
whose duty was to assist the authorities, while tribal populations were administered by sheikhs, 
responsible to the competent authorities, on the basis of tribal subdistricts. 
Lisa Anderson The State and social tranformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1920-1980,1986, p. 181f. 
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adopting the most effective and economic strategy. In Algeria, the early 
period of conquest had led to military administration in the conquered 
areas, which was gradually replaced by civil authority. 
As with the case of land reform, French policy aimed to put aside 
traditional structures, in favour of French judicial and administrative 
institutions. 79 They rejected both annexation and direct rule of Tunisia 
in favour of the creation of a protectorate, seen as an effective and 
inexpensive method of securing French interests. "' The administration of 
the protectorates l in Tunisia was geared to the pursuit of French 
interests, and to this end, it used some existing structures, though 
traditional authority was progressively undermined, with bureaucratic 
structures coming partly to replace and redefine relationships formerly 
based on kinship and tribal affiliation. From the beginning of the 
protectorate, the elite had worked with the French, but they exercised 
little real power in the increasingly complex administrative system, and 
this undermined their traditional authority. Despite their exclusion from 
positions of responsibility, 0' educated Tunisians were increasingly 
employed in junior administrative posts under the protectorate, and 
their ability to manipulate the machinery of government earned them 
79. After the creation of the Arab Bureaux, their agents carried out administration. The military 
moved into police work and the judiciary, and their position was enhanced by modification of the 
judicial system in 1854, when officers were able to submit offenders to military justice. Only in 1858 
with the creation of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies did the officers become public 
prosecutors and investigators. 
The French aimed to establish a tribunal in every commune, by which means the destruction of the 
traditional judicial and local administrative structure was to be accomplished. The land law of 1873 
had deprived the qadis of jurisdiction over land tenure, and the tribal assembly could no longer 
control local affairs, which were now governed by French tribunals. A new Penal Code was issued in 1881, which permitted administrators and the civilian political authority to exercise powers normally 
restricted to the military in time of war. Other administrative bodies were established, including 
the Conseils generaux and the Conseils municipaux, at the local level, to which some Algerians were 
appointed by the governor-general. At the national level, most important were the Conseil superieur 
and the Delegations financieres, through which the settler administration established financial 
autonomy from metropolitan France by 1900. Parliamentary representation was achieved in 1930, in which 
the settler share was disproportionate : 53 settlers to 11 Algerian landowners. In 1930, a law was 
promulgated, creating two colleges, or parliaments, European and Algerian. 
Rachid Tleucani State and revolution in Algeria, 1986, p. 41f. 
80. Lisa Anderson The State and social tranforuation in Tunisia and Libya, 1820-1980,1986, p. 141 
81. The succession of Ali Bey gave the French Resident-General the opportunity to take control of the 
whole administrative structure, though the bey retained nominal sovereignty. The convention of al- 
Marsa provided that the bey should undertake 'such administrative, judicial, and financial reforms as 
the French government may deem useful'. The Resident-General legislated through and enforced beylical 
decrees, the government structure was controlled by the Protectorate administration through 
directeurs, and there existed a Council of Ministers, made up of directors of government departments, 
Tunisian ministers and the French commanders of the armed forces along with the Resident-General. A 
consultative body was established in 1896, and by 1907, this included 16 Tunisian appointees of the 
Resident-General, as well as elected French officials. A Grand Council, established in 1922 and 
containing both French and Tunisian sections, exercised little power in itself or over the government. 
Wilfrid Knapp Tunisia, 1970, pp. 113-136. 
82. 'The complexity of the French administration, its insistence on territorial conscriptions, and its 
monopoly of coercion and of genuine political influence diminished the roles of the tribal networks 
and pre-colonial elite and created the content for new political roles. ' 
The French established 'technical' services, which became independent ministries staffed and 
controlled by Frenchmen. As the Tunisians gained technical education, the French introduced other 
conditions such as military service to exclude Tunisians, who were thus relegated to the ministries of 
local administration and Islamic law. Holding no other positions of responsibility, their role was 
reduced to that of intermediary between French and Arabic speakers. 
Lisa Anderson The State and social tranforuation in Tunisia and Libya, 1820-1980,1986, p. 150f. 
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a status formerly restricted to the elite. 
French colonial policy in North Africa, and in particular in Algeria, was 
affected to a large degree by changes of government within France itself, e3 
as well as by the attitudes of the large settler communities in Algeria, and 
to a lesser extent in Morocco and Tunisia. 
Other regional events identified earlier, such as the rise of fascism, the 
granting of independence by the British, World War Two and eventually the 
growth of pan-Arabism, also affected French policies, which appear to have 
swung between reform and repression. Governments of the Fourth Republic 
were weak, formed as a result of political compromise and were therefore 
weak in their administration of colonial territories and vulnerable to 
pressure from the settlers. A distinction is clear between the French 
attitude to Tunisia and Morocco, and to Algeria. The former achieved 
independence relatively soon after the war, whereas until de Gaulle, the 
French seemed determined to hold Algeria at any price. 
Changing circumstances in both France and Algeria, in particular after the 
start of civil war in 1955, were crucial in shaping French colonial policy in 
its later stages. As elsewhere, the French responded to Algerian nationalism 
with both limited political reform and violent repression. The French 
government's response to an organised armed uprising in May 194586 was to 
attempt mild political reform. In 1955, after the outbreak of civil war, the 
French authorities began a twin programme of keeping Algeria French and 
carrying out administrative and economic reform in the hope of satisfying 
both settlers and 
83, In Tunisia, liberalisation of French colonial policy occurred earl Y under the administration of Pierre 
Vienot, but even limited liberalisation was opposed by the Popular Front, arousing opposition from the 
French chamber, with the government breaking up in 1937. The sore conservative assembly in power after the 
1951 election brought fresh proposals making little concession to Tunisian nationalism. They were opposed by 
the French socialists, and the Resident-General used his powers to dismiss the moderate Tunisian leader and 
his colleagues. Strikes and demonstrations were met by increased repression, culminating in the murder of 
national leaders, such as Ferhat Rai-hid, leader of the Union generale des travaiIleurs tunisiens, by an 
extremist settler organization. 
A further change in French policy came in 1954, to provide in Tunisia, extended participation of the native 
population while retaining a federative principle for the republic as a whole. In 1954, the new French 
leader, Pierre Mendis-France, announced self-government for Tunisia. Negotiations over Tunisia's internal 
sovereignty went on for a year, and were embodied in a series of conventions of June 1955, which protected French interests. Tunisia became independent in March 1956 
For Maghrib history in general, see : Abdallah Laroui The history of the Naghrib : an interpretative essay, 
1977. 
94. In the June 1946 election to the Algerian seats in the French assembly, the newly formed Union 
democrativue du aanifeste algerien won 71 1 of the vote. The new French Constitution of September 194? increased Algerian representation to 18 in the Union Assembly and in the National Assembly, 30 in the 
Chamber of Deputies and 14 in the Senate. Half of the seats were reserved for Muslims in the National Assembly and Algeria itself was given a two-college assembly, an all-Muslim college, and a mixed Muslim- 
European college, the first was dominated by collaborationist Muslims and the second by colons, in both 
cases because the elections were 'arranged' by the administration. 
Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy Nationalism and new states in Africa, 1984, p. 123f. 
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nationalists. B5 The government of Pierre Mendes-France had moved 
Morocco and Tunisia toward independence in progressive stages in 1954- 
55, partly in order to avoid armed rebellion on either side of Algeria. 
The appointment in 1956 of Guy Mollet as Prime Minister who had 
advocated direct negotiation with the Fronte de liberation nationale, 
raised nationalist hopes that a political solution was in sight, but Mollet 
gave way to pressure from the colons, and his weakness encouraged 
extremists in the French army, who helped overthrow the Fourth 
Republic in 1958. From 1957, French policy swung back to violent 
repression. ee With de Gaulle, after the overthrow of the Fourth Republic, 
France entered the final stages of its North African colonial occupation. 
His policy was reformist, e' and in 1959, he began moves towards a 
political solution based on majority rule. It seems that de Gaulle was 
more concerned with the strategic implications of the use of half a 
million troops in Algeria than to safeguard the interests of the colons. 
In 1959, he proposed a referendum on self-determination for Algeria, 
which provoked a revolt by the colons in 1960 which was defeated by 
army groups loyal to de Gaulle, and by Muslim non-cooperation with the 
colons. In June 1960, his government began direct negotiations with the 
provisional government in exile, 8° and after some difficulties, in 1962, he 
declared that Algeria would become independent. 
85. Along with strict security measures, the new governor-general tried administrative reform, through 
decentralisation and allowing Muslims more participation in local affairs. He established a new body 
of officials known as the Sections adainistratives specialisees, who were appointed as district 
officers to administer directly the areas under their control. Their duties were to develop education, 
improve agricultural methods, supervise health and house-building programmes and act as judiciary. 
Ibid. P. 125 
86. French policy from 1957 was a programme of forcible re-grouping of villages, in an attempt to cut 
contact with the guerillas. Atrocities were carried out by government troops, disguised as Armee de 
liberation nationale soldiers, a counterproductive measure which strengthened support for the FLN. 
French military retaliation against the FLN resulted in a brutal act in 1958, when French planes 
bombed an apparent FLN colon near the Tunisian border, Sakhite Sidi Youssef, killing 6B Tunisian 
villagers. This outrage led to international condemnation, including diplomatic pressure from the United States. 
87. Muslims were given voting rights as French citizens on the constitutional referendum for the Fifth 
Republic. In 1958, he launched the Constantina plan, which provided for expansion of education, health 
care and industrialisation, and the rapid introduction of Muslims into public service. 
Ibid. p. 129 88. A contemporary description of the government in exile may be found in Mohammed Bedjaoui Law and 
the Algerian Revolution, 1961 
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An important factor with far-reaching implications in the contemporary 
political and legal order was the use of minorities by the colonial powers 
for maintaining their authority and influence in the region. 89 Colonial 
policy toward minorities aimed at the division of colonised society on 
religious, ethnic and linguistic grounds, 8° in order to undermine the 
development of organised forces within society. Minorities also became 
the instrument of colonial policy in several countries. The philosophical 
background of each colonising power also affected their attitude toward 
minorities. Despite the non-discriminatory character of the French 
doctrine of incorporating colonial territory within the Republic, the 
French tended to favour minorities who could be expected to further 
their interests. ° 
Though contemporary Arab states differ in economic development and 
political outlook, they share in varying degrees the legacies of foreign 
rule, which have had far-reaching implications for the development of 
the present political structure and constitutional order from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Gulf. This brief conclusion reviews the main implications 
of that period, focusing on the legacies of European colonial rule on the 
emerging order. The political legacy of domination of the Arabs was deep 
and lasting : for two centuries the Ottomans dominated the region, to be 
followed by European control. 92 
Foreign rule disrupted traditional society, creating divisions in 
territories and communities which still have effect today. The depth of 
cultural transformation of the European colonies of the Middle East and 
North Africa is open to question. However, there is a greater degree of 
apparent cultural impact in the former French North African colonies, 
while Britain's cultural influence appears superficial. 
89. The Palestinian question and the Israeli occupation in which all colonial powers share 
responsibility, remains the most striking legacy of colonial rule in the region. An examination of 
this complex and well-documented issue is beyond the scope of this research, save to note its impact 
on the development of the contemporary order in the region and its stability. 
90. French policy aimed at the division of North African society between Arab and Berber communities, for example, by reviving Berber customary law in place of Islamic legislation for the Berbers, and by 
sponsoring their educational development. Their concern was not to protect the minority culture or language, with education conducted in French at the expense of both Arabic and Berber. 
Rachid Tlemcani State and revolution in Algeria, 1986, p. 19Bf. 
In Morocco, the Berber Dahir of 1930 had aimed at encouraging Berber separatism as a counter-weight 
to urban Muslim Arabs' anti-colonialism. 
Michael C. Hudson Arab politics : the search for legitimacy, 1977. 
91. The French military in Syria-Lebanon adopted the French policy of supporting minorities who would in turn favour France. The military commander divided the province into b: Greater Lebanon, Latakia (an Alawi district), Aleppo, Syria (districts of Homs, Damascus and Hama) and Jabal al-Druze (a Druze 
district). Though this division proved impractical, it is clear that it was made partly with the 
minority Alawi community favoured by France in Latakia, and the Druze Minority in Jabal-al-Druze in 
mind. Lebanon was easier for France to administer than Syria, chiefly because of the Maronite 
Christians who supported the.. Division of people according to religion was a basic policy, but the 
military high commissioners aided the propagation of Roman-Catholicism and favoured Catholics. 
92. Of the 16 Arab territories that attained independence between 1926 and 1968, all were under Ottoman administration since at least the beginning of the 18th century. During the 19th and 20th 
centuries, they case under the direct administration of European powers, whether under French or British protectorates, or, after the First World War, French or British Trusteeship (under the League 
of Nations mandates). After the Second World War, Libya passed from the direct control of Italy to the 
trusteeship of the UN, under which she achieved independence. 
For the impact on the region in general, see Fred Halliday Arabia without sultans :a political 
survey of instability in the Arab world, 1975. 
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Most important and lasting of the legacies of colonial rule in the region 
is the psychological legacy, since the exploitation of Arab land, 
resources and the Arab population, and the creation of false institutions 
has had far-reaching implications for the progress of the Arab nation, 
inhibiting its development, creating obstacles to unity and instability, 
elements which persist in the contemporary order. 
The economic, political and administrative policies" of the foreign 
powers who controlled the Arab countries reflected the cultural 
characteristics°t and national interests of the powers themselves" 
rather than the needs of these communities. The presence of the powers 
was always closely connected and practically linked to national interests 
or, in France's case, to those of the larger community. Economic 
development, for example, was influenced to a great extent by colonial 
policies, and paramount in every case was the interest of the colonizing 
as opposed to local needs or concerns. France and Italy in particular 
transformed the system of land tenure in their North African colonies in 
the interests of the settler communities. "' Rapid urbanization of the 
nomadic and semi-nomadic population as well as limited industrialization 
were also consequences of European economic policies in their Arab 
colonies. 9' 
93. As we saw, during the Ottoman period, the Arabs were subject to political and administrative 
systems which reflected the political movements and the changing administrative organization in 
Turkey, with the Islamic element representing the only common ground between the leadership and 
institutions such as the Ulara. The balance of power was subject to shifts according to the relative 
strength of these institutions. Islamic Shari'ah governed the attitude of both the Ottomans and the 
Arab population to minorities, which were religious in character, and according to Shari eh. 
regulated by the laws and organs of their own beliefs. The period of governing until 1908, when the 
constitution was promulgated, was far from ideal, with dynasties and corruption characteristic. The 
Ottoman administration took into account social conditions in their political and administrative divisions, especially the tribal conditions of these provinces. 
94. Agricultural production in North African colonies, for example, focused on grape-growing for wine 
production, in spite of the Muslim population. 
95. Documents issued by the British government with respect to the Egyptian Protectorate indicate the 
attitude that British interests remained paramount. For example, a Foreign Office Circular to British 
Diplomatic Missions in March 1922 stressed ' .. 
the rights and interests of the British Empire are 
vitally involved, and will not admit the, to be questioned or discussed.. Muhammad Khalil The Arab states and the Arab League ... , 
1962 p. 460. 96. For example, the Italians took land for the settlement of colonists to provide 68 000 hectares of land in Tripolitania by 1925. Between 1923 and 1932,120,790 hectares in Cyrenaica were taken. Lisa Anderson The State and social tranforuation in Tunisia and Libya, 1820-1980,1986, p. 215. See also the articles by P. Lombardi and G. L. Fuller cited above, footnote 75. Protectorate economic 
policies in Tunisia, in furthering the commercialization of agriculture and the development of a real 
estate market provided a suitable context for colonization, in which Europeans came to control the 
most fertile land. 
9?. As France introduced plantations and mechanised farming on a large scale in Algeria, for example, 
settlers forced many Algerians from their land into the urban centres, where they were politicised by 
unemployment and poverty. Both the immigrant middle class and favoured local minorities enjoyed 
privileges not shared by the native middle-classes, again leading to their politicization. 
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The administrative policies too, of the foreign powers reflected the 
political concerns, the cultural policies and the economic interestsBB of 
those powers, either manipulating or seeking to undermine features of 
traditional society, such as tribal authority structures. The Ottoman 
administration99 encountered by the European powers had made use of 
both religious and tribal structures and affiliations. While in some 
countries, the European colonizers constructed their own administrative 
systems, elsewhere they adopted and reformed aspects of the Ottoman 
administrative structure to fit their own purposes, l 1111 sometimes 
appointing European administrators to supervise existing legal and 
administrative apparatus. 
Where Europeans created an administrative structure, its work was 
conducted entirely or largely by the personnel of the foreign Power, ' 01 
though in some countries there was limited participation in the junior 
levels. This was normally conditional on participation within the 
assimilationist policies of the power, which clearly limited the numbers 
able or willing to participate within this context. The effect in the 
98. Cromer's reforms in Egypt increased cotton output after the building of the first Aswan Dam in 
1903, but its main result was to enrich the political power of a small class of land-owners. In 1913 
almost half of Egypt's cultivated land was owned by 13,000 landlords while the rest was shared by a 
million and a half fallahin. 
99. Aspects of the provincial religious administration are still to be found in modern Arab republics 
and monarchies, such as the Ulaaa and mufti, while the administrative section of divan and wali, 
though remaining in some states only until independence, remain to the present within some monarchies. 
Consultative councils remained too within some modern monarchies, with some developing to be the 
'Council of Notables', appointed by the King. 
For example, the monarchical Constitution of Libya of 1951, as amended, establishes the Una council, 
containing the Councils of Notables and of Representatives, (article 93) of which the former contains 
42 members appointed by the King (article 94). It also establishes local administration containing local and baladiyyah councils (article 176). 
In the provinces, de-centralised institutions, such as Milayat headed by Mali, Muhafaza headed by Muhafize, Saladiyyah headed by Din, Mutasarrifiyyah headed by Mutassarif remained until the sixties in 
Libya, and to the present in other monarchies. 100. In most cases, the colonizing powers sought the most economical and effective system of 
administration regardless of the effect on the development of the colonised community, as we saw, for 
example, in British policies in the Gulf. 
French direct rule was not always imposed, where an alternative and reliable power structure already 
existed, as for example, in the case of Morocco, where in the Treaty of Fez of 1912, the French 
recognised the Alawi Sharifian dynasty. The existing administrative structure was retained with the 
addition of an administrative substructure staffed by French personnel. Legislation and decrees were 
promulgated in the name of the sultan leaving his nominally the source of authority in the country. In 
Tunisia, in the early stages, the beylical administration was preserved, though a parallel French 
administration quickly acquired all effective powers, and the bey became a figure-head, while central 
power was in the hands of the French Resident-general. 
101. Examples from the three Powers illustrate this approach. 
In Libya, the provincial administration was almost entirely Italian, with the Libyans largely 
excluded from government, though, as we saw, some Libyans, granted special citizenship, were allowed to exercise administrative functions in areas with Libyan populations, or act as advisers in mixed 
districts. 
The British tended to use their own personnel in senior posts in the administration, in order to 
secure British interests. Cromer and Kitchener in particular, believed that the Egyptians could not be trusted with the administration of Egypt. However, the body of administration was carried out by 
Eggptians, with the result that the British left Egypt with a thriving bureaucracy and governmental 
machinery. 
The French protectorates in North Africa were also largely staffed by French personnel, and 
administration by metropolitan institutions tended to move the focus away from local needs to those of the larger community. 
For useful discussion of the impact of colonial education and administrative policies, with 
particular reference to the legal profession, see Donald M. Reid Lawyers and politics in the Arab 
world, 1880-1960,1981. 
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French colonies of North Africa was to create a French-speaking and 
French-educated intellectual elite, but few administrators, while in 
former British colonies, the tendency to create national apparatus 
created administrative bureaucracies and a trained body of Arab civil 
servants. 
Another factor restricting Arab participation in colonial administration 
was the increasing requirement of technical or political qualifications to 
exercise power even at junior levels. The growing importance of 
technical qualifications also contributed to undermining traditional 
authority based on kinship, 102 though elsewhere, to varying extents, the 
Powers had shared the policy of maintaining and using the tribal or 
kinship organizational structures, to extend their authority to the 
hinterland. 10 3 Where applied, this policy had the result of deepening the 
division between rural and urban communities, and of creating a two- 
tier administrative structure, containing both traditional and modern 
elements. 
As before, the fact that the interests of the power itself, rather than 
the needs of the colonised community predominated led to negative 
results reflected in both the quantity and quality of the administrative 
apparatus, in terms of institutions and personnel, at independence. In 
contrast to the spirit of the aims set out, for example, in the League of 
Nations mandates in accordance with Article 22 (4) of the League of 
Nations Charter, of creating institutions which could serve the nation's 
interests at independence or of developing the population so as to 
provide qualified and experienced administrators to take over the 
European apparatus, colonial policies tended to serve only the short- 
term interests of the European Powers and to restrict local participation 
to comparatively junior levels. 
Similar conclusions may be drawn about the policies of administrative 
reform adopted at various times by colonising powers. lo4 
102. The Pre-colonial Tunisian state administration was not dismantled, but administrative reforms, 
particularly concerned with educational qualifications for posts in the bureaucracy undermined 
political support based on kinship, while at the same time the extension of territorial administrative 
units and registration of title to land undermined the coherence of kin-based political identity. 103. Tribal and kinship organization became the tool of Italian administrative policy in Libya, with lasting consequences for political organization. As peasant communities were destroyed along with the 
Libyan administration, kinship identities were revived as a political structure. 
M. Administrative reform in the French North African colonies occurred at more than one stage. In 
Tunisia, where aspects of the pre-colonial administration were maintained by the French, reform 
minimised the role of Tunisians. At a different stage, in Algeria, the French carried out 
administrative reform in response to the outbreak of civil war in 1955. As we saw, the French 
governor-general implemented administrative reform, which although allowing Muslims more 
participation in local affairs, established the Sections administratives specialisees, a corps of 
french military officials. 
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Colonial policies also affected political life in the Arab countries to a 
great extent, interrupting the development of political thought and 
activity, and affecting the creation and development of political 
organizations. With colonial occupation regarded as a cultural assault on 
Islam, l°6 political and religious movements were diverted to the national 
struggle for independence as a direct reaction to foreign domination, 
and in particular, the "missionary" nature of some colonial policies. The 
nature of some parties was a response to the presence of foreign 
powers, with their programmes based primarily on the achievement of 
independence, and to a greater or lesser extent, on calls for Arab 
unity. 1oe 
Nationalist opposition to colonial rule developed at varying stages in 
different countries. ' O7 In some countries, colonial policies delayed the 
creation of modern political parties, l°8 and inhibited the growth of 
conventional forms of political participation. ' °eA policy which 
undermined the development of political parties was the tendency of 
some powers to deal principally with traditional elites, thereby excluding 
and alienating other sectors of society, who were thus unable to 
participate effectively in developing political life. To a certain extent, 
this led some elements of the population to accept the de facto 
circumstances of colonial rule, whether exercised directly or through the 
leadership which assumed power in the post-independence era in 
countries such as Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. 
Within some colonies, the Arabs' political role existed within the larger 
nation, a phenomenon which began under Ottoman rule. 11° Political 
institutions developed later in French colonies, with parties and other 
105. French colonial occupation in Morocco was regarded as a Christian assault on Islas, and the early 
nationalist movement, particularly in Istiglal, was influenced by the ideas of Muhammad Abduh and the 
Salafiyyah movement. 
106. For a discussion of Arab political parties see : Elie Kedourie Arabic political memoirs and other 
studies, 1974, pp. 28-58. 
107. For example, in the French territories, Tunisian reactions reflected both changes in protectorate 
policies and growing disenchantment with French government. Early protests came from the beylic elite, 
concerning the failure of the protectorate to develop the Tunisian population. The middle class of 
Tunis attacked the failure of the French to employ Tunisians in high level posts, and the refusal of 
the French to recognise a Tunisian constitution. Finally, protest organised by Tunisian provinces 
emphasised the protectorate's systematic bias against Tunisians and called for a return to Tunisian 
control. 
108. Elsewhere, conventional parties grew up both to voice nationalist opposition to colonial rule and 
to act as intermediary between the population and the foreign administration. For example, the Neo- 
Destourians used a clientele network throughout Tunisia, providing services such as legal aid, 
e Qloyment and insurance, and acting as intermediaries with the French administration in return for 
political support. Its organization around clientele networks permitted nationwide participation, and 
patronage allowed the party to bring together varied groups which ideological politics would have 
divided. 
Lisa Anderson The state and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1986, p. 141f. 
109. For example, the consequence of the British presence in the Arabian peninsula was to strengthen 
the rule of particular families and tribes. Little political development took place and at 
independence there was no experience of political participation apart from the traditional tribal 
structure. 
110. For example, the whole Libyan population was represented by six members -representing six 
provinces - in the Turkish parliament. Muhammed al-Radani Libyan Administrative Law, 1965, p. 62. 
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associations''' initially organized with respect to national concerns, 
rather than those of the colony itself. 
Political favour was shown to certain groups within the colonies, as the 
Powers saw most convenient for their ends. Thus, certain groups within 
Arab society came to exercise political influence or power. ' l2 Another 
outcome of the colonial policy of favouring certain groups was that of 
incoherence in the political front opposing the colonial power. Traditional 
leaders, modernised elites and broadly-based nationalist movements 
found themselves in opposition to one another as well as to the colonial 
power. ' l' 
Parties like the Wafd in Egypt and the Neo-Destour in Tunisia 
operated within the political framework created by the colonial powers, 
though the failure of this framework to translate Arab aspirations led 
nationalist forces in several countries to seek power in alliance with the 
military. Belief in the "democratic process" as a vehicle of change was 
irretrievably undermined, with the failure of existing organs or those 
created by colonial rulers to provide a mechanism through which 
political parties could bring about change responding to national needs. 
This failure was due both to the inherent weakness of the organs 
themselves and interference in such aspects as limitations on the scope 
of participation, and the "arranging" of elections. 
The colonial powers, or leaders acting on their advice, responded to 
nationalist calls with reform"" of constitutions and institutions, with the 
result that the new constitutional order became more authoritarian, """ 
Other responses included the imprisonment, exile or assassination of 
nationalist leaders, which dramatically weakened political leadership. The 
failure of the political mechanism to bring about change meant that the 
military option was seen in several countries as the only mechanism by 
which nationalist goals might be achieved. 
M. In 1946, the Union generale tunisienne du travail was formed, independent from the CGT, since the 
French union which had come under communist domination after the war, wanted to preserve the 
dominance of French workers. It pursued an independent course, joining the anti-communist 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and thereby gaining access to an international forum 
for its case for independence. 
Wilfrid Knapp Tunisia, 1970 pp. 132-3. 
112. A consequence of the British presence in the Arabian peninsula was to strengthen the rule of 
particular families and tribes. We have seen another example, which has implications for the 
contemporary structure, in French support to minorities who thereby became the protectors of their 
interests. The French favoured those groups who potentially might support France, including religious 
minorities like the Christians or Alawis, and the Berbers in the North African colonies. 
113. The struggle for independence in British colonies was often triangular, since the British, the 
traditional or British-backed leader and the modernised elite or nationalist movement tended to oppose 
one another, as in the cases of Iraq, Aden and Egypt. 
114. In British colonies in particular, concessions tended to come in response to organised demand and 
when the higher cost of resisting reform outweighed any advantage which might be kept by maintaining 
the status quo. British policy in South Yemen had been slow to respond to growing calls for 
independence. By relying on traditional leaders and leaving nationalist groups out of negotiations 
until the last stage, Britain found herself unable to negotiate a constitutional route to 
independence, leaving the country to civil war. 
115. Constitutions Promulgated in Egypt, as we saw, enhanced the power of the monarch to give him 
over-riding executive authority. 
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Another conclusion which could be drawn from these policies is the 
undermining of constitutionalism''° and institutions. The constitutional 
route to independence in most Arab countries was undermined in the 
eyes of the population, by the role of the colonial power in the framing 
of the constitutional order, l l' which in some cases confirmed the legal 
status of a ruling minority, 11B or failed to reform the feudal economic 
structure. It was also undermined by continuing colonial influence after 
"semi-independence", for example, through the treaties which maintained 
a foreign military presence, such as the treaty between Britain and Iraq 
of 1930, the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 or British treaties with Gulf 
states. 
In several countries, the lack of a peaceful route to independence, L1a 
as well as the absence of a mechanism for peaceful political change after 
independence may also be traced to the failure to build a coherent 
constitutional order. Despite an appearance of modern state-building, 
Arab participation in the foreign-created institutions of colonial rule was 
superficial and restricted to participation by select groups in the 
government of their subject nations, while real political power was 
strictly controlled by foreign personnel, even when they utilised 
traditional power structures to extend their control. Particularly after 
the First World War, with the emergence of the principle of self- 
determination, the European powers became concerned to an extent to 
legitimise their position in Arab territory by providing limited 
opportunities for the participation in government of local elites, and 
eventually a measure of self-government, but with the national interests 
of the Powers remaining paramount, the political structures they created 
and the opportunities for participation they allowed, were no more than 
superficial. 
116. Elie Kedourie has made a study of the failure of constitutionalism in the Middle East. See, for 
example, his Arabic political memoirs, 1974, pp. 1-27, and recently, 'Crisis and revolution in modern 
Islas' in Times Literary Supplement May 19-25 1989, pp. 549-553 
117. King Faisal I governed under the Constitution of 1924, which had been given by the British, after 
a series of constitutional proposals proposed by a British Commission and the Iraqis, had been 
rejected. The authorship of the new Constitution is disputed, as some regard it as the grant" of the 
British, wile others describe it as the work of the constitutionol assembly. I. Mirza Political science and principles of constitutional law], 1960, p. 89-110. 
118. The British policy of installing members of the Hashemi family as their representatives in the 
mandate territories was not fully successful in maintaining control after independence, as the British 
were forced to intervene militarily to secure Iraq from the German threat. In the post-war period, the 
policy maintained western influence in Jordan through Abdullah's grandson, but successive army coups 
d'etat in Iraq removed British influence. Their continuing influence in Egyptian political life, 
principally exercised through the ruling dynasty of Muhammad Ali, was ended by the Free Officers coup 
of 1952. 
119. The Yemeni case provides a striking example. The British were unable even to establish a 
caretaker government, and left the country to civil war between the two main nationalist movements. 
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The policies of both direct and indirect rulers of the Arab population 
were aimed not at nurturing the Arabs' political development with a view 
to building strong institutions capable of translating Arab desires for 
equality, justice and political participation, but rather to provide the 
mechanism by which the colonial nation could maintain power. Some 
argue that "western" institutions were transplanted into Arab countries 
where they failed to take root because of differences in historical 
experience and values, " 2° but this analysis is based on orientalist 
assumptions, and must be rejected, since there are no grounds for 
suggesting that the population of Arab countries did not share common 
aspirations to political equality, justice and the opportunity to 
contribute to their political development. While it is clearly the case that 
Arabs' modern historical experience, under foreign domination, was 
distinct from the experience of European nation-states, leaving behind 
legacies of division, political incoherence, a crisis of representation and 
weak institutions in political life, this does not mean that the Arabs 
rejected political development, simply that they had yet to experience it 
in reality. Institutions and laws were unable to satisfy the aspirations of 
the population, not because they embodied values alien to Arab society, 
but because they were not successful in translating such ideals as 
equality, justice and participation into reality. 
120. John L. Esposito Islam and politics, 1985, p. 129. The weakness of 'political institutions (parliaments, political parties, free elections)" is not due 
to 'differing* values and concepts, but rather, as this thesis will continue to argue, in their 
failure to operate in practice because of the weakness of the political and legal structures which 
should sustain and regulate them. "Parliaments' in which a single governmental viewpoint is dominant 
and maintained by constitutional and other legal provisions, are not parliaments in any real sense; 
"political parties' which are not free to represent the spectrum of political thought and aspirations 
of the population cannot be described as true political parties; and "elections" where the law is 
unable to safeguard the right of free and equal participation in a secure and legally protected 
political process cannot be described as "free elections". The failure of political institutions in 
Arab countries is not due to their 'western' or 'alien' origin, but to their lack of real content, 
which would ensure their failure in any country. 
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The Arabs embraced the cause of Qawniiyya (nationalism) because of a 
cultural, linguistic unity and, to a certain extent, unity of historical 
experience, but because of problems in definition, it is important to 
examine the term "nationalism", both in content and scope, through its 
various manifestations. As we saw, Arab contact with the West took 
several characters : military, commercial and colonial, leading in most 
cases to a collective, nationalist response. In identifying the role of 
nationalism in the creation of the contemporary political and legal order, 
it is important to identify the precise nature of Arab nationalism in 
particular periods of history. 
Arab nationalism today does not share the same content, l 2' or context 
- even in general usage - as, for example, the classic European notion 
of nationalism, ' 22 where the European communities formed homogeneous, 
administratively and politically centralised nation-states. " 23 Although the 
term may be applied according to its general usage in an Arab context 
during a certain period, a distinction must be made in a later stage. l24 
For Arabs, under Ottoman and European control, the first object of 
nationalism was independence and liberation from foreign domination, not 
necessarily the creation of independent nation-states, as in Europe. 
At a later stage, the nationalist struggle within each state focused on 
national independence, leading to the creation of independent states, 
each in accordance with different ideologies. A further dimension, that 
of "pan-Arabism" was added to the term with the result that it became 
misleading. Though Arab nationalists strove for a greater unity at the 
regional level, the factor of political unity did not exist, and the 
maximum achievement at this level was the Arab League whose Pact 
stressed Arab unity and created a regional political organization aimed 
at fostering cooperation between the member states. ' z6 
121. The same has been said of African nationalism. 
K. N. J. Post Nationalist movements in West Africa, p. 326. 
For background, see also : Hazen Z. Nuseibeh The ideas of Arab nationalism, 1956; Walter Z. Lageur 
Communism and nationalism in the Middle East, 1956. Translations of important texts may be found in 
Sylvia Haim Arab nationalism, 1962. 
122. From the European point of view, nationalism combines negative and positive elements, where the former represents a rejection of the outside world, a rejection of universalism. The positive element, 
at least in the European context, has been the expansionism which has led both to foreign conquest and 
border quarrels on the European continent for four centuries. European nations fought, not to 
establish their identity and sovereignty against a foreign occupier, but to control the sources of 
wealth in Europe and throughout the world. Some see nationalism in Europe and its subsequent overseas 
expansion in colonialism as the inevitable consequences of the development of capitalism. 
S. Amin The Arab nation . nationalism and class struggle, London, 1978. 
Nowadays, in the European context, both elements have been rejected as outmoded : interdependence and the interests and aims of the broader European community have largely triumphed. Nationalist movements 
continue to thrive in European states, particularly where communities feel that their political and 
cultural identity is threatened by the trend towards political union. 
123. S. Amin The Arab nation : nationalism and class struggle 1976, p. 10. 
124. The aftermath of the First World War brought some hope to the Arab nation, when historical events led to political progress, including full or semi-nationhood. In contrast, the Second World War, 
combined with the danger of political Zionism, heightened the urgent need for Arab unity. The creation 
of Israel and other events led to the establishment of the League of Arab States, giving nationalism the chance to put itself to the historical test. 
125. Article 2 defines its purposes as the strengthening of the relation between the member states, the cooperation between them, and the safeguarding of their political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. American Journal of International Law 39,1945 
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Early "nationalist" movements then, campaigned not in the name of an 
already existing unity, but rather to translate into reality their 
aspiration to the right to be free politically. This distinction has led 
writers to suggest that "Arabisni" is a more accurate term in this 
context. From the Arab point of view, the aim of the early nationalist 
movement was principally to regain national sovereignty, with a view to 
regaining control over the political and economic life of the area, and 
shaping the destiny of the Arab nation. This is one of the important 
differences between Arab and European nationalism. Arab nationalism was 
no expansionist movement. The principal struggle was focused against 
external occupation it was primarily a struggle for national 
liberation. ' 26 Though historical events played a major role in the rapid 
development of nationalist movements in the Arab world, a religious 
consciousness fed Arab nationalism throughout history and continues to 
influence it today. -21 
In the twentieth century, with the collapse of Ottoman rule, some Arab 
Muslims achieved the status of nationhood. The ensuing ideological 
controversy among Muslim intellectuals was only the beginning of a 
continuing debate between nationalism and universalism. 
The 
consequences of the First World War, when the European Powers divided 
the spoils of the Turkish empire, highlighted the basic contradiction 
between the goals of Arab nationalism and Islam with its universal 
message of non-discrimination. 12 8 
In this era, we see the effect of the two main currents : religious and 
secular, and within them, traditional and modern, conservative and 
radical, in Arab political thought, their positive and negative effect, arid 
their essential role in the creation of contemporary Arab states. The 
current aspirations of Arab intellectuals to democracy in a rationalist 
order depend on the success of the balance between these forces. 12' 
Nationalism, as other aspirations of Arab society, found and continues 
to find its reflection within the two main tendencies of that society. The 
first represents the religious dimension, and the second the secular. It 
should be noted that each dimension took its own place in each modern 
Arab state. At this stage, it is worthwhile to summarise briefly the two 
main tendencies of nationalism, Islamic conservatism and liberal 
modernism. The first is based on Islamic orthodoxy, and draws its 
identity from the original sources of Islamic law and 
126. Anouar Abdel-Malek characterises this struggle as a "nationalitarian" as 
" 
opposed to a 
conventionally nationalist" movement. He further characterises the nationalitarian period as the 
predominance of a positively oriented movement, creating progressive values and institutions, while 
the conventional nat'ona is, of the colonial powers aimed at ethnic and racial domination". 
Anouar Abdel-Malek 
(ed. ) 
Contemporary Arab political thought 1983 p. 9. 
127. For example, in the nineteenth century, Islamic political thought identified nationalism as 
patriotism and a mark of faith. 
Hamid Enayat Modern Islamic political thought 1982, p. 111f. 
128. Islamic law confirms the prohibition of discrimination : "A coloured person has no preference 
over a white man, nor a white person over a coloured one, nor an 
Arab over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab 
over an Arab, except through righteousness". 
129. Anouar Abdel-Malek (ed. ) Contemporary Arab political thought 1983 p.?. 
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ethics. 13° Arab and non-Arab fundamentalists, like Banna', Sayyid Qutb, 
Ghazzali and Mawdudi, rejected all varieties of nationalism, linguistic, 
ethnic and liberal, on grounds of universalism arguing that the only 
homeland which could be recognised by the term "Dar-al Islam" is the 
global application of the "domain of Islam", with the Islamic homeland 
the only legitimate ground for nationalism. 131 
The second tendency, that of liberal modernism, took a quite different 
approach. Philosophical rationalism and political liberalism, with its 
Eastern character, shaped its political thought, as far as the creation of 
the social, political and economic order was concerned. The 
transformation, in this context, took into account the cultural heritage, 
and varied in outcome from conservative liberalism to Marxism. 
The context of the rise of Arab nationalism can be traced from the 
decay of the Ottoman empire, and the spread and consolidation of 
European rule in the region. Early nationalist activity had 
been directed 
against Ottoman rule, 13 z but the focus of Arab nationalism proper was 
resistance to European colonialism. Three factors combined to give 
force 
to the nationalist movement after the First World War : firstly, the 
division of Ottoman territory between the Powers after the war and 
the 
creation of separate nation-states, no longer held together 
by a 
centralised regime on a religious pretext. The second factor was 
the 
growing Arab movement for liberation from European 
domination. As 
Turkish influence receded, European cultural and political dominance 
gave impetus to resistance to a rule which was both foreign and non- 
Muslim. A third factor, also related to Islam, was the influence of 
3 religious movements, such as the Salafiyyah movements. ' 
We have already seen how the territory of the former 
Ottoman empire 
was divided between the European powers, beginning in the nineteenth 
century. The process continued, as we saw, with the distribution of 
Arab territory in the Middle East as European mandates, as part of the 
post-war settlements, and the consolidation of European rule in North 
Africa. European colonial rule in these territories provided a focus for 
nationalist resistance movements, which may be divided between the two 
characteristics mentioned earlier : one a religious tendency, which drew 
on the Salafiyyah movements and modern Islamic political thought, 
130. It should be stressed that this basis remains a purely theoretical one which neither Left or 
Right have substantially practised at any level, as we shall see in the examination of Islamization. 
131. Hamid Enayat Modern Islamic political thought 1983 p. 115. 
132. Lisa Anderson "Nineteenth century reform in Ottoman Libya" International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 16,1984. 
133. The Salafiyyah movement as a force manifested itself in Saudi Arabia in the last decade when its 
open rebellion and discontent reached its height in the events which took place in the Great Mosque of 
Makkah. 
Hermann Frederick Eilts, foreword in John L. Esposito Islas and politics 1985. 
Salaiiyyah cults included the Nahhabi in Arabia, Shawkani in Yemen, Sanussi in Cyrenaica (Libya), 
Nahdi in Sudan. 
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and the other, Arab nationalism, l a' which manifested a range of 
orientation, from secularism to nationalism of a Muslim rather than 
Islamic character. "' The focus is on these two main tendencies of 
nationalism, tracing the movements from their early manifestations as a 
reaction to foreign rule and the decay of the Ottoman Caliphate, through 
their role in the achievement of independence and, in broad terms, how 
the secular radical tendency is manifested politically today. 
Arab nationalism originated in the late nineteenth century within the 
territory of the Ottoman empire. The earliest nationalist movements were 
primarily secular and found expression in the writing of Syrian and 
Lebanese intellectuals, who drew on European nationalism, 
constitutionalism and liberalism. Later, Muslim writers identified the 
cause of Arab nationalism closely with Islam. Such ideas posed a 
challenge to the Ottoman administration of Arab territory, and they 
crystallised into political ideas under Abd al-Hamid, finding expression 
in organizations, particularly in Syria and Lebanon. 
Within the Ottoman empire, a number of Salafiy-ya cults had grown into 
an important political force. It based its doctrine on the political 
philosophy of Ibn Taymiyah, 13" and initially, represented a 
conservative reaction to the contemporary political and legal order, in 
religious terms, contrasting the corruption of Ottoman rule with Islam. 
With the advent of European colonial rule, Muslim thinkers, such as al- 
Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Redha articulated the Muslim 
response both to domestic problems of development and European 
imperialism. Al-Afghani stressed the weakness and disunity of the 
Islamic world in the face of European expansion, connecting it to the 
corruption of the political order, and advocating radical reform of 
political institutions. He was joined by Abduh, who actively supported 
revolution in Egypt, and advocated secular principles of nation- 
building. "' He urged the reform of the Caliphate within the framework 
of the Ottoman empire, as a defence against European imperialism. 
134. In the light of the dominant role of the 'ruling party' in several radical Arab republics, an 
understanding of their ideological foundations begins with a review of their role in the nationalist 
strug le. 
135. John Esposito Islas and politics 1985, p. 94. 
136. Ibn Tayaiyah was one of the Muslim theologians who responded to the disintegration of the Muslim 
empire into disparate and competing dynasties by calling or a return to the original teaching and 
early practice of Islas. He defined the sources of Islamic teaching strictly, as th Qur'an ad Sunnah, and the practices of the early Muslims, dismissing later developments as Bedah 
einnovation). 
He argued that the Qur'an specified clearly that the basis of government in Islamic state is 
Shura( 'consultation'), and his view went against the contemporary trend which divided religion from 
secular authority, by opening the consultative council to religious and national representatives : the 
ulema and leaders of public opinion. He thereby opened the dynamic of the state to other elements of 
the Muslim community. He re-iterated the responsibility of the state to implement and safeguard Shari'ah, adding that it is the duty of the people to ensure that the government regains true to the 
doctrine. 
137. For example, he argued that government should be civil rather than religious, that sectarianism 
should be rejected as a political force dividing society and that education be the basis of a civil 
society. Though he identified these bases as characteristic of European nations, he stressed that they 
did not contradict Islamic doctrine. 
Hasid Enayat Modern Islamic political thought, 1983. 
For background, see also C. C. Adams Islas and modernism in Egypt, 1933; Tom Little, Egypt, 1958; P. J. 
Vatikiotis, The history of Egypt, 1980. 
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The question of the Ottoman Caliphate was the subject of debate and 
division between Muslim and nationalist thinkers of the early twentieth 
century. The secular thinker, Ali Abd al-Raziq, called for its abolition, 
on the grounds that Islam had never prescribed any form of 
government in the literal sense, and that the Caliphate had no 
foundation in the primary sources. ' 38 While his thesis was opposed by 
orthodox scholars, his attack on the notion of Caliphate encouraged 
many Muslim thinkers to adopt in its place the concept of a "democratic" 
Islamic state. Earlier writers, like 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi and Najib 
Azuri, had called for the Caliphate to be restored to the Arabs. Later, 
Reda, 13 9a follower of Abduh, called for the restoration of the universal 
Caliphate as the mechanism of Islamic legal reform, l°° though after 
Ataturk's abolition of the caliphate and the establishment of separate 
Muslim states, he supported broad Arab nationalism, with an Islamic 
character, in contrast with some Egyptian nationalists who favoured 
secular nationalism, as he saw it as the mechanism for bringing about 
wider Muslim unity. Calls for the restoration of the Caliphate to the 
Arabs were not translated into reality, despite Sharif Husayn's 141 self- 
proclamation as Caliph of the Muslims in 1924, when the Caliphate was 
abolished. Turkey's transformation to a secular state 14 2 and termination 
of institutions of an Islamic character led to hostility among Muslim 
Arabs. 
138. He argued that the Muslims therefore, are free to choose any form of government. He advocated the 
separation of religion and government : he argued that although the Prophet had combined religious and 
political leadership of the community, this true combination ended at the Prophet's death. The early 
political community had established some fore of government, and the first administration of the 
Khalifa was political and not religious in its nature. 
139. Hamid Enayat Modern Islamic political thought, 1983 p. 70f. 140. Reda supported Ibn Sa'ud's revival of the Wahhabi movement in the Arabian peninsula. Like Hassan 
al-Banna, he stressed the sufficiency of Islam, and restricted the source of its teaching to the 
primary. 
141. Sharif Husayn of Makkah, though recognised by the Hijaz, Iraq and east Transjordan, was 
discredited for Muslims in India and Eyppt, as he was seen as the agent of the British. Husayn had 
been involved in negotiations with the British, who hoped to use him to lead Arab opposition to the 
Ottomans. The "Husayn-McMahon correspondence' concerned Husayn s promise to recruit soldiers to fight 
the Ottomans, in return for which, the British had promised to support Arab independence, and Husayn's 
ambitions to lead an Arab nation. 
142. In 1928, a constitutional amendment deleted the phrase the religion of the Turkish state is 
Islam', and the Constitution declared Turkey a secular state. 
John L. Esposito Islas and politics 1984, pp. 94-100. 
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After the First World War, Arab nationalism took on a new dimension. 
Writers like Satih' al-Husri' 43 began to articulate ideas of pan-Arabism 
which gradually spread beyond Greater Syria and Iraq, and gained 
ground among the Arabs, focusing in their desire for liberation from 
foreign rule. The varied experience of foreign rule explains the 
differing forms of nationalism which emerged during the European 
colonial period. 144 In Iraq, for example, less urbanized than Syria and 
with a heterogeneous population, the idea of pan-Arabism developed 
later than, for example, Syria and Palestine, where the post-war 
European division of territory fostered ideas of a re-united Syria, and 
greater Arab nation. 14 1 At a later stage, such ideas were developed by 
the founders of the Be'th party in Damascus, one of the manifestations 
of Arab nationalism which affects the contemporary legal order. 
The Ba'th, created in 1953, combines pan-Arabism and socialism, 
advocating nationalization of industry, l°e distribution of land 14 and 
extensive social reform. '-4 8A secular Arab nationalist movement, the 
Ba'th party speaks of "one Arab nation with an eternal mission", and 
sets itself the task of forming a united Arab homeland, free from 
143. 'Nhoever has links with an Arab country and speaks Arabic, whatever the official name of the 
state of which he is a citizen, whatever his religion or doctrine, or descent or family history ... 
is 
an Arab. Arabiso is not restricted to the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula, nor is it specific to 
Muslims. On the contrary, it extends to all those who have links with an Arab country and who speak 
Arabic, be they Egyptian, Kuwaiti, Moroccan, Muslim, Christian, Sunni, Jafarite, Druze, Catholic, 
Orthodox or Protestant. They are all children of Arabism, provided they have links with an Arab 
country and speak Arabic. The existing Arab states were not constituted as so many distinct entities 
by the will of their inhabitants or because of any natural necessities : rather, the repartition was 
the outcome of treaties and agreements concluded between the states which dominated the Arab countries 
and shared them out among themselves. The same applies to the present frontiers between Arab countries : they were not drawn up according 
to the interests of these countries and their inhabitants; rather they were the outcome of endless 
haggling and manoeuvring between imperialist powers determined to look after their own interests. 
Satih' al-Husri Arabism before everything, 4th ed., 1961. 
144. In Syria, France overthrew an Arab government in 1920, and introduced direct rule. In Iraq, 
Britain responded to the uprising of 1920 by introducing a form of indirect rule by Arab ministers and 
local governors, backed by British advisers. Those in power under the monarchy thought of themselves 
as nationalists in the sense that they had opposed Ottoman rule, and were part of the government of an 
Arab country, but it soon became clear that Turkish rule had merely been exchanged for European 
control. 
145. Post-war nationalists in Syria tended to fall within two main groupings : Hizb al-Sha'b and al- Kutla al-Nataniyya, which opposed the French mandate. Both had the programme of 'Syria for the Syrians' and sought an independent united Syria. In Iraq, political parties were less developed before 
the second world war. The ruling structure was the creation of the British, and the only opposition 
grouping was Jam'iyyat al-Ahali. 
146. For example, article 29 of the Bath Constitution provides that : 'Public utility institutions, 
major natural resources, and big production and transport facilities are the property of the nation to be operated by the state directly, and all foreign companies and concessions shall be cancelled. ". Quotations from the Ba'th Constitution are from Muhammad Khalil's The Arab states and the Arab League :a documentary record. Vol. 1 Constitutional developments, 1962. 
For historical background to the Bath, see John Oevlin The Ba' ath :a history from its origins to 1966,1984. 
147. For example, article 30 of the Constitution states : `Under the supervision of the State and in 
agreement with its general economic programme, land ownership shall be limited according to the 
ability of the owners to cultivate it fully without exploiting the effort of others. " 148. Article 42, for example, of the Constitution calls for abolition of class differences and distinctions, sayin that class differences are due to a corrupt social system. It therefore sets as its goal the removal of such distinctions for 'the persecuted working classes of the community", until 
all citizens are given the opportunity to live under an equitable social system, without distinction between citizens 'except insofar as mental efficiency and manual skill are concerned". 
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imperialism. l°9 Ba'th ideology links socialism and Arab unity in that it 
.. 
[does] not believe that it is possible to separate Arab unity from 
socialism, " though "Arab unity is a higher value than socialism, and is 
more advanced, but the demand for Arab unity will remain an abstract 
and theological notion ... consequently, our 
identification of unity and 
socialism gives the ideal of unity its substance ". ' 6° Nevertheless, the 
Ba'th does not regard itself as merely a socialist party . "it is an Arab 
party, a party of the Arab renaissance, which implies upheaval ... 
". 
It stresses the role of the people and the necessity for social and 
economic liberation. According to its theory, unity will become a 
practical question and demand, when the people are prepared for 
struggle for a free and honourable life. It lays emphasis on opposition 
to imperialism and Zionism as the enemies of Arab unity, and attacks 
what it characterises as obstructing progress to unity, such as 
dogmatism, backward customs and tribalism" 61, rejecting fanatical 
nationalism and internationalism. The Constitution of the Party focuses 
on the worth of the individual, though it judges this by "the work they 
do toward the development and prosperity of the Arab nation ... . 
It 
specifies his freedom to exercise the political rights of freedom of 
speech, assembly, belief and art, as "sacred things, which no authority 
can diminish ". 1 sz 
Cairo was another centre for the development of secular nationalism in 
the Arab world. From an early stage, under Ottoman and colonial rule, 
nationalist calls for a constitution, representation and limits to 
the 
power of the Khedive were common under Tawfiq and Isma'il, and early 
nationalist movements manifested the elements which were to become 
characteristic . military leadership and political parties with nationalist 
programmes. lss Egyptian nationalism was affected by western, liberal, 
secular nationalism, and although early nationalist leaders were followers 
of the Islamic modernism of Afghani and Abduh, a more secular-oriented 
nationalism developed with the thought of Ahmad al-Sayyid Lutfi, Taha 
Husayn and Abd al-Raziq. 
149. The "Third Principle" of the Ba'th's Constitution describes imperialism as "a crime to be fought 
by the Arabs with all the means at their disposal', and it goes on to describe the Party as a 
revolutionary party which believes that its main objectives, the revival of Arab nationalism and the 
building up of socialism, can only be achieved through revolution and struggle ... 
". It therefore 
decides : to tight foreign imperialism for the complete liberation of the Arab homeland" and to 
strive for the unity of all the Arabs in one independent state. (Article 6) 
150. Michel 'Aflaq The Battle of the single destiny, 1959. " 151. The Constitution of the Party describes "bedouiniseas a primitive social state, which weakens 
national production and paralyses a large part of the nation and retards its growth and progress. It 
aims to settle "Bedouins" by giving thee lands, abolishing tribal systems, and applying the laws of 
the State to them. 
152. "The Second Principle : Personality of the Arab Nation" 
153. Colonel 'Urabi headed the uprising of 1882 which provided the pretext for the Powers to intervene 
in Egypt. Mustafa Kamal's Hizb al-Natani, through its anti-British position, was able to mobilise mass 
opposition, and a later stage of nationalist development saw the combination of a number of groups 
into a broad front seeking independence, headed by the Nafd party, which was broadly based and able 
to mobilise popular support. 
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The tendency in Egypt which favoured a secular state was not 
organised in militant organizations like Islamic groups, believing in 
separation of religion and state, while stressing the importance of 
Islamic culture in the life of Egypt. An influential spokesman of the 
secular movement between the wars was Taha Husayn, whose thought 
took a liberal, national and rationalist course, rejecting both excessive 
traditionalism and excessive western. liberalism as well as western 
domination of the Arab world. This tendency was also reflected in Arab 
nationalism in the wider context. 
Egypt's secular path continued after the coup which brought Nasser to 
power in the fifties. The Free Officers Movement, a grouping which 
contained communists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as 
radical nationalists, opposed the political and economic corruption of the 
pro-British monarchy, "' but, in the early fifties, had no radical 
programme other than land reform. By 1956, the programme of the 
revolution was set out in the Constitution. lss It set forth broadly 
socialist aims, and aimed at the establishment of "social justice" and a 
"sound democratic system". The attitude of this Constitution to Arab 
nationalism is conservative, with Egypt described as "a sovereign, 
independent Arab state ... part of 
the Arab nation". ' Gamal Abdel 
Nasser"? emerges through his dedication to Arab unity, socialism and 
the task of what he describes as regaining "decision-nmaking" power", an 
aim shared by other nationalists 1S8 and the link he establishes between 
independence, socialism and Arab unity. 
Nasser laid emphasis on the need to develop the depth of the Arab 
people's revolutionary understanding : the clearer their vision of their 
aims and insight, the more they would be able to evaluate possibilities 
and discover their "true revolutionary path to freedom". 159 Thus, he 
thought, any triumph against imperialism was only the beginning of the 
revolutionary struggle from a better position. 
154. The first statement by Muhammad Neguib announcing the coup d'etat of July 1952 described Egypt as having "undergone a most critical period of bribery, corruption and government instability. these 
factors had a great influence on the Army. People who received bribes, and those with ulterior motives 
contributed toward our defeat in the Palestine war. After the war, corrupt elements increased, and 
traitors plotted against the Army, whose affairs were entrusted to ignorant, treacherous or corrupt 
people. This was in order that Egypt would be without a (strong) army to protect her. Muhammad Khalil The Arab states and the Arab league ... 1962, pp. 492-3. 155. To put an end to imperialism and its agents, to abolish feudalism, to put an end to monopolies, 
and the domination of the government by capital, to establish a powerful national army, to assure 
social justice, to establish a sound democratic life". 
Constitution of the Republic of Egypt, January 16th 1956. Ibid. 
156. Part 1, article 1 of the Constitution. The preamble also mentions the Arab nation : *conscious of 
our function as an organic part of the great Arab entity; conscious of our responsibilities and of our 
obligations in the common Arab struggle for the dignity and glory of the Arab nation' . 
Ibid. 
157. As well as his leading role as President of the Revolutionary Guidance Council of the Republic of Egypt and then of the first United Arab Republic in 1958, Nasser's vision and philosophy of Arab 
nationalism may be seen in his main works : Socialism (41-ishtirakiyyah), Our Social Revolution (ihawratuna al-igtiuaiyyah); National Action Charter (Nithaq al-anal al-watani) ; The Great Change (Al-tahawwul al-azim) and above all the Philosophy of the Revolution (Falsafat al-thawra). 158. Sometimes termed the national 'will's . 159. Quotations which follow are from a speech by Nasser in 1962, in which he drew up a 'balance- 
sheet' of the first ten years of the revolution. 
Gaaal Abd-al-Nasser Mithaq al-aval a]-watani, 1962. 
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He blamed the failure of previous nationalist movements on the lack of 
economic reform, which had undermined political change, and also 
criticised such movements for not adopting theories inspired by the 
national experience, instead importing ready-made theories. Democracy 
and social freedom, according to Nasser, could not be reduced to 
conformity with theories without roots in the national experience. 
According to Nasser, political democracy and political freedom alone are 
meaningless without "economic democracy and social freedom", since the 
political framework of any country reflects its economic situation and 
represents the interests of the dominant group. Thus, according to 
Nasser, Egypt before the revolution of 1952 represented the political 
product of the coalition between feudalism and exploitative capitalism, 100 
and this was reflected in its political life. 
Nasserism saw socialism as the route to social freedom : social freedom 
could only be achieved "if each citizen [were] given the opportunity of 
acquiring a fair share of the national wealth. " This was not only a 
question of redistribution of wealth, but also required the "broadening 
out of the foundations of the national fortune", to satisfy the rights of 
the masses. ' B1 
Nasserism calls for scientific socialism as the form most suited to 
implementing a successful plan for progress, rejecting capitalism, 
whether local or international, as unsuitable for the under-developed 
country, in the light of international capitalist monopolies. Since Nasser 
criticised national capitalism as being motivated by a desire for profit, 
he proposed uniting the national economy, using modern science to 
serve investment, and drawing up a general plan of production. Along 
with increased production, equitable distribution had to be tackled by 
the setting up of programmes in every sector to ensure the workers' 
benefit. The task of broadening the foundation of national wealth could 
not be left to private capital, nor could distribution of profit be a 
matter of free choice or good faith : the spirit of the revolution thus 
led to "the need for the people to own all the means of production and 
to orient the surplus produced according to a plan drawn up in 
advance". Nasserism saw this socialist solution as the only path to 
economic and social progress, the path to democracy in all political and 
social aspects. However, the fact of the people controlling the means of 
production did not imply the nationalization of those means, nor the 
160. He saw capitalism as the partner of imperialism, with the economic momentum of capitalist 
countries deriving from investment in the colonies. Thus, the wealth of India formed the basis of 
economic activity which led to the development of British agriculture and industry. Likewise, the 
cotton-fields of Egypt sustained the British economy at the expense of the Egyptian peasants. 161. Nasser's socialist programme found its place in the Constitution and institutions of Egypt. The Constitution of 1956, for example, in the section headed The fundarental basis of the Egyptian social 
order', specifies that the national economy is organised according to plans which conform to the 
principles of social justice, and aim at the development of national productivity and the raising of the standard of living' (article 7), that "capital Rust be employed in the service of the national 
economy. The different ways in which it is employed may in no case be incompatible with the general 
welfare of the people' (article 9), and that the law with a view to the realisation of social 
objectives and the prosperity of the people, assures the compatibility between the / ... 
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abolition of private property., -"2 The twin means were to be the 
creation of a competent public sector to direct progress, with 
responsibility for the development plan, and the existence of a private 
sector which rejected exploitation and contributed within the context of 
the development plan. Both sectors were to be controlled by the people. 
Alongside programmes of economic planning, Nasser sought to organise 
the population in a "national union", whose aim was to achieve the goals 
of the revolution. ' 63 Nasser's revolutionary plan intended to draw upon 
all the experience of the Arab nation, its history, wisdom and 
revolutionary spirit. He believed that unity could not and should not be 
imposed, ' e° being rather a long process with several stages. He 
described national governments reflecting "the will of the people and 
their struggle for national independence" as steps toward unity in that 
they could not oppose it. He described the unity of even two Arab 
nations as a progressive step toward wider unity. Though Nasser 
envisaged the creation of a federation of progressive and 
nationalitarian movements at some stage, he did not see the Arab 
League' B6 as the means to Arab unity, criticising it as an inherently 
limited association of governments. Though he acknowledged its role in 
coordinating Arab activity, it should not become "a means of blocking 
the present and undermining the future". 
general economic activity and private economic activity". The Constitution also seeks to combat feudalism : the law determines the maximum holding of 
agricultural land in such a way as not to permit the establishment of feudalism' (article 12), "the law organises the relations between landlords and their tenants' (article 14), and encourages 
cooper tives : 't e State encourages co-operation and aids co-operative enterprises in all their 
forms 
" 
? 
article 16Y, 
162. The Constitution of 1956 states that 'private property is inviolable. The law organises its 
social function. Property may not be expropriated except for purposes of public utility and in 
consideration of just compensation in accordance with the law', (article 11). 163. 'The citizens constitute a national union with a view to realising the aims of the revolution and 
to coordinate the efforts to build up a nation, healthy politically, socially and economically. The 
national union will nominate candidates for membership of the National Assembly. The way in which this 
union is to be formed will be the object of a decision of the President of the Republic. ' (article 192) 
164. Though in this context, the UAR supported any nationalitarian movement, its support would be 
confined to matters of fundamental principle, allowing local elements to work out specific tactics in 
the light of local circumstances : the forces of Arab unity should cooperate with all nationalitarian forces in the region, but it should not impose a formula. 165. As we saw, the Pact of the Arab League sets out its objectives as follows : 'strengthening the 
close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab states ... 
to support and stabilise these ties 
upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states, and to direct their 
efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the 
security of their future, the realisation of their aspirations and hopes'. The Pact of the League of Arab States in American Journal of International Law, vol. 38,1945 The founding members of the League were the presidents of Syria and Lebanon, and the monarchs of Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen. Naturally, radical nationalists rejected the 
organization as the means to Arab unity, since it was founded by conservative leaders, some of whom 
were closely associated with the colonising powers. In addition, the articles of the Pact emphasise the independence and sovereignty of member states, and it clearly aims at cooperation, rather than 
closer federation. Later, its membership was extended, and from the 1950s, nationalist movements were 
admitted with observer status. 
Omar A. 8akhashab The Legal structure of the Arab League LLM thesis, Glasgow University, 1979. 
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1958 saw several attempts to bring about Arab unity, through both 
federation" and union. The latter mechanism was adopted by the 
Egyptian National Assembly and the Syrian Council of Deputies when the 
two republics of Egypt and Syria joined in the United Arab Republic, 
"as a first step toward the realisation of complete Arab unity". 167 The 
republic was to have a presidential democratic system of government, in 
which executive authority was to be vested in the Head of State and 
legislative authority in one legislative assembly. The Union was to be 
open to all other Arab states, to join in union or federation. 
The necessity of constitutional development, to encompass the political 
development, was taken into account. The Egyptian leader, in his speech 
to the combined Egyptian and Syrian assemblies, laid emphasis on the 
evolution of the 1956 Egyptian Constitution to accommodate the political 
change. l°e The provisional Constitution of the United Arab Republic, 
promulgated by Nasser as head of state, contained a number of elements 
common to the revolutionary Egyptian Constitution of 1956. For example, 
it emphasised once again that "social solidarity" was to be the 
basis of 
society, and that the national economy should be organised by plans, 
in 
pursuit of social justice and raising the standard of living. 169 
According 
to article 68, legislation within each of the two regions17° was to remain 
valid unless repealed or amended by procedures provided in the 
Constitution, when promulgated. 
166. In response to the creation of the United Arab Republic, the Hashemite kingdoms of 
Iraq and 
Jordan joined in the Arab Federation in February 1958, though each state retained integral state 
entity, sovereignty and existing government (article 1 of the Arab Federation Agreement between 
Iraq 
and Jordan, February 14th 1958). The preamble of the agreement recalls the proclamation of "a new 
dawn 
of the Arab nation ... and unification of 
its peoples ... 
" by Sharif Husayn, father of Abdullah and 
Faisal. It recalls the 'revolution' for the unity 'based on the glorious past of the Arab world, 
faith 
in itself and its old and eternal mission". The elements of federation included : foreign policy and 
diplomatic representation; unity of the armies; elimination of customs; unification of education 
curricula. Like the United Arab Republic, the Arab Federation was open to other Arab states, 
but 
proved unsuccessful and short-lived, as Oasis withdrew from the federation later the same year 
(July 
23rd 1958), saying that it "was not a real union that aimed at [realising] the interests of the people 
in the two countries. It was rather meant o cons Iidate the corrupt monarchical system as well as to 
disrupt the unity of the emancipated Arab jpeoplef and to realise the interests of a clique of rulers 
who did not come to office through [the choice of the people and who did not work for the realisation 
of their aspirations'. 
167. Proclamation of the United Arab Republic February 1st 1958 
Muhammad Khalil The Arab states and the Arab League ... , 
1962 
This attempt to bring about Arab unity was the first in a series in which Nasser played a leading 
role. His final attempt, the Federation of Arab Republics, in which he joined with the revolutionary 
Libyan leader and Niseiri of Sudan, in 1971, began with the signature of the Tripoli Charter in 
December 1969, was followed by the promulgation of the Federation of Arab Republics on 2nd September 
1971, when the original members were joined by Syria, though Sudan dropped out. This experiment in 
Arab cooperation is examined in Peter K. Bechtold's New attempts at Arab cooperation : the 
Federation of Arab Republics, 1971-? ' Middle East Journal 27,1973 pp. 152-172. 
168. Address by President Ga. al Abd al-Nasser to the Egyptian and Syrian National Assemblies sitting 
in joint session, February 5th 1958. 
Ibid. 
169. Articles 394 of the Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Republic 
cf. articles 4&7 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1956, above. 
170. 'The United Arab Republic consists of two regions : Egypt and Syria. In each there shall be an 
executive council ... 
' article 58 of the provisional Constitution. 
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Like Egypt again, the Constitution of the United Arab Republic also 
provided for the existence of a "national union" "to work for the 
realisation of national aini_s and the intensification of the efforts for 
raising a sound National structure, from the political, social and 
economic viewpoints". 17 1 
If Egypt represents a centre of secular nationalism, Saudi Arabia, long 
the paradigm of the modern "Islamic" state, was enabled by its oil 
wealth to become a force in the Muslim world beyond its borders, 
challenging secular nationalism and pan-Arabism. Modern Saudi Arabiai' 2 
reflects the success of the religio-political alliance of the Islamic 
revivalist Wahhabi movement with a local ruler, Ibn Sa'ud. The Wahhabi 
leader provided the movement's religious legitimacy, which sought to 
mirror the early Islamic community, in rejecting the idolatrous 
polytheism of the tribes whose commercial interests focused on the Holy 
Cities, in favour of a strict monotheism. Islam and control of the Holy 
Cities have formed the ideological basis of Saudi domestic, '-73 regional 
and foreign policy, The guardianship of Makka and Madinah, and 
control of the Hajj have secured. the prestige and power of Saudi Arabia 
in the Muslim world. The threat from Arab nationalism, and in particular 
from Nasser, led Saudi Arabia to seek to expand its role in the Islamic 
world, with the overthrow of monarchies in Iraq and Egypt, the 
emergence of radical socialist governments in Syria and Algeria, and the 
defeat of the royalist leaders of Yemen all contributing to Saudi Arabia's 
quest for a leadership role in the wider Muslim community. 
The rise of the pan-Arab movement and Nasser's increasing prestige as 
a third world leader in the sixties led him to condemn conservative 
regimes, such as that of Saudi Arabia, accusing them of collaboration 
with western powers and distorting Islam to retain their position. He 
too sought to utilise the legitimising factor of Islam by presenting his 
ideology of pan-Arab socialism as an Islamic movement, embodying the 
revolutionary spirit of Islam, emphasising equality and social justice. 
171. Article 72 of the provisional Constitution, cf. article 192 of the Egyptian Constitution, above. 
172. The emergence of modern Saudi rule began in 1902, with the capture of Riyadh by Abd al-Aziz. By 
1912, he controlled all of Najd and by 1926, Abd al-Aziz had captured the Hijaz from the rival 
Hashemites. He declared himself King of the Hijaz and Najd in 1927, and five years later, the state 
was renamed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
By 1932 Abd al-Aziz controlled the peninsula, and he used Islas to legitimise his claims : Nahhabis  legitimised his seizure of the Holy Cities from fellow-Muslims and his battles with other Muslim leaders; his appeals to Islamic unity drew on Islamic symbolism, recalling the religious solidarity of 
the Islamic community under the Prophet. 
Islamic symbolism had been used to focus the Saud movement and Islam continues to be used as the 
ideological basis of Saudi rule. The Qur'an and Shari'ah form the fundamental structures of state 
constitution, law and judiciary, as we will see in the next chapter. 
173. Saudi Arabia's heavy reliance on Islas in legitimising the rule of the royal family has invited 
criticism of the government by opposition in the name of Islam, as occurred, for example, in 1979 
when the Grand Mosque in Makka was seized by militants. The siege lasted until the Saudi government 
obtained a (etwa calling on the government to retake the mosque. This incident was followed by riots 
among the Shia population of the Eastern Province. The significant Shi'a minority of the Province has long felt discriminated against by Sunni rulers, and they drew impetus from the Iranian revolution. Both the seizure of the Mosque and the Shia riots raise questions about political unrest within Saudi Arabia. 
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Nasser's aspirations to Arab leadership led him to utilise both Arab and 
Islamic aspects of Egyptian identity. He also appealed to Islam 17 4 to 
mobilise popular support and counter the threat from the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The use of Islam to legitimise Arab socialism also increased 
the prestige of Nasser's foreign policy for Muslim Arabs, and Islam 
became politicised in the developing struggle between radical nationalism 
represented by Egypt and the conservative nationalism of Saudi Arabia. 
Faisal responded to Nasser's challenge by taking up the cause of pan- 
Islam. 175 According to Esposito, "O Faisal sought to create an Islamic 
alternative to Nasser's Arab socialism, with the result that ideological 
battle 1" was joined, with each side appealing to Islam. Faisal used pan- 
Islam to try to counter Nasser's pan-Arabism, and the two leaders 
competed by obtaining fatawi legitimising and discrediting Arab 
socialism. When Faisal said that pan-Islam included Arabism, Nasser 
announced that Arab socialism was based on Islam, attacking the Saudis 
as usurping the people's power and wealth. 
Arab nationalism, as distinct from Islamic modernism, stressed the unity 
of the Arab nation, its national identity and common culture, history and 
language. Although Arab minorities had supported nationalism during the 
period of Ottoman rule, when nationalism became allied to Islam as the 
common ideology of the Arab Middle East, it became a popular movement. 
174. Though he had refused to include a statement that Islas was the state religion in the Egyptian 
Charter of 1956, the Constitution of the same year contained such a statement in a prominent position (part 1, article 3). He also nationalised al-Azhar, giving key positions to his officials and imposing 
reform of the curriculum. The University thus lost most of its academic and political independence, 
and the government's control of al-Azhar and mosque officials allowed Nasser to rally support for 
policies of nationalisation of public utilities and land reform. The rector of al-Azhar, for example, 
declared that Islam and socialism were reconcilable. He also justified government policies such as 
expropriation of land. 
175. Saudi Arabia's pan-Islamic leadership manifested itself in a number of ways : during the 1962 
Hajj, Faisal persuaded the UIeia to condemn socialism, and organised the Muslim World League, which 
propagated Saudi views of Islam, emphasising Islamic community over any form of nationalism. In 1965, 
Faisal and the Iranian Shah joined to call for a summit conference of Muslim heads of state in Mecca. This was denounced by Nasser, who saw it as a threat to pan-Arabism, as falsification and exploitation 
of Islas. In 1970, the first Islamic conference of ministers was held in Jeddah, and it established the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This body, the first official inter-governmental pan- 
Islamic institution, was only the first of a series of trans-national Islamic bodies, created by Saudi Arabia to enhance her position of leadership of the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia has also used its 
financial wealth to support Islamic movements throughout the Muslim world, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria, and the Jaiiyat Islaai in Pakistan. Another facet of Faisal's pan- 
Islas focused on calls for the liberation of al-suds (Jerusalem). The defeat of Arab forces and the 
loss of al-muds in 1967 was the opportunity for Saudi Arabia to counter Nasser's bid for regional pan- 
Arab leadership , and enhance her own prestige at 
the expense of radical Arab nationalism and 
socialism, as Faisal provided aid to the defeated Arab countries, forced Nasser to remove his troops 
from Yemen, and took up the Palestinian cause. 
This issue became an important element of foreign policy, to which Saudi Arabia rallied world Muslim 
support. Faisal was thus able to combine pan-Islamism with Arabiss and establish the position of Saudi 
Arabia as world leader of Arab and Islamic concerns. On Faisal's death in 1975, Khalid asserted his 
Arab Islamic leadership, repeating Saudi Arabia's committment to Islam and Arab solidarity. 
William Ochesnwald 'Saudi Arabia and the Islamic revival' International Journal of Middle East 
studies, 13 1981 pp. 271-86. 
See also, John 
buke Anthony Saudi Arabia's influence in the Arab world, 1982. 
176. John L. Esposito Islam and politics, 1985. 
177. Radical and conservative nationalism came into direct conflict over North Yemen, where radical 
forces joined with Nasseris  to support the revolutionary government, and influence the nationalists 
of South Yemen. 
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Arab history, identity and language had remained closely linked to 
Islam, through the language of the Qur'an and the history of Islamic 
conquest. Arab nationalism had inevitably to address its relationship to 
Islam. Despite the secular modernising orientation of modern radical 
governments, l' ° the socio-political character of the Arabs remains 
broadly conservative, with religion continuing to play a crucial role. 
This is reflected in governments' politicization of religion and the rise 
of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. i' 
Nationalism grew up in North Africa at a later stage than in Egypt, for 
a number of reasons. "o As we saw, French colonial policy placed its 
north African protectorates within the French republic, thus inhibiting 
the growth of nationalism. French policy in the Maghrib aimed at 
political and cultural assimilation through a programme of naturalization. 
Arab identity along with Islamic heritage thus became key issues in the 
nationalist movements of the Maghrib. Religious and secular leaders 
mobilised mass support on a number of religious issues. 181 
178. As new Muslim states tended to minimise the role of religion in state-building, major Muslim 
groups, like the Brotherhood and Jaaaat i-Islam, called for an Islamic alternative, and their 
influence grew in the Arab and Muslim world. Within EyYPt, for example, the Brotherhood became 
involved in politics, opposing British influence and calling for the establishment of an Islamic 
state. In 1948, Farouk reacted to a spell of violence by banning the organization and its leaders. 
After the assassination of the Prime Minister, the Brotherhood was driven underground and into exile. 
With the lifting of martial law in 1952, the Brotherhood emerged briefly, but their early support for 
Nasser disappeared when he failed to establish an Islamic state, and conflict between the Brotherhood 
and the government reached a peak in 1954, with an assassination attempt against Nasser. This was used 
as a pretext to crush the Brotherhood with mass arrests, and the execution of members, including 
Sayyid Outb, the second main ideologue of the Brotherhood who was more militant than al-Banna, and has influenced such radical contemporary Islamic groups as 
irakfir wa Hijra and al-Jihad in Egypt. 
179.4I-Ikhwan al-Musliaun declared their beliefs to be based on three rinciples : Islas is a 
complete, self-evolving system; Islam derives from two sources - the Our' an and Sunna; Islas is 
suitable for all times and all places. Al-Banna outlined the programme of the Brotherhood in two 
'fundamental goals' as follows : 'That the Islamic fatherland be freed from all foreign domination ' and 'That a free Islamic state may arise in this free fatherland, acting according to the 
precepts of Islas, applying its social regulations, proclaiming its sound principles, and its sage 
mission to all mankind. ' 
M. Asad Government and politics in Islam, p, 63. In Nahwa al-Nur, al-Banna called for the judicial system to be brought into conformity with Shari'ah. 
In the area of government institutions, and criticism of government actions Islamic principles must 
be paramount. He also called for an end to political pluralism and the multi-party system, instead 
proposing a single common front. Other reforms proposed by al-Banna were social and economic, again 
advocating the enforcement of Islamic principles and the rejection of Western influence. Al-fktwan al- 
Muslioun called for the re-establishment of Islamic principles, above all in public morality, though 
also pervading government institutions and the judicial system. 
Hamid Enayat Modern Islamic political thought, 1983 p. 85. 
180. The degree of the religious impetus to nationalism also meant that north African nationalism 
arose later than in the Fertile Crescent : internally, the North African cults were relatively 
conservative; the external threat to Islas was posed by European invasion. Thus the reaction in North 
Africa was initially less pronounced than in a state like Egypt. 
181. For example, in Morocco, where the French tried to play on traditional divisions between Arab and Berber, providing the focus for political resistance. The Berbers, who had resisted attempts at Arabization, became the focus of French policy, as the Berber Decree of 1930 declared that Berber tribal areas would be under French and tribal law rather than Shari'ah. It was an issue which united Berbers and Arabs in resistance as mosques and preachers denounced the policy as a threat to Islam, 
and to the unity and identity of the community. In Tunisia, French attempts at assimilation by the offer of naturalized citizenship were rejected on Islamic grounds as apostasy, since this citizenship implied a transfer from Islamic to French jurisdiction. The Tunisian mufti issued a ruling in 1932 which prohibited the burial of such 
naturalized citizens in Muslim burial-grounds. 
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The reactions of the religious leadership to European administration 
varied, as Ulema and Sufi brotherhoods though resisting the ideological 
challenge, compromised politically to varying degrees with the 
Europeans. ' 82 The acquiescence of religious leaders meant that early 
resistance movements against foreign rule in North Africa tended to be 
led by modern educated reformers. The defence of Islam was a rallying 
issue for such reformers in view of French assimilationist policies. 18 3 
The . Salafiyyah movements also affected the nationalism of Arab North 
Africa. 
As nationalists of several political views sought to mobilise popular 
support, Islam provided the focus which transcended social divisions, 
throughout the Maghrib. l84 In the independence movements of the 
Maghrib, Islam complemented nationalism, and as a basic component of 
national identity and an ideological focus for mass mobilization, it 
continues to play its role in the contemporary political and legal order, 
and the nationalist movements of today. 
Secular nationalist movements have had to accommodate the question of 
Islam, within a range of socialist ideologies. From the revolutionary 
regime of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the radical 
nationalist leadership of Algeria, ideologues have responded to critics 
with the claim that Islam is compatible with revolutionary development 
through socialist programmes. 
182. For example, the Sanussi'ah in Cyrenaica case tu agreements with the Italians which safeguarded 
rights of schools, and in Algeria, a religious leader assisted the French by obtaining a ruling from 
al-Azhar dealing with the position of Muslims in a Christian-ruled country. 
John L. Esposito Islas and politics, 1985, p. 74. 183. Islamic reform in each French colony shared common characteristics : resistance to French 
policies, a rejection of the supposed detrimental effects of Sufi cults. Educational reform which 
sought to provide an Islamic counterpart to the French and Italian educational systems also became a 
mechanism of resistance to colonialism. The leadership of such reform tended to be modern, educated 
Muslims, rather than the traditional religious establishment, who had lost prestige through 
collaboration in the French colonies. Another aspect was a call to reform of Muslim personal life, 
with emphasis being placed on the dynamic character of Islas. 
184. Islam played its role in the development of the main Moroccan political party, Istiqlal, led by 
the Salafiyyah leader, Allal al-Fasi, which remained a small grouping of religious reformers based in 
Fez and Rabat until it adopted the organization of the Sufi orders, with the result that it became a 
mass political movement. 
The Algerian nationalist movement also drew on the influence of Salafiyyah ideology, and used Islas 
as a rallying factor. A number of Islamic reform groups were influenced by Abduh and Redah, among the 
most important of which was led by Abdul Hamid ben Bathis. The reformers joined with the uleaa to 
found the Algerian Association of 111e. a, whose motto was 'Islam is NY religion, Arabic is my language 
and Algeria is my fatherland'. The organization combined Islamic reformism aad nationalism, creating a 
network of schools and centres, through which it spread Algerian Muslim nationalism. Modern reformers 
gained legitimacy by joining with the traditional religious leaders to promote Algerian nationalism 
which combined an Islamic with an Arab character. The Algerian revolution adopted the Islamic theme of 
earlier nationalist movements, with the slogan 'Algerie iusulman". The war was characterised as a 
Jihad its fighters as Nujahidin. 
See F. Colonna 'Cultural resistance and religious legitimacy in colonial Algeria' Economy and 
society, 2 (3) 1976, pp. 233-52. 
In Tunisia, nationalism gained motivation from Abd al-Aziz al-Thalibi, who organised the Destour 
party. Again, he was influenced by the ideas of Abduh and the Salafiyyah, though while advocating 
Islamic reform, he focused on national independence, with the Destour promoting a national identity 
based on Tunisia's Arab and Islamic heritage. Nationalist leaders asserted their role as the defenders 
of Islas against French cultural domination, and adopted Islamic symbols for mass mobilisation and 
political activism. French attempts to outlaw the wearing of the veil were also rejected by a range 
of Muslim opinion as a threat to Islamic culture, and a threat to a symbol of national identity. 
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The approaches of Algeria and Yemen to Islam differ, with Algeria stressing 
the Islamic element of the national struggle, and reiterating the importance 
of Islam in the National Charter and Constitution, while the Yemeni 
nationalists, though acknowledging Islam, give it less prominence. The 
nationalist movement in PDRY has had to clarify its position with respect to 
Islam, which poses a challenge to the ruling ideology. Since it is often 
characterised as "atheist" by conservative leaders in the region, it has 
adopted a conciliatory attitude toward Islams "S by, like Nasser, asserting 
egalitarianism and social justice, and avoiding actions which might 
antagonise the population. 
In the fifties, the ideological divide became clear between conservative 
monarchies1° and republican nationalists, the latter represented by 
Nasserism with its reformist pan-Arab socialism. ' 67 During the sixties, as 
Nasserism waned and Ba'thism gained support from activists, radical regimes 
came to power in Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan and Libya. A third pan-Arab 
movement, the Arab Nationalist Movement, -had backed Nasser's calls for 
Palestinian liberation. 
In the late sixties, all three movements shifted leftward, with the failure of 
the United Arab Republic, the defeat of 1967 and the failure to liberate 
Palestine leading to the radicalization of Arab nationalism, for example, 
giving radical groups the impetus to reform the ANM, and create the 
left- 
wing Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. l°B 
Emphasis on socialism and opposition to colonialism were the focus of such 
movements which blamed Western-style government for sustaining feudal 
society and the continuing influence of western capitalism and imperialism 
in 
the region. The failure of liberal nationalism was denounced by the new 
regimes, which promised social revolution to redress the socio-economic 
imbalance of their countries. l°° Contemporary radical nationalist movements, 
such as the Iraqi Ba'th, the National Liberation Front in the PDRY, the 
Front de liberation nationale in Algeria, " and lately the 1969 revolutions 
of Libya and Sudan, 
185. Islas is recognised by the 1970 Constitution as the state religion (article 46), and guaranteed 
protection insofar as it is compatible with other constitutional principles, though particular emphasis is 
laid in combating 'corrupt concepts' spread by colonialism and tribalism, (article 31). See also Al-Tayyib Zain al-Abidin The Yemeni Constitution and its religious orientation' Arabian Studies 
3 1976, pp. 115-35. 
1b6. For example, the Libyan Kingdom, which achieved independence in 1950, the Hashemite Kingdoms of Jordan 
and Iraq, the Kingdom of Morocco, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as well as the emirates of the Gulf and 
Peninsula. 
187. This ideological division was focused by Egyptian and Saudi involvement in North Yemen's civil war, 
when Nasser's support for the revolutionary regime in North Yemen provided a support base for South Yemeni 
nationalists who later became radicalized as a nationalist movement in the region. With the failure of the 
United Arab *epublic, and Nasser's move to national social reform, Yemeni nationalist forces divided between 
those who advocated traditional political development and popular movements which called for revolution. 
188. David McDowall The Palestinians New ed., 1987 p. 30. 
189. For example, the theses of a speech of Ahead Ben Bella President of Algeria, provide the national 
doctrine for utilisation of natural resources : To be efficacious and coherent, the actions of the 
producer-countries will have to be geared to win back all the revenues due to them as owners of these 
natural resources, which are a gift of nature and not a creation of the capitalists. 
In Anouar Abdel-Malek (ed. ) Contemporary Arab political thought, 1970, pp. 168-171. 
190. The FLN was set up by the union of fallahin, workers and intellectuals in the independence struggle and 
was identified with the core of the population. 
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advocate socialism and Arab unity, though they differ in degree and 
approach to achieving these goals. Another common factor is the stress 
which each lays on the recovery of the society from the legacies of the 
past, the consolidation of national sovereignty and national development. '"' 
These movements share the characteristic of giving a prominent role to the 
leadership of the revolutionary forces, l°2 and most establish a ruling party 
and stress the role of the al-jamahir al-sha'biyya (popular masses) in 
building socialist structures, though again, they vary in degree. 
Since the present leadership came to power in 1968, the Iraqi Ba'th193 has 
focused primarily on "consolidation of economic and political independence, 
liberation of the national will, the creation of a unified and socialist. society, 
the building up of a central and strong- national authority, and the 
liberation of the oil wealth and other natural resources from the control of 
foreign monopolies", 19 
It has tried to achieve its aim of "consolidating its revolutionary march and 
effecttins. radical transforrnations within a nationalist, socialist and 
democratic framework" by state structure legislation, such as the Law of 
the Leading Party (Law no. 142) of 1974, which hinds all government organs 
to adhere to the ideological principles set out in the Political Report of the 
8th Regional Congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. 
In Algeria too, the national liberation struggle shaped the contemporary 
state, its structure and ideology. Socialism partners national liberation as 
key issues in the National Charter, where other key issues are Arabization, 
Islam, anti-imperialism and third world concerns. ies 
191. For example, the Algerian National Charter emphasises the necessity of a strong state : 'The recovery 
of national sovereignty, the construction of socialisa, the battle against underdevelopment, the building of 
a modern and prosperous ft-onosy, and vigilance against external dangers all require a solid and ever- 
strengthened State ... 
' 
Quoted in Rachid Tleecani State and revolution in Algeria 1986, p. 159 
192. While neither the Egyptian nor the Algerian revolution made any direct reference in ideological documents to the character of revolutionary leadership, the Bath stressed two points : the importance of 'collective leadership" as against the leadership of a single person, and the distinction between party leadership and government. 
Hisham B. Sharabi Nationalism and revolution in the Arab world, 1966, pp. 84-55. 193. After the split fror Syria, the Iraqi Bath party was concerned to establish itself as the 'true' 
party, and so invited 'Aflaq to become secretary-general of the 'sole legitimate Ba'th party', but it is important to distinguish between the Iraqi Bath as an organization and Bath ideology as originally 
articulated. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett 'Iraqi Ba'this., nationalism, socialism and national socialism' in Saddam's Iraq : revolution or reaction CARORI, 1986, p. 102-5. 194. CCPR/C/1/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, pp. 2-3. 195. Algeria is particularly associated with pan-African issues, within the context of both the Organization 
of African Unity and the Arab League. 
Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy Nationalism and new states in Africa, 1984, p. 348f. 
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Like the Yemeni Constitution, the Constitution of the Arab Ba'th Socialist 
Party seeks to combat all religious, sectarian, tribal, racial and regional 
fanaticism. It also seeks to abolish "bedouinisrn". 19e This is a threat to the 
traditional social order of Arab society, and represents a direct threat to 
conservative regimes, where power continues to be based on family and 
tribal structures. 
The principle of Arab unity remains a vital element in radical Arab 
nationalism. Unlike Libya, where it is seen as an urgent necessity, the 
movements in PDRY and Iraq see socialism as the mechanism by which a 
greater unity could be achieved, while each concentrates on national unity 
and state-building as a first step. 
In keeping with original Ba'th ideology, l °7 the Iraqi Ba'th party lays 
stress on the goal of Arab unity. Its ideological framework, as enunciated 
in the 8th Regional Congress of 1974, focuses on the Arab nation (Urania 
Arabiya), the Arab homeland (al-Watan a1-'Arabi) and the Arab masses (al- 
Jamahir). 19' Thus, it states, "the political strategy of the party ainºs, in a 
scientific and practical way, at developing Arab trends and tendencies 
toward the higher national aspirations of the Arab nation in its present 
stage of historical development". 
The nationalist characteristic of the Yemeni revolution is set out in the 
first article of the Constitution, where the unity of the Yemeni population is 
stressed. ' 9° Article 13 goes on to set the guiding principles of Yemeni 
foreign policy. z°° As in Iraq, an ideological document, the Report of the 
5th Congress of the National Front Political Organization, outlines the 
movement's nationalist programme. According to the Report, the Front 
supports the movement for Arab national liberation, which contributes to the 
struggle against imperialism and the exploitative capitalist classes. The 
nationalist movement is seen as a force for democracy, and the Front 
recognises that different parts of the Arab world have special 
characteristics, and so agrees that a certain diversity of nationalist 
approach should be tolerated. 
196. Article 43 provides " 'Bedouinis, is a primitive social state which weakens national production and 
makes of a big group of the nation a paralysed organ which retards its growth and progress. The Party shall 
strive for the settlement of the Bedouins by giving them lands, abolishing tribal systems and applying the laws of the State to them. ' 
Muhammad Khalil The Arab states and the Arab League ... , 1962, p. 669. 197. The Con titut'on of the Ba'th party begins : One Arab nation with an immortal mission, the Arab 
renaissance 
(Ba'thj 
Socialist Party a popular national revolutionary movement striving for Arab unity, freedom and socialism. ' Its first principle states : 'The Arabs are one nation, having a natural right to live in one state and to be free to direct its affairs ... Ibid. pp. 663-4 
198. The changing priorities given to goals of Arab unity, including the liberation of Palestine, according to political necessity, are reviewed in A. Barau 'Oawuiyya and Wataniyya in Ba'thi Iraq : the search for a 
new balance' Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 19 no. 2 1983. 199. This states : 'Believing in the unity of the Yemen, and the unity of the destiny of the Yemeni people in the territory ... 
', and specifies its goal as a 'united democratic Yemen' leading to 'democratic Arab 
unity'. 
200. '... it shall strengthen its relation with progressive Arab states, Arab peoples, socialist, 
progressive and peace-loving states. * 
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It asserts that the PDRY will not deviate from what it describes as its 
patriotic and national duties, and that it will support the Palestinian cause 
and the revolutionary movements in the Arabian Gulf and Peninsula. 201 
Although neither Nasserism nor Ba'thism, 2oz with their forms of Arab 
nationalism, could have become effective in the sense of gaining political 
power without the direct or indirect role of the military, ironically, the same 
vehicle was the force which set back Arab unity, with the dissolution of the 
first united Arab state in contemporary history. z0 It could be said that 
the military coup of 1952 in Egypt'" set the pattern of post-war military 
intervention on the grounds of what has been called "renewal of national 
purpose", adding a new element in the distribution of political power. 205 
Military rule has tended to follow the civilian rule of the post-independence 
nationalists, for example, in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Yemen and Sudan. 206 
The Algerian case is unique in that the military took part in the nationalist 
struggle and in the first government after independence along with 
civilians, as well as in the coup of Boumedienne, which took power from the 
civilian government of Ben Bella. 
The introduction to this chapter mentioned several factors which 
contributed to the important role of the military in Arab political life. In 
addition, the political vacuum left by the end of colonial rule gave the 
impetus for the army to take power, The presence of alien rulers had led 
the nationalist movements to focus their political energy on liberation. When 
this focus disappeared, the political forces in the society were unable to 
create a united political front. Military intervention for "renewal of national 
purpose" took place particularly in countries where post-independence 
regimes were perceived both as too closely allied to the former colonial 
power, and as out of step with 
201. The PDRY has barked attempted rebellions in the Gulf. for example, in Oman in the mid-70s. Time, December 3rd 1984 
However, the decline of Nasseriss after 1967 along with the need for security has led Yemen to seek 
accommodation with its hostile neighbours - 'Saudi Arabia has been perceived as South Yemen's most deadly 
enexy and Iraq one of its few friends ... 
' 
Michael Hudson Arab politics : the search for legitimacy 1977, p. 351 202. Fouad Ajasi describes the impact on Ba'thism of its military route to power in The Arab predicament 
Arab political thought and practice since 1967,1981 PP. 40-50 
203. For example, Syria withdrew from the United Arab Republic in 1961, when the 1958 Constitution was 
suspended by Decree no. 1 of 30th September, which restored the Constitution of 1950, promising a new 
Constitution within six months. Uasii s withdrawal from the Arab Federation n 1958 follows the save 
pattern, though the union of Iraq and Jordan represented only a superficial unity 
I(see 
footnote 166 above). 
204. Although Colonel Husni al-Za'ii s successful coup in Syria in 1949 was the first in the post-war 
period, its political impact was limited in comparison with Free Officer's coup in Egypt in 1952. 
As well as providing the model for military intervention, Nasser 's coup influenced the radical programmes 
of coups in Libya, Sudan and North Yemen in 1969. Both Nimeiri and Oadhafi led a free Officers Movement, 
which initially adopted Nasserist ideas. 
Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy Nationalism and new states in Africa 1984, p. 230-2. See also. P. J. Vatiki ti The E9Yptian army in politics : pattern for new nations, 1961. 
205. John M. Harbeson 
(ed) 
The Military in African politics 1987, p12. 
206. In Syria, in 1949, Colonel Husni al la is seized power. In 1958 General Aboud took power in Sudan, as a 
result of rivalry between armed forces and politicians, aggravated by sectarian considerations. In the same 
SothOYemen by power 
the monarchy archy in Iraq, In the aid 70s, Colonel Ali Abdull h 
Salehntook powerainK u 
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current political trends toward Arab unity and socialism, for example, in 
Egypt, Iraq and Libya. In such countries, the army saw itself as the 
"vanguard" of the population, which intervened on behalf of the people 
to remove backward regimes. zo? 
A second stage of transition of power within the military by coup 
d'dtat can be seen in the assumption of power by the Ba'th in Syria and 
Iraq '208 while transitions in 
Egypt and Algeria209 illustrate later 
phases of military rule, where peaceful succession takes place within the 
military structure. This second stage when power changes hands within 
the ruling military structure represents a shift away from the pretext of 
national purpose for military intervention in political life. Such transfers 
of power within the military may be based on rivalry or reform, where 
the reason given may he corruption or the failure of the earlier coup to 
achieve its goals, 2 10 or that the leadership has distanced itself from the 
regular military. For example, the intervention of the military in 1965 in 
Algeria was justified on the pretext that the civilian government had 
exceeded its constitutional power, z'' though the real reason may have 
been Ben Bella's moves to minimise the role of the army. 212 
Naturally, the military's arrival in power tends to lead to the removal 
of existing institutions, 213 and the suspension of political parties. 
207. In Libya, the Free Officers' Movement said that it came to power in response to the desire of the 
Libyan population to remove the former corrupt regime. Its first communique stated : ... your armed forces have undertaken the overthrow of the corrupt regime, . 
By a single stroke it has lightened 
the long dark in which the Turkish domination was followed first by Italian rule, then by this 
reactionary and decadent regime, which was no more than a hotbed of extortion, faction, treachery and 
treason. From, this day forward Libya is a free self-governing republic ... 
". 
In Iraq, the head of the armed force's First Statement Proclaiming the Revolution and Abolishing the Monarchy : "Depending on sod, and the support of the faithful sons of the people and the [assistance] 
of the national armed forces we have accomplished the liberation of the beloved fatherland from the 
domination of the corrupt clique that was installed by imperialism to rule the people and to tamper 
with their fortunes in the interests [of imperialism and for personal interests ... The Arab states and the Arab League .. 
Muhammad Khalil, 1962 pp. 27-8. 
208. The Bath came to power for a second time in Iraq in 1968, and in Syria in 1963. In 1971, Asad 
took over by coup d'etat. 
209. Benjedid's regime differs from that of Boumedienne in being more open to civilian politics. He 
has consolidated his position by working with civilians, though he sets the terms of such cooperation. 
He has worked within the framework of the party while those who brought him to power regain on the 
sidelines to play a critical role at the next succession. While working with civilian politicians, the 
Algerian military have not diminished their identity as military officers. 
1. William Zartman "The Military in the politics of succession : Algeria" in John N. Harbeson (ed) 
The Military in African politics 1987 pp. 21-45. 
210. One pretext for Boumedienne's coup in 1965 was that he was acting in accordance with the 
principles of the Revolution : socialism and democracy. Elsewhere, second-stage movements against the 
original leadership have also been described as "correction" movements, such as Asad's action to 
remove al-Atassi, and in different circumstances al-Sadat's "correction` in 1971 of Nasseriss. In Syria, the preamble of the Constitution describes the "rehabilitation movement of 16th November 1970`. 
Nimeiri's coup in 1969 criticised earlier governments, including that of General Aboud as having no 
programme other than the maintenance of power. 
211. Under article 52, which allowed him "in case of imminent peril ... to take exceptional measures'. A. Carty The Third world state (the Algerian military coup of June 1965) Political human rights, the 
separation of powers and legal positivism. 
212. For example, Ben Bella intended to form a popular militia and run down the regular army. 
Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy Nationalism and new states in Africa 1984, p. 233f. 
213. For example, the coup of 1958 in Iraq led to the deposition of the Hashemi king, with the First 
Statement proclaiming the Revolution and Abolishing the Monarchy in July 1958. In Libya, the 1969 
movement led to the deposition of the Sanussi monarch. The Egyptian case is unusual in that, after the 
abdication of Farouk in July 1952, his son, Fouad was proclaimed king. The monarchy was not replaced 
by the republican system until the Constitutional Proclamation of July 18,1953. 
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In general, a first stage is then to create temporary institutions. In the 
transitional period, power tends to be exercised by an organ like the 
"revolutionary" or "republican command council"214, in which sovereign 
power is centralised, and which may issue constitutional declarations, zs 
Judicial institutions, such as "r"evolutionar"3 court" and the "revolutionary 
prosecutor" may be created. The leadership also tends to assume legislative 
authority during this period, and legislates by decree or communique. 
During this stage too, coup leaders may create or enhance the power of an 
existing intelligence apparatus as a counter-balance to the power of the 
military as, for example, in Sudan . 
21" 
At a later stage, characterised as the beginning of normalisation, a 
temporary order tends to be created, with, for example, the drafting of a 
provisional constitution. Once in power, one tendency of the military is to 
seek a direct popular base, by connecting itself to the masses, for example, 
through the creation of a political organ which represents the ideology of 
the movement such as the Sudan Socialist Union, or the Arab Socialist Union 
in Libya and Egypt, of which the military ruler is the head. Existing parties 
may be used as the mechanism to achieve a similar goal, for example, the 
Ba'th in Syria and Iraq, Z1° and the FLN in Algeria. Other processes of 
"civilianizing" their presence in power appear to aim at "military 
democracy-". Popular support is sought through broadened political 
participation . some rely on political parties 
to achieve institutional 
strengthening and wide political participation; z" others stress mass 
participation through General People's Congresses Z1° and revolutionary 
committees at the expense of other political forces within the society; 2zo 
others adopt the strategy of treating parties as one element in a three- 
part structure, involving the military and civil service. While most military 
regimes retain ultimate supremacy, some also make civil service and party 
members partners in ruling coalitions. 2 21 
214. Collective leadership of this type has been short-lived in most military regimes. As Hisham B. Sharabi 
asserts, 'as soon as ... the Revolutionary Council becomes supreme, dissension arises and the struggle for 
absolute leadership begins. Every military coup d'etat in the Arab world has had the same result: collective 
leadership breaks down and is replaced by a dictatorship'. Hishas B. Sharabi Nationalism and revolution in the Arab world, 1966, p. 64-65. 215. Like the Constitutional Proclamation which established the government during the transitional period in E ypt in 1953, or the Constitutional Declaration of 11th December 1969 in Libya. 
216. Nelson ((asfir 'One full revolution . the politics of Sudanese military government, 1969-1985' in John 
N. Harbeson (ed) The Military in African politics 1987 pp. 141-62 
21?. The 8a'th in Iraq have reversed the process by making members of the Regional Command of the 8a'th 
party members of the Revolutionary Command Council. 218. For example, both the Egyptian and the Iraqi National Assemblies in the 1980s contain a restricted 
range of political parties. The parties which participate in the Iraqi Assembly in the National and Progressive Front (in which the 8a't/ý plays a guiding role) are listed in Report of the Human Rights Committee 6AOR 35th session SuPp n( . 
40 (A/35/40), pp. 32-J 
219. In Libya, the relationship between the military or their representatives and the people has been 
manifested through the General People's Congresses. 
Jonathan Bearman Oadhafi's Libya 1986 p. 153. 220. Military regimes tend to exclude former 'professional politicians' and members of government from the 
political process as 'reactionary' elements which will obstruct radical programmes. 
221. Despite the banning of political parties soon after Niseiri's coup in Sudan in 1969, he made a short- lived ruling coalition with communists, who were added to the Revolutionary Command Council and allowed to 
pursue political activity. 
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For example, Zartman has identified a ruling coalition in Algeria containing 
military and civilians, while the party has been reduced to a secondary 
role, as a "mechanism of recruitment and discip4ine". 222 
Decentralisation of power to local councils is also a feature of some military 
programmes aimed at encouraging popular participation, though key posts 
tend to be reserved for those loyal to the central authority. Later changes 
within the military, as a result of coup d', -Rat, tend to lead to less far- 
reaching changes in the political or legal order, though even here 
constitutional institutions and instruments may be subject to revision or 
amendment. 2 21 
Military governments are frequently responsible for prolonged states of 
emergency"' to effect political transition, or on the grounds of state of 
war or threat of war, danger to public order or to national security. Most 
dangerous is the doctrine of national security, which has contributed to 
the frequent military coups, and the imposition and extension of states of 
emergency in the Arab world. As elsewhere, the use of this doctrine 
threatens democracy and freedom of political life, 225 as the duty of the 
military to defend the nation is extended to combating ideological or cultural 
manifestations of the "enemy-". 228 
While "second-stage" military regimes may not abolish the Constitution 
itself, martial law or other exceptional legislation tends to he the mechanism 
which abrogates constitutional provisions. In some cases, like Syria, martial 
law has become more permanent than the Constitutions, which have changed, 
while martial law became the norm rather than the except ion. 227 Emergency 
legislation normally focuses power in the hands of a strong executive, 22° a 
tendency which can be seen in all military regimes. The use of emergency 
legislation allows this concentration of power to be maintained beyond the 
transitional period which follows any coup d'etat. 
222. I. William Zartian 'The Military in the politics of succession : Algeria' in John N. Harbeson (cd) The 
Military in African politics 1987 pp. 21-45. 223. In Syria, the coup of 1962 dismissed the constituent assembly instituted by the leaders of the 1961 
coup with the task of drafting a new Constitution. The leaders of the 1962 coup then amended the 1950 Constitution, which had been restored by the leaders of the 1961 coup. 224. As we will see, the threat from Israel has provided the pretext for long-term extension of states of 
emergency in Jordan and Syria, while in Egypt, the pretext has been internal threats to security. 225. This doctrine also explains the reluctance to permit a return to genuine elections, civilian government 
and political pluralism. The UN Special Rapporteur on States of Emergency describes the position of 
governments who have adopted regimes of transition to so-called new forms of democracy. Though in some 
situations, a lapse of time or 'transition' may be necessary to prepare for a return to elected government, 
what characterises these new forms of democracy is the purpose of confining the political process within 
narrow ideological parameters, thus limiting participation to a select part of the population. This is 
incompatible with the very essence of democracy. 
States of emergency : their impact on human rights. A study prepared by the International Commission of Jurists, 1983. 
The impact of emergency legislation on the legal order will be examined in detail in the next chapter. 226. Normally the 'enemy of the revolution', 'enemy of the people', and so on. 
227. The leaders of 1962 coup in Syria declared martial law in December 1962, by Decree no. 51, abrogating the emergency Decree no. 162 of 1958. This Decree has remained in force up to the present despite the 
promulgation of a number of Constitutions, in 1964,1969 and 1973. 228. For example, Decree no. 51 of 1962 in Syria, article 3, para. (a) and its amendments, concentrates power in the hands of a Martial Law Governor. 
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Military rule has shaped the emergence of the contemporary political order 
in some Arab countries. While the role of the mil ', ar"3y may not be paramount 
or even clear in &o, %- rnment, in most states it is nevertheless important, 
because of the force or pressure the military c, ýn 
bring to bear by virtue 
of its power 229 
Legitimacy has been sought, not only by force of arms, but also politically, 
and as we have seen, this has fundamentally affected the political order and 
other spheres. The constitutional order, in particular, has been affected by 
military intervention, which has also precipitated the progress from 
monarchy to republic in several countries. 2 ' The nationalist programmes 
implemented by the leaders of military movements have also deeply affected 
the new constitutional order, because of the stress they lay on the radical 
nationalist doctrines of socialism and Arab unit, %. 
One pretext for military intervention or maintenance of power has 
remained, in general terms, resistance to imperialism : with a shift from the 
need to remove corrupt regimes with links to colonial powers to the need to 
combat the threat from Israel and neo-colonialism. It has been pointed out 
that in order to bolster popular support for military leadership dramatic 
incidents have been initiated. Z91 The nationalisation of Kamst-al-Suez in 
Egypt in 1956, and the removal of British and American military bases in 
Libya232 in 1970 come into this categor3'" 
The military have tended to retain power, in part because of the long-term 
goals they set, and in part for reasons associated with the doctrine of 
national security, which leads to the restriction of political life, as we will 
see, and the postponement of a return to civilian government. A related 
aspect of military rule which we have seen is the use of state of emergency 
legislation. This too, may be connected to the nationalist programmes which 
involve the threat of a seventh confrontation with Israel. 
229. The threat of military intervention has shaped the policies of the monarchical system in Morocco, 
leading for example, to the suspension and replacement of constitutions in the sixties and seventies. The 
King's decision to occupy the Spanish Sahara in 1975 was also primarily a means to divert the military who 
posed a threat to the monarchy, as had become apparent in a number of attempts on the King's life. 
Other um siderations underlying Hassan's decision to occupy Spanish Sahara are reviewed by Jerome B. Weiner The Green March in historical perspective' Middle East Journal 33,1979, pp. 20-33 
230. For an examination of the trend of military coups d'etat in the region in the period 1949-1979, see 
Eliezer Be'eri The Waning of the military coup in Arab politics' Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 18 no. 1 1982. 231. Hisha  B. Sharabi Nationalism and revolution in the Arab world, 1966, p. 64 
232. The intention of deriving political advantage from this action is clear since the leases on the air- 
bases were due in any case to expire in 1970. The treaty of 1954 between the United States and Libya 
stipulated in article 30 that it would remain valid until 24th December 1970, and will continue to be so 
until one of the governments informs the other of its intention to terminate. Libya chose to finalise the 
treaty by negotiation before the date due. 
Muhsin al-Shishakli [Public international law], 1971, pp. 144-5. 
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In the period since independence, we can see the effect of the two 
main currents identified in the previous chapter, conservative and 
radical, in Arab political thought, and their essential role in the creation 
of the contemporary legal order. This section examines the scope of the 
ideological dimension translated in political documents, which also found 
its way to Constitutions and other legislation. Since the framework of 
the legal order in general and the protection of rights and freedoms in 
particular are subject, inter alia, to their compatibility with the 
ideological principles and the foundations of the political system and its 
prevailing plans and programmes, thus it is essential to examine their 
scope and the degree of their effect. "Ideology", in the Arab context, is 
understood to mean "a set of political and social ideas which guide the 
policies of a government or a party, and which tends to constitute a 
dominant doctrine in as much as it becomes the ideological expression of 
a ruling power". 1 
The content of such "ideologies" in the Arab world, whether secular, 
religious or in combination, should likewise be understood to be more 
the "ideological expression" of the ruling group than representing the 
values and ideas normally associated with the terms mentioned. Terms 
such as "al-thewriyyah" (revolutionism), "ishtirakiya" 
(socialism), ' 
"dimuqratiya" (democracy)' and even "Islam" will be found to 
have 
differing meanings from country to country and over a period of time. 
From this perspective, the concept of ideology in the Arab context 
presumes a body of ideas centred on political power or authority, which 
Ali Merad has called a "doctrinal expression of power". 
This discussion is confined to a brief evaluation of the essential role 
which these currents have played from the outset in drawing up 
political doctrines and programmes, to shed light on the spirit of the 
new constitutions and institutions they have created. Firstly, the focus 
will be on the secular ideology' expressed in ideological documents and 
Constitutions, and secondly, the Islamic dimension, which affects to a 
greater or lesser degree the legal order of most states. 
Most radical nationalist regimes have tried to build a socialist political 
framework through state structure legislation and institutions, though 
their approach, and the degree of its effect has varied. The two radical 
nationalist ideologies we examined in the previous chapter have found 
their way to power in the contemporary constitutional order : 
1. Ali Merad "The Ideologisation of Islas in the contemporary Muslim world" in Alexander S. Cudsi and 
Ali E. Hillal Dessouki. Islam and power, 1981. 
2. Al-Thawra, the Iraqi Ba th newspaper, quotes the following statement of Saddam Husain: 'Socialiss 
does not wean the equal distribution of wealth between the deprived poor and the exploiting rich; this 
would be too inflexible. Socialism is a means (Wasilal to raise and improve productivity. " 
3. In 1980, al-Thawra contained a discussion of democracy in which it was said not to be "the 
relationship between the leading party and the citizens, " but `the extension of the bond between the 
vanguard part 
ý 
y, the state and the gasses". 
Quoted in Marion Farouk-Slugglett and Peter Sluglett "Iraqi Ba'this.: nationalism, socialism and 
national socialism" in Saddam's Iraq : Revolution or Reaction ? CARDRI, 1986, pp. 89-107. 
4. The elements of 'revolutionary ideology" in the Arab world are reviewed in Hisha. B. Sharabi 
Nationalism and revolution in the Arab world, 1966, p. 82-92. 
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Ba'th ideology has been proclaimed by the Iraqi Interim Constitution of 
1970 and the Syrian Constitution of 1973,5 while the present leadership 
in Egypt and Libya proclaim their debt to Nasserism and 1952 
revolution. 
The Ba'th believes that socialism" is the mechanism by which the goals 
of nationalism may be achieved, through dimugratiya sha'biya (popular 
democracy) in which the Ba't. h is the central element. In Iraq, the 
Political Report of the 8th Congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party 
describes socialism as "a vital prerequisite for the liberation, unity and 
resistance of the Arab nation", and the Arab masses as the participants 
and objects of socialism. ' The preamble to the Syrian Constitution of 
1973 describes the establishment of a socialist system as "a necessity 
stemming from the needs of Arab society". 
In Algeria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the national 
liberation struggle shaped the contemporary state, its structure and 
ideology. In Algeria, socialism partners national liberation as key issues 
in the National Charter, which also stresses the Algerian people's "choice 
of socialism", and sets out how this is to be pursued through state 
socialism. ' Since its creation, a clear committment to socialism has 
shaped the PDRY's ideological framework, 9 leading to intervention in 
several spheres with the aim of altering the traditional structure of 
society, with a strong committment to Marxist-Leninist socialism which 
claims to take into account local conditions. ' o 
In Libya, political programmes have varied since the abolition of the 
monarchy in 1969. At an early stage, it identified itself with the common 
themes of Arab nationalism "Hurriya, Ishtirakiya, Wahda" (Liberty, 
Socialism, Unity), emphasising the special nature of "socialism" as a 
local phenomenon, distinct from alien ideology. 
5. Article 8 of the Syrian Constitution states The vanguard party in the society and the state is the Bath Arab Socialist Party. It directs a national progressive front which strives to unity the 
potential of the popular "asses and to press them into the service of the goals of the Arab nation'. 6. Article 4 of the Bath Constitution states : "The Arab Socialist (Ba'th) Party is a socialist 
party, which believes that socialise is necessary for Arab nationalism, being the ideal system which 
enables the nation to increase its production ... 
". 
Muhammad Khalil The Arab states and the Arab League :a documentary record. Vol. 1 : Constitutional developments, 1962. 
7. The Iraqi 8a'th has aimed to achieve its goals of "consolidating its revolutionary . arch and 
effecting radical transformations within a nationalist, socialist and democratic framework". 8. As we saw, the Algerian National Charter emphasises the necessity of a strong state . the construction of socialism, the battle against underdevelopment, the building of a modern and 
prosperous econoR .. require a solid and ever-strengthened 
State 
... 
". 
Quoted in Rachid Tleacani State and revolution in Algeria, 1986, p. 159. 
9. The PDRY has been described as "the only Arab state with an institutionalized socialist structure". Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael PUR Yemen : politics, economics and society, 1986, p. 161. 10. Articles 7 nd 9 of he Constitution provide The historical role of the working class moves upwards and (it beco e(s ultimately the leading class in society. Soldiers, women and students are 
regarded as part of this alliance by virtue of their membership of the productive forces of the people The National Front Organization leads, on the basis of scientific socialism, the political 
activity amongst the lasses and within mass organization so as to develop society in such a may that national democratic Revolution, which is non-capitalist in approach, is achieved. ` 'All power serves the welfare of the working people. The working people in the People's Oe ocratic Republic of Yemen 
exercises its political authority through the people's councils which are elected in a free and democratic manner'. 
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The ideological dimension found its way to the Constitutions of many Arab 
countries, which identify their nation's ideological framework as 
"nationalist", "socialist", "people's" and "democratic" and it is within this 
context that the establishment and operation of organs of government, and 
indeed the exercise of all political rights in such countries must be viewed, 
as we will see in the following chapter. 
The revolution of 1952 continues to have an impact inside and outside"' 
Egypt. We have seen how Nasserism was translated in the Constitutions of 
1956 and 1958, and it continues to influence the Egyptian Constitution of 
1971, whose first article sets the ideological tone, in defining "The Arab 
Republic of Egypt whose socialist, democratic system is based on alliance of 
the working forces of the people.., ". The first article of the Algerian 
Constitution of 1963 likewise identifies the nature of the republic with the 
qualifying words "democratic and people's ", ' 2 though in the 1976 
Constitution, this was replaced by the declaration that : "Algeria is a 
socialist state". The 1963 Constitution went on to set out the objectives of 
the revolution, for example, in article 10, as "building- up the country, in 
accordance with the principles of socialism and the effective exercise of 
power by the people", and the 1976 Constitution confirms the Algerians' 
choice of socialism, in article 10. 
Along with socialism, "revolutionary democracy" is the mechanism adopted 
by the radical states for achieving the goals of nationalism, though its 
description and nature vary from country to country, for example in 
Algeria, it is "socialist democracy", while in Libya, the phrase is "direct 
popular denmocracy". According to Iraq's government"', the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist party "was able to define the general framework for its theory of 
democracy- as direct popular democracy- ... 
" The Syrian legislator also chose 
"popular democracy" as the system of governing, as the preamble to the 
Constitution indicates. Democracy in Algeria, as elsewhere, is influenced to a 
great extent by the ideological framework of the Fronte de Liberation 
Natiornale, and within the limits of the FLN as manifested in the National 
Charter. 11 ' 
11. In Libya, article 6 of the Constitutional Declaration states : '... the Libyan revolution aims to 
achieve socialise by implementing social justice ... '. The preamble of the Nasserist Constitution of 1956 lists the objective of assuring social justice, as we saw in the previous chapter. 
12. Variations of the formula 'democratic and people's' are found in the titles of other Arab republics, for 
example, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the People's Democratic Algerian Republic. 
Official titles are taken from the Arab League draft Convention for Human Rights. 
13. For example in its statement to the Human Rights Committee. 
CCPR/C/1/Add. 4t of 8th June 1979, p. 103. 
14. Chapter 2 of the National Charter describes the 'Concept of the State' : 'The concept of the Algerian 
state as an ancestral entity rebuilt by the National Liberation Front has witnessed various stages leading 
it fror the concept of social democracy as it was enunciated by the Proclamation of November 1,1954, to the 
reality of the popular democracy imposed by the , asses striving for the building of the socialist society'. 
It goes on 'the Algerian republic is popular in essence, Islamic in faith, socialist in orientation, 
democratic in institutions, and modern in inclination'. 
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Although, as we will see in a later chapter, constitutional and other 
provisions in these countries appear to legalise the existence of more 
than one party, it is clear that in many countries, a single "ruling" 
party plays a pre-eminent role, under varying pretexts. This role is 
institutionalized by the Constitution in the People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen (PDRY), Algeria and Syria, and by the Law of the Ruling Party 
in Iraq. It seems that this common theme is inspired by socialist 
models, 16 which lay stress on the role of the ruling party in the life of 
the nation. 
Since it came to power in 1968, the Iraqi Ba'th has focused primarily 
on " ... the 
building up of a central and strong national authority 
"1e by state structure legislation, such as the Law of the Leading 
Party (Law no. 142) of 1974, which binds all government organs to adhere 
to the ideological principles set out in the Political Report of the 8th 
Regional Congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. In Syria, article 8 
of the 1973 Constitution describes the Ba'th Arab Socialist Party as "the 
vanguard party in the society and the state" which directs the national 
progressive front. According to article 7 of the PDRY Constitution : 
"the National Front Organization leads, on the basis of scientific 
socialism, the political activity amongst the masses and within nass 
organization so as to develop society in such a way that national 
democratic Revolution 
... 
is achieved. " After the integration of all 
"vanguard" parties within its ranks, the National Front was renamed the 
Yemeni Socialist Party, which has been described as the "vanguard" 
party by its secretary-general, one of Yemen's leading ideologues. " 
15. For example, in the Soviet Constitution of 1936, which is the clearest model for the 
institutionalization of a single party. Article 126 states that : 'The Communist Party of the USSR is the avant-garde of the workers in their struggle to build a communist society and represents the 
guiding nucleus of all workers' organizations, whether social or state". Its position is re-confirmed 
in the Constitution of 1977, in article 6, states : 'The leading and guiding force of Soviet society 
and the nucleus of its political system and of all State organizations and public organizations, is 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people". 
A model fror within the Arab region may be found in the Provisional Constitutions of the United Arab Republic, which specify the role of the Arab Socialist Union as representing the vital forces of the 
nation, for example, in article 192, above. The role of the ASU is upheld by article 5 of the Constitution of 1971, which provides that it is 
'the political organization which ... represents 
the alliance of the people's working forces; namely 
peasants, workers, soldiers, the intelligentsia and national capital". It is described as the tool of 
this alliance in entrenchin the values of democracy and socialism. 16. CCPR/C/1/Add. 45 of 8th 
June 
1979, pp. 2-3. 17. 'The Yemeni Party is the vanguard of the Yemeni working class aligned with the peasants and other 
working segments of the population and revolutionary intellectuals. It is the living expression of this class-consciousness -a consciousness of its real interests, future and historic role. The aim of the Party is to transform the society in a revolutionary manner to consolidate the achievements of the 
national democratic revolution and the transition to socialism. [This transition] is guided by ... 
the 
theory of scientific socialism, which takes into account local conditions of growth and the development of the national democratic revolution in our country. ' 
Interview with Abd al-Fattah Ismail in AI-Hadaf (party newspaper) 29th October, 1978, p. 6. See also Helen Lackner "The rise of the National Front as a political organization' in B. R. Pridham (ed) Contemporary Yemen : politics and historical background, 1984. 
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The Algerian Constitution of 1976 illustrates the pre-eminent position of the 
FLN in relation to other constitutional organs. It is described as "tile single 
party of the country", which "constitutes the guide of the socialist 
revolution and the leading force of society. It is the organ of leadership, 
planning, and animation of the socialist Revolution ". It "sees to the 
permanent mobilization of the people through the ideological education of 
the masses, their organization and their formation into cadres for the 
construction of the socialist society". Article 98 of the Constitution goes on 
to specify that "the country's leadership is the embodiment of the unified 
political leadership of the Party and the State. Within the framework of this 
unity the par"ty-'s leadership guides the general policy of the country". 19 
In countries like Algeria and PDRY, the "ruling" party, by virtue of 
playing a significant part in the struggle for independence, claims the role 
of interpreting the aspirations of the people and guiding the nation toward 
realising its goals. Mohammed Bedjaoui, a leading member of the FLN, has 
characterised it as a "nation-party", which he distinguishes from both a 
"union of parties" and a "single party", emphasising its "exclusively 
national character" and its identification with the nation. 19 
The union of parties has become a common phenomenon in the Arab world, 
particularly after the creation of the United Arab Republic, when even the 
Syrian Ba'th agreed to dissolve itself in order to participate in the 
"National Socialist Union" established by the Constitution. It has become 
conventional, particularly in the period following revolutionary change, for 
political parties to lose their formal identity in joining with others in a 
"national front" or union party. 20 In Syria, the "national progressive front" 
formed by this process is nevertheless directed by the Ba'th Arab Socialist 
Party, according to article 8 of the present Constitution, as we have seen. 
Bedjaoui rejects the identification of the FLN as a "union of parties" of 
this type, arguing that the failure of other parties led Algerians to join the 
FLN "as individuals after the preliminary or actual dissolution of their 
respective parties 11.21 He notes that political parties themselves could not 
become part of the FLN, and in this, the similarity to the National Socialist 
Union in the United Arab Republic and Libya, for example, is clear. 
18. Chapter 1 The Political Function of the Constitution of 1976. 19. Mohammed Bedjaoui Law and the Algerian revolution, 1963, pp. 82-3. 20. As we have seen in the first chapter and as we shall continue to argue in the next chapter, any such 
organization, voluntary or involuntary, runs the risk of undermining the right of freedom of association. 
While a voluntary union of political parties, for example, in time or crisis, need not necessarily endanger 
freedom of association, should such an arrangement be institutionalized, or maintained beyond the existence 
of the grounds which led to it, this would represent a threat to this freedom, 
21. Article 7 of the Statutes of the FLN indicates its intention towards its political future and that of 
other organizations, in stating : 'The character of a militant member of the FLN is incompatible with 
aeiºbership of any other political organization. ' 
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Bed jaoui makes clear that the 
the liberation of Algeria, but 
Statutes -, the "building of ad 
Statutes of the FLN make explicit t'. 
with other ruling parties in the re 
the people in achieving the goals 
1961, qualifies the characterisation 
theoretical and organizational grout 
description of "the single party" 
political leaders to rule the nation. 
the party as a mechanism of reci 
which maintains direct communicatic 
population. He stresses its dual ch 
and a mechanism for reflecting the 
the single party or group is commoi 
indeed many third world nations, 
of the FLN are not restricted to 
icompass - in the vreamble of its 
ýmocratic and social Republic" The 
e aim which the organization shares 
; ion, that of guiding and organizing 
E nationalism. 2z Bedjaoui, writing in 
of the FLN as a single party on 
ds. 23 He quotes Maurice Duverger's 
"hich aims to create a new elite of 
Duverger's description characterises 
uitment, selection and organization, 
z between the government and the 
iracter, as an organ of government 
, eople's reactions. This conception of 
to other radical Arab republics and 
where the party acts as both the 
agent of government policy, and the guide and interpreter of the wishes 
of the population, and mediator in communication with the government. 
Another tendency which often accompanies political change is the 
creation of a single and permanent ruling authority, 
(such as head of 
state, revolutionary or republican council, party leadership). The 
unconstitutional character of this development may be seen in countries 
where, in the name of revolution, a group or party obtains power and 
exercises it in the name of the people, as the source of that power. At 
this stage, political parties are dissolved and the establishment of a 
limited or unlimited transitional period is declared. 24 During this period, 
a body such as the Revolutionary Command Council is considered to be 
the supreme authority in the country which enjoys sovereign powers. Z6 
22. Article 4 of the Statutes of the FLN provides : 'the FLN will pursue its historical mission as 
guide and organizer of the Algerian nation after independence has been established, in order to build 
a real democracy, economic prosperity and social justice. ' 
23. Bedjaoui denies that the FLN is either a purely ideological party, a class party on Marxist lines 
or a conservative party of the fascist type, claiming that it is "a revolutionary, equalitarian and 
democratic party". 
Mohammed Bedjaoui Law and the Algerian revolution, 1963, p. 87. 
24. For example, in Egypt, where the Proclamation of January 16,1953 states that: "The Army Revolution has derived its strength from its complete faith in the right of all citizens to a strong 
and honourable life, to full and absolute justice, and to a full and comprehensive liberty within the 
framework of a sound constitution that expresses the wishes of the people and that regulates the 
relationship between those in power and those who are governed ... 
". 
In North Yemen, in 1974, the Constitution was suspended and a constitutional Declaration made as 
follows : 'In the name of the people, the Chairman of the Command Council, ., 
desiring to consolidate 
the bases of authority during the transitional period ... announce in the name of the people that 
during the transitional period the country will be governed in accordance with the following rules 
'. Thirteen articles follow. 
25. '.. as the [political] parties in their antiquated manner and their reactionary mentality (can) 
represent only the gravest danger to the existence of the country and its future, I, therefore, 
declare the dissolution of all politics parties as from today and the confiscation of all their funds for the good of the people, Ito prevent] their being expended in order to sow the seeds of discord and 
disharmony. And in order that the country may en. oy stability and productivity, I declare the 
establishment of a three-year transitional period. 
(is) will enable us to set up a sound democratic 
and constitutional government. I shall not permit any tampering with, or hare to, the interests of 
the homeland, and .. most severely strike at any one who may stand 
in the may of those objectives .. 
". 
Muhammad Khalil The Arab states and the Arab League ... , 
1962, pp. 495-6. 
The 1970 Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic centres executive power in the Republican Council. 
3 goals 
also er 
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Moreover, this organ entrusts itself with the task of taking measures 
in particular for protecting the Revolution and its objectives. ae 
As a consequence of the weakening of the rule of law by the 
introduction of ideology, so the enjoyment of human rights could be 
gravely affected by the influence of ideology, since it tends to be 
subject, inter alia, to its compatibility with the ideological principles and 
foundations of the political system, its prevailing plans and programmes. 
Such ideological boundaries could lead to the application of measures 
which contradict the spirit of constitutional provisions upholding human 
rights. Constitutions and political documents establish the framework and 
scope of the exercise of rights and freedoms, stressing in addition the 
duties and obligations which accompany them. For example, article 55 of 
the Algerian Constitution provides for freedom of expression and 
assembly, but goes on to stipulate that they are exercised subject to 
article 73, which provides for the lapsing of freedoms of those who use 
them "to infringe upon the essential interests of the national 
collectivity, ... and the socialist 
Revolution". The Chapter of the 
Constitution headed "The Duties of the Citizen" stipulates, in article 75, 
that every citizen must protect "the interests of the national collectivity 
[and] respect the achievements of the socialist Revolution". 
Several radical states emphasise the socialist democracy which 
establishes the conditions in which individuals exercise freedoms and 
rights. For example, within the context of "... socialist democracy, the 
Algerian State guarantees real freedom of the individual... Socialist 
democracy 
... prepares the objective conditions 
that enable citizens to 
exercise their fundamental freedoms and their rights within the 
framework of the law ... 
". 27 
Likewise, the two states28 governed by Ba'thist ideology proclaim 
"popular democracy" as the formula which ensures the population the 
enjoyment of fundamental freedoms. The Yemeni Constitution, in several 
articles, guarantees rights to citizens, but stresses the obligations of 
the citizen to the community, within the context of the revolution. 2 
Though we saw in the first chapter that restrictions on specified and 
strictly determined grounds are acceptable and even necessary for the 
26. For example, article 37 of the Libyan Constitutional Declaration of December 1969 provides that 
the RCC is the supreme organ of state, competent to promulgate laws. 
Similarly, the Egyptian Constitutional Proclamation of 1953, establishing transitional government, in 
Article 8 states that: "The Commander of the Revolution shall, in the Revolution Command Council, be 
entrusted with supreme sovereign powers, particularly in respect of measures which it considers to be 
necessary for protecting the Revolution, the system on which it is based for the achievement of its 
objectives, as well as the right to appoint and dismiss Ministers. ". Ibid, p. 296. 
27. From the Algerian National Charter. 
28. For example, the preamble to the Syrian Constitution states that : "freedom is a sacred right and 
popular democracy is the ideal formula which ensures for the citizens the exercise of their freedom, 
which makes them dignified human beings capable of giving and building .,, ", For the impact of the Bath ideology in Syria, see Robert N. Olson, The 8a'th and Syria 1982. 29. Individuals are rewarded in accordance with their contribution to economic and social development (article 14), work is not just a right but an obligation (article 35) citizens contribute to the 
public revenue according to their ability (article 54). "Every citizen shall protect and support 
public ownership as the essential material basis for the national democratic revolution" (article 52). 
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enjoyment of rights and freedoms, by reviewing certain constitutional 
provisions in radical Arab countries, it may be observed that ideological 
concerns restrict or limit the exercise of certain rights within the 
context of "the socialist system" or the "progressive line of the 
revolution". Such restrictions tend to be imposed within the framework 
of the revolution or, in more vague terms, the themes of Arab 
nationalism. 
The Iraqi Constitution of 1970 illustrates a basic limitation imposed by 
the ideological framework, as article 26 provides that political rights are 
guaranteed in accordance with the objectives of the Constitution, and 
the limits of the law as the "... . State shall endeavour to provide the 
means required for practising these freedoms, which are compatible with 
the nationalist and progressive line of the revolution ". A similar 
approach elsewhere may be found in other legislation which sets the 
criteria of participation in the state apparatus, including the 
judiciary. 30 
Similarly, the right of individuals to freedom of opinion and expression 
is restricted in the Syrian Constitution, in the following terms : "Every 
citizen has the right freely and openly to express his views ... 
He also 
has the right to participate in supervision and constructive criticism in 
a manner that will safeguard the soundness of the domestic and 
nationalist structure and will strengthen the socialist system. 1131 
Likewise, in the Libyan Constitutional Declaration, freedoms are ensured 
"within the limits of the interests of the people and the principles of 
the Revolution", and as we have seen, the rights of freedom of 
expression and assembly are restricted by the ideological context in 
Algeria. 
Despite the secular ideology of the Arab republics, the population of all 
Arab countries is predominantly Muslim, and so the Islamic dimension 
remains to varying degrees a vital factor, to which all the authorities 
have responded, within modern and traditional states alike. One can say 
that reference to Islam is one of the most important constants of 
ideological legitimacy in the contemporary Arab legal order. 
30. For example, the Labour Code no. 151 (1970), article 196, sets forth trade union objectives as 
follows : 'organising the struggle of the working class in the light of a free, conscious and 
progressive prograhe for the protection of the sacredness of labour and the noble value of the human 
being, the re-affirmation of the historic role of the working class in building, administering and 
building society and the State, and in realising the goals of the Arab nasses in unity, freedom and 
socialism'. CCPR/C/l/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, pp. 88-89. 
Similarly, Act no. 35 of 1977 provides that judges are selected in line with "socialist aspirations". 
CCPR/C/SR. 747 of 22nd July 1987, p. 7. 
The oath of the chairman and members of the Supreme Constitutional Court in North Yemen swears to 
guard 'the objectives of the revolution', according to article 156 of the Constitution of 1970. 
In Algeria, article 166 of the Constitution stipulates that Justice contributes to the defence of 
the accomplishments of the socialist Revolution and to the protection of its interests', and article 
173 provides that 'the judge is to contribute to the defence and protection of the socialist 
Revolution'. 
31. This is provided by article 38 of the present Syrian Constitution where, similarly, freedom of 
association is secured towards realising goals such as the building of the Arab socialist society and 
the protection of its regime', according to articles 48 and 49. 
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Ideological documents" and Constitutions33 rarely omit a reference to 
Islam or affirmation of Muslim identity, which ranges from a source of 
legislation"t to the basis of the political dynamic, but everywhere 
constitutes an important source of ideological legitimacy. 
Revolutionary leaderships' use of Islam emphasises the social values of 
liberation, community and distribution, in order to provide legitimacy for 
their political and socio-economic programmes'36 while traditional leaders, 
such as those of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Morocco, rely on the 
values of piety and obedience, and strict observance of the state version of 
Islamic law, which tend to reinforce their traditional authority. 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia represents the most traditional Islamic 
country in the region, where preservation of Islamic traditions has had the 
fullest impact on the political and legal order. More than any other Arab 
country, Saudi Arabia has displayed a commitment to the preservation in its 
society of . Shari'ah, since the creation of Kingdom of Hijaz, whose 
Constitution of 1926 underlines this commitment. "' We have seen in the 
previous chapter how the Saud family in collaboration with the Wahabbi 
religious sect drew on Islam to legitimise the creation of the state of Saudi 
Arabia, and how reliance on this formula of ideological legitimacy continues 
to manifest itself. 
In what Omar Bendourou 37 has described as the "theocratic monarchy" of 
Morocco, the legitimacy of the ruling structure is based on Islamic religious 
tradition, despite article 2 of the Constitution of 1972,38 according to which 
sovereignty is vested in the nation. In a royal address of October 1978, the 
monarch rejected separation of powers, asserting that his role as "Amin a! 
Mouminine" allowed him to control constitutional institutions. In political life, 
the Moroccan legislator 
32. The Algerian Charter proclaims that 'the Algerian people is an Arab and Muslim people', and that 'Islam is the State religion and a fundamental component of the national personality ... 
'. 
31. The Algerian Constitution reaffirms Algeria's choice of 'Islas, which is the State religion', (article 2. Article 6 of the Moroccan Constitution of 1972 states: 'Islas is the religion of the State ... 
". The 
Iraqi Constitution, in article 4, stipulates that Islas is the state religion. Article 1 of the Tunisian Constitution proclaims Islas to be the religion of the Tunisian state. The 1970 Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic prefaces its preamble with Qur'anic verses, and states, in its first sentence, that the Yemenis are an Arab and Muslim people, before going on to stress the importance 
of Islas, in articles 1,2 and 3, which describe Yemen as an Arab Islamic state', where Islam is the 
religion of the state, and Islamic Shari'ah is the source of all laws. 34. A discussion of some practical aspects of the use of Shari'ah as a principal source of legislation may be found in George N. SfeLr's 'Source of law and the issue of legitimacy and rights" Middle East Journal 42 
no. 31988 pp. 436-446. 35. The Algerian National Charter, in Chapter 2, states that '... socialist has a powerful bond with the 
lengthy evolution of the national liberation struggle, in complete conformity with the doctrine of Islas, 
which advocates social justice". 
36. For example, parts I, II, III, Article 2 states : 'the Arabian Kingdom of the Hijaz is ... 
Moslem 
country in all its internal and foreign affairs ' The Constitution also, in Article 5, states that: ' The entire administration of the Kingdorº... His Majesty is bound by the Shari'a laws'. Article 6 states that: 'Sentences in the Kingdom of the Hijaz shall be given according to the Koran and the Sunnat of the Prophet'. Article 10 provides : "Shari'a 
Affairs include everything in connection with the Sheri'e court, the two Holy Sanctuaries, wakfs, mosques and all religious establishments'. 37. Omar Bendourou 'The Exercise of political freedoms in Morocco' in Review of the International Commission 
of Jurists, no. 40, June 1988. 
38. "Sovereignty is vested in the nation, which shall exercise it either directly, by way of referendum, or indirectly through constitutional institutions' 
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affirmed the principles of modern democracy through . Shar"i'ah, and 
therefore, the system of Shura, involving direct consultation with the 
representatives of the Muslim community, and Bai'a, which is the act 
through which the head of the community was recognised by the 
representatives of the people, as the spiritual and temporal head of the 
legislative and executive powers, as we will see, 3a 
Libya and Sudan appear to represent a similar phenomenon, since their 
policies of Islamization seemed to give Islam the supreme position in the 
state structure, though their real impact and duration was limited. 
From 1977, the Libyan authority declared that the 1951 Constitution and 
the 1969 constitutional declaration were abolished in favour of the 
Qur'an, and that the Libyan legal system was based on Shari'ah. 40 
However, the Libyan authority did not reinstate Shari'ah in traditional 
form, but introduced some Islamic elements to be interpreted by the 
courts as part of Libyan law. 4' A small number of Islamic laws, closely 
related to the positive legal order, °Z were promulgated with enough 
publicity to create the impression that Libya was reverting to 
Shari'ah. 43 The selective use of the elements of Islamic law has meant 
the failure of any real attempt to Islamicize Libyan law. 
Modern states, like Egypt, Iraq and Syria, have emphasised radical, 
secular modernization, though in recent times, some have implemented 
Islamization policies. 44 In the radical republics, Nasser in Egypt" and 
the Bath in Syria4 6 
39. CCPR/C/SR. 332 13th November 1981 p. 2. 40. CCPR/C/1/Add. 20 of 24th January 1978. 41. The schools of Fiqh were dismissed as being without legal force, and the Sunnah of the Prophet 
were rejected as a source of law. In 1978, the authority stated that the only Islamic law was that 
contained in the Qur'an : 'The Qur'an is the Shari'ah of the society'. 
Quoted at the beginning of Raymond N. Habiby "Muammar Qadhafi's new Islamic scientific socialist 
society" in Religion and Politics in the Middle East (ed) Michael Curtis, 1981, pp. 247-259. 
However, the leadership has also insisted that the Qur'an provides guidance only on matters of 
personal ethics and does not cover the problems dealt with in the Green Book, so that there is no 
possibility of conflict between the two. When the Ulasa presented verses contradicting the philosophy 
of the Green Book, their views were rejected on the grounds that they were linked to the conditions of 
the seventh century Arab world, and so were irrelevant for contemporary Muslims. 42. The laws enacted were drawn up by experts from the civil and Islamic law fields, with a commission 
established to review existing laws and eliminate laws violating Islamic law, replacing them by laws 
embodying the basic principles of Shari. 'ah. Muhammad Sarni Nabrawi [Highway robbery and theft], 1975. 
43. 'Human rights practices in the Arab states : the modern impact of Shari'a values", Georgia Journal 
of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 12: 55,1982, p. 56. 
44. Ibrahim Ibrahim 'Islamic revival in Egypt and Greater Syria" in Cyriac K. Pullapilly (ed) Islas in 
the Contemporary World, 1980, p. 163. 
45. Nasser was unable to bring about reform in Egyptian family and personal status codes. Any such 
reform would have substantially reduced the influence of Shari'ah rules, and light have been regarded 
as a threat to the Muslim basis of the Egyptian state. 
R. Humphreys 'Islam and political values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria" in Michael Curtis (ed) 
Religion and Politics in the Middle East, 1981, pp. 287-306. 
Such reform came only in 1979, when very limited amendments to the law of personal status in Egypt 
were confirmed by the National Assembly. 
Aziza Hussein 'Recently approved amendments to Egypt's law on personal status" in Michael Curtis (ed) Reli to n and Politics in the Middle East, 1981, pp125-128. 46. Syria, the secular Ba' thist government has avoided recognising Islas as the state religion, though it has not attempted to reform the . Shari'ah-based personal status code of 1953. The Constitution of 1973 merely identifies Shari'ah as a principal source of legislation and provides that the head of state should be a Muslim. Some claimed that the riots which followed publication / ... 
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faced opposition when they sought to reduce the role of Islam. As we 
saw, Nasser attempted to minimise the effect of opposition organised on 
Islamic grounds, and under Sadat in the seventies, the continuing 
influence of modernisation could be seen in the debates on the drafting 
of the 1971 Constitution. " 
This brief review clearly indicates the impact of the ideological context 
on the constitutional framework, both in terms of legislation and of 
organs. As far as the legal order is concerned, the stamp of ideology 
finds its place in the early statements of the new political order, as well 
as constitutional declarations and Constitutions. 
As we saw in the Constitutions, so almost all other legislation is 
inspired by this ideology. Organs too, from the Supreme Court to the 
ordinary judiciary find themselves called upon to interpret phrases such 
as "socialist aspirations", which cannot be understood within the 
classical jurisprudence of terms such as public order, since the gap 
between the political legislator and the judiciary is expressed in 
different languages as a result of the interference of these ideologies. 
As we will see, for example, in the judgement of the Libyan Supreme 
Court with regard to the Election Law, the judiciary understood the 
"democratic life of the nation" within the classical jurisprudence, quite 
differently from the political legislator, who has a revolutionary 
definition of democracy. 
Since all these governments retain the role of legislator as well as 
executive, they bring laws to protect the new political order, for 
example, the Law for the Protection of the Revolution in Libya, and 
frame other legislation within the ideological context, for example, the 
Law for the Reformation of the Legal System in Iraq. "' 
of the draft constitution of 1973 were directed against its 'irreligiousness', but they brought 
about no significant change in the secular Constitution adopted by the Syrian government in that year. 
47. All agreed that Islas should be named as the state religion and that Shari'ah should be in some 
way a basis of legislation. The practical role of the Shari'ah was debated, with some saying that legislation should be drafted simply in its spirit, while others argued that it should be strictly 
adhered to as the only source of legislation. 
The comment of one of the drafting committee of the new constitution was that by the Shari'ah 
we should understand not the whole corpus of medieval jurisprudence but only the Duran and the 
authentic teaching of the Prophet ... 
this approach was fu ly in accord with the best and most ancient 
practice, for if one examined the conduct of the first generation of Muslims, it was plain that they 
were guided not by blind adherence to fixed rules but by their sense of how best to serve the public 
welfare. ' 
In the event, the Egyptian Constitution stipulated, in article 2, that the principles of Shari'ah 
constitute a primary source of law. 
48. This Law sets forth the foundations for and objectives of reform in the spheres of economic, 
commercial, civil, administrative, political and penal legislation. It also specifies the means for 
the reform and its stages. 
S. H. Amin Middle East legal systems, 1987, pp. 193f. 
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The constitutional background naturally reflects the transition from 
colonial control or influence through semi-independence to full 
independence. Thus a condition of constitutional difficulty will be seen 
in the following examination, since the emergent states within each 
tendency are well characterized either by a static order which 
represents the traditional political thought without adjustment, or by an 
unstable order, with frequent suspension or breakdown of constitutional 
processes, the continual replacement of new constitutions and finally by 
the institutionalization of state of emergency in more than one Arab 
country. 
Therefore, it is essential, as a background to assessing the efficacy of 
the emerging legal order in protecting the rule of law and individual 
liberties to examine the different legislators' approach. Its efficacy will 
depend essentially upon the degree to which these States' institutions 
are able to use the powers conferred upon them by legislation, to bring 
about stable and effective reform, and so it is also important briefly to 
review the role of the judiciary in assimilating radical principles and 
institutions to the emerging states, their response to the validity and 
efficacy of these Constitutions especially in the transitional periods and 
times of political change. This analysis of constitutional developments 
should enable us to have an overall view of the new political structures 
and the main boundaries of the emerging legal order in the Arab region. 
This view must remain rather approximate in this section, as the 
evaluation of these principles and institutions will depend on other 
stages of analysis in several other parts of this Chapter and the next. 
The emergence of the constitutional order in the Arab world in the 
mid-twentieth century illustrates classic examples of the establishment of 
Constitutions : at the creation of a new state, for example, Saudi Arabia; 
at the achievement of independence, for example, Morocco and Tunisia; 
and by revolution, for example, Egypt. The mechanism of creation of the 
new constitutional order is determined by the nature of the constituent 
power which originates the Constitution. The monarchical method creates 
a constitution which represents the "contract" between ruler and ruled, 
while democratic methods are through constitutional referendum, 19 
based, for example, on French practice, or the work of a constituent 
assembly, 6°a method based on the American Convention. 
49. The Constitution of the United Arab Republic was adopted by this method. It was originally to be 
created by a governmental committee, but its draft was rejected by the Egyptian leaders on the grounds 
that "it does not respond to revolutionary calls and objectives, in eliminating imperialism, feudalism 
and monopolies". A second committee to draft 'a new constitutional project within the scope of the 
objectives of the revolution' was agreed by the Revolutionary Command Council and the Cabinet. It was 
adopted by referendum in June 1956. 
50. This method was adopted by Jordan in framing the Constitutions of 1946 and 1952, by Syria in 1950 
and by Kuwait in 1962 as well as by Tunisia in 1959, as we will see. 
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The mechanism of constitutional referendum allows the people to 
participate directly in confirming the prevalent legal idea of their 
society, while the constituent assembly allows the people's 
representatives to take part in the creation of the Constitution itself. 
For the referendum to represent the legal idea, the Constitution should 
be presented to the people, and the referendum conducted according to 
certain conditions. "' Examples of each type may be found in the recent 
constitutional history of the Arab world. 
Theoretically, it seems that most Arab Constitutions have adopted the 
method either of constituent assembly or people's referendum, and in 
some cases both, 52 as we will see. Apart from the Egyptian Constitution 
of 1923, the Iraqi of 1925 and the Lebanese of 1926, which were created 
by treaties or with external interference, 63 as we saw in the previous 
chapter, the Sa'udi Kingdom, remains the only Arab country which 
cannot be characterised by any such formula. 
While the theocratic monarchy64 of Saudi Arabia lacks a formal 
Constitution, it is often asserted that the Qur'an and Sunnah along 
with the consensus of the four Caliphs act in its place. "" Constitutional 
principles drawn from these sources were expressed in positive form in 
1926 in the Basic Law of the Hijaz, sometimes called the Constitution of 
Hijaz. It establishes a consultative monarchy and centralises all power in 
the King, whose activity is regulated by Shari'ah, 5° as interpreted by 
the Ulama, who provide interpretative fatwa on external and internal 
affairs of state. s' The King's actions are also regulated by consultation 
with the Majlis al-Shura. 
51. Firstly, that it should take place in a society of some political maturity, where several views of 
the Constitution may be discussed, (though, as we will see, this qualification should not be 
stringently applied so as to delay the establishment of the constitutional order); secondly, that it 
should take place in conditions of complete freedom; and thirdly, that the subject of the referendum 
should be a Constitution or specific legal idea. 
52. The Ba'th Arab Socialist Party seized power by coup d'etat in 1963. The provisional Constitution 
adopted in April 1964 was suspended in February 1966 by the regional command of the Ba'th party. The 
new provisional Constitution of May 1969 was amended in 1971 after a military coup in which the 
present regime case to power. The present constitution was brought into force by a Presidential decree 
of 14th March 1973, a national referendum having taken place three days before the Constitution had 
been drafted by a People's Council, whose members had been selected by the President. 
States of emergency : their impact on human rights A study prepared by the International Commission of 
Jurists, 1983 P. 
M. 
53. For example, in Iraq, King Faisal I governed under the Constitution of 1924, which is connected to 
the British colonial period when a series of constitutional proposals, based on the New Zealand and 
Australian constitutions proposed by a British Commission), and the Turkish and Japanese 
constitutions (proposed by the Iraqis) had been rejected. Some regard it as the 'grant' of the 
British, rather than expressing the will of the Iraqi people, while others describe it as the work of 
the constitutional assembly. 
Ismail Mirza [Political science and principles of constitutional law], 1960, p. 89-110 54. Islas has continued to provide the ideological basis for the ruling family and provides its legitimacY. 
John L. Esposito Islam and Politics, 1985, pp. 100-111. 
55. Aharon Layish "'Ulama and politics in Saudi Arabia" in Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, Islam and 
politics in 
part 
the 
II, article e 5, , 
Middle 
of 
East 
the , 
1994. 
56. 
. 
In "The entire administration of the Kingdom of the Hijaz Basic Law, 
shall be in the hands of His Majesty King Abd-el-Aziz the Ist, Ibn Abd-el-Rahean A1-Faisal 41-Saud. 
His Majesty is bound by the Shari'a lams. * 
57. For an examination of the role of the Ulama in legal and political life in Saudi Arabia, see 
Aharon Layish " Ulama and politics in Saudi Arabia" in Metin Neper and Raphael Israeli, Islas and 
politics in the modern Middle East, 1984. 
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This body comprises several parliamentary elements, though its members are 
appointed by the King. 
Aspects of constitutional reform occurred in the 1950s, when the Council of 
Ministers, formerly an advisory organ, was granted legislative and executive 
powers by Royal Decree, S° and in the 1960s, when a draft organic law was 
prepared, based on Islamic principles. Internal and external pressure also 
led to a proposal for the creation of a more democratic version of the Majlls 
al-. Sh ura, 6° which was rejected. When Faisal came to power in 1962, he 
announced a ten-point programme of government, 60 partially in response to 
the creation of the republican regime in North Yemen, though his proposals 
for constitutional reform were not adopted, Again, in December 1979, the 
preparation of a basic law creating a consultative council was announced, 
along with the drafting of a Constitution, which did not take place, although 
a constitutional committee was set up in 1980 to prepare a fundamental 
law, "' 
In the absence of a formal Constitution, sovereignty in Saudi Arabia is 
vested in the . Shari'ah, and succession to the throne of the Kingdom is 
according to custom, with the consent of the Ulama and senior princes, 62 
and allegiance to the King sworn in the act of bay'a, as in the Moroccan 
monarchy. In the absence of any conventional constitutional life no national 
assembly or parliament in the classical sense has ever been created as in 
other traditional monarchies or Emirates. " 
58. 'The Council of Ministers shall draw up the policy of the State, internal and external, financial and 
economic, educational and defence, and in all public affairs; and shall supervise its execution; and shall have legislative authority, and executive authority and administrative authority. ., and 
international 
treaties and agreements shall not be regarded as effective, except after its approval. Article 18 of Royal 
Decree no. 380, embodying the new Statute of the Council of Ministers of May 1958. 
See : C. Harrington 'The Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers' Middle East Journal, 12,1958, pp. 1-19; H. St 
John 8. Philby 'Saudi Arabia, the new statute of the Council of Ministers' Middle East Journal, 12,1958, 
pp. 318-323. 
59. A Najlis al-Watani (National Council) was proposed, which would be subject to dissolution by the King, 
and of whose members, only one third would be royal appointees. 
60. These included enactment of a basic law setting up a consultative council with legislative power, 
regulating its relations with the authorities, and ensuring rights within the framework of Shari'ah. 
61. Aharon Layish " Ulama and politics in Saudi Arabia' Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, Islas and politics in the modern Middle East, 1984. 
62. As in 1964, King Saud ibn al-Aziz was removed from office after 12 years, when the council of senior 
princes, Ulaua and officials demanded the resignation of the King, on grounds of the Islamic legal principle 
of 'public interest'. He was succeeded by his brother Faisal who ruled until 1975. 
63. In 1971, the federation of six shaykhdoss of the Gulf 
forced the United Arab Emirates, whose President 
is the Asir of Abu Dhabi, and Vice-President the asir of Dubai. They comprise Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Shar4a 
Ajoan, Una al-Qaywayn, Fujayra, Ras al-Khaywa. Its highest Executive body is the Supreme Council, which 
consists of the rulers of each emirate, who exercise one vote each, according to article 46 of the Provisional Federal Constitution of the United Arab Emirates. Below it is the Council of Ministers, 
established by article 55, consisting of a Prime Minister, his deputy and a number of ministers, the total 
not exceeding fourteen members, which administers each emirate. 
Article 68 of the provisional Federal Constitution establishes a federal National Council, consisting of forty delegates nominated by the ruler of each emirate. Abu Dhabi and Dubai have 8 seats each, Sharja and Ras al-Khayea 6 each and the remaining emirates, 4 each. Its power is limited to considering legislation 
prepared by the Council. For example, it is presently considering a draft federal Criminal Code. Shari'ah is the gain source of le slation in the United Arab Emirates, accordin to the provisional Constitution, 
article 7, and article 
1i 
stipulates that the United Arab Emirates is an Islamic state, See E. Nakleh 'Poli icol participation and constitutional experiments in the Arabian Gulf : Bahrain and Qatar' in T. Niblock 
ted) 
Social and economic development in the Arab Gulf, 1980, pp. 161-76. 
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Since there are no parliamentary assemblies, political parties, or trade 
unions, traditional channels of tribal authority remain the prime 
mechanism0 4 through which citizens may exercise their political 
aspirations, as Saudi plans for a consultative assembly in the last three 
decades have not come to pass. One can say that the Saudi monarchs 
have maintained close and stable relations with the Ulama and other 
elements of the religious establishment, and they have been careful to 
consult with and establish a basic agreement with them not only on 
religious matters but also internal and external political issues that 
require or benefit from religious sanction, in contrast with several other 
Arab orders. 
In contrast with the Saudi system, which lacks a formal constitutional 
framework, the Maghrib countries of Tunisia, Morocco and Libya took a 
constitutional path at independence in establishing what has become 
their contemporary legal framework, apart from the latter which was 
changed by the revolution of 1969. Before examining the constitutional 
development of the Maghrib, it is worthwile to point out again the 
international dimension and its role in the creation of the constitutional 
order, which can be seen, for example, in the treaties between Britain 
and Iraq in 1922, "11 and with Egypt in 1936, and the French with 
Lebanon in 1926.06 In the early fifties, the Tunisians brought to the 
attention of the United Nations Security Council a dispute between 
France and themselves concerning negotiations on Tunisian 
independence. After some difficulties, 87 the French were pressurised 
into holding negotiations with Tunisian nationalist representatives, which 
culminated in the Franco-Tunisian Protocol of March 20th 1956, °B in 
which France recognised the independence of Tunisia. 
Morocco was the first of the former French colonies to become 
independent in 1956, and Muhammad V° ° announced that a Constitution' ° 
64. Centres of power in the Kingdom include : the Royal Court; heads of major tribes; businessmen; the 
professional elite of technocrats and the military. Layish comments that it is not clear whether the Ulaia holds more effective power than the tribal leaders. 
Aharon Layish "'Ulasa and politics in Saudi Arabia" Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, Islas and 
politics in the modern Middle East, 1984. 
65. In the first of these, in article 3, King Faisal declared that his government intended to 
promulgate a Constitution, which remained until the revolution of 1958. Its background was briefly 
examined in Chapter 2. 
66. Like the British in Iraq, the French provided the draft of the Lebanese Constitution of 1926. 
67. The Tunisian Prime Minister's attempt of January 1952 to bring about the intervention of the Security Council was unsuccessful, as was the action in April 1952 of eleven members of the United 
Nations to bring the question before the Security Council. A further attempt by thirteen member states 
was successful however, and on 13th December 1952, a resolution called upon France and Tunisia to 
negotiate to bring their dispute to an end. 
68. The text may be found in American Journal of International Law 51,1957, pp. 683-684. 
69. For an examination of the constitutional role of the Moroccan king prior to independence see : I. 
William Zart. an "The King in Moroccan constitutional law" Muslim World, 52, pts. 2d3,1962. For 
eneral historical background see, Douglas Ashford, Political change in Morocco, 1962. 
0. Muhammad V established a commission of jurists, theologians and political representatives to draft 
a Constitution to replace the Royal Charter, though this body was dissolved in 1961 without 
accomplishing its task. On the accession of Hasan II, a constitutional committee, composed principally 
of foreign jurists, was established to draft the Constitution eventually presented in November 1962, 
less than one month before the referendum of 7th December. 
"The New Constitution of Morocco" in Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists, 16,1963, 
pp. 28-37. 
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would be drawn up in 1962 to replace the Royal Charter of 1958. " The 
campaign which preceded the constitutional referendum of December 1962 
raises the question of the King's decision to put a Constitution before the 
Moroccan population, in a referendum which, like similar French referenda, 
limited the scope of response to simple acceptance or rejection of the 
Constitution as presented. The opposition considered it was "imposed" on 
the population, since it had not been drafted by a constituent assembly. 
The King argued that no basis existed in law for the creation of such an 
assembly and, as an absolute monarch, he could not confer his power on 
such an organ, pointing out that the Moroccan Constitution was subject to 
referendum. ' 2 The King's argument, that he could not confer his power on a 
constituent assembly, is not borne out by events in Tunisia, where the 
beylical monarchy gave way to a republican regime, and the Constitution 
was drafted by just such a constituent assembly as the Moroccan king 
refused. Although the Constitution was subject to referendum, its draft was 
made available less than a month before the referendum, with the result 
that the campaigns which preceded it were largely unable to focus on its 
content. The Constitution of 1962 describes Morocco as "a constitutional, 
democratic and social monarchy". It has been pointed out that articles 2 and 
3 are drawn from articles 3 and 4 of the French Constitution of 1958, in 
that they provide that sovereignty shall be exercised by the nation "either 
directly through referendum or indirectly through constitutional 
institutions" and that political parties contribute to the representation of 
citizens in the government. French influence is noticeable elsewhere, and its 
tendency is to enhance the power of the Executive, in respect of the 
Cabinet, Prime Minister, " and Parliament° °, as well as by giving 
71. The Charter of 1958 set forth constitutional principles, such as separation of powers, responsibility of 
ministers, the election of a National Assembly, and uarantees of individual liberties, such as freedoms of 
speech, assembly and association, enacted in the 'Code of Public Rights' of November 1958. Dahirs dating from this period still regulate these freedoms in Morocco. Omar Bendourou, 'The Exercise of political rights in Morocco', Review of the International Commission of Jurists, no. 40 1988. 72. Willard A. Beling 'Some implications of the new constitutional monarchy in Morocco' in Middle East Journal vol. 18, pt. 2.1964, pp. 163-79. This article also contains an examination of the campaigns which preceded the referendum. 
73. Article 24 states that the King 'will appoint the Prize Minister and the Cabinet ... He may accept their resignations either on his own initiative, or as a result of an individual or group resignation. ' This 
provision is closer to the French Constitution of 1830 than that of 1958, in allowing the Head of State to dismiss a Minister on his own authority. Also similar to this Constitution is article 65 of the Moroccan one 
where it is stated that 'the government is responsible to the King and to the House of Representatives. ' Articles 80 and 81, which deal with the vote of confidence in the government, are also based on article 49 
of the French Constitution. 74. The predominant role of the King as the Executive may be seen clearly in the latter's relationship to the Parliament from the following articles. For example, according to article 27, the Kin may dissolve the House of Representatives, and articles 77-79, dealing with the circumstances in which Parliament may be dissolved, are similar to those of article 12 of the French Constitution. The power of the Parliament to legislate is strictly confined, according to article 48, while the Executive is empowered to make law by Dahir. Between parliamentary sessions the government may, according to article 58, legislate by Decrees, later submitted to Parliament for ratification. Article 47 gives the government, 'for a limited period and for a specific objective', the power to legislate by decree. This corresponds to 
article 44 of the 1972 Constitution. The King may return a law proposed and passed by the Parliament for 
revision, according to article 70, and any law may be submitted to public referendum by the King, article 72. If a bill rejected by Parliament is accepted by public referendum, the Parliament is dissolved, article 75. 
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scope to emergency powers. " s An important, and in the Arab world, 
unique provision is found in article 3: "There shall be no single party 
government in Morocco". The Constitution makes the King the Head of 
State, Chief Executive, Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces, and 
above all, Amir al-Mouniinine (Commander of the Faithful). 
Constitutionally, the period following independence was unstable, as the 
King tried to respond to political change by adjusting the constitutional 
framework, °a until the promulgation of the present Constitution in 1972, 
which embodies many of the features of the 1962 Constitution. 
The process of return to constitutional life in Tunisia" did not begin 
until 1956, when a Constituent Assembly was elected to draft a new 
Constitution, ' ° although it was not until June 1959 that the Assembly 
approved the first Constitution of independent Tunisia. In July 1957, the 
Republic was proclaimed by a resolution of the Constituent Assembly. ' Q 
It is worth pointing out that the National Constituent Council, 8° created 
by the Beylical decree of 29 December 1955, provided that the election 
of its members should be by free, direct and secret ballot for Tunisians 
resident in Tunisia at the date of the final electoral lists, though the 
decree confined the right to vote to males. "' 
Like the Moroccan legislator, the Tunisian favoured a strong executive 
authority in the context of a presidential republican regime. 62 
75. Article 35 of the Constitution regulating the state of emergency though drawn from art. 16 of the 
French Constitution, goes further in empowering the King to declare a state of emergency when '. such 
events take place may jeopardize the functioning of constitutional institutions' : the French article, 
in contrast, specifies-Eiia1heir functioning should have been interrupted in fact. The Moroccan art. 
requires "consultation with the leaders of both Chambers", while the French requires consultation with 
the Constitutional Council. Like the French article, the Moroccan specifies the aim of the King's oust be to "ensure a return to the normal exercise of constitutional institutitions". The French text 
stipulates that its aim oust be 'to ensure to the constitutional governmental authorities, in the 
shortest possible time, the means of fulfilling the functions assigned to them". 76. In June 1965, the King responded to increasing discontent and instability, as political parties 
called for democratic elections and the formation of a government by the party with a parliamentary 
majority, by declaring a State of Emergency, suspending the Constitution and assuming all legislative 
and executive powers for five years. In August 1970, a new Constitution was promulgated by elections 
to a new single chamber parliament. The two major parties in Morocco, IstiglaI and the Union National 
des Forces Populaires (UNFP) boycotted both the constitutional referendum and the elections, as they 
had done in 1962. Efforts for reconciliation were unsuccessful, leading to the promulgation of a third Constitution in less than twelve years, in 1972. 77. Tunisia had long been a beylical monarchy, under the Constitution of 1861, which was suspended in 1864. In 1934, the bey met with the Destourian (Constitutional) party, who demanded a return to the 
constitutional system. 
78. Ismail Mirza [Constitutional law: a comparative study of the Libyan Constitution and those of 
other Arab countries], 1969 pp. 130-131. 79. "Nous, Deputes de la Nation Tunisienne, seabres de I'Assemblee Nationale Constituante ... prenons, au nom du peuple, la decision suivante ... nous 
declarons la regime monarchique totaleient aboli; nous 
proclaaons que Ia Tunisie est un Etat Republicain ... . Resolution of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly Proclaisiny the Republic July 25th 1957. Muhammad Khalil The Arab states and the Arab League ... , 1962, p. 448. 80. The National Constituent Council formed several Committees which drafted the Constitution, before 
it was accepted unanimously. 
81. Official Gazette, 104 of 30th December 1955, p. 2493f. 
82. During the drafting of the Constitution, the Chief Rapporteur of the Constituent Assembly 
emphasised its intention of establishing a genuine regime to abolish anarchy and overcome difficulty, 
while safeguarding the freedoms and rights of citizens. In the light of this intention, he stressed, 
the assembly had chosen a strong executive "in order that responsibilities shall not be dispersed and 
authority scattered. A strong executive authority is the primary guarantee of individual and group 
liberties, the best security of their rights ... . George N. Sfeir "The Tunisian Constitution" in Middle East Journal, 13 pt. 4,1959. 
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The Constitution confirms the establishment of the republic in the 
Preamble8 3 which also describes the system of government as "une 
democratie fondee sur la souverainete du peuple et caracterisee par un 
regime politique stable base sur la separation de pouvoirs". 
Although the Constitution provides for the establishment of a single 
legislative organ, the National Assembly, which "exerce le pouvoir 
legislatif", as in the Moroccan Constitution, the President may legislate 
by decree "pendant an delai limite et en vue d'un objectif determine" at 
the end of which the decrees must be submitted to the Assembly for 
approval, 84 and in emergency situations, "en cas de peril imminent 
menacant les institutions de la Republique ... et entravant 
le 
fonctionnement normal des pouvoirs publics", when the President may 
take extraordinary measures on his own initiative, on which he must 
later report to the Assembly, (article 32). Unlike the Moroccan 
Constitution, the President in Tunisia may act without consulting the 
Head of the Legislature, but like the French Constitution, which clearly 
influenced the scope of the article, an interruption of the normal 
functioning of organs of government may lead to the adoption of 
exceptional presidential powers. 
The Constitution balances the strength of the Executive authority with 
provisions which secure individual rights (Part One, articles 5-17), and 
safeguards democracy through establishing the mechanism of 
government, for example, by providing that both President and 
National 
Assembly are chosen by free, direct and secret ballot (articles 40 and 
19), and by subjecting important functions of the Executive such as 
general government policy, the budget, declaration of war, peace-making 
and treaty-making to the supervision of the National Assembly 
(articles 
33-36,49). Part Three, which deals with the Executive Authority, defines 
the scope of executive action and Part Four safeguards the 
independence of the judiciary. The Tunisian Constitution does not 
empower the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of legislation 
or create a constitutional organ, °6 but instead provides for the 
legislative supremacy of parliament, although it provides for a Council of 
State, one of whose functions is : "une juridiction administrative 
connaissant des litiges entre les particuliers d'une part et 1'Etat ou les 
collectivites publiques d'autre et des recours pour esces de pouvoir" 
(article 57). 
83. The Preamble also describes 'le regne republicain' as "Id ieilleure garantie pour le respect des 
droits de I'Houue et pour le maintien de 11egalite, au regard des droits et des devoirs, de tons les 
citoyens ... 
' 
84. Similarly, when the Assembly is in recess, the President may enact decrees which are likewise 
submitted to the Assembly for approval (article 31). 
85. Unlike the Moroccan Constitution of 1962, which envisaged the creation of a constitutional body 
within the Supreme Court, to rule upon the constitutionality of certain laws and other measures along 
with supervisinj the legality of electoral procedure. 
"The New Constitution of Morocco" in Bulletin of International Commission of Jurists, 16,1963, p. 32. 
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This brief review of the constitutional route to independence followed 
by two former French colonies of North Africa indicates both the 
influence of French legal culture and the concerns of developing nations 
to reconcile the needs of development with the need for legal reform. 
Although this led to different forms of government, the Tunisian and 
Moroccan Constitutions both lay great emphasis on the necessity of a 
strong executive, with several provisions enhancing executive power 
drawn from the Gaullist Constitution of 1958. This phenomenon is common 
to other African countries, particularly Francophone states, where the 
concern for development led to the enhancing of executive power : 
"their principal concern was ... 
the establishment of a strong executive 
as the pivotal constitutional instrument, and such regulation of its 
relation with the legislative body as to endow it with a 
dynamic power 
of change". $" 
Features of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic which found 
their way into the two Constitutions we have examined comprise several 
which enhance executive power to varying degrees : 
the possibility of 
appeal to the people and to the Constitutional Council against 
decisions 
of the legislature in the Moroccan Constitution; the exceptional powers 
available to the Head of State in case of emergency 
in both 
Constitutions; certain restrictions on the law-making scope of 
the 
legislative body and exercise of control over government, again, 
in both 
Constitutions. Each Constitution also stresses legal principles and gives 
characteristic weight to individual liberties. 87 
A third North African state which followed a constitutional route 
to 
independence also illustrates the international dimension 
in 
decolonisation and its role in the creation of the constitutional order. 
The creation of Libya, "comprising Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the 
Fezzan, 
... an independent and sovereign state" was presided 
over by 
the United Nations. The creation of the first Constitution of 
the new 
state was set in motion by a UN resolution, e8 which provided that : 
"a 
Constitution for Libya, including the form of the government, shall be 
determined by the representatives of the inhabitants of Cyrenaica, 
Tripolitania and the Fezzan meeting and consulting together in a 
National Assembly", with the assistance of a UN Commissioner8" and 
Council. 10 
86. Ernest Hamburger 'Constitutional thought and aims in former French Africa" in Social Research, 28, 
1961. 
87. The Constitutions, drafted in the late 1950s and early 1960s, could hardly fail to incorporate the 
spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 
in 1949. 
98. UN General AssemblY Resolution 299 (IV A) of 21st November 1949. 
89. Article 4 of the Resolution provides that : "for the purpose of assisting the people of Libya in 
the formation of the Constitution and the establishment of an independent government, there shall be a 
United Nations Commissioner in Libya appointed by the general Asse. bly and a Council to aid and advise 
him". 
90. The Council consisted of ten members, namely . "(a) one representative nominated by the Government 
of each of the following countries Egypt, France, 
Italy, Pa istan, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 
America; /b) one representative of the people of 
each of the three regions of Libya and one representative of 
the minorities in Libya ... 
". 
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The Federal Constitution of Libya of 1951 described the United Kingdom of 
Libya as federal and its system of government as representative, (article 
2). It represents the only lasting central confederation in the contemporary 
Arab legal order, (with the exception of the United Arab Emirates9') with 
the State becoming "The Kingdom of Libya"" Z in 1963.113 
The Federal Constitution also described Libya as an hereditary monarchy, 
its form as federal and its system of government as representative, (article 
2). Chapter Two enumerates the rights of the people in thirty five articles 
and Chapter Three sets out the powers of the government. Article 36 lists 
the matters in respect of which the federal government exercises legislative 
and executive powers, including matters relating to war and peace, treaties 
and martial law. Chapter Four provides, in article 40, that sovereignty is 
vested in the nation, in article 41, that legislative power be exercised by 
the King in conjunction with the Parliament, in article 42, that executive 
power be exercised by the king, and in article 43, that judicial power be 
exercised by the Supreme Court. 
Chapter Five of the Constitution sets out the powers of the King, the 
supreme head of the State, entrusted by the people with the sovereignty° " 
of the United Kingdom, who exercises his power through his ministers, with 
whom lies all responsibility. °6 As with the other Constitutions we have 
examined, article 64 allows the King to take special powers to legislate by 
decree when Parliament is not in session. 
Again, such measures must be submitted to Parliament at its first meeting. 
According to article 69, the King, like the other Heads of State we have 
seen, declares war, concludes peace and enters into treaties. He is also 
empowered to proclaim martial law and a state of emergency, though the 
Libyan Constitution provides a safeguard not present in the Moroccan or 
Tunisian texts, that the proclamation must be presented to Parliament to 
decide whether it should continue, (article 70). 
91. See footnote 62 above. 
92. The Libyan Kingdom Constitution. After amendment by Law No. 1 of 1963, Article 2 states : .. 
its nage 
is The Libyan Kingdom' 
93. The experiment of central federation has important implications for its participants, since states lose 
their international character in the new federal state. 
As we saw 1958 saw several attempts at Arab federation. The two republics of Egypt and Syria joined in the 
United Arab Republic, which was to have a presidential democratic system of government, in which executive 
authority was to be vested in the Head of State and legislative authority in one legislative assembly. The 
Union was to be open to all other Arab states, to join in union or federation. Despite the fact that Syria 
and Egypt were later joined by Iraq and Yemen in the United Arab Republic, the federation ended within a few 
years. 
In the same year, the Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan joined in the Arab Federation, though each 
state retained integral state entity, sovereignty and existing government. Like the United Arab Republic, 
the Arab Federation was open to other Arab states, but proved unsuccessful and short-lived, as basis 
withdrew from the federation later the same year. 
94. The 1963 amendment to the Federal Constitution provided, in article 40, that sovereignty was to God, 
entrusted to the nation, as the source of all powers. 95. According to articles 58-60 of the Federal Constitution. For a comprehensive examination of the Federal Constitution and its 1963 amendment, see Ismail Mir ?a (Constitutional law: a comparative study of the Lib an Constitution and those of other Arab countriesj, 1969. For the period after independence see also, Saladin Hassan Sury 'The political development of Libya 1952-1969 : institutions, policies and ideology' in J. A. Allan ed) Libya since independence, 1981. 
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As in Morocco, the King has the right to appoint and dismiss the Prime 
Minister and his cabinet from office, or accept their resignations, (article 
72). The seventh Chapter of the Constitution regulates the parliament and 
the eighth, the judiciary, where the independence of judges is upheld in 
article 142. This Chapter also provides for judicial review of 
constitutionality. °° 
The Libyan Constitution of 1951, like the 1962 Constitution of Morocco and 
the 1959 Constitution of Tunisia, is characterised by the concentration of 
wide powers in the hands of the King as Head of State, however, it contains 
in addition, a number of provisions safeguarding against the abuse of 
executive power not found in the other Constitutions. 
It is true that, at independence, the Arab legal order contained many 
legacies from the past as we have seen, and several deficiencies requiring 
urgent and uncompromising reform which nationalist regimes came in some 
countries to bring about. It is equally true, and perhaps more important, 
that in resolving these problems, reform went hand in hand with the need 
for legality. Continuing political change has naturally affected the stability 
of legal systems, in particular at the constitutional level, where the 
reconciliation of these two necessities faced by almost all new states today 
will determine true development, present and future. Charles Howard 
Mcllwain has perfectly expressed the legislators' dilemma : 
"We cannot get the needed redress of injustice and abuses without reform, 
and we can never make these reforms lasting and effective unless we 
reduce them to the orderly processes of law. "O7 
Even revolutionary reformers in the Arab world have been concerned to 
maintain a form of legality, seen in their Declarations and revolutionary 
Constitutions, though their concern tended more toward political legality, as 
we saw in their ideological emphases. 
Constitutional reform was one of the first problems to present itself to the 
new orders with, above all, that of adjusting their new principles and 
institutions to a specific set of circumstances and local conditions. By virtue 
of the decline in critical jurisprudence in most Arab countries, 
constitutional jurists were hesitant in their dilemma of accommodating the 
revolutionary demand for urgent reform and the observance of the principle 
of legality with its broad connotation. 
96. Article 152 provides that the King may refer 'important constitutional and legislative questions' to the 
Court for an opinion, in which it oust take into account the provisions of the Constitution. Article 153 
provides that : 'an appeal gay be lodged with the Supreme Court ... against any judgement by a provincial 
court in civil or criminal proceedings if such judgement included a decision in a dispute concerning the 
Constitution or the interpretation thereof. ' 
These articles were cancelled in the 1963 amendment of the 1951 Constitution, as we will see in the 
following section. 
97. Charles Howard Mcllwain, Constitutionalism : ancient and modern, 1947, p. 145 quoted in George N. Sfeir 
'The Tunisian Constitution' Middle East Journal, 13.4 1959, p. 447. 
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Thus, opinions among constitutional jurists reflect this difficulty, for 
example, in their assessment of the effect of the political change, whether 
it comes through revolution or coup d'etat, or change within the 
revolutionary context itself. 
Some consider that the revolution or coup d'etat revokes the Constitution 
automatically, without the need for explicit legislation. Abdul Hamid Metwalli 
argues that abolition of the Constitution happens automatically, provided the 
coup d'etat is directed against the previous political system. If the coup is 
directed against the corruption of the previous administration however, the 
result is not the same. Abolition of the Constitution requires an act of the 
legislature, or some positive statement by the authority that the 
Constitution is repealed. He argues that if the revolution is not against the 
political system, but only the corruption of the regime and its 
administration, the revolution does not cancel the Constitution immediately, 
giving as an example, the movement of 1952 in Belgium which deposed 
Leopold III, but did not lead to the abolition of the Belgian Constitution. - 
The Iraqi legislature took a similar stance after the revolution of 14 July 
1958, which did not immediately cancel the monarchical Constitution of 1925. 
In my view political change does not automatically cancel the Constitution, 
as it does not interrupt the legal idea, but represents only a change. Thus, 
the revolution of 1952 did not abolish the Egyptian Constitution of 1923. The 
fate of the Constitution rested on the will of the new power, and only on 
10th December 1952, did the leader of the armed forces declare, in the name 
of the Egyptian people, the abolition of the Constitution of 1923. Thus, 
during the period from July until the Constitutional Declaration of December, 
the 1923 Constitution remained in force, when not in contradiction with 
legislation brought by the new leadership. " 
Another example which demonstrates this approach, is the Libyan 
Constitutional Declaration of 1969, which in article 34, states that legislation 
in force will remain valid except when it conflicts with the rules set in 
the Constitutional Declaration, or with new laws promulgated by the new 
legislature. This Declaration, unlike the initial Declaration of the Free 
Officers in Egy pt, ' oo established "a free self-governing republic ... 
the 
Libyan Arab Republic". 
In Egypt in February 1953, the Constitutional Proclamation established a 
government for a three year transitional period and confirmed that the 
Revolutionary Command Council maintained sovereign power and authority 
in the state. ' o' 
98. Abdul Hauid Metwalli [Constitutional law], 1956, p. 83f. 
99. Nuhauuad Kanal Layla [Constitutional law[, 1967 pQ. 199-501. 
100. The Egyptian monarchy was not abolished until July 1953, though Farouk was forced to abdicate in favour 
of his son soon after the coup in July 1952. 
101. Article 8 provides that ; 'The Commander of the Revolution Shall, in the Revolution Command Council, be 
entrusted with supreme sovereign powers ... as well as 
the right to appoint and dismiss Ministers'. 
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A new permanent Constitution was promulgated in 1956. This formula is 
common to Iraqi political change in 1963111 and 1964103, where again, 
the Revolutionary Command Council acted on its own authority in 
promulgating temporary Constitutions, but contrasts with Libya, where 
the Revolutionary Command Council, although possessing sovereign power 
and being the legislature, made the Constitutional Declaration in the 
name of the people, (article 18) and that authority would be exercised 
by the Command Council on their behalf. 
It is clear that the legal system is likely to be deeply affected by 
revolutionary change and so, in this section, the focus is on the 
position of legislation in the revolutionary transitional period in Libya. 
Even though the Libyan Constitutional Declaration does not contain an 
explicit text protecting human rights for example, one can say that 
rights are granted, the authorities are bound by law to protect them 
and may be held accountable for their violation. The legislature's 
intention in this respect may be drawn from four sources. Firstly, as we 
saw, the Declaration itself, in Article 34, stipulates that all laws and 
legislation prior to the Declaration will remain in force, except the 
revoked Constitution of 7 October 1951 and its amendments, (Article 33), 
and other legislation which conflicts with the rules set out in the 
Declaration, as well as other legislation which contradicts future 
Revolutionary Declarations. Secondly, the legislature authorized the 
judiciary, during the revolutionary transitional period, to take into 
account in its judgements the protection of human rights until 
promulgation of the permanent Constitution. '°4 The majority of jurists 
agree on the full competence and responsibility of the Libyan judiciary 
to protect human rights, and consider the constitutionality of laws which 
could undermine them in the transitional period, especially when, as 
Shukri argues, the legislator allowed by implication legislation and 
organs to operate in this period. l06 
Thirdly, the Libyan Supreme Court in 1970 adopted the same 
interpretation, sharing the view that the First Revolutionary Statement 
announced by the RCC on ist September 1969, revoked only the 
monarchy and its political institutions of 7 October 1951, and not the 
Constitution and its legal institutions. loe 
102. Article 19 of the temporary Iraqi Constitution of April 1963, states that this law is considered 
as constitutional law. 
103. Constitutional Declaration of 22nd April 1964. 
104. This authorisation is stated explicitly in Article 27 of the Constitutional Declaration which 
states that: the judicjary ... protect 
individual's rights, dignity and freedoms. " 
105. Muhammad Shukri 
ILectures 
in constitutional law] 1972-73 (Libya University Faculty of Law) 
p. 149f. 
106. Likewise, the Second Announcement refers only to the invalidity of all the political institutions 
under the monarchical system, such as the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. It goes on to 
confirm the Revolutionary Command Council as the only supreme authority in the Libyan Arab Republic. 
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The Court confirmed that the matter of abolishing the political 
institutions is entirely different from abolishing a law, on the ground 
that legislation in force was not repealed according to the Constitutional 
Declaration. Another conclusion which may be drawn from this case is 
that the Supreme Court itself, in examining the constitutionality of a 
law, was exercising its judicial control of constitutionality of legislation 
under prior legislation, the Supreme Court Law of 1954. '° 1 This confirms 
that both organs and legislation continued to function under the new 
constitutional order. 
Finally, since the Constitutional Declaration, in line with others, l°8 can 
be seen only as a temporary guideline""' in the transitional period for 
the establishment of the new order and organization of state 
institutions, hence, the question arises of the duration of this 
necessary transitional stage. Again, the Libyan Declaration, ll° stands 
silent in this matter, though an indication may be seen of the intention 
of promulgating a Constitution, from Article 27, which stipulates that : 
"This Declaration will remain in force until the permanent Constitution 
be promulgated". By implication, one can say that only when a new 
Constitution is promulgated will the transitional period be at an end. 
In Libya, in April 1973, the Head of the RCC called for the Abrogation 
of Laws", though this gesture did not go beyond a political 
declaration, and did not take any constitutional or other legal formula. 
In contrast, the legislature (the RCC) issued several acts and 
amendments to existing 
107. The Court considered that the Election law remained in force, as democratic life could not be imagined without elections and legislation which ould regul to thee. The Libyan Supreme Court judgement in case 
would 
if of 11 January 1970, The Supreme Court 
 agazine, the sixth year, the first second and thi d issue, April, 1970, pp. 42-43. 108. The Libyan Supreme Court judgement in case 
[No. 
1/12 J, of 11 January 1970], was based on its jurisdiction as a constitutional supreme court under Articles, 14,15 and 16 of Supreme Federation Court Law, which was promulgated by a royal Decree on the 10th of November 1953, and its Amendment by the 
royal Decree of 3rd November 1954. The Supreme Court magazine, the sixth year, the first, second and 
third issue, April, 1970, pp. 42-43. 
109. Like, for example, the Egyptian Constitutional Declaration issued by the RCC on 10th February 
1953, which states in its preamble that its intention is to stabilise the rules of governing during 
the transitional period, and to organise the ri hts and duties of all citizens, 
Muhammad Layla [Constitutional law], pp. 502-50 . and the Iraqi Constitutional Declaration of 27th July 19 8. 
Muhammad Shukri Lectures in constitutional law 1972-73 (Libya University Faculty of Law), p. 147f. 
110. In creating a "Progressive, Unifying, Democratic and national system', the legislature 
distinguished between the temporary and the permanent order in achieving the national and progressive 
revolution whose final goal is "freedom, socialism, unity". 
111. On 15 April 1973, the Head of the Revolutionary Council declared Five Points for the Continuation 
of the Revolution: the first was "To Abrogate All Laws ". According to the representative of the Revolution 'All laws at present should be cancelled while revolutionary work will continue to lay down 
new measures. The new measures will be based on laws which are compatible with what is actually taking 
place. This does not mean any threat to the life and security of the people. That will never happen because we are Moslems and apply the Islamic law. If you apply the law of God' it is impossible to 
wrong any person or threaten his security. Other points were: To Purge the Country of the Sick Persons; Freedom of the People; Revolution Against Bureaucracy; and The Cultural Revolution. 
C. Bezzina The Green Book : practice and commentary, 1979, pp. 62-65. 
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laws, such as the amendments to the Penal Code by Law No. 80 of 1975,1 12 
and the promulgation of additional laws in 1979 for economic offences, "' 
and in 1975 for trade unions (act no. 107/75). Legislation, in the form of 
acts, was promulgated in the years which followed, both on internal 
matters"' ` and at the international level. 1' 
Another major change in the Libyan order was the annouricement of 2nd 
March 1977, of the Establishment of the People's Authority, ' 1e from which 
again, one could draw several assumptions with regard to the validity of 
the Constitutional Declaration of 11th December 1969. As we see, though in 
this action of 1977, the Libyan political order took a new turn, theoretically, 
the principle of constitutionality was not ignored, but remained an 
important factor in legitimizing political decisions. Other aspects of the 
Declaration stress the continuing validity of the role of law, for example, 
even though popular direct authority is the basis of the political system, 
the fact remains that the people exercise this authority by law, which 
defines the function of people's organisations. ' 17 
112. These amendments, according to Amnesty International, introduced harsher punishments for offences 
against the external and internal security of the state as well as illegal political activities, and 
significantly increased the number of offences punishable by death. Amnesty International, Violations of Human Rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 20 November 1984, p. ll. 
113. These laws, for example, The Law of Economic Crimes such as damaging oil installations, public 
institutions and depots of basic commodities, which provided for the death penalty. Ibid. p. 11 114. For example, the Labour Act no. 58 of 1970, and Law no. 106 of 1973 (as amended by Act no. 53 of 1975), 
concerning health care. Social security was provided for the Libyan population by Act no. 11 of 1980. Other 
acts were promulgated concerning the personal and family status of women, such as Act no. 10 of 1984, and Act 
no. 15 of 1984. 
115. For example, Act no. 37 of 1976, by which Libya ratified its accession to some of the ILO Conventions. 
116. 'the Libyan Arab People 
..., 
in keeping with the first Declaration of the revolution ... guided 
by the 
principles set forth in ... the Constitutional Declaration 
issued on 2 Shawwal 1389 A. H. (corresponding to 
11th December 1969) .... believing in the objectives of the glorious revolution ... to establish a system of direct democracy ... which embodies the rule of the people over 
the land of the glorious revolution of Ist 
September and establishes the authority of the people, which is the only authority ... 
'. 
IN C. Bezzina The Green Book : practice and commentary, 1979, p. 66f. An brief examination of the structure of the Libyan congresses say be found in Jonathan Bearian Dadhafi's Libya, 1986, pp. 145-56. An examination of the Arab Socialist Uion in Libya may be found in Henry Habib Politics and government of revolutionary Libya, 1975. 
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We have seen how colonial policy aimed at the division of colonised 
society on religious, ethnic and linguistic grounds. This policy has 
enhanced the significance of minority groups in the contemporary legal 
and political order, with lasting implications. 
The aim of international legal protection of minorities 118 has 
undoubtedly shifted in approach from the protection of groups to the 
protection of individual rights, with the earlier focus on the rights of 
such groups to self-determination giving way in the new international 
legal order, after the achievement of independence by many former 
colonial territories, to a concentration on the principle of non- 
discrimination and encouragement of integration. 119 
118. The United Nations Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
formulated a definition of minority focusing on 'only those non-dominant groups in a population, which 
possess and wish to preserve stable ethnic, religious or linguistic traditions or characteristics, 
markedly different from those of the rest of the population'. Further, such minorities must be "loyal 
to the State". 
This formulation may be criticised on a number of grounds. Firstly, it is clear that minority status 
may be imposed on a group so that the will to preserve identity may then be the result and not the 
cause of minority status. Secondly, a non-dominant group may actually be a majority within the 
population. Colonial boundaries, as we saw, and the exploitation of religious and ethnic divisions, 
made tribes, for example, involuntary minorities throughout North Africa. Thirdly, the requirement of 
loyalty to the State is clearly inappropriate where a minority is the dominant group, like the ruling 
minority Alawi group in Syria, the Gathaftha tribe in Libya and the al-Saud family in Saudi Arabia. 
A more useful definition might provide that a minority is a group in a country which possesses, and 
has a common will (however conditioned) to preserve certain habits and patterns of life and behaviour 
which may be ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious or a combination of them, and which 
characterise it as a group. This definition is based on the understanding of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Greco-Bulgarian Communities Case (1930). Such a minority may be 
politically dominant or non-dominant. Another definition prepared by the Special Rapporteur for the Subcommission (in the Capotorti Report, 
1977) defines minority as : 'a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state in 
a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the state - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population, and show if only 
implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, traditional religion or 
language ". 
James Fawcett The International protection of minorities, Minority Rights Group Report, 1979 
119. The protection of minorities has long been the subject of international legal instruments, 
through treaties such as the Treaty of Berlin (1878). The Wilson-Miller Draft of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations sought to give expression to the protection of minorities, for example, "The League 
of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves, as a condition precedent to their 
recognition as independent or autonomous States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within 
their jurisdiction exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded 
to the racial or national majority of their people. " 
The Minorities treaties, concluded after World War One, contained common provisions, setting the 
standards for the protection of minorities, such as an "equal right to establish, manage and control, 
at their own expense, charitable, religious or social institutions schools or other educational 
establishments" and to have an "equitable share in public grants" 
for 
such purposes. The minority 
language was to be used freely and instruction in schools was to be conducted in the minority language 
in towns or districts where a considerable portion of nationals of the country whose mother tongue is 
not the official language reside. The Treaties placed the protection of minorities under League of 
Nations guarantee, and a number of countries, including Iraq, made declarations undertaking to protect 
their minorities on being admitted as members of the League of Nations. The next stage was the move to protection of minorities through the principle of non-discrimination 
and hence the process of integration, which was reflected in the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice, for example, in the Minority Schools in Albania case, which described the 
principle underlying the minorities treaties as securing for certain elements incorporated in a 
state, the population of which differs from them in race, language or religion, the possibility of living peacabIy alongside that population and cooperating amicably with it, while at the same time 
preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the majority and satisfying the ensuing 
special needs. " The Court also pointed out that additional measures may be required to secure 'equality in fact" : "Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind : whereas equality in fact 
may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an 
equilibrium between different situations. " 
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This is reflected in the human rights provisions of the United Nations 
Charter which emphasises the principle of non-discrimination, as does 
article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination goes 
further in setting the scope of protection of rights, by prohibiting 
racial discrimination, 1zo against "persons, groups of persons, or 
institutions", and it allows distinctions made between citizens and non- 
citizens. 12' In contrast, the Political Covenant, in article 27, provides 
explicitly for the protection of the interests of minorities, 122 although as 
with the other rights safeguarded by the Covenant, the rights are 
guaranteed to individuals rather than groups. This provision seeks to 
achieve the "equality in fact" mentioned in the opinion cited above. 
Thus, it can be said that international legal protection' z3 has moved 
from the protection of minorities through separation, expressed in the 
principle of self-determination, to integration, expressed through the 
principle of non-discrimination, with emphasis on the achievement of 
equality in fact, which may require special measures. Confirmation that 
the principle of non-discrimination has gained considerable ground in 
the international approach to the minority question is found in the 
establishment of the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, which has focused on discrimination in 
respect of specific rights, examining submissions from non-governmental 
organizations. 
It is undeniable that the minority issue has been and remains a factor 
contributing to the instability of the political order in the Middle 
East, 124 where cohesive minorities present a challenge to governments 
120. Which it describes as `any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, 
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, engagement or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life". 
121. This provision is accompanied by the requirement that provisions dealing with nationality, 
citizenship and naturalization should not discriminate against any particular nationality. 
122. A study of the implementation of article 27 of the Political Covenant was initiated by the 
Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and Special Rapporteur 
Francesco Capotorti submitted his report in 1977. Its conclusions, which included a recommendation for bilateral treaties between concerned parties, were adopted by the Subcommission. It further proposed 
that the Human Rights Commission draft a Declaration of Minority Rights, within the context of article 27. Though a Yugoslav draft declaration was used as a starting point, work on the declaration has not 
progressed far to date. The draft rejects the numeric criterion adopted in Capotorti's definition of 
minority and prescribes full equality with the rest of the population, and gives strong support to the 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs, through 'strict respect for sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence'. 
123. The International Labour Organisation has adopted a Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations (107/1957). It does not provide for their right to self-determination, since it describes 
their social and economic conditions as being at a less advanced stage than other parts of the 
national community, and their `status as regulated wholly or partly by their own customs or traditions 
or by special laws'. The aim of the Convention appears to be the "progressive integration into the 
life of their respective countries", according to article 1, although it provides that national integration must exclude 'artificial assimilation", according to article 2. 
124. R. D. McLaurin (ed) The political role of minority groups in the Middle East, 1979. 
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where the political order or government in power are fragile. Alienation 
has meant that group loyalties are often stronger than loyalty to the 
state, and so state policies must attract the support of minorities or 
minimise the effect of their opposition. In addition, minority groups are 
often associated with illegal changes of government, for example, 
following coups d'etat, ' Z6 while minority groups in power may modify 
the political and legal order itself. "" 
Minorities in the region12' fall into a number of categories - linguistic, 
religious and racial - and exist at a number of levels. They hold power 
in several states, are in revolt from the political order in some states 
and are subject to the process of assimilation in others. Clearly 
minorities may exist within the borders of nation-states, or, like the 
Kurds, Berbers and Armenians, form transnational minority groups. 
Besides these classical minority groupings, other groups in the region 
may be viewed as having minority status, such as political opposition 
and some professional groups. 
The approaches and policies of governments in the region to the 
minority question take a number of forms, sometimes conditioned by the 
nature of the real or perceived threat to the government itself, the 
political order or the integrity of the national territory. 
From 
governments which face the threat of secession by a minority 
to 
governments which face challenges from groups seeking a greater share 
of power in the state, policies vary according to the perceived threat. 
Where the minority question is acknowledged to exist, legal policies 
adopted by governments vary. Positive measures include the granting of 
limited autonomy within the national territory, or integration through a 
process of assimilation. More widespread are policies based on the 
belief 
that minority groups pose a threat to the government or political order. 
Measures taken include the restriction of political rights for members of 
the minority, in particular, of its leadership, and restrictions on 
expressions of minority identity. 
Extreme measures include violation of the civil rights of minority 
populations, mass deportations126 and even policies which amount to 
genocide. 12 
125. The minority Kurdish and Iraqi Communist groups participated in coups in Iraq during the early 
sixties. 
126. This is clear in the case of Syria, where for more than twenty years, the Alawi minority has 
controlled political power, and most aspects of domestic and foreign policy. 
127. The creation of minority groups in the region has been attributed to some extent to the policies 
of colonial rulers and the boundaries they left. For example, the present position of the Hashemi 
family in Jordan was largely as a result of British colonial policies in the Fertile Crescent, and 
colonial boundaries made the Berber population a transnational minority throughout North Africa, in 
Libya, Algeria and Morocco. Development too has created a large minority class of migrant workers 
within many Gulf states and elsewhere. These migrant groups comprise several categories, including 
other Arab nationals and non-Arabs. 
128. Migrant workers in particular are subject to mass deportations, often because of disputes between 
host governments and those of the countries of which migrant workers are nationals. 
129. Mass killings of political opponents have occurred in a number of countries, including Iraq, 
where the Kurdish minority is a target, according to 
Amnesty International. 
See, for example, Amnesty International Newsletter vol. xix, number 3 March 1989. 
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In some countries, the issue of minorities is not officially acknowledged 
by the government, who nevertheless adopt policies ranging from 
assimilation to suppression, sometimes in association with other 
governments. 13o 
A distinct category of minority in the region is that of the minority in 
power, 131 whose policies tend to focus on the retention of power, 
through the granting of positions in government, the armed forces and 
so on, and may affect the political order itself. 13 a The minority may 
base its power on political, military or economic superiority, or on 
religious or cultural identity. Some minority groups find themselves in 
power in traditional societies which, as we will see, have not adapted in 
response to change. For example, the political and legal order of Saudi 
Arabia has not changed to accommodate contemporary political ideas. 
While sectarian differences underlie aspects of the political and legal 
order in Syria, in Saudi Arabia, the ruling family of Sa'ud is sustained 
by a narrow interpretation of Islamic doctrine, which has led to political 
stagnation. 133 
130. For example, radical and conservative governments alike joined to oppose the candidature of the 
Arab Lawyers Union for consultative status within ECOSOC in 1987. A. Youssoufi "Human rights in Arab countries' Review of International Commission of Jurists, 39/87. 
131. Technically, the situation in Qatar and United Arab Emirates is that a minority government of 
nationals rules a population which contains a majority of aliens. Religious minorities in power have included the Maronites in Lebanon and the Alawis in Syria. 132. Since the fifties in Syria, power has been held by the Alawi sect, a minority religious group, 
whose rise to political power through the army and the Ba' th party during the fifties and sixties illustrates a phenomenon which can be seen elsewhere in the Arab world. Their rise to power began after the Druze revolt against the Shishakli government, when many Alawi joined the military and political parties. Military service offered an opportunity to the Alawi, who had gained key positions in the officer corps and the ranks, during the French mandate, since unlike the Sunni majority who did not cooperate with the French authorities, the Alawi were encouraged by the 
French policy of recruitment of minority groups, part of their wider policy of fragmenting opposition. The many coups d'etat in the fifties had depleted the officer corps of Sunnis, through purges and 
transfers, leaving the Alawi in key positions in the sixties. Both major political parties, the Bä th 
party and the Syrian Social National Party, who also recruited Alawis to their membership, saw the 
army as a way of securing power. The Alawi were attracted to secular parties, because of their 
religious minority status, though they did not support Nasser's appeal to pan-Arabiss. After the 
dissolution of the United Arab Republic, the position of the Syrian Socialist National Party was 
considerably weakened, leaving the Ba'th party as the most effective political channel for the Alawi. 
A detailed description of their rise to power may be found in Nikolaos van Dal, The struggle for 
power in Syria, 1979. See also, Patrick Seale The struggle for Syria, 1965; Robert W. Olson The Bath 
and Syria, 1982. 
Since in power, it is clear that the Alawis have consolidated their control of the Syrian 
administration and armed forces by Alawi appointments to key posts, and by purges of opposition. The aim of securing the position of the Alawi is also clear from legislative measures and 
administrative actions, particularly those directed against Sunni Muslim opposition. For example, 
membership of the Muslim Brotherhood is a capital crime in Syria, according to Decree No. 49 of July 1980 (which is retroactive) and Amnesty International have reported mass killings in the early 1980s. Amnesty International Yearbook 1982. 
Conflict of a sectarian nature surfaced at the promulgation of the new Constitution in 1973, when the failure to name Islas as state religion led to urban riots. The Constitution reflects a policy by the 
administration of diminishing the role of Islam in favour of secular socialism, and minimising the 
role of the Sunni Ulama. 
Peter 6ubser "Minorities in power : the Alawites of Syria" R. D. McLaurin (ed) The political role of 
minority groups in the Middle East, 1979. 
133. For example, political participation has not developed beyond tribal consultation, political 
parties and trade unions are prohibited, and there is no effective opposition to the ruling family. 
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Besides religious minorities in power, other countries in the region are 
led by minority groups of an ethnic nature. In Libya, for example, 
considerable power is exercised by the minority Qadhadfah tribe who 
have carried out Gadaffi's policies, whether these have adopted the tone 
of Arab nationalism or the "Third Universal Way". Another category of 
minority which undermines the stability of the political and legal order 
in the Middle East is that of the minority in revolt. The Kurds, the 
Saharawi' 3a and the South Sudanese"' 6 are among the most striking 
examples of minorities who are seeking separation from the existing 
political order. 
One of the largest minority groups in North Africa is the transnational 
Berber population, who live throughout Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco. 
134. In 1975, Morocco occupied the former territory of Spanish Sahara claiming it as part of Greater Morocco, although the United Nations and the International Court of Justice rejected the Moroccan 
claim, saying that it did not find any tie of territorial sovereignty' between Western Sahara and Morocco. Since 1976, the Polisario Front has conducted an armed campaign to reclaim the Saharawi Arab 
Democratic Republic, while its population has been largely confined to refugee camps inside Morocco 
and Algeria. The Republic was declared in 1976 and is now recognised by more than 70 countries, includin Al eria, which has in the past provided strong support. In 1988, the IJN called for a cease-fixe, which should be followed by a referendum, in which the 
population of the occupied territory would choose independence or integration with Morocco. Details of 
the referendum were disputed between the Polisario and the Moroccans. For example, the Moroccans 
insist that the Spanish census be used as the basis of electoral lists. The minority question in the West Sahara must be regarded as the creation of the Moroccan government. 
The decision to occupy Spanish Sahara followed a number of attempted army coups against the monarchy, 
and must be seen as a measure intended to divert the army from the political struggle, which reached 
its heights in the seventi s. While thirteen years of war have undoubtedly placed strains on the Moroccan national economy, (the construction of a 1000 Nile desert wall is estimated to have cost £ 500 million, and the cost of its defence is said to be £1 million a day) its claim to the territory, 
untenable in international law, is maintained for reasons of national policy. 
The latest position of the Moroccan government on the referendum illustrates classic elements of the 
minority issue, identified earlier. While the referendum offers the choice between separation and 
integration, the Moroccans have now suggested that integration might be achieved by the granting of 
limited autonomy within the Moroccan state or a future Maghreb federation. The issue of the Western Sahara is interesting for the light it sheds on the effects of the minority issue in the regional context. The changing attitudes of neighbouring states reflect the political use 
which can be made of the minority question by hostile or friendly governments. Algeria, for example, from the earliest stage a supporter of the Polisario Front and one of the first to recognise the 
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic provided military and political support throughout the war with Morocco. Since 1987, however, diplomatic contacts between the Algerian and Moroccan governments have 
suggested a shift in Algeria's position, and it may be that recent peace talks between Morocco and the Polisario leaders reflect this change. 
Although Libya has supported the Front, politically and militarily, against Morocco in the past, some 
contacts between the two governments have suggested that Libyan interest is in Making political use of the conflict. For example, the treaty of federation between Libya and Morocco of August 1984 was followed by a security agreement, according to which nationals of each state could be forcibly 
repatriated, perhaps to face political charges. The agreement, which led non-governmental 
organizations to voice concern, also banned all political activities 'against the other side". Amnesty International Yearbook, 1985. 
Such a treaty clearly undermines any support that the Libyan leader might give to the Front. It also illustrates the temporary nature of the support any Arab government may give to another state's 
political opponents, another form of minority group, as we have seen. Exiled members of Libyan 
opposition have been returned by Morocco to Libya, where they were executed. In 1983, for example, 'Uua al-Mahayshi, was executed in Libya after being deported from exile in Morocco. 
Amnesty International Yearbook, 1988. 
135. Sudan under Nimeiri sought secularization as a means of diffusing conflict between north and 
south, a strategy abandoned by the declaration of the Islamic state before his fall from power. 
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Where the government of a country acknowledges that the minority 
question exists, Berbers are the subject of official policies of 
assimilation. In other countries, however, governments deny that the 
Berbers constitute a distinct ethnic group, on the grounds that their 
populations are homogeneous. "" Policies of these governments too are 
based on assimilation. ' 37 There is little transnational political unity 
among the Berbers, ' 38 though within each of the countries they inhabit, 
Berbers have taken part in activities against the national 
governments. 139 
The influence of the Berbers in political life in North Africa, like that 
of any other group out of power is limited. Added to restrictions on 
political life in general, the Berber social structure means elections are 
dominated by the system of patronage and obligation, which can be seen 
elsewhere in the region, and which limits the independence and 
effectiveness of any candidate. 
136. The Moroccan government, for example, has said that Morocco's national unity has withstood many 
attempts to destroy it, 'attempts sometimes based an alleged differences of language or at least of 
dialect, and sometimes on imagined ethnic or at least geographical differences ... CCPR/C/10/Add. 2 of 19th February 1981, P. O. The Algerian government has said that its population is homogeneous, and that it has never conducted 
censuses based on ethnic origin, as this would be "contrary to the principles of Islam". The National 
Charter describes national policy as "strengthening the national personality and .. 
the collective 
identity of the people". 
CERD/C/158/Add. 2 of 3rd April 1987, p. 4. The National Charter states that the Algerian population is "not a collection of disparate people or 
a collection of disparate ethnic groups. The nation is the people itself seen as a historical entity, 
acting consciously in daily life and within a clearly defined territorial context with a view to 
carrying out, with all the citizens which comprise it, the communal task of a joint destiny and 
sharing the same trials and the same aspirations . 137. Throughout North Africa, Berbers are being assimilated into the Arab population. Their territorial dislocation began with forced relocation by the French, and the process has continued 
throughout North Africa as many Berbers, displaced from their traditional homes, sought employment in 
the new urban industries and abroad. Assimilation policies implemented by central governments continue 
the colonial policies of diminishing the role of traditional leaders by substituting government 
appointees, and weakening tribal ties, for example, by nationalising tribal lands. Another policy 
common to North African governments is Arabization, which stresses the Arabic language and Arabic 
culture. In Algeria, state policies indicate in addition, an attempt to weaken Berber culture, for 
example, by restricting Berber language broadcasts in 1971 and discontinuing the Berber Dialect Chair 
at the University of Algeria in 1973-4. The National Charter continues to stress the Arab and Islamic 
character of the Algerian nation, although sporadic Berber unrest indicates the dissatisfaction of this community. The interpretation of Berber unrest manifested, for example, in April 1980 after the 
banning of a conference on "Ancient Berber poetry" at the university of Tizi Ouzou, is controversial. 
The western media interpreted the unrest as expressing ethnic conflict between Arab and Berber, 
reflecting the traditional Orientalist view "the Kabyle myth', while the Algerian media blamed the 
unrest on external agitators, representing the forces of neo-colonialism. A more credible 
interpretation of the unrest, which was popular in character, is that it represents a response to the 
decreased margin of intellectual and cultural freedoms allowed by state socio-cultural programmes, 
such as Arabization. 
Rachid Tlemcani State and revolution in Algeria, 1986, pp. 198-203. 
Another policy is the promise of special development aid to Berber regions. While the Moroccans 
failed to fulfil these promises, the Algerians have included Berber areas, particularly the Kabyles, 
in their development plans, including schools, housing, roads and agricultural loans. Similarly, the 
Libyan government has included Tuaregs in development plans, Algerian assimilation has also led to 
Berbers being assijned a proportionate share in public service. 
William E. Hazen Minorities in assimilation : the Berbers of North Africa" in R. D. McLaurin (ed) The 
political role of minority groups in the Middle East, 1979. 
138. Berbers in Tunisia and Morocco supported the Algerian struggle against the French, though this 
was not an independent policy, as the Moroccan and Tunisian governments also supported the rebellion. 139. In Morocco, prominent Berbers were involved in an attempted coup, and many members of the 
Polisario Front are Berbers. In Algeria, Berbers were involved in resistance against Ben Bella in 1963 
and 1964. 
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The Kurds represent an ethnic and linguistic minority in five 
countries, l4o and Kurdish nationalism has grown during the twentieth 
century, since their case for independence was recognised by the Allied 
Powers after the First World War, during the Paris Peace Conference in 
1919, from which came the Treaty of Sevres (1920). 141 The Treaty, which 
did not come into force as a result of political change in Turkey, 
represents the nearest the Kurds have come to an independent state. 
This section is not a detailed study of the long and complicated 
struggles of the various Kurdish communities for autonomy or 
independence, but concentrates on the Iraqi Kurdish community, and 
the approach of the Iraqi legal order to the question, which was initially 
based on a policy of integration, 14 Z and the granting of limited 
autonomy, despite the failure of successive Kurdish leaders to make a 
coherent response to its legislative proposals. Ironically, the present 
Ba'th government in Iraq, while it has recognised Kurdish rights to a 
greater extent than other countries in the region, has found itself 
increasingly at conflict with the Kurds. 
Despite several changes of government in Iraq during this period, the 
Kurds were unable, in part because of continuing rivalry between 
nationalist leaders which prevented the establishment of a united front, 
to make any real steps toward autonomy. In 1970, the Bath government 
announced an agreement with the Kurdish Democratic Party, which 
provided for the first time, a large measure of autonomy for the Kurds. 
It provided for the amendment of the Iraqi legal order, to give explicit 
140. Significant communities of Kurds live in Turkey, Syria the Soviet Union, Iran and Iraq. 141. The treaty stated that a Commission composed of Allied appointees would 'prepare for lord] 
autonomy in those regions where the Kurdish element is preponderant, lying east of the Euphrates, to 
the south of the still-to-be established Armenian frontier, and to the north of the frontier between 
Turkey, Syria and Mesopotamia" (article 62). 
Article 64 states . 
if, after one year has elapsed since the implementation of the present 
treaty, the Kurdish population of the area designated in article 62 calls on the Council of the League 
of Nations and demonstrates that a majority of the population in these areas wishes to become 
independent of Turkey, and if the Council then estimates that the population in question is capable of 
such independence and recommends that it be granted, then Turkey agrees, as of now, to comply with 
this recommendation and to renounce all rights and titles to the area ... 
If and when, the said 
renunciation is made, no objection shall be raised by the main Allied powers should the Kurds living in that part of Kurdistan at present included in the vilayat of Mosul seek to become citizens of the 
newly independent Kurdish state. 
David MacDowall The Kurds, New ed., 1985, p. 11. 142. Before the Bath party came to power in Iraq for a second time in 1968, the Kurds had achieved a 
measure of recognition within the Iraqi Constitution of 1961, which stated that : The Kurds and Arabs 
are partners within this nation. The Constitution guarantees their rights within the framework of the Iraqi republic'. 
Despite this recognition and the achievement of ministerial office by a number of Kurds, war broke 
out late in 1961 between the Kurds and the Iraqi central government, and conflict continued 
sporadically until 1970. In June 1966, the civilian Prime Minister Bazzaz put forward a twelve-point 
pan. "A permanent Constitution will guarantee the equal rights and duties of Kurds and Arabs, (Point 1). This will be realised by a provisional law, which is to be promulgated on a decentralized basis'. 
Each province, district and sub-district will have its own elected council, exercising wide powers in 
education, health and other local affairs, Point 2). The Kurds will be represented in the national Council in a percentage proportionate to the whole population. Then they will have equal opportunity 
of taking public employment. Provision is made for Kurdish to be an official language, for 
scholarships being awarded to Kurds, and for a free Kurdish press. Compensation will be paid to the 
war victims and their families, and funds will be spent on reconstructing the Kurdish areas. " Bulletin of International Commission of Jurists, 31,1967 p. 39. 
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recognition of Kurdish nationality in the Constitution, ' 3 the 
participation of Kurds in government, 144 the recognition and promotion 
of Kurdish language and culture, economic development and agrarian 
reform within the Kurdish region, and most important from our point of 
view, the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region. ' 46 
The next opportunity for the Kurds to pursue their nationalist 
ambitions seemed to come with the outbreak of war between Iraq and 
Iran in 1980. Without examining the role of the Kurds in the nine-year 
struggle in detail, it must be said that the Kurdish minority became the 
instrument of interested powers, as they attempted to take advantage of 
the preoccupation of their governments to pursue a policy which now 
moved from demands for autonomy to demands for virtual separation. 14e 
Legislative measures undertaken by the Iraqi government illustrate a 
policy of integration, granting some degree of autonomy as an 
alternative to Kurdish independence. We have already seen some of the 
provisions of the 1970 autonomy agreement, partially implemented in 1974 
and the years which followed. One of the terms was the amendment of 
the Constitution to acknowledge the position of the Kurdish minority. 1 " 
Autonomy is granted to the Kurdish region in article 8 of the 
Constitution, l4e and it is regulated by other legislation such as 
Revolutionary Command Council Decision 288 of 11th March 1970, which 
143. The Constitution was to be amended to read : 'The Iraqi people consist of two main 
nationalities : the Arab and Kurdish nationalities'. 
144. It proposed a Kurdish vice-president and key ministerial positions for Kurds. 
145. The agreement, which was to be implemented within four years, was signed by Barzani, but splits 
within the Kurdish movement again prevented any progress. Although the government began unilateral 
implementation of parts of the agreement during the early 1970s, the Kurdish leadership again found 
itself in conflict with the Baghdad government. 
Points of dispute included the question of the Kurdish candidate for the Vice-Presidency, the 
question of the extent of the Kurdish area, and the demands of the Kurds for decentralisation, through 
economic resources and territorial independence. Conflict focused on the status of Kirkuk, desired by 
each side for its rich oil resources. Barzani accused the government of trying to change the 
demographic balance in the region by settling Arabs there, while the government offered to use the 
1965 or 1957 census. Bartani and the KDP insisted, after nationalisation, on a proportion of the oil 
revenue from Kirkuk. This was clearly unacceptable to the Iraqis. The KDP also suspected that the 
Iraqis would continue to intervene in Kurdish local affairs, while the Iraqis accused the KOP of 
wishing to form a state within a state. 
146. By 1983, when the Iraqi government was weakened by the continuing conflict, the Popular Union of 
Kurdistan had the opportunity to press once again for regional autonomy. The Iraqi government agreed 
to some Kurdish demands and agreed to discuss others in return for an end to hostilities in northern 
Iraq. The demands included : an extension of the autonomous region to include Kirkuk and other areas; 
an end to Arabization, the return of displaced Kurds to the Kurdish area and the removal of the "no- 
man's land'; clear autonomous powers save in respect of foreign affairs, economy and defence; members 
of the executive to be elected by the legislature; reconstruction of cultural life with Kurdish as 
official language; establishment of a Kurdish University at Sulaymaniya; constitution of pesh mergas 
as the force guaranteeing autonomy; security of the region to be regional rather than national 
responsibility; 30 X of oil revenue to be allocated to the development of Kurdistan. 
147. Article 5 of the current Constitution provides (a) Iraq is part of the Arab nation; (b) the 
Iraqi people consists of two main ethnic groups : Arabs and Kurds. This Constitution recognises the 
ethnic rights of the Kurdish people, as well as the legitimate rights of all minorities, within the 
framework of Iraqi unity '. 
148. These are : '(a) One of the vice-presidents of the Republic must be a Kurd; (b) In administrative 
units where the majority of the population is Kurdish, civil servants must be Kurds or proficient in 
the Kurdish language; (c) There must be no discrimination between Kurds and others in regard to access 
to public office, including key positions in the State such as ministers and army commands, subject to 
the requirements of competence. ' 
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contains general guidelines for autonomy. 149 
Act no. 33 of 11th March 1974, subsequently amended by RCC Decision 28 
of 20th September 1978, sets further principles on which Kurdish 
autonomy is based. '5° The region of Kurdistan enjoys autonomy, being 
regarded as a separate administrative unit, l 51 with distinct personality 
though remaining "within the framework of the legal, political and 
economic unity of the Republic of Iraq". 
With the exception of powers invested in the institutions of the 
Kurdish autonomous region, all authority is exercised by the central 
institutions of Iraq, and departments of the central authority within the 
region are subject to the jurisdiction of the ministries to which they 
belong, though autonomous institutions may report on such departments 
to the ministries concerned. The principal autonomous institutions are 
the Legislative Council lb2 and the Executive Council. 15 3 
149. The region remains an "inseparable part of the territory of Iraq" and 
its population "an integral 
part of the Iraqi people". The Act places the responsibility for safeguarding the rights and 
freedoms 
of the population of the autonomous region with the autonomous administration, 
in article 3. Arabs and 
minority groups are represented in autonomous institutions in numbers proportionate 
to their numbers 
in the region. It also regulates the position of the Kurdish language, regarded, along with 
Arabic, as 
an official language of the region and a language of education. 
150. The region in Nhich the majority of the population are Kurds shall enjoy autonomy 
in accordance 
with the provisions of the law". 
An English translation of Act no. 33 of 11th March 1974 is contained in CCPR/C/37/Add. 3 of 
18th July 
1986, p. 54f. 
151. The composition of the Legislative Council is regulated by Act no. 56 of 15th March 
1980. Its 
members are chosen by secret ballot in free and direct public elections, and each member of 
the 
Council represents the entire population of the autonomous region. A member of the Legislative 
Council 
may not also be a member of the National Assembly. Any citizen who meets the legal requirements may 
become a candidate for membership of the Council. 
It may adopt legislative measures, such as, those needed to develop the region within the general 
policy of the State; to develop the culture and traditions of the people of the region; concerning 
semi-official departments, institutions, and agencies of a local nature. It  ay also approve planning 
proposals prepared by the Executive Council dealing with socio-economic affairs, development projects, 
education, health and employment, in accordance with the central planning of the State. 
It may hold 
discussions with the Executive Council on matters within its own responsibility. It meets at 
Arbil, 
elects its officers by secret ballot and its term of office is 3 years. It holds 2 annual sessions, 
whose duration may be prolonged for a month by the President of the Republic or by a majority of 
members of the Council, where it considers legislative measures, which may be proposed by the 
Executive Council or 10 members of the Legislative Council. 
152. The Executive Council is accountable to members of the Legislative Council on matters within its 
scope, and the latter may propose a vote of no-confidence in the Executive Council or any of its 
members. The Council, which contains a president, vice president and members from each autonomous 
department, exercises a number of functions, which include : enforcement of laws, regulations and 
court orders; the administration of justice and preservation of security; the promulgation of 
decisions adopted by the Legislative Council. It also prepares draft plans for development in the 
autonomous region and supervises local public facilities and institutions. It is also responsible for 
the appointment of civil servants, where this does not require a presidential decree, administers the 
region's budget and prepares an annual report on the region, which is submitted to the President of 
the Republic and the Legislative Council. 
153. The president of the Executive Council of the autonomous region attends meetings of the Council 
of Ministers, and the secretaries-general of branches of autonomous administration may become members 
of the councils of ministries to which their branches are related. Supervision of the legal validity 
of decisions taken by autonomous institutions is exercised by a body established at the Iraqi Court of 
Cassation, consisting of the President of the Court and 4 members chosen by the Court from its 
members. Decisions taken by legislative institutions of the autonomous region are transmitted to the 
Minister of Justice, who may lodge an appeal against their validity with this special body. Such 
measures are suspended until the delivery of a judgement on its validity, which must be delivered 
within 30 days of the lodging of the appeal. Decisions 
found to be legally invalid are regarded as 
null and void. This procedure is distinct from that which. operates erates in Iraq as a whole where there is 
no special organ concerned with the constitutionality of laws, and the only mechanism seems to be 
through the National Assembly. 
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After this brief review of the emerging constitutional order in the Arab 
countries, the next section examines the legislatures' approach to the 
rule of law, and the principle of legality. An indication of the supremacy 
of principles of law, such as separation of powers and equality before 
the law as expressed in Arab Constitutions, may be drawn from articles 
which emphasis adherence to the rule of law as the basis of legality 154 
and stress the supremacy of law. lss Even states which lack a 
substantial body of positive law, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman, stress 
that Shari'ah has supremacy over all authorities. Most Arab Constitutions 
identify the rule of the law as the framework within which the freedoms 
and rights of individuals are secured and regulated. lse 
The principles of separation of powers' 67 and the independence of the 
judiciary"' are upheld by constitutional texts throughout the legal 
order. Provisions safeguarding the independence of the judiciary take 
several forms : some stress that no interference in the judicial process 
is tolerated, while others emphasise the independence of judges, provide 
that their activity is regulated by law159 and that they are subject only 
154. In Egypt, the 1971 Constitution emphasises the adherence of its order to the rule of law, which 
it describes as the sole basis for legitimate authority, in the preamble :: "the achievement of freedom for the human personality of every Egyptian, in full awareness of the fact that the humanity 
and dignity of every individual is the guiding principle which has directed the course of Man's tremendous progress towards his highest ideals. The dignity of the individual is a natural reflection 
of the dignity of the nation since the individual is the corner-stone in the structure of the nation 
which derives its status, strength and prestige from the value, work and dignity of its individual 
members. The rule of law, apart from being a necessary guarantee of individual freedom, is also at the 
same time, the sole basis for the legitimacy of authority". 
Public bodies and institutions are committed to the principle of the sovereignty of law as the basis 
of rule in the state, as emphasised in article 64 of the Constitution. 
155, For example, the Constitution of 1973 stresses the rule of law in Syria in article 25 (ii), which 
states: the supremacy of the law is a fundamental principle in society and the state", while the Libyan Constitutional Declaration of 11 December 1969, like the revoked Constitution of 1951, declares its adherence to the rule of Law. 156. The legal framework within which Algerian citizens enjoy and exercise rights may be seen in the 
Constitution and National Charter. Chapter IV of the Constitution is devoted entirely to fundamental 
freedoms and human rights, which should not be affected by any proposed revision of the Constitution. 
This is stated in article 195, which describes human rights as having a supra-constitutional 
character. The National Charter emphasises, among other objectives, that : '... the Algerian State 
guarantees real freedom of the individual ... prepares 
the objective conditions that enable citizens 
to exercise their fundamental freedoms and their rights within the framework of the law ... 
". 
Article 27 of the Syrian Constitution states that : "citizens exercise their rights and enjoy their 
freedoms in accordance with the law'. 
157. As we saw, in Tunisia, the Constitution, in its preamble, emphasises the important principle of 
the separation of powers, as does the Syrian Constitution, which proclaims the principle of the 
separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers. 158. For example, article 165 of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution states that the judiciary is independent. The principle is also established in article 63 of the Iraqi Constitution and has been 
confirmed by a number of legislative acts, including Act no. 160 1979 concerning the structure of the legal system. The 1970 Constitution of' the Yemen Arab Republic provides that the judiciary is 
independent and controlled by no authority save the law, (articles 144-5). 
Article 131 of the Syrian Constitution guarantees the independence of the judicial authority, and the Moroccan Constitution establishes the judiciary's independence from other powers in article 76. The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed in the Jordanian Constitution, in article 97. 159. For example, the Egyptian Constitution, in article 70, stresses that the judiciary is the only 
authority competent to issue orders affecting individual freedom. Act no-35 of 1984 was promulgated to 
amend provisions of the Judicial Authority Act no. 46 of 1972, establishing and regulating a Higher Council of the judiciary and guaranteeing judicial immunity to members of the Department of Public 
Prosecutors. 
CERD/C/149/Add. 22 of 30th January 1987, pp. 16-7. 
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to law in the exercise of their duties. 100 
All these constitutional provisions aim to provide a secure judicial 
framework in which the rights and freedoms of citizens may be 
protected. The Algerian legislator, for example, stressed the role of the 
judiciary in safeguarding the rights of citizens, in both the Charter, 
which states "... the judges are called upon to play an important role in 
view of the fact that they are invested with the power to interpret the 
laws and apply them under the auspices of the Supreme Court ... " and 
article 164 of the Constitution, which provides that : "The courts shall 
guarantee for all the legitimate protection of their fundamental freedoms 
and rights. " We saw a similar intention in the declaration of the 
revolutionary legislature in Libya in 1969. 
Protection for individual liberties tends to be guaranteed in the 
constitutional order on a basis of equality. The principle of equality 
before the law is widely found in Arab Constitutions, of monarchies'", 
and republics' e2 alike. The general statement of the principle often 
contains a reference to the principle of non-discrimination. The principle 
is modified, however, by ideological considerations, in a number of 
160. For example, article 166 of the Egyptian Constitution provides : "Judges are independent in the 
administration of justice. They are subject to no other authority save that of the Iasi. No authority 
whatever has the right to interfere in pending cases or in the affairs of justice". Likewise, the 
Algerian Constitution, in article 172, provides that : "Judges shall be subject only to the law. Chapter V of the Tunisian Constitution provides, in article 65, that : "Judges shall be independent. They shall be subject to no higher authority in their judgement, but that of the law". The Higher Council of the Judiciary regulates the appointment and conduct of judges and an organic law, Act 
no. 67-29 of 14th July 1967, governs the status of judges. 
Article 28 of the Libyan Constitutional Declaration states : "Judges shall be independent. In the 
exercise of their functions, they shall be free from any authority except that of the law and their 
conscience. ' Article 133 of the Syrian Constitution stipulates that udges are independent and subject 
only to the law. Judges are appointed by a Supreme Judicial Council presided over by the President, 
and containing the Minister of Justice and the President of the Court of Cassation, and the Presidents 
or members of other courts, and they may not be suspended, dismissed or transferred without the 
Council's approval, according to Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 
Article 98 of the Jordanian Constitution provide that judges must be appointed and dismissed by royal 
decree, in accordance with the law. According to article 101, courts are open to all and protected 
from interference. In North Yemen, the 1970 Constitution provides for the establishment of a technical 
Shari'ah body to assume responsibility for defining Shari ah rules in relation to commerce. 
161. Article 5 of the Moroccan Constitution provides : "All Moroccans are equal before the law", and 
the Jordanian Constitution, in article 6, provides that all Jordanians are equal before the law, and 
that there shall be no discrimination between them with regard to their rights and obligations, on 
grounds of race, language or religion. 
162. The Libyan legal system contains legislation at different levels to safeguard individuals equally 
within Libyan territory. The Egyptian Constitution provides for equality before the law for all 
citizens, in article 40, which affirms equality "without discrimination on grounds of sex, origin, 
language, religion or belief'. Likewise, the Algerian Constitution provides for equality before the 
law for all citizens, in article 40, which specifies that "The law shall be the same for all, whether 
protecting, restricting or repressing" and in article 165, that "Justice shall be equal for and 
accessible to all and is reflected by the respect for Iasi and the search for equity. " 
The principle of equality before the law is also to be found in the Tunisian Constitution in article 6, which states All citizens shall be equal in rights and duties and equal before the law", the 
principle is safeguarded by the Iraqi Constitution, which states : "All citizens are equal before the law without discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, language or religious origin. " 
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states. '"' A further category of ideological restriction is apparent in texts 
in countries where the ruling authority's interpretations of Shar"t'ah form 
the basis of the legal and political structure. le4 
Principles upholding the legality of penalties are to be found in the legal 
systems of most Arab countries, in constitutional texts and legislation at the 
level of Codes. Both monarchies and republics stress that penalties are 
personal, """ and set the principle that there is no crime or penalty except 
as prescribed by law, nulls poena sine lege. 1911 Most also stress the 
principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law. ' e7 
163. For example, although the Syrian legal system stresses the principle of equality before the law, by 
reviewing the constitutional text, it seems that this equality is accompanied by duties and oust be seen in the light of article 45, which stipulates that such guarantees exist within certain ideological boundaries, 
since they are intended to enable citizens to contribute to the creation and maintenance of the new order. The Syrian legislator guaranteed this right by an explicit text as article 25, para. 3 states: The citizens 
are equal before the law in their rights and duties' 
Article 45 stipulates that: The state shall guarantee women every opportunity that will enable then to 
contribute effectively and fully to political, social, cultural and economic life. It shall act with a view 
to removing obstacles which hinder their development and their participation in building the Arab socialist 
society'. 
164. For example, in Qatar, human rights are guaranteed to Qatari citizens on a footing of equality 'within 
the limits of Islamic customs and traditions'. CERD/C/156/Add. 2 7th March 1988, P. B. In the Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic, while article 19 states that all Yemenis are equal [in 
terms of] public rights and obligations, article 34 provides that women's mandatory rights and obligations 
are as stipulated in the Shari'ah and in accordance with the law. 
165. For example, article 21, paragraph b of the Iraqi Constitution, which states that : 'there shall be no 
offence or penalty except as defined by law ... 
", and article 13 of the Tunisian Constitution provides 
'penalties are personal ... 166. For example, article 31 of the Constitutional Declaration in Libya stipulates that : '1. there shall be 
no crime or punishment except on the basis of a law', and article 21 of the Constitution of the Yemen Arab 
Republic provides that there is no crime or punishment except as defined. Likewise, the Jordanian Constitution provides, in article 8, that no one shall be detained or imprisoned 
except in accordance with the provisions of the law. 167. For example, the Egyptian Constitution, article 45, specifies that : 'No person may be held guilty, 
except by virtue of a law duly prosulgated prior to the alleged offence' and the Algerian Constitution, in 
article 45, states : 'No person may be held guilty, except under a law promulgated prior to the offence in 
F Pstion. ' In Tunisia, article 13 of the Constitution provides : 'Penalties ... may 
be imposed only under a 
w enacted prior to the commission of the offence', while in Morocco, article 4 of the Constitution 
provides for the non-retroactivity of law, and this principle is also to be found in the Jordanian Criminal 
Procedure Act, which stipulates that no penalty may be imposed if it is not prescribed by law at the time 
when the crime was committed, and any law modifying the conditions of incrimination in favour of the accused 
applies retrospectively to acts committed before its entry into force. This applies to a new law abolishing 
a penalty or imposing a lighter one, when the application will be of the favourable law, even to crises 
committed before its entry into force. In cases where, after sentence has been pronounced, a new law is 
promulgated to such effect that the act for which sentence was pronounced ceases to be a punishable offence, 
execution of the sentence is halted, and the conviction set aside. However, a law which imposes heavier 
penalties is not applied retrospectively to crimes committed before its entry into force. 
A similar provision is to be found in the Tunisian Penal Code, though the text here specifies that the 
heavier penalty oust have been imposed before the final judgement, article 1 of the Code also provides for 
the application of the lighter penalty should the punishment be made more severe after the commission of the 
offence, but before final judgement is made. Article 2 of the Libyan Penal Code provides that crimes shall be punished according to the law in force at 
the time they were committed, and in cases where a law more favourable to the defendant is enacted, that law 
shall apply. 
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Legal principles intended to ensure fair trial are again to be found at 
the constitutional level and in Codes. For example, the principle of 
presumption of innocence is found in the legislation of republics and 
monarchies alike. 88 Further principles which may be found in republics 
and monarchies alike are the right to defence, '"" and the provision that 
trials should ordinarily be held in public. Legislation in both republics 
and monarchies, besides stipulating this principle, also sets out the 
cases in which trial may be held in camera, in general cases likely to 
affect public order or public morality. l'o 
Throughout the Arab legal order, the right of appeal to a higher court 
is provided for at several levels of the judicial systems. In general, 
conciliation and cantonal courts are appealed to the first instance 
court, l" which in turn may be appealed to the appeal court. i' 2 
168. For example, the Algerian Constitution provides, in article 46, that "linder the law everyone 
shall be presumed innocent until found guilty by an ordinary court, with all the guarantees required 
by law. ' Other examples may be found in article 12 of the Tunisian Constitution, which states that : 'Everyone charged with a penal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty ... ' and article 20, paragraph a of the Iraqi Constitution, which provides that : "An accused person is presumed 
innocent until proved guilty through a legal trial. ' The Syrian Constitution also provides that 
defendants are innocent until proven guilty by a court. Likewise, in the Libyan Constitutional Declaration, article 31 provides that . 
the defendant is 
innocent until he is proved guilty ... 
', and according to the Yemen Arab Republic Constitution of 
1970, article 24, 'the accused is innocent until he is proved guilty'. The Egyptian Constitution provides, in article 67, that the accused is given the benefit of any doubt 
and presumed innocent until proven guilty. Again, in Morocco, the principle of the presumption of innocence is also provided by article 14 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, while in Jordan, the Criminal Law no. 16 of 1960 states that every 
accused person shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law. 
169. For example, the Egyptian Constitution, article 67 provides that the Court will depute an 
attorney to act in defence of anyone accused of a crime, and according to article 12 of the Tunisian 
Constitution, "Everyone charged with a penal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty at 
a trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence". 
The Syrian Constitution guarantees the right to access to defence counsel, according to article 27, 
and in Libya, article 106 of the Code of Penal Procedure establishes the right of the defendant to be 
accompanied by counsel. Likewise, the Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic upholds this principle 
in article 24, and article 20, paragraph b of the Iraqi Constitution provides that : "The right to 
defence is sacred during all the stages of enquiry and trial in accordance with the provisions of the 
law". 
Article 311 of the Moroccan Code of Criminal Procedure provides that every person tried by a criminal 
court shall be assisted by counsel, while according to the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Law no. 9 of 
1961, an accused person will have defending counsel. 170. In Tunisia, the Code of Penal Procedure and the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure have 
established the principle that hearings should take place in public, though this rule is subject to 
specified exceptions. Similarly, the Iraqi Constitution provides in article 5, that the courts conduct 
cases in public, and that hearings in camera are the exception. Article 20, paragraph c. states that : 'Sittings of courts shall be open, unless the court decides to convene in camera. " Hearings in 
Moroccan courts are public, except in cases affecting public order or morality, where hearings may be 
held in camera, according to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
171. For example, in Tunisia, offences judged in the cantonal court can be reconsidered by the court 
of first instance, according to article 124 (2) of the Code of Penal Procedure. 
For a wider examination of the judicial systems of Middle Eastern countries, see : S. H. Amin Middle East legal systems, 1985; Herbert Liebesny, "Judicial systems in the Near and Middle East" Middle East 
Journal 37,1983, pp. 202-217. For individual countries, see, for example, S. Solaim, "Saudi Arabia' s judicial system' Middle East Journal 25,1971, pp. 403-40?; Riad Khany, "The legal system of Syria" Comparative Law Yearbook, 1 1977 pp. 137-151; M. Swidler, Egypt : the court system" Middle East Executive Reports, 4 no. 1 1981 pp. ý8-30. 
172. In Tunisia, the Court of Appeal judges, in second instance, offences judged in the court of first instance, according to article 126 of the Code of Penal Procedure, while in Morocco, judgements 
rendered by courts of first instance in the case of minor punishable offences may be appealed against in the Criminal Appeals Division of the Court of Appeal, and the judgement rendered there may be the 
subject of an application to the Supreme Court for annulment. 
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Appeals to the Supreme Court, or Court of Cassation are normally based 
on the grounds of violation of law, erroneous application or 
interpretation of law. 13 Persons who have interest, that is, either the 
accused, the prosecutor or the plaintiff are permitted to appeal, 
according to the Codes of Civil or Penal Procedure, which normally 
'4 regulate the conditions and procedures of appeal. ' 
From its position at the head of the judicial hierarchy, the Supreme 
Court is able to play an important role in interpreting constitutional 
provisions and creating legal principles to guide lower courts. "s 
173. For example, in Iraq, article 249 of the Criminal Procedure Law permits anyone convicted of a 
criminal offence to challenge, before the Court of Cassation, judgements, decisions and measures taken 
by a Criminal Court or a Court of Session if such a judgement, decision, or measures were based on a 
violation of the law, or on an erroneous application or interpretation thereof or of an essential 
error in procedure, examination of evidence, or the imposition of penalty has taken place in such a 
way as to have prejudiced the decision. If however, the procedural error does not harm the defence, it 
is neglected. 
CCPR/C/1/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, pp. 68-9. 
In Tunisia, judicial decisions may be reviewed in order to correct an error of fact made to the 
detriment of a crime or offence (article 277). The cases in which such a review can be made are 
prescribed in articles 277 and following of the Code of Penal Procedure. An appeal for cassation may 
be made to the Administrative Tribunal against a decision of a cantonal tribunal having the final say 
and against decisions of the Criminal Court. The grounds for such an appeal may be incompetence, abuse 
of authority, Miscarriage of justice or false application of the law. CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 of 2nd May 1986, P. D. 174. For example, in Iraq, article 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits anyone convicted of a 
violation to challenge, before a court of session, judgements, decisions and measures taken by a 
criminal court or an examining judge within thirty days. Under article 275 of the same Code, it is 
possible to appeal to a higher criminal court against a decision of the criminal court within thirty 
days of the day it is taken. 
CCPR/C/l/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, pp. 68-9; CCPR/C/37/Add. 3 of 18th July 1986, p. 34. Likewise, in Jordan, articles 256 to 260 of the Code of Court Procedure guarantees for every 
convicted person the right to appeal to a higher tribunal. 
In Morocco, article 134 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 28th September 1974 provides that : "fhe 
right of appeal exists in all cases which are not expressly excluded by the lax. ' 
APPeats again2 st 
of19 
udgements by a court of first instance must be lodged within thirty days ... 
" 
CCPR/C/10/Add. th February 1981, pp. 9-10. 
In Libya, article 365 of the Code of Penal Procedure provides that the defendant shall have the right 
of appeal, and article 381 provides that the defendant shall have the right of recourse to a Court of 
Cassation. CCPR/C/l/Add. 20 of 24th January 1978, pp. 7-8. 
In some countries, specified exceptions exist to the right of appeal. For example in Tunisia, petty 
offences are considered not to merit the right of appeal, so that the cantonal judge has the final 
say. In addition, article 128 of the Code of Penal Procedure provides that the Criminal Court shall 
always have final say, because of the composition of the court and the procedures followed, which are 
considered adequate guarantee. The court is composed of 5 judges and its judgements follow a 
preliminary examination undertaken by a specialist judge, and reviewed by the Committal Chamber, which 
contains a President and 2 Counsellors. Even for these exceptions however, an appeal for cassation may 
be made against a decision of a cantonal tribunal and against decisions by the Criminal Court on the 
grounds of incompetence, abuse of authority, miscarriage of justice or false application of the law. 
CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 of 2nd May 1986 p. 33. 
175. The Supreme Court in Jordan illustrates the practical importance of this role in the appeal 
process, by extending its jurisdiction to safeguard the rule of law during the state of emergency. 
Since the provisions of martial law in Jordan were applied over a long period, the Jordanian Supreme 
Court in its decision no. 44/1967, abandoned the principle that appeals against exceptional 
legislation did not fall within its jurisdiction, and instead ruled that " .. 
decisions taken in 
accordance with exceptional legislation are invalid unless they are intended to ensure the defence of 
the kingdom'. 
CCPR/C/1/Add. 56 of 25th January 1982, pp. 5-6. 
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Finally, the question of international treaties within the emerging legal 
order should be reviewed, in order to identify the position of 
instruments of relation to the rule of law and individual liberties, as an 
important component of the legal order in safeguarding human rights. 
Taking in account the fundamental principle that specification of the 
competent authority to ratify international treaties is left to the 
Constitution, the relationship of international treaties to the 
constitutional order varies throughout the emerging legal order. 
In most countries, the ruling authority is the power authorised to 
conclude international treaties on behalf of the populations. Though the 
identity varies between countries, from King to President to Emir, the 
Executive acts on behalf of the nation in concluding treaties and 
participating in international agreements. 
In the republican systems, the tendency is for the sovereign acts of 
legislation and setting state policy to be exercised by Revolutionary 
Command Council or President, whose role is specified at the 
constitutional level. 1' In the monarchies, the King or Emir exercises 
this function on behalf of the population. '" 
Procedures vary among the Arab countries as to how international 
treaties and agreements are ratified, and gain the force of law. In some 
countries, the legislature has the power to ratify international 
treaties, "'" elsewhere this is carried out by the Revolutionary Command 
Council l' ° or Executive while elsewhere, a legislative act promulgated by 
the legislature 1e0 or in some countries, the Executive is required. l B' In 
176. For example, in Libya, the Revolutionary Command Council carries out sovereign acts on behalf of 
the people, according to article 18 of the Constitutional Declaration. According to article 23, the 
RCC is the organ authorised to conclude and ratify treaties except in the case where it authorizes the Council of Ministers to conclude and ratify treaties. 
Article 104 of the Syrian Constitution of 1973 authorises the President to conclude and to abrogate 
treaties and international agreements, in accordance with the Constitution. 
The Algerian Constitution, in article 159, provides that the President may conclude international 
treaties. Likewise, according to article 58 of the Iraqi Constitution of 1970, paragraph j, along 
other powers, the President has the authority to conclude international agreements and treaties. 
177. Article 31 of the Moroccan Constitution provides : '.. the King shall sign ... 
treaties. ' 
178. In Tunisia, ratification is carried out by the legislature, where the Constitution states that 
treaties ratified by the Chamber of Deputies become part of domestic legislation. 
Similarly, in Syria it is implicit in the Constitution that international instruments, once ratified 
and promulgated, become part of the Syrian legal system, since the People's Council exercises the 
power to approve international treaties, according to article 71, para. 5, which provides : 'The 
People's Council shall exercise the following powers ... 5. fo approve international treaties and 
agreements which concern state security ... and all 
treaties which relate to the right of sovereignty 
as well as those treaties and agreements which run counter to the provisions of laws in force or 
whose execution calls for the promulgation of new legislation'. 
179. In Iraq, and Libya international agreements are ratified by the Revolutionary Command Council, as 
prescribed in the Constitution, (article 43, paragraph d), or by the National Assembly while in Libya 
the ratification could be either by Decisions as in the case of the Cooperation Treaties with Algeria 
or by law such as Law no. 22 of 1970, ratifying the Protocol to the same treaty. 
Official Gazette no. 15, Eighth Year, of 1 April 1970. 180. The Kuwaiti legal system adopts the principle that an internal legislative act must be 
promulgated through the channels specified in the Constitution for an international convention to 
which Kuwait has acceded to acquire the force of law. 
181. In Egypt, it seems that international treaties are ratified by Presidential decree, according to 
article 151 of the Constitution. For example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination was approved by Presidential Decree no. 369 of 1967. 
Likewise, according to the Algerian Constitution, article 159, treaties are signed and ratified by 
the Algerian government, in the person of the President of the Republic. 
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some monarchies, the task of ratification is shared by the King and the 
legislature. 18 2 Even though the importance of assigning the power of 
ratification to the Head of State or the Legislature is conceded, 
nevertheless, within the Arab context, one must disagree with the 
opinion which favours the Head of State or other such organs as 
ratifying power. A more positive mechanism would be to allow the 
Legislature to examine the content of important. treaties. 
In general, within the Arab legal order, treaties acquire the force of 
law on ratification. ' 83 Although in some countries, the provisions of 
treaties are granted equal status with municipal legislation, in others, 
their status is higher than other laws, including, in some countries, the 
Constitution. l e' 
Finally in this section, emphasis must be laid on Arab Constitutions' 
recognition of the Political Covenant. We have seen already how the 
position of international treaties within national law varies, with some 
countries giving them precedence over domestic law, with the exception 
of the Constitution. 
182. For example in Morocco, article 31 of the Constitution provides that :. the King shall .. ratify treaties. However, treaties involving state finances may not be ratified without prior approval 
of the Chamber of Representatives". 
183. The Egyptian Constitution stipulates that conventions to which Egypt accedes have the effect of law after they have been signed, ratified and published in accordance with the prescribed procedures. The Algerian Constitution, in article 159, considers international treaties, once ratified, part of 
national legislation - "International treaties duly ratified by the President of the Republic, in the 
conditions provided for by the Constitution shall have the force of law. ' When ratified, international instruments become part of the Iraqi domestic legal system and acquire 
the force of national law as binding provisions on all organs, which may be invoked before tribunals 
and administrative bodies. The Iraqi government, in its initial report to the Human Rights Committee in 1977, shares the same assumption as the representative points out that . 
the ratification of 
such international charters and agreements makes them part of the local legislation. ' CCPR/C/1/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, p. 11; CCPR/C/1/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, pp. 5-6. In Syria, with regard to international treaties, it is implicit in the Constitution that such 
instruments, once ratified and promulgated, become part of the Syrian legal system. According to article 24 of the amended Provisional Constitution of the state of Qatar, all treaties, 
of any subject, acquire the force of law on ratification, the exchange or deposit of instruments of 
ratification or accession, and the publication of the instruments in the Official Gazette. There is no 
need for their provisions to be promulgated in the fore of domestic law, or approved by the domestic 
authority. Both secular and Shari'ah courts must apply then within certain restrictions. 184. Article 32 of the Tunisian Constitution states that duly ratified treaties take precedence over 
internal laws. This means that once ratified by the Chamber of Deputies, such instruments become part 
of domestic legislation and carry greater legal weight than other laws. International treaties become an integral part of Moroccan internal public order, since the Moroccan legislator, in the Dahir of 6th September 1956, provided that "... The provisions of duly ratified and 
published international treaties or agreements shall take precedence over those of internal legislation'. The position of treaties signed by Morocco is outlined in article 31 of the Constitution 
which states: `Treaties which night affect the provisions of the Constitution shall be approved in 
accordance with the procedures laid down for amendment of the Constitution". Treaties which do not 
affect the provisions of the Constitution can be incorporated immediately into Moroccan law. 
Article 70 of the Kuwaiti Constitution outlines the manner in which international treaties to which Kuwait is party, acquire the force of law, providing that international conventions to which Kuwait has acceded thereby prevail over existing legal provisions which conflict with them. As we saw, according to article 24 of the amended Provisional Constitution of the state of Qatar, all treaties, of any subject, acquire the force of law on ratification. 
In Jordan, it seems that international agreements which Jordan ratifies or accedes to have the force 
of law, and have precedence over all national legislation, with the exception of the Constitution. Judgement no. 32-82 of 6th February 1982 ON GAOR 37th Session Supp. nu. 40 (A/37/40) p. 43, para. 196. 
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Several of the Arab countries have signed the Covenant, and of these most 
have ratified it, l's though three""' have made reservations which do not 
affect their obligations concerning the substance of political rights. The 
status of the Covenant in Arab states' domestic law, reflects the general 
problem of the position of international agreements vis-ä-vis national 
legislation. As we saw, some legal systems give precedence to international 
treaties, while others place such treaties on an equal footing with all or 
some domestic laws. In most Arab countries which signed and ratified the 
Covenant, it thereby became part of domestic legislation, on an equal footing 
with other national laws. This should have given the judiciary competence 
to apply these international provisions, particularly those which uphold 
basic rights. 
185. 
1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
3 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
4 International Convention on the Eliaination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
5 The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
6 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
7 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
8 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
9 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 10 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 
11 Convention on the Political Rights of Women. 12 African Charter for Human and People's Rights. 
1 2 34 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Algeria s s x x x s x x x Bahrain 
Dee. Yeaen x x x s x x x Egypt x x x x x x x x x x x Iraq x x x x x x Jordan x x x s s x Kuwait x x Lebanon x x x x x Libya Jam. x x x x x Morocco x x x x s x x x 
Oman s 
Qatar x x 
Saudi Arabia x 
Sudan x x x x s x x x Syria x x x x x 
Tunisia x x x x x x xc x x x x U. A. E. x x Yemen x x x 
x= ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession, acceptance or definitive 
signature. 
s= signature, not yet followed by ratification. 
c= declaration recognising the competence of the Committee against Torture under articles 21 and 22 
of the Convention. Taken from Human rights . status of international instruments as at 1 March 1989, Geneva, 1989, and Document no. AHG/155 (XXIV) Annex 1 supplied by the Organization of African Unity. 186. Iraq, Libya and Syria have made reservations in respect of their obligations under the Covenant. Each country indicates, in similar terms, that signature of the Covenant does not signify recognition 
of the state of Israel. Iraq makes the further reservation that signature and ratification of the Covenant does not constitute signature of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, while Syria adds a 
reservation to the effect that it considers article 26, para. 1 of the Economic and Social Covenant and 
article 48, para. 1 of the Civil and Political Covenant incompatible with the purposes of the two Covenants. 
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THE CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY : 
LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW 
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As rioted earlier, factors of particular importance in the efficacy of the 
constitutional order in upholding the rule of law during the transitional 
period of reform are the extent and nature of constitutional review 
within the legal order itself. Since control of constitutionality is an 
important aspect of the principle of legality, the criterion for judging 
the nature of government acts, this role is ever more important. 
In the Arab legal order it is most striking, since radical and 
conservative countries, the former affected by revolutionary change and 
ideological concepts of reform, and the latter by their reaction to radical 
change, have been led to intervene more and more in political, social 
and economic activities under the pretext of reform, either by executive 
acts or by the promulgation of legislation, giving rise to the danger of 
conflict between the legal idea enshrined in the Constitution and these 
laws. 
The organ charged with the protection of the rights of the population, 
the judiciary, may exercise to a greater or lesser degree, retrospective 
control of constitutionality of laws, L87 though, as we shall see, in some 
Arab countries, the courts are not empowered to carry out this vital 
function, as the constitutional legislator either chose review through the 
legislative power in the French tradition, ' 88 or stood silent altogether. 
This section examines the issue of review of constitutionality of 
legislation within the Arab legal order. It excludes Saudi Arabia and 
Oman, since they do not possess written Constitutions, as we have seen. 
The Constitutions of the remaining countries fall into the two categories 
of rigid or flexible. 
187. The entitlement of the courts to examine the constitutionality of laws passed by the American 
legislature has long been recognised. This legal institution developed through practice, in the 
absence of constitutional provision, and in the American context, has led to political and 
constitutional controversy, for example, the well-known issue of Roosevelt's "New Deal" in the 1930s. It was adopted from 1803, when Chief Justice Marshall said that this power was consequent on the judge's duty to decide what the law was in the case of dispute. In case of conflict between a 
constitutional provision and other law, the court's duty was to decide the question by applying the 
the higher or constitutional provision. 
B. Schwartz, American constitutional law, 1955, pp. 10-11. 
188. Constitutional review by the legislative, and to some extent, the modern concept of 
constitutions, arose from the French Revolution, which greatly influenced political structures in Europe and beyond. The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people did not empower courts to limit the Legislative Assembly, regarded as expressing the will of the people. The rigid revolutionary 
Constitutions of France could not be amended by normal majority votes in the Parliament, since the 
pouvoir constituant was seen as distinct from legislative power in belonging to the people themselves, 
with the result that the power of Parliament was limited to interpretation of the Constitution. This interpretation was regarded as authoritative in that Parliament was regarded as the organ expressing 
the will of the people. In this context, the principle of separation of powers was regarded as 
prohibiting the courts from examining constitutionality of laws. Some French Constitutions of this 
period explicitly prohibited the courts from interfering in the legislative power or preventing the 
application of law. 
States following the French example naturally encountered difficulties with the relationship between the Constitution and statutory laws. Switzerland was the first to address the issue by establishing a 
procedure in which appeals could be made to the Federal Council, thence to the Federal Parliament, and 
ultimately to the Federal Court. A constitutional amendment of 1874 allowed the individual to pursue his case to the Federal Court. Elsewhere, special constitutional courts were established. In Austria, 
such a court was established as early as 1867 to resolve disputes resulting from government actions, 
and since the Second World War, constitutional law courts have become more widespread. 
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A. Tabataba has characterised the Constitutions of Iraq and Qatar' 89 as 
flexible on the grounds that they may be amended by ordinary 
legislation, and those of Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates 
as rigid, on the grounds that more stringent procedures are required 
for constitutional amendments than for ordinary legislation. 1911 
189. The Amended Provisional Qatari Constitution of 1972 provides, in article 67, that "The Emir may 
modify this fundamental system by amendment, repeal or addition if he sees that the supreme national interest requires that change'. Furthermore, articles regarding the promulgation of ordinary laws or its amendments indicate that the Council of Ministers is the organ competent to propose laws or 
regulations, which are referred to the Shur'a Council for discussion and opinion before referral to 
the Prince for ratification and promulgation. (art. 23/F2,34/F2 and 51/Fl) 
So, Tabataba argues, since the procedure required to amend or promulgate ordinary laws is more 
difficult than for amendments to the Constitution, where it is sufficient that the Emir orders it, 
without any requirement for referral to the Shura council, and there is no restriction on the Amir's 
authority to propose an amendment other than that the amendment is required by the "supreme national 
interest', the Constitution of Qatar must be described as flexible, and control of constitutionality 
cannot be said to exist at all. A. Tabataba ["The jurisdictional control over constitutionality of laws in the Arabian Gulf") Maj. Dirasat al-Khalij wa-al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah, v. 6 1990 part 24 pp. 11-40. 190. Article 174 of the Kuwaiti Constitution provides that "the Asir and one third of the National Council have the right to modify the Constitution by amendment, repeal of one or more of its 
provisions or by addition of new provisions. If the Amir and the majority of members of the Parliament 
agree on the modification, the Council discusses the project ... 
There must be an agreement of two 
thirds of the Council. This modification will not be executed except after its ratification and 
promulgation by the Prince'. If the Prince refuses a proposed amendment, it may not be referred again 
within one year of the rejection. Any proposition to amend the Constitution will not be accepted 
within five years of its promulgation. Tabataba comments that such a complicated procedure is not required in the cases of the promulgation 
or amendment of ordinary laws, since according to article 109, any members of the National Council can 
propose ordinary laws, whose acceptance requires no more than the agreement of the members present. In Bahrain, article 104/f of the Constitution stipulates the condition that any amendment to any 
provision of the Constitution, must be agreed by the majority of the Council, and ratified by the Prince. Like the Kuwaiti Constitution, article 104/b provides that if any constitutional amendment is 
rejected it cannot be referred again within a year. It is not clear who is competent to propose an amendment to the Constitution, which means that the Amir or any member of the Council may propose an amendment and therefore, the Constitution is equal to 
ordinary law. Nevertheless, Tabataba describes this Constitution too as rigid, though it seems to 
display the characteristic he identified in the flexible type of Constitution. 
The Provisional Federal Constitution of the IJAE appears to be rigid, since proposal for amendment is the right of the Supreme Council in the state, while the proposal to amend ordinary laws is in the 
competence of the Federal Council of Ministers according to article 50/f2. In addition, article 144 
requires the presence of supreme interests of the Federation for an amendment to the Constitution, and 
the Supreme Council is competent to evaluate the presence of such an interest, while the Constitution 
does not require any objective conditions for amending ordinary laws. Finally, the Constitution does 
not require a special majority for the Federal Council to agree on bills or their amendments, while 
the Federal Council's consent to constitutional amendments requires a special majority of two thirds 
of its members, according to article 144,2/b, which means there is a restriction on the amendment of the Constitution than for amending ordinary laws. 
Tabataba examines a number of articles which cast doubts on the rigidity of the Constitution, because 
of apparent discrepancies in the nature of majorities required for, for example, holding Federal Council meetings in places other than the capital and constitutional amendment. He also emphasises that for constitutional amendments as well as in promulgation or amendment of 
ordinary laws, the Supreme Council could overcome the opposition of the Federal Council by re- introducing a proposed amendment, and if the latter opposes it, the Supreme Council has the right to insist on the amendment and promulgate it. 
Ibid. 
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Legislative control of constitutionality also varies in nature, since in 
Tunisia, for example, no specific organ exists to review constitutionality, 
though review may be carried out by the legislative body""' or 
administrative organs. Several Arab countries have a conseil d'et. at, l9z 
though in practice the duties of this organ tend to be restricted to 
preparing legislation and acting in an advisory capacity. 
In Iraq, there is no special organ concerned with the constitutionality 
of laws, la3 though a mechanism appears to exist through the National 
Assembly, where a Judicial Committee considers draft bills or other 
legislation referred to it directly by any ministry or indirectly, where 
legislation and bills drawn up by the Council of State are transmitted to 
the President of the Republic, who in turn transmits them to the 
National Assembly to examine their constitutionality. If the National 
Assembly rejects a bill, the Revolutionary Command Council may call a 
meeting of the two houses, in which the bill must then be passed by a 
two-thirds majority. 1194 
According to article 66 (b) of the Iraqi Provisional Constitution, it 
cannot be amended save by a two-thirds majority of the Revolutionary 
Command Council. l95 The RCC also play a dominant role in the 
promulgation of ordinary legislation, l9e Tabataba argues that since RCC 
191. Tunisia operates a system of political control of constitutionality of laws, according to 
articles 72-74 of the Constitution. The President or one third of the Chamber of Deputies may suggest 
revisions of the Constitution, and a proposed amendment may be debated by the Chamber of Deputies, 
after an absolute majority has agreed to consider it. The Chamber of Deputies should pass the 
amendment by a two-thirds majority, after two readings, though even then, an interval of at least 
three months must elapse between readings. 
192. In Syria, the Majlis al-Ilawla (State Council) makes administrative and judicial review of the 
decisions of government agencies which are binding on the government. According to the Constitution, 
article 138, the State Council acts as an administrative tribunal. The Tunisian Constitution of 1959 also establishes a Council of State to deal with conflicts arising 
between individuals and the State or Public Authorities, and in all matters concerning abuse of 
powers. 
In Egypt, according to article 172 of the 1971 Constitution, the State Council is an independent 
judicial body, which specialises in settling administrative disputes and disciplinary cases. 
In Kuwait, article 171 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of a Council of State to 
assume the functions of an administrative jurisdiction, rendering legal advice, and drafting bills and 
regulations. 
193. According to a representative of the Iraqi government, although no special body exists, the 
method used is a "pragmatic" one. If any ministry considers a iven law to be in contradiction with 
the Constitution, it could request the National Assembly to repeal or amend it. 
CCPR/C/SR. 744 of 22nd July 1987, p. 12. 194. CCPR/C/SR. 744 of 22nd July 1987, p. 9. 
195. Two-thirds of the People's Assembly oust combine to suggest amendments to the Constitution. 
CCPR/C/37/Add. 3 of 18th July 1986, p. 3. 
An example occurred when the Iraqi National Assembly voted to reject a draft bill on 29th December 
1985, on the ground that the proposed bill was incompatible with existing legislation. The bill 
prescribed financial penalties for women who married a foreigner without having obtained prior 
permission. According to its provisions, the women concerned would have hail to reimburse the state the 
costs of schooling for their children. The National Assembly had held that "... the bill was contrary 
to human rights and in particular to the rights contained in the Covenant'. 
CCPR/C/SR. 744 of 22nd February 1987, p. 9. 196. For example, article 52 provides that the National Council will review legislation proposed by 
the RCC within fifteen days ... 
If agreed to, it is referred to the President for promulgation. 
If refused or amended, it is returned to the RCC. If the latter accept the amendment, it is referred 
to the President for promulgation. If the RCC insist on its opinion on a second reading, it is 
returned to the National Council to be reviewed by a joint session of the two Councils, and the 
decision of a two-thirds majority is final. 
Likewise, article 53 stipulates that the National Council will review legislation / ... 
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regulations have the force of law, and it is not possible to identify the 
nature of the legal rules promulgated by this Council except by 
examining their nature and subject, control of constitutionality of laws 
cannot be said to exist. ' 97 
The role of the Syrian Court, established by articles 145-8 of the 1973 
Constitution and Act no. 19 of 2nd July 1973, should be seen in a 
different light from other such courts in the Arab legal order, since 
even though article 145 explicitly gives the Supreme Court the task of 
reviewing constitutionality of laws, the same article specifies that it 
must be requested to review legislation passed by the People's Assembly 
or the President by the latter or a quarter of the People's Assembly. 19 8 
Since the importance of this organ does not lie only within the control 
of proposed laws or legislation, but also in examining the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations in force, with some Syrian 
legislation in force dating from as early as the 1940s, "99 it must be said 
that the Syrian legislator gave a severely limited role to this authority, 
by restricting its scope to laws proposed by the President or Peoples' 
Assembly, and allowing it to act only at the request of the Legislature 
or the Executive. 
. proposed 
by the President of the Republic within fifteen days, If rejected, it is returned to the President with reasons for the rejection. If accepted, it is promulgated. if the National Council make 
amendments, they are referred to the RCC. If accepted, the legislation is promulgated. If rejected by 
the RCC, it is returned to the National Council again, within one week. If the National Council agree 
with RCC, then the project is referred to the President for promulgation, but if the National Council, 
in its second reading, insists on its opinion, a joint session of the two Councils, will examined the 
proposed legislation, and the decision of a two-thirds majority is final, and transferred to the 
President of the Republic for promulgation,. 
Again, according to article 54, the National Council reviews proposed legislation referred to it by 
quarter of its members, excluding military and public security affairs. If the Council accepts the legislation, it is referred to the RCC within fifteen days of the day of its arrival in the Council's Office. If the RCC agrees to it, it is referred to the President of the Republic for promulgation or 
amendment. If the RCC rejects or amends it, it is returned to the National Council. If the latter 
insists on its opinion in its second reading, a joint session headed by the President of the RCC or 
his deputy considers the legislation. The decision of a two-thirds majority is considered final and 
the legislation it referred to the President for promulgation. 
197. A. Tabataba 'The jurisdictional control over constitutionality of laws in the Arabian Gulf"] 
Ma'. Dirasat al-Khalij wa-al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah, v. 6 1980 part 24 pp. 11-40. 198. Article 145 provides . 'The High Constitutional Court decrees and rules on the constitutionality 
of the laws in accordance with the following : (1) if the President of the Republic or one quarter of 
the members of the People's Assembly challenge the constitutionality of a law before its promulgation, 
the latter will be suspended until the High Court rules on it within 15 days starting from the date 
when it was apprised of the challenge. If the law has an urgent character, the High Constitutional 
Court must rule on it within 7 days- (2) if one quarter of the members of the People's Assembly 
challenge the constitutionality of a legislative decree within 15 days starting from the date of the 
opening of the session of the People's Assembly, the High ConstitutionaJ3 court must rule on it within 
15 days counting from the date when it was apprised of the challenge; if the High Constitutional 
Court determines that the law or the legislative decree infringes on the Constitution, then the 
provisions of the said law or the said legislative decree which are contrary to the provisions of the 
Constitution will be considered to have been automatically abrogated with retroactive effect". Article 147 goes on to provide that : "The High Constitutional court, at the request of the President 
of the Republic gives its opinions on the constitutionality of government bills, legislative decrees 
and executive decrees'. 
199. Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab republic, 1983, p. 5. 
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Limitation on the scope of the Supreme Court in this respect is long- 
standing, as the 1950 Constitution gave the Syrian Supreme Court 
competence to review : 
(a) the constitutionality of laws referred to it, according to 
article 63 of the Constitution, that is, laws which a quarter 
of the People's Council or the President object to on 
grounds of unconstitutionality; (b) the constitutionality of bills or decrees referred to it by the 
President. 20° 
It is important to highlight some views as to whether this constituted 
political or judicial control of constitutionality of laws. According to 
Munir al-Ajlani, 2°1 the Syrian Constitution chose judicial control, though 
it narrowed this control, by specifying the Supreme Court, and by the 
provision that the objection could only be raised by a quarter of the 
People's Council or the President. Mustapha Barudi202 is also of the 
opinion that the constitutional article meant to avoid repealing many 
laws for an article or paragraph contradicting the Constitution, so that 
the Supreme Court cannot examine the constitutionality of law unless 
requested by the President or quarter of the People's Assembly, and 
otherwise it has no right to interfere in the laws promulgated by the 
Legislature. If the court decides on unconstitutionality, it does not act 
alone, but its decision is shared by the Government and the People's 
Council. 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the 1950 Constitution was 
confined to review of constitutionality of laws before they were 
promulgated, with the further limitation that they should be transferred 
by quarter of the People's Council or the President of the Republic, 
which means that the control of Supreme Court is prospective only and 
dominated by the executive and legislative powers. Even when a law was 
referred, it did not end by repeal of a projected law, but only its 
return to the Council to review it. For this reason, and because of the 
dominant role of the Executive and Legislature, in law as well as in fact, 
this must be considered as political control. 2o3 
200. Legislation promulgated before the Constitution remains in force, according to article 153, which 
states : 'legislation in effect and issued before the proclamation of the Constitution will regain in 
effect until amended so as to be compatible with its provisions'. 
Article 63 of the Constitution states that if a quarter of the People's Council object to a law on 
the grounds of unconstitutionality before it is promulgated, the President of the Republic will send 
it to the Court. This prevents promulgation until the court makes a decision within ten days. If the 
law is urgent, the court must decide within three days. If the Court does not take a decision during 
this period, the President may promulgate the law. If the law is compatible with constitutional 
provisions, the President may promulgate it, and if the law violates the constitution, the law will be 
returned to the People's Council to correct the constitutional conflict. 
201. Munir al-Ajlani Constitutional rights] 1955, p. 65. 
202. Mustapha Barudi 
[Constitutional 
rights] part 1,2nd ed. 1957, p. 293. 
203. Mirza compares this function with the function of the constitutional committee in the French 
constitution of 1946 and the constitutional council of 1958. If the Syrian constitution adopted what 
article 63 before its final adoption (article 73 of the project of the Syrian Constitution), which 
states that a proposal of law which the Supreme Court decides is unconstitutional is considered 
repealed'. In that case we could have said that the Syrian Constitution accepted constitutional 
control by prospective repeal, which is a definite constitutional control of the constitutional law. 1. Mirza [Constitutional law 
... 
), 1969. 
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One must disagree with Ajlani's point of view entirely and with 
Barudi's conclusions and justifications. One cannot say that the Syrian 
Constitution accepted judicial review by any means, since it is not 
enough to be influenced by the title and ignore other considerations. 
The method adopted in the Constitutions of 1953 and 1971 must be 
considered legislative and executive control of a political nature rather 
than judicial. 204 
The same could be said of the mechanism for interpretation of 
constitutional provisions in Jordan, since, according to article 122 of the 
Constitution, the High Tribunal established by article 57 of the 
Constitution interprets constitutional texts, at the request of the Council 
of Ministers or by a decision taken by an absolute majority of any 
House of the National Assembly. 
In the revoked Libyan Constitution of 1951, the legislator clearly chose 
judicial review of constitutionality of laws, 206 referring it to the 
ordinary judiciary, namely the Supreme Court, 200 but in 1963, it was 
deprived of this important constitutional authorisation. The legislature, 
by Law no. 1 of 1963, amending the Constitution, weakened this important 
function, by repealing articles 153 and 154 of the Constitution. When the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was thus limited, control of 
constitutionality passed to the ordinary legislature. This principle 
remained in force at least until 1969, when it was not in fact repealed 
or strengthened by the new legislator. 
204. A further worrying restriction on the scope of the High Constitutional Court of Syria is the 
provision of article 146 of the 1971 Constitution, which provides that laws which receive the people's 
approval in popular referenda may not be the subject of constitutional review by the Court. The 
phenomenon of a direct appeal to the people by the Head of State, by-passing the legislative 
authority, has already been noted in the Moroccan Constitutions of 1962 and 1972. Any provisions which limit the scope of the organ charged with upholding the constitutionality of law must be regarded as a 
potential threat to the rights upheld by the Constitution. 
205. In the Libyan Constitution of 1951, in articles 153 and 154, the legislator by explicit text 
authorised the Supreme Court to control the constitutionality of laws. Article 153 provides that ., judgements will be petitioned in accordance with the federation law before the Supreme Court. The 
judgement will be promulgated from criminal and civil provincial courts, if the judgement derives from 
a dispute relating to the Constitution or its interpretation. In November 1953, a law regulating the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was passed. Article 14 of 
this law again authorised the Supreme Court to give judgement in the cases where constitutional 
matters were involved. In the same law, article 15, paragraph 2, provides that ". . 
if the case before 
any section of the court ... contains a fundamental 
legal matter in relation to the Constitution or its interpretation, that section oust postpone final judgement and transfer it to the constitutional 
section of the Supreme Court to decide, or else, the judgement of that section may be appealed against before the constitutional section within 60 days of announcement", and paragraph 3, "Judgements from 
the provincial courts, whether civil or criminal, may be petitioned before the Supreme Court, if these judgements are related to the Constitution or its interpretation". Article 16 states that ". . any person who has a direct personal interest has the right to petition the Supreme Court against any legislation procedure or act in contradiction with the Constitution", 
1. Mirza [Constitutional law 
... 
) 1969, p. 549. 206. The Constitution considers that when it sits in this capacity, as a result of the judgement of the Supreme Court that a law is unconstitutional, this law is repealed ergs ones. The Iraqi Supreme Court exercised a similar authority under the Constitution of 1925. 
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Egypt stands at the beginning in developing the judicial role, in its 
increasingly important task of protecting the rule of law and individual 
and collective rights. 207 
A brief review of Egyptian judicial decisions on constitutionality of 
legislation promulgated under the Constitution of 1923 illustrates how 
the judicial power interpreted certain principles with regard to its 
competence in exercising this function. It also illustrates how the 
judiciary has interpreted constitutional provisions, setting legal 
principles. Since the beginning of constitutional life in Egypt in 1923, no 
judicial organ was authorised explicitly to control the constitutionality of 
laws, though the view that the judiciary had this implicit right arose 
early208 and continued until this task was made an explicit duty in the 
Constitution of 1971,209 Far more important in the development of the 
legal. order is the establishment of an independent judicial. body in 1979, 
by Law No. 48 of 1979, to control and review the constitutionality of 
legislation, namely the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
At the beginning of 1941, the Egyptian Ahleia First Instance Court 
judged clearly for the first time the right of the judiciary to examine 
the constitutionality of laws. The Court found that the duty of the 
judge is to find the legal text in disputes under his jurisdiction, and 
judge within the limits of the ordinary law as well as the fundamental 
law of the state, If the ordinary law comes into conflict with the 
Constitution, the judge is obliged to implement the constitutional text, 
ruling out the ordinary law. In so doing, the judge cannot be 
considered to usurp legislative authority to promulgate law, 21 o since he 
does not repeal the lower law or abstain from judgement, but only 
exercises his legal right in characterising the law which should be 
implemented in a dispute. 
207. Mostafah K. Kerah, in ["The Courts in their hundredth year"] in Al-tiara Newspaper, (1st December 
1983) pointed out the role of the Egyptian judiciary, reviewing key cases since 1910, such as the 
Abrahim al Wadani Case Badari, the workers wards, and the case against the writer Abas E1-Akaad, 
which have not been available for study since the revolution of 1952. 208. As early as 1924, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of part of the Penal Code as 
an appeal court, when a judgement from Alexandria Criminal Court in a case involving individual 
liberties was considered by the Court of Cassation. Petition was made against the judgement of the lower court on the grounds that the article 151 of the Penal Code restricted the right protected by 
article 14 of the Constitution, and that the judgement was in conflict with article 164 of the Constitution. The Court of Cassation returned the case, supporting the judgement of the Criminal Court 
on the following grounds : "... with regard to ... article 
151, it does not violate constitutional 
provisions, as freedom of opinion guaranteed by the Constitution should be understood within the law. " 
Attorney-General Y. Mahmud Husni al-Urabi, Anton Maron et al. 
Mahaud Helmi, The Constitutional system in the United Arab Republic], 1965. 
209. Articles 174 & 175 : 'The Supreme Constitutional Court will be an independent and separate judicial body in the Arab Republic of Egypt ... . 'The Supreme Constitutional Court alone will assume judicial control of the constitutionality of laws 
and bills. It will interpret the legislative provisions ... '. 210. The defendant claimed that the competence of the judiciary to examine the constitutionality of laws would undermine the principle of separation of powers, by ? iving the judiciary a dominant 
position over the legislator. In the Court's judgement, if the legislature violated the provisions of the Constitution, it could not force the judiciary to be partner in this violation, since the latter is independent within its jurisdiction and the judge is required to find the legal' text in disputes, 
and judge within the limits of the ordinary as well as the fundamental law of the state. 
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Development of judicial review of constitutionality may he seen in the 
first judgement of the Egyptian Supreme Court, through the 
Administrative division, on 10 February 1948, when the Court upheld the 
principle that in the case of conflict between the Constitution and other 
legislation, the constitutional text prevails, confirming the competence of 
the judiciary in this respect. Z 1' 
Another case demonstrates the Egyptian Court's reasoning, when the 
Constitution is silent with regard to control of the constitutionality of 
laws, as in the case of the Egyptian Constitution of 1936. Once again, 
the return to constitutional principles is the only course for the 
judiciary in respect of a law which conflicts with the Constitution. 212 
211. The government defendant argued that courts have no jurisdiction to examine the substance of the 
constitutionality of laws, but may only identify that the formal foundation of a law exists. They 
should abstain from examining the matter of a law's compatibility with the principles laid down in the 
Constitution, according to the principle of separation of powers, which depends on the independence of 
each authority in its function from the others, and the obligation of non-interference or delay. 
The Court reasoned that there existed no text restricting its authority in reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws. It reasoned that in this action the Court applies the principle of 
separation of powers, in putting affairs in correct constitutional context. It argued that the 
Egyptian Constitution set this principle implicitly, when it specified for each authority that it 
should operate according to the Constitution (article 23), and that judicial authority should 
be 
exercised by courts in their different degrees and competence (article 30). The Egyptian Constitution 
set the principle of separation along with the principle that all authorities should adhere 
to the 
principles set in the Constitution (article 23), and since the Constitution confirms the principle of 
cooperation between them on the grounds of respect for these principles, thus they operate 
in parallel 
to organise constitutional life, since if any authority violates any of these principles, it will be 
considered as exceeding its competence. If an authority were to misuse the concept of the principle of 
the separation of powers to violate the Constitution, this would mean anarchy and lack of control, 
whereas the obligation of each authority to uphold the principles of the Constitution is the 
best 
guarantee in applying the principle of separation to support the Constitution. 
The jud ement also examined the role of the courts with regard to conflict between an ordinary law 
and the 
Constitution, 
whether by text or by spirit, determining what the courts should apply in that 
case, and how the court interprets its jurisdiction. Since the Constitution provides, in article 
30, 
that the judicial authority exercised by the court is appointed to implement law in the disputes 
before it, this means that courts have the right to determine in situations of conflict between laws, 
which law should apply. In the case of contradiction between normal law and the Constitution in any 
dispute before any court, there is no doubt that courts apply the Constitution as the supreme law, 
and neglect the normal law. In so doing, the judiciary is not over-riding the legislative authority, 
since the courts do not legislate or repeal laws, and indeed do not suspend application of law. If the 
ordinary law is neglected, that is due to the supremacy of the Constitution, which has to be taken in 
account by the judge and legislator on equal terms. The Constitution itself repeats that legal idea in 
article 167 when it makes the application of laws prior to the Constitution depend on their 
compatibility with its provisions. It is clear that this article was intended for courts facing 
conflict between applying those laws and the Constitution. Thus, the Court considered the right of the 
judiciary well known, and confirmed the supremacy and sovereignty of the Constitution in the case of 
conflict with ordinary law. 
212. In 1952, the administrative court issued judgement on the issue of conflict of laws, providing 
the following reasoning : if the Constitution is silent with regard to judicial control of the 
constitutionality of laws, the return to constitutional principles is the only recourse for the 
judiciary when the court is asked to implement a law in conflict with the Constitution. The principle 
that the judiciary must apply the law in any case is considered to be an original principle of the 
Constitution, and in this case, the law is an abstract general rule despite its source, whether 
constitutional or brought by the legislature through the Parliament or regulating decision. Conflicts 
between laws demand the implementation of the higher decree law and the dismissal of the lower law. 
Thus, in the case of conflict between Council of Ministers' decision and Minister's decision, the 
former is applied and of conflict between decree and 
law, the latter will be applied. On the save 
footing, if a law conflicts with the Constitution, the Constitution must be applied. 
1. Mirza, [Constitutional law ... 
] 1969, pp. 442-448. 
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An examination of Arab Constitutions indicates that the majority of Arab 
legislators adopted judicial control of constitutionality of laws. The organ 
which exercises judicial control may be established by constitutional text or 
other legislation as a distinct organ, 213 or else the function is exercised by 
a division of the Supreme Court. 214 
Law stipulates details of the formation of organs concerned with 
constitutionality of legislation, For example, article 2 of Law no. 14 in Kuwait 
provides that five advisors, who must be Kuwaiti citizens, are selected by 
secret ballot by the Judicial Council, and a decree is promulgated for their 
appointment, while in the United Arab Emirates, article 3 of the Supreme 
Federal Court Law stipulates its composition of a President and four 
judges. Article 4/F1 specifies that he should be a national of the United 
Arab Emirates, though article 5 of the same law makes an exception of Arab 
nationals, who may be appointed as judges in the Supreme Court in certain 
cases. 
In Tabataba's z' 6 opinion, although judges are more capable than others in 
examining legal issues, it would be more effective if political considerations 
were taken into account in the composition of constitutional Courts. He goes 
on to point out that the travaux preparatoires of article 173 of the Kuwaiti 
Constitution stipulate that 
... 
the possibility will be left to the regulations of that constitutional 
court of including the Parliament and Government in its formation ... ". 
According to Tabataba, this mixed composition of the court would help to 
make the legislative and executive powers more susceptible to judgements of 
unconstitutionality. Authman Khalil Authman21 e shares Tabataba's view that 
the participation of political elements does not mean that they will dominate 
its views. Rather, this political representation means that the circumstamces 
surrounding the promulgation of a law and the implications resulting from a 
declaration of its unconstitutionality, which may not be seen by judges 
whose task is only to examine the law itself, would be taken into account. 
213. The Constitutional Court in Kuwait was established by Act no. 14 of 1973. 
CERD/C/149/Add. 16 14th November 1986, p. 4. 
The establishment of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court was embodied in Act no. 48 of 1979. 
In the Yemen Arab Republic, the 1970 Constitution provides for a Supreme Constitutional Court `formed from 
a number of Shari'ah scholars ... elected 
by the Najlis al-Shura and nominated by the President of the 
Republican Council' (article 155). 
214. The Algerian Supreme Court is authorised to review the constitutionality of laws, and exercises the 
power to interpret thee without any interference by the organs of the party or the state. Its decisions and judgments must be respected absolutely. 
CERD/C/158/Add. 2 of 3rd April 1987, p. 24. 
Section X of the Moroccan Constitution of 1972 concerns the establishment of a Constitutional Chamber 
within the Supreme Court, whose organisation and functioning will be governed by an organic law, exercising 
the power conferred upon it by the Constitution or organic law. 
The Provisional Federal Constitution of the United Arab Emirates authorises the Higher Federal Court to 
review constitutionality, in article 99. 
According to Article 103 of the Bahraini Constitution 'the law will appoint the judicial organ which will 
have the jurisdiction in examining disputes regarding constitutionality of laws and regulations .. 215. A. Tabataba ['The jurisdictional control over constitutionality of laws in the Arabian Gulf. ) 
Maj. Dirasat al-Khalij %21-al- azirah al-'Arabiyyah, v. 6 1980 part 24 pp. 11-40. 
216. Authean Khalil Authýean 
[Constitutionality 
of laws], Lectures to post-graduate students in Faculty of 
Laws of the Shar'ah University, 1973, pp. 160-1,166. 
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Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti legislator preferred to keep the Court's 
composition to judges, on the grounds that the subject of the Court's 
review was law, and no one without qualification in law should deal with 
them, in order that legal matters should not be affected by politics and 
the views of non-judges. 
As we saw, the UAE Constitution specifies the number of 5 judges, in 
article 96, while the Kuwaiti Constitution does not specify the numbers 
in article 1.73, leaving that to the law. It would have been better had 
the constitutional legislator followed the UAE Constitution in specifying 
the number of judges. In states where the ordinary law can increase or 
decrease the numbers of members of the courts, their independence is 
in danger, since the political organs may change the court's composition, 
making it more compatible with its views, by appointing new members 
adopting the government's views. 217 
The scope of jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts or Chambers within 
the Supreme Court vary throughout the legal order. Besides considering 
constitutionality of laws and regulations, 21e they may also interpret 
217. The composition of the Constitutional Chamber of the Moroccan Supreme Court is also subject to 
the threat of political interference, since three of its members are appointed by the King and three by the President of the Chamber of Representatives '. . at the beginning of each legislature, after 
consultation among the groups represented', according to article 95 of the Constitution. A similar risk exists in the Yemen Arab Republic, where the 1970 Constitution provides for a Supreme 
Constitutional Court 'formed from a number of Shari'ah scholars ... elected 
by the Majlis al-Shura and 
nominated by the President of the Republican Council", (article 155). 
218. According to article 175 of the 1971 Constitution of Egypt, the Supreme Constitutional Court is 
authorised to interpret legislation. For example, in case no. 5 of judicial year no. 1, the Court ruled 
that article 2 of Legislative Decree no. 150 of 1964 was unconstitutional. In case no. 7 of judicial 
year no. 2 (1983), the Court found that, according to the Constitution, no legislation may stipulate 
that an administrative act should not be subject to judicial control. The principle involved was a 
denial of the right of a certain group to engage in litigation which, . notwithstanding 
its 
applicability ... entails a negation of their equality with other citizens to whoe this right is not denied'. 
CERD/C1149/Add. 22 of 30th January 1987, pp. 3-4. The Algerian Supreme Court is authorised to review the constitutionality of laws, and exercises the 
power to interpret them. The Code of Civil Procedure article 274, specifies the cases in which the Supreme Court is the judicial authority responsible for hearing appeals for interpretation or 
assessment of the legality of legislation. CERD/C/158/Add. 2 of 3rd April 1987, p. 24. According to article 155 of the Constitution of North Yemen, the duties of the Supreme Constitutional Court will be to give final decisions on inter alia the constitutionality of ordinances and 
resolutions which have the force of law'. Article 33 of the Law composing the Federal Supreme Court in UAE specifies that it "examines the 
constitutionality of federal laws if an objection from one or more emirate alleges that they violate the Constitution'. It also examines the constitutionality of law, legislation and regulations if 
referred to it by any federal or emirate court during the examination of a case. In addition, it 
examines the constitutionality of legislation promulgated by one of the Emirates if an objection is 
raised by the federal authorities on the grounds of unconstitutionality. Article 103 of the Bahraini Constitution states the law will appoint the judicial organ which will have the jurisdiction in examining disputes regarding constitutionality of laws and regulations ... 
'. 
For Kuwait, article 1 of the Kuwaiti Constitutional Court Law states that 'a Constitutional Court 
will be established with jurisdiction ... 
to examine disputes regarding laws and regulations ... 
". The 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional court in Kuwait covers not only constitutionality of laws' and 
regulations, but extends to laws and decrees promulgated by the executive according to article 71 of the Constitution, when Parliament is in session or when it is dissolved, if the necessity of taking 
measures cannot be postponed. Article 6 of the law of the Constitutional Court establishes the Court's 
competence to examine the legality of regulations, in conflict with articles 169 and 171 of the Constitution, which give this jurisdiction to a Chamber, special court or state council. This jurisdiction includes repeal of legislation and compensation for administrative decisions violating the law, which, it may be argued, will also belong to the Constitutional Court too until one of these 
organs is established to control the legality of regulations and administrative decisions in general. 
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constitutional provisions , 2IL ° interpret treaties 22° and in some cases, 
consider administrative acts. 221 A number are also called upon to examine 
electoral disputes. 222 
With regard to the question of who has the right to request or challenge 
the constitutionality of laws or regulations, again Arab legislation varies. An 
examination of constitutional texts indicates that the right may be exercised 
by the public authorities, by courts and by individuals. Public authorities 
have the right to claim before the competent court the repeal of a law on 
the grounds of unconstitutionality. 222 Individuals may raise the issue of 
unconstitutionality of law, as may courts. aZ 
For example, the Supreme Constitutional Court Law of Egypt instructs that 
if any of the litigants rebut during litigation before any court or organ of 
judicial competence on grounds of unconstitutionality of text, in law or 
regulation, and the Court or organ observes the seriousness 
219. For example, the Constitutional Court in Kuwait considers constitutional texts, while the 1970 Constitution of North Yemen provides that the Supreme Constitutional Court May consider the 
constitutionality of constitutional amendments, according to article 155. 
220. For example, the IIAE Supreme Federal Court may interpret international treaties and agreements. 
221. According to article 155 of the 1970 Constitution of North Yemen, the Supreme Constitutional Court may 
try 'the Chairman and members of the Republican Council and the prime Minister and Ministers'. The Federal Supreme Court of UAE  ay try ministers and senior officials, for acts in the course of their 
official functions. In addition, according to Tabataba, the judgement of the Supreme Court indicates its 
jurisdiction to examine the legality of administrative decisions, when it discussed the definition of 
administrative decision and decided that the Court will not interfere except when there is an administrative 
decision within the legal meaning. This jurisdiction may also be understood from the text of article 102/f/1 
of the Constitution. 
Case no. 2/2 Judicial Supreme Administrative Session 9 1975, judgement in Justice magazine issue 8,2nd 
year 1975 pp 67-8, 
A. fiabataba t'The jurisdictional control over constitutionality of laws in the Arabian Gulf"] Maj. Dirasat al-Khalij wa-al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah, v. 6 1980 part 24 pp. 11-40. Section X of the Moroccan Constitution authorises the Supreme Court to supervise any abuse of authority through its Constitutional Chamber. The Supreme Court is also the body with jurisdiction over 
administrative decisions which  ay violate laws and regulations in force. 222. For example, the Constitutional Court in Kuwait examines electoral disputes, while in North Yemen, 
according to the 1970 Constitution, the duties of the Supreme Constitutional Court will include 'investigation in election disputes concerning members of Mailis al-Shura'. 223. According to article 173 of the Kuwaiti Constitution, the Government and the interested parties shall have the right to challenge the constitutionality of laws and regulations. According to article 4, para. 2 of the Constitutional Court Law, the Kuwaiti parliament has the right to 
object on grounds of constitutionality. Since the law does not specify the majority required to make this decision, a simple majority of those present will be sufficient, 
The Council of Ministers has the right to present a bill to amend or repeal a law considered to violate the Constitution. If the legislator gave the Council of Ministers this right, the intention was to give a final 
opportunity for objection to a law supported by Parliament. In addition, if the Executive authority proposes 
a law amending a law to which the Parliament agreed, the legislator gave the Council of Ministers the right to object on the constitutionality as a final method. The Provisional Federal Constitution of the United Arab Emirates authorises the Higher Federal Court to 
review constitutionality, in article 99, if asked to do so by one or more Emirates or the Federal Authority. As we have seen, article 145 of the Syrian Constitution permits the High Constitutional Court to examine the 
constitutionality of laws if the President of the Republic or one qcarter of the members of the People's Assembly challenge its constitutionality before promulgation. It also gives its opinion on the 
constitutionality of government bills, legislative decrees and executive decrees at the request of the President of the Republic. 
224. For example, the Court Laws in Kuwait (article 4/B), UAE (article 58) and Egypt (article 29) indicate 
that courts may raise the issue of unconstitutionality of law. For example, in Egypt, as we will see in detail, should any courts or organs of judicial competence, during review of a case, note 
unconstitutionality of text in law, regulation or decision, the court is instructed to suspend the case and 
refer it to the Supreme Constitutional Court to decide on the issue of constitutionality. 
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of the rebuttal, it should adjourn the case and specify to whoever raised 
the rebuttal a date not exceeding three months by which to raise the case 
before the Supreme Constitutional Court to decide on the issue of 
constitutionality before the court makes its final judgement in the case. 
The legislative texts in Bahrain, Kuwait and UAE give the individual the 
right to object on the ground of unconstitutionality of laws and regulations, 
although the objection is again made in an indirect way through raising the 
issue during the court's examination of the case. The person making the 
objection should be party to the case (article 4, para. b of the Constitutional 
Court Law in Kuwait and article 58/f/2 of the Federal Supreme Court in UAE 
and article 103 of the Bahraini Constitution). The individuals concerned do 
not have the right to go directly to the constitutional court, but the issue 
must be raised before the subject court, which should examine the 
seriousness of the rebuttal and if accepted, suspend the case, pending the 
judgement from the competent court for the judgement on constitutionality. 
The procedure in Kuwait differs from that in UAE, since in the former, the 
court of the subject will transfer the case to the constitutional court 
directly, while in the latter, as in Egypt, the subject court will specify to 
the plaintiff a time within which the case should be raised before the 
Federal Supreme Court. If that time passes without the objection being 
raised, the rebuttal will be considered abandoned, and the case will 
continue. It is notable that the procedures applied in 
UAE regarding the 
objection on grounds of unconstitutionality, although 
it begins with the 
branch rebuttal before the court end up by a case before the Supreme 
Court, since if the subject court rejects the seriousness of the rebuttal, 
its 
rejection is not considered final, since the legislator guaranteed to the 
person making the rebuttal the right to appeal that decision. 
Again, the mechanism adopted by the Kuwaiti and the UAE legislator 
varies. In Kuwait, there is a Committee for objections within the 
Constitutional Court, which is composed of the President of the Court and 
the membership of the senior chancellors in the court, before which the 
individual can object, if the court decides there is no seriousness in the 
objection. The Committee either decides to repeal the judgement of 
the 
subject court, if it sees seriousness and transfers the case to the 
Court, or 
rejects the rebuttal, confirming the judgement of the court of the subject. 
The decision of the Committee is final and no objection can be made. In the 
UAE, the legislator guaranteed to those concerned, to challenge the court's 
decision to reject the rebuttal on the grounds of seriousness, but 
accompanied it with the condition that the subject of the original case may 
be appealed to a higher court. 
The question of the implications resulting from a decision or judgement of 
unconstitutionality varies. In Syria, for example, if the High Constitutional 
Court determines that a law or legislative decree infringes the Constitution, 
then the provisions which are contrary to the 
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Constitution will be considered to have been abrogated with retroactive 
effect. Likewise in Kuwait, according to the Kuwaiti Constitution, article 
173, if a law or regulation is considered unconstitutional, "it shall be 
considered null and void". 226 
In other countries the judgement of unconstitutionality does not lead 
automatically to the repeal or annulment of legislation. In UAE, for 
example, the authority of the Supreme Court ends by judging the 
unconstitutionality of a legislative text, without extending to its repeal. 
This may be seen in para. 2 of article 101 of the Constitution which 
states that if the Court decides during its examination of 
constitutionality of laws, legislation or regulations, that a federal law 
violates the Federal Constitution, it will be the duty of the authorised 
power in the Union or the Emirate to take the measures necessary to 
correct this constitutional violation. This is confirmed by article 151 of 
the Constitution. 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not extend to repealing an 
unconstitutional law, but only the judgement of unconstitutionality and 
abstention from applying the law in dispute. The law remains in 
existence, though deprived of its real force in practice, with 
the 
obligation of the federal or local authorities to take the measures 
necessary to correct the constitutional violation. This is not applied 
retroactively, but only from the date of the judgement of 
its 
unconstitutionality. Some justify this approach on the grounds that 
it 
takes into account practical considerations in maintaining and protecting 
legal positions created in the light of the law. In addition, neglecting 
the rights and obligations which arise under such a law 
during its 
application and before the judgement of its unconstitutionality could 
lead to material and moral damages. 22e 
In contrast, in Kuwait, the judgement of repeal will extend to the date 
of promulgation of the unconstitutional law, in other words retroactively, 
eliminating all the implications of the repealed law. This approach could 
be justified on the grounds that justice could not be fully done without 
the amendment of the mistakes which arose from the application of an 
unconstitutional law from the date of its application, or else it could be 
objected on the grounds that such difficulties could not be amended. In 
other words, the law violating the constitution cannot be considered 
truly a law at all either formally or in substance, since it is a condition 
for the work of the legislative authority that it remains within the 
boundaries set by the Constitution. 
225. Article 6 of the Kuwaiti Court Law states that ; If the Constitutional Court decides on the 
unconstitutionality of a law or a decree-law, or the 
illegality of a regulation or adeinistrative 
regulation to a law in force, the authorised authority should take the "easures necessary to correct 
this violation and avend its isplications retroactively'. 
226. Ahead Kaial Abu al-Maid [Control of constitutionality of laws in the USA and Egypt], 1960 
pp. 223-221. 
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In this examination, we have seen how Arab legislators who chose 
judicial control of constitutionality have centralised control of 
constitutionality of laws and regulations, reducing the competence of 
other courts to consider the validity of rebuttals on grounds of 
unconstitutionality by any party to the dispute or any court, instead 
instructing courts to refer the matter to the organ concerned with 
constitutionality. 
Since individuals may not go directly to the constitutional organ, cases 
must be raised through lower courts, and at this level, the courts are 
given the right to examine the seriousness of the rebuttal. This 
procedure clearly contains drawbacks in the length of time required and 
the possibility of rejection by the lower court. In addition, Tabataba 
points out that, in a sense, the right to reject it on these grounds 
constitutes an examination of the constitutionality of the text, which 
should not be the task of the lower court. 
A possible safeguard in this respect is the procedure in some countries 
whereby the individual may appeal against the rejection on grounds of 
seriousness to the Supreme Court for wrong application or interpretation 
of law, though as we saw, the decision of bodies like the Committee in 
the Constitutional Court in Kuwait is final. 
Review of constitutionality of legislation means the protection of the 
Constitution and prevention of violation of its provisions. The aim of 
upholding the supremacy of the Constitution cannot be achieved unless 
control of constitutionality extends to all original legislation and branch 
legislation, such as regulations. 
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We have seen in the Egyptian cases in which the judiciary ruled on 
constitutionality of legislation that their competence to do so is opposed by 
those who see in it a violation of the principle of separation of powers in 
line with the French approach, for example, the Tunisian government at the 
Human Rights Committee discussions, has commented that a judge may not 
declare a law unconstitutional in Tunisia due to the principle of the 
separation of powers. The reasoning of the Egyptian court, that such 
competence of the judiciary is in fact supportive of the principle and of the 
Constitution itself, is more convincing. It is clear that the Court, in favouring 
the constitutional text over a lower law, is not exceeding its authority and 
usurping that of the legislator, but simply carrying out its legal duty of 
determining the law which is applicable in the case of dispute of laws. 
The fact of France's long constitutional experience on one hand, and the 
continuous process of modification to limit Executive powers on the other, 
are issues which the Arab counterpart did not and does not yet enjoy, thus 
one views this tendency with apprehension, if taken and accepted out of 
context. 
We argued that the jurisdiction of the judiciary to review legislation within 
the Arab legal context was and remains of vital importance in protecting the 
rule of law and promoting effective reform. The following analyses of 
decisions given by the Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court and Supreme 
Constitutional Court are cases in point, in the sense that they illustrate on 
one hand, the importance of such organs in the legal order as a vital 
component in upholding the rule of law, by setting important principles for 
other judicial bodies, and on the other, shed light on how far judicial review 
in general and within the developing Arab legal order in particular, could 
contribute more positively to upholding the rule of law and protection of 
individual and collective rights than any other mechanism, in cases of 
Executive abuse. 
As we saw, the Egyptian legislature took an important step in creating an 
independent body for the task of controlling and reviewing legislation to 
ensure its compatibility with the Constitution, regulating this task by Law 
no. 48 of 1979. 
This examination points out the competence of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court, when and how the Court's jurisdiction is established, as well as the 
implications which result from its decisions regarding legislation considered 
by the Court to be unconstitutional, and how the Egyptian Supreme Court has 
interpreted administrative objections, in the light of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court's decision. It also focuses both on the Court's 
interpretation of constitutional provisions concerning political rights, and 
principles of legality. 22 
227. These Cases are published in the Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court Publications, issues No-5-6 
for Year 63 and quoted in the Libyan magazine, [al-Mohamy] (the Lawyer), second issue, October- 
December, 19§4, pp. 43-67. 
An analysis of Law no. 48 may be found in A. 'Atiyah 
[`A comparative and analytical study on the law bearing on the Constitutional Supreme Court (Law no. 48/1979) L'Egypt contemporaine 70, no. 375 1979, 
pp. 15-52. 
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According to article 29 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Law, the Court 
is authorised to carry out judicial control of constitutionality of laws and 
regulations. Should any courts or organs of judicial competence, during review 
of a case, note unconstitutionality of text in law, regulation or a decision on 
a dispute, the court is instructed to suspend the case and refer it to the 
Supreme Constitutional Court to decide on the issue of constitutionality. 2z8 
Also, if any of the litigants rebut during litigation before any court or organ 
of judicial competence on grounds of unconstitutionality of text, in law or 
regulation, and the Court or organ observes the seriousness of the rebuttal, it 
is instructed to adjourn the case and specify to whoever raised the rebuttal a 
date not exceeding three months by which to raise the case before the 
Supreme Constitutional Court to decide on the issue of constitutionality 
before the court makes its final judgement in the case. 
In reviewing this law, one notes inter alia that according to article 49, the 
judgement of the Court in constitutional cases and its decisions in 
interpreting are binding on all the authorities of the state, and that these 
judgements and decisions should be publicised in the Official Gazette, within 
a maximum period of 15 days from the date of promulgation. It also provides 
that the result of the judgement of unconstitutionality of a legal text or 
regulation is that it may not be implemented from the day following 
publication of the judgement. However, regarding laws of penal nature, the 
judgement of unconstitutionality regarding a penal text means that the 
provisions which convict will be considered, according to this text, repealed 
erga onUnes retroactively. 
Under Case no. 47 for the third judicial year constitutional registered in the 
Supreme Constitutional Court, several lawyers raised a case against the 
President of the Republic and the President of the People's Council as the 
authorities which promulgated Law No. 125 of 1981, regarding the dissolution 
of the Bar Association, and the Minister of Justice's Decision No. 2555/81, 
regarding the formation of a temporary Council for the Bar. They requested 
the judgement of the unconstitutionality of Law no. 125 of 1981, and the 
unconstitutionality of both the Letter of the President to the President of the 
People's Council requesting investigation of issues relating to the Bar Council 
228. The Supreme Administrative Court, in Case no. 3949/35J dated 5th September 1983, confirmed that 
the Court's right in this matter is not limited to the occasion when one of the litigants in a case 
rebuts on the grounds of unconstitutionality, since the court, if it notices the unconstitutionality 
of text linked to the case, should suspend consideration of the case and refer the papers to the 
Supreme Constitutional Court for consideration. Therefore, the Administrative Court's decisions to suspend the case and transfer it to the 
Constitutional Court to determine the constitutionality of law no-17/83 on the ground that this text 
is the source on which the challenged decision is based, cannot be considered it violation of para. B of 
article 29 of the Supreme Constitutional Court law. 
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and the People's Council's decision regarding the formation of an 
investigation Committee. 2 29 
The Supreme Constitutional Court, with regard to the challenge on grounds 
of unconstitutionality of the Letter of the President of the Republic and the 
decision of the President of the People's Council dated 13th July 1.981, 
confirmed that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Constitutional Court in 
constitutional matters cannot be raised unless the Court is connected to a 
case in conformity with article 29 of the law which created it, that is to 
say, its jurisdiction applies only where other competent courts transfer a 
request to examine a constitutional matter, or any of the litigants in a case 
under consideration raises the unconstitutionality of a legislative text and the 
court of the subject considers its seriousness and allows him to raise a case 
before the Supreme Constitutional Court. 2 30 
Despite the Government's original objection231 on. the grounds of the nature 
of the Minister of Justice's decision for the formation of a temporary Bar 
Council, 2 3' it decided that the constitutionality of both this decision and Law 
no. 125 of 1981 should be reviewed. 
229. When the claimants raised Case no. 2479/35J before the Administrative Court, the Court held that 
the plaintiffs in Case no. 2350/35 before the Administrative Court had requested urgently the judgement 
to suspend implementation of the President of the Republic's Letter to the People's Council, which 
includes the request of investigation of what he regarded as the "Bar exceeding its mandate and 
correct activities as a professional association and syndicate, as well as their attitude towards the 
public interest", and the People's Council's decision dated 13 July 1981 to form the ad hoc Fact 
Finding Committee, and the Minister of Justice's Decision no. 2555/81 forming a temporary Council 
for 
their Bar Association. 
During the Administrative Court's review of this case, the plaintiffs raised another case, within the 
same Court, requesting urgently the judgement of suspension of the decision of dissolving the Bar and 
the decision of the Minister of Justice no. 2555/81 of forming the temporary Council. Since the Supreme 
Constitutional Court Law, as we saw, requires that the dispute be referred by another court or 
judicial organ to be subject to its jurisdiction, they also requested the Court to refer the case of 
unconstitutionality of the legislation as a result of which these two decisions were promulgated, to 
the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
The Court, observing the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction, decided in its session dated 11 August 
1981 to adjourn judgement in the case for two months to allow the plaintiffs to raise their 
constitutional case. The plaintiffs raised the present case, amending their objective demands to 
include the respondent to pay compensation for damages resulting from these decisions. 
230. In the light of this, the Court rejected the claim of unconstitutionality of the President's 
letter and its subject. Since the case documents do not indicate that the plaintiffs rebutted the 
issue in front of the Administrative Court, the Court rejected the claim of unconstitutionality, on 
the grounds that the Court's jurisdiction was not applicable according to the law. 
231. The Government originally requested the rejection of the claim, subsequently called for the 
dispute to be considered as finalized and finally called for the dismissal of the case. 
232. The Government objected to the claim of unconstitutionality of the decision of the Minister of 
Justice to form a temporary Council for the Bar, since in the Government's opinion, it did not exceed 
the Executive act in implementing the text of Article two of Law no. 125 of 1981. It does not 
constitute an administrative decision, and therefore the administrative judiciary was out of 
urisdiction in requesting the repeal of laws or in disputes of executive actions which do not qualify 
for the status of administrative decisions. Therefore, the government argued, the constitutional claim 
reached the Court by direct means in contradiction and nonconformity with law. 
This rebuttal, in the view of the Court, oust be rejected since the Court is not an appeal court to 
the court of the subject but of original jurisdiction. Its limit is the law which created /... 
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With regard to the unconstitutionality of Law no. 125 of 1981, the 
Government subsequently argued that, in the light of the suspension of 
Decision no. 2555 and the promulgation of Law no. 109 of 1982 and Law no. 17 
of 1983, which repealed both Law no. 61 of 1968 and Law no. 125,23 a which 
formed the subject of the claimants' request, it was now non-existent and 
its implications were finalised, since the lawyers' interest in pursuing the 
case no longer existed. 
However, in the view of the Court, the legislator's repeal by Law no. 17 of 
Law no. 125 with retroactive effect does not prevent the Court from 
examining and deciding on its constitutionality in respect of those for whom 
this Law has been implemented, since it created legal implications for them, 
and they retain a personal interest in the rebuttal. 
The Supreme Constitutional Court examined Law no. 125 of 1981 regarding 
the Bar Association, 23 and referring to the plaintiffs' rebuttal to the first 
it, and a constitutional case cannot be raised to it unless a rebuttal has been made before the court of the subject or by the latter's referral to the Supreme Constitutional Court. Once it has been raised, it becomes independent of the subject case, because it treats a subject completely different from the original 
claim on which the plea to jurisdiction is based. Hence, the court of the subject -unlike the Constitutional Supreme Court - is the one of jurisdiction to decide and the issue of jurisdiction will not be before this 
court unless there is a jurisdiction dispute between the judicial organs or in the case of dispute regarding 
two contradictory final judgements promulgated by two different organs, when it is requested to point out 
the competent organ to view the dispute or which of the judgements should be executed in the light of 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 25 of the Court Composition Law. Hence, the Administrative Court alone is the Court with jurisdiction to determine its own urisdiction in the case before it, with regard to the primary 
and the secondary claim for compensation, subject to the Supreme Administrative Court, and therefore the Government's rebuttal on these grounds is incorrect and should be rejected. 233. The Government pointed out the promulgation of Law no. 109 and the fact that another decision from the Minister of Justice had been promulgated, no. 3309 of 1982, stipulating the formation of a new Permanent Bar Association Council as well as the promulgation of Law no. 17 regarding the Lawyers' Law, including in its first article, the repeal of Law no. 61 and Law no. 125, with the result that the objective request and its implications are invalid after the repeal of Decision 2555 of 1981, and Law no. 125, since this was the 
subject of the claimants' request. Thus, their interest in continuing the case does not exist, and the dispute is finalised. 
234. The Court considered the legal principle that the implementation of a legal rule applies to matters 
which take place during its application, that it to say, from the day ois -promulgation and entry to force 
n the date of its repeal. Unce is rue is replaced by another rule, the latter will be that applicable, 
nevertheless, legal implications which emerged as a result of the previous rule remain valid, and so their 
effect could be the subject of examination. Therefore, since Law no. 125 was implemented, and its implication affected the objectors, the objective 
demand focused on the rebuttal against the unconstitutionality of Law no. 125, and the Court considered that their interest remained in fact as far as the constitutional case is concerned, despite the subject of 
compensation which remains within the jurisdiction of the subject court. The matter is not affected by the Government's point with regard to the issue of compensation, that it was raised after the constitutional 
claim took place, since the interest in rebuttal of the unconstitutionality is that the judgement on it will 
affect the objective demands which are still the whole subject of the objective court, thus the request of 
considering the constitutional dispute void is not in its place. This Law was publicised in the Official'lGizette on 23 July 1981. After stating in its first article that it dissolved the Bar Council from its promulgation, its second article goes on to form a temporary council to 
the Bar enjoying all jurisdiction. Its third article provides that the temporary Council shall prepare a Lawyers' bill within a Year of the date of this law, and within sixty days of the promulgation of the Lawyers' Law, elect the ear President and members. Article four provides for the suspension of articles 12 to 19 of the Lawyers' Law no. 61 of 1968, until the election of the Bar President and Council according to the third Article. The fifth article repeals any of the content of the previous law which conflicts with the 
present Law, while the final article provides for publication of this Law in the Official Gazette and its 
application from the day after publication. 
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article of this Law, which in fact finalized the tenure of elected president 
and members of the Bar Council before the specified date in the Lawyers' 
Law by replacing them with a temporary council appointed by the Minister of 
Justice, found that this amounted to infringement of Article 56 of the 
Constitution, which made the establishment of trade unions a guaranteed 
constitutional right, whose exercise is based on democratic foundations. This 
means that elections are the only means for the formation of trade union 
councils, hence the Court considered that the challenged Law, in dissolving 
the correctly elected council and in forming another by appointment 
amounted to violation of the freedom of trade unionism, contrary to the 
Constitution. 23s 
The Constitution of 1971., in article 56, provides for the formation of 
associations, syndicates and unions with corporate personality on democratic 
grounds, a right guaranteed by law, and that law regulates, inter alia, the 
accountability of its members for their actions. The Court pointed out that 
the draft of the 1971 Constitution did not follow previous Constitutions by 
granting political rights and freedoms only, 238 but went further in 
emphasising the democratic principle as a basis for these rights and 
freedoms, including syndicalism. It provides that these associations should be 
formed on democratic grounds so that the democratic system will be 
deepened, as the Constitution built on it the foundation of the state, in line 
with its first article, which provides that : "The Egyptian Arab Republic is a 
democratic and socialist state ... 
". 
235. Since the President and members of the Bar Council are elected by the members of the Bar, 
termination of their syndicate posts before the end of their term of office by means external to the 
electorate, which is the General Assembly of the Bar, thus undermined its right in selecting thee. The 
law also prevented the assembly from electing new members to occupy the posts, as article 4 provided 
for the suspension of articles 12 to 19 of the Lawyers' Law in force, which dealt with candidacy and 
elections to the post of President and the Council, until the promulgation of the new Lawyers' Law and 
elections according to its regulations. Hence, article one constituted an infringement of article 56 
of the Constitution, for its violation of the principle of free trade unionism and for its conflict 
with the democratic foundation which this text created as a rule for promoting syndicalism and 
unionism. 
It is irrelevant that it was impossible for the competent general assembly to meet due to the 
withdrawal of confidence from the Bar Council, according to the applicable law at the time - which 
states in article 6, the necessity of the presence of half of the lawyers - since the constitutional 
remedy to this is the amendment of that article to what the legislature considers important to enable 
the general assembly to exercise its jurisdiction. Nor is it significant as the government claims, 
that professional syndicates, including the Bar Association, should be considered within the public 
domain and falling under state supervision to ensure its function and control of its activities, 
including its right to dissolve the Bar Council, since regulating the syndicates as part of public law 
is considered within the jurisdiction of the state as the guardian of general interest and the public 
domain. Nevertheless state regulation and supervision of syndicalism should be within the boundaries 
and according to the rules set by the Constitution, including those stated in article 56. 
Hence the Court made its judgement of the unconstitutionality of article 1 of Law no. 125, and since 
the rest of the articles of this Law depend on this first article, and the connection does not bear 
separation or division, thus the unconstitutionality of article 1 and nullification of its effect 
require in consequence the repeal of the whole law. 
236. Article 55 of 1956 Constitution provides : "The creation of syndicates is a guaranteed right. 
Syndicates have a moral personality in the manner prescribed by the law", in line with article 41 of the 1964 Constitution. 
Muhammad Khalil The Arab states and the Arab League ... , 1962. 
Page 196 POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB LEGAL ORDER 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The Constitution lays emphasis, in several articles, on principles which 
specify the democratic conception which it firmly establishes and which 
constitute the fundamental characteristics of the society it seeks to 
establish, whether in relation to the emphasis on popular sovereignty - which 
the Court rightly describes as a core of democracy - or by guaranteeing 
rights and freedoms, which is its aim, or by popular participation in 
exercising power, which is its means. z3° When the constitutional legislator 
provided, in article 56, that associations and unions be formulated on a 
democratic foundation as a right guaranteed by law, in the view of the 
Constitutional Court, 238 the legislator meant to confirm that the principle of 
freedom of association in its democratic sense implied, inter alia, the right 
to choose freely and in person the union leaders who represent their will.. 
Conversely, this article imposes an obligation on the ordinary legislature to 
observe this, which means that what it legislates must not conflict with 
legislation in respect of associations by contradicting the principle of 
freedom of association within its democratic sense. 
For all these reasons, the Court found Law no. 125 unconstitutional and by 
publicising this judgement in the Official Gazette, repealed it ergs omne_s. 2 39 
Further cases raised by the Bar Association deal with the constitutionality 
of legislation regarding the Bar Association in Egypt. zao 
237. The Court further considered that, since freedom of opinion and choice form an essential part of 
public rights and freedoms, and the foundation of any coherent democracy, thus the Constitution 
provided, in its third Chapter, that freedom of opinion is guaranteed and that every individual has 
the right to express his opinion and declare it orally, in writing, by photographs or any other means 
of expression within the limits of the law, (article 74), and that the formation of associations and 
unions on a democratic basis is a right guaranteed by law, (article 56), and that to every national 
are guaranteed the rights to elect and be a candidate, to express opinions in referenda according to 
the law, with participation in public life regarded as a national duty (article 62). 
The Court considered that the Constitution sought to facilitate citizens in exercising public rights, 
including their contribution in the choice of their leaders and their representatives in the governing 
process, and the protection of collective rights through elections at the national level such as the 
People's and Shu'ra Councils, as well as at the local level, in the People's Councils, according to 
articles 87,162 and 169. 
238. The Court referred to the opinion of the Joint Committee of the Manpower Committee and the Bureau 
of the Legislative Committee of the People's Assembly on this constitutional concept of article 56, in 
its report on the projected Law no. 35 of 1976, in connection to the promulgation of Workers' trade 
unions which, in the Court's opinion, - is- an -a solute provision applicable to all associations despite 
their nature, whether worker or professional. 239. The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, case no. 47/3, of 11th June 1983. 
240. Case no. 3949/37J dated 28th May 1983, raised by the President and the members of the elected Bar 
Council before the Administrative Court, and the Government's Case no. 2742/29 dated 7th July 1983 
before the Supreme Administrative Court, challenging the decision of the lower court. 
The President and Bar Council demanded : firstly, as a matter of urgency, the suspension of the 
decision regarding the composition of a temporary Bar Council according to Law no. 17 of 1983, of which the plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality, and request the transfer by the Court to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court; secondly as a matter of urency, and until the judgement of unconstitutionality 
of the two laws, no. 125 of 1941 and no. 17 of 1983, 
' 
983, of imposing receivership on the Bar and appointing 
the legitimate Bar Council as guardian of its affairs; and lastly, the repeal of the challenged decision, and the judgement of obliging the Government to pay compensation to the plaintiffs as legitimate representatives of the Bar Association. 
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The Bar Council was dissolved by Law no. 125, and a decision of the Minister 
of Justice was promulgated in respect of formation of a temporary Council. 
During its examination by the Supreme Constitutional Court, Law no. 109 of 
1982 - amending Law no. 125 - and subsequently, Law no. 17 of 1983 were 
promulgated, in the light of which the Minister of Justice promulgated 
another decision for the re-election of the temporary Bar Council. It seems 
that the Government meant by this amendment to prevent the Supreme 
Constitutional Court making its decision on the constitutionality of Law 
no. 125. Law no. 17, regarding the Bar Association regulations, included a text 
giving a Committee2 41 the right to form a temporary Council for the Bar. 
This Committee was formed, and the plaintiffs alleged that this decision and 
Law no. 17 infringed the Constitution, because discussion and acceptance of 
the projected law, containing more then two hundred articles, took place in 
four days, one day before the judgement of the Constitutional Court, 
indicating bad faith on the Government's part . 
242 
On 14th June 1983, the representative of the claimants submitted the 
judgement of the Supreme Constitutional Court no. 47/3JC, which establishes 
the unconstitutionality of Law no. 125. The claimants also requested 
suspension of execution of the decision regarding the composition of a 
temporary Bar Council, and the decision of this temporary organ in 
executing Law no. 17 specifying a date for the election of the temporary 
Council, preventing the legitimate Council from exercising its jurisdiction. 
Lastly, they demanded the repeal of these two decisions. The claimants 
presented a memorandum including the assertion that Law no. 17 is an 
extension to Law no. 125, and that the Supreme Constitutional Court's 
judgement therefore implies that it too is unconstitutional. 243 
241. This Committee was to be drawn from the judiciary, headed by the President of the Court of Cassation, 
and would appoint a temporary Bar Council of 20 members. 242. They also alleged that the intention in promulgating Law no. 17 was not to organize the public domain, 
but was ideologically motivated as revenge on the Bar Council, and that this Law aimed at covering up an 
unlawful and unconstitutional act. This Law was also described as an outrageous violation by the Legislative 
and Executive authorities on the Supreme Constitutional Court by interfering in constitutional justice, 
since they participated in the drafting and promulgation of the law. 
243. The lawyers also argued that, since the Supreme Constitutional Court published its judgement in the 
Official Gazette after the promulgation of the new law, this implies that the new law too is 
unconstitutional, since if the Court considered that Law no. 17 had corrected the unconstitutionality of Law 
no. 125, it need not have publicised its findings on Law no. 125. 
The claimants also challenged the legitimacy of the formation of the Council, which took place as a result 
of Law no. 17, since the judgement cancelled every legislative text undermining the legitimacy of the elected 
Council, thereby returning the legitimacy which was withdrawn unlawfully and by an unjust law. The claimants again requested the referral of their rebuttal on the unconstitutionality of Law no. 17 to the 
Supreme Constitutional Court. 
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The Government argued, inter alia, zaa that the Court did not have 
jurisdiction to examine the case, since the objection to the decision of the 
temporary Committee to supervise the Bar Council elections and specify the 
date for the election of the new Bar Council was raised prematurely. 246 
On 5th July 1983, the Administrative Court announced its judgement, 
dismissing the Government's objections, 2°e acceding to the urgent request for 
suspension of execution of the decision of the Committee created by article 
2 of Law no. 17 of 1983, z°° and adjourning the case, while its papers were 
244. The Government called for rejection of the case, arguing that Law no. 17 is the first democratic 
law since the revolution to regulate advocacy, as the previous regulations were promulgated by by- 
laws. This law was not promulgated by a person or persons, but by the People's 
Council, 
the 
legislative authority in the country, and according to the constitutional arrangement and standing 
orders of the People's Council, and this does not violate any of the 
Bar or the lawyers' rights, on 
the contrary, supporting them. Nevertheless, there is no foundation for the claims that the government 
promulgated this law to deprive the Supreme Constitutional Court of its right to exercise 
its control 
on Law no. 125. Despite the proclamation of the mentioned 
law, the Court did not abandon examination of 
Challenge no. 47/3J Constitutional. 
245. The Government's legal characterisation of the request of the claimants was that as an objection 
to the provisions of Law no. 17, it exceeds the competence of the administrative 
judiciary. In 
addition, the three-man Committee, which the legislator appointed to select the temporary members of 
the Committee, were drawn from the Presidents of the organs of the judiciary. 
Therefore, it cannot be 
considered an administrative decision. The Governemnt also stated that the decision which 
the three- 
man Committee Promulgated on 19th May 1983, regarding the elections, 
does not count as an 
administrative decision. Nor does it go beyond a preparatory action which the 
legislator took to 
compose the Bar Council. according to the provisions of the law and the 
internal regime of the Bar, it 
is an action which does not create, repeal or amend a previous legal position, and therefore, 
the 
objection cannot be legally acceptable. The rules of the Lawyers' Law and 
the internal system of the 
Bar do not allow a challenge to the independence of a decision inviting the 
General assembly to meet 
to elect a President and members of the Bar Council. Nevertheless, it is important 
to wait until the 
election has been conducted before an objection can be raised against the whole matter. 
246. The Court rejected the challenge against the competence of the judicial administrative organ, on 
the grounds that it exercised its jurisdiction as a public authority, and everything promulgated 
by it 
in this capacity is considered an administrative act. In the light of this, the 
jurisdiction in 
examining this case, which focuses on the exercise of this Committee in that capacity, is authorised 
to the administrative judicial organ, according to article 10/5 and article 14 of the 
Law of the State 
Council, promulgated by Law no. 47 of 1972. 
With regard to the grounds of time, the Court found that the claimants' intention in raising 
their 
case was to challenge the new procedures for organising the Bar, since they seem corrupt, 
in the view 
of the claimants, from their foundation, because of their promulgation by an authorised authority, 
based on a law suspected of unconstitutionality. Thus, the raising of the case is considered timely. 
247. The Court's judgement on the suspension on the decision of the Committee was based on the 
principles of seriousness and urgency, existing in the request. The Court saw seriousness in the 
legal 
text, which appeared to it unconstitutional. The judgement of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court, of 
ýlth June 1983, established the unconstitutionality of Law no. 125 from the date of its promulgation 
22/7/81), and thus returned the Bar Council which the previous law had dissolved. This leads to an 
examination of Law no. 17 in the light of the Supreme Constitutional Court judgement which returned 
the legal existence of the elected Bar Council. A review of Law no. 17 indicates clear'ly that this Law 
did not consider the legal existence of the elected Council, according to its articles 2 and 3, 
paragraph 2 of article 4 and paragraph 1 of article 5. These texts are considered an extension of the 
implications created by Law no. 125, and hence the Legislature commits the same constitutional 
infringement which the Supreme Constitutional Court had indicated. 
These grounds were confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court, when it rejected the Government's 
challenge of the Administrative Court's decision, confirming that its judgement pointed out that the 
challenged decision was based on corrupt legislation, most likely to be found unconstitutional and 
consequently repealed. 
With regard to urgency, the Court found that the prevention of the Bar Council exercising its 
competence, as provided by law, in particular, its supervisory role on the election of the President 
and members of the General Bar Council within 6 months of the promulgation of the law, would give rise 
to implications which could not be amended if a judgement of unconstitutionality was made, and the 
decision was repealed. 
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transferred to the Supreme Constitutional Court to decide on the 
constitutionality of articles 2 and 3, and the second paragraph of article 4 
and the first paragraph of article 5 of Law no. 17. 
The interpretation of the Supreme Administrative Court, in Case no. 3949/35J, 
which confirmed the Administrative Court's decision to suspend the case and 
transfer it to the Supreme Constitutional Court on the ground that Law no. 17 
is the source on which the challenged decision is based, illustrates an 
important principle adopted by the lower court and confirmed, despite the 
Government's objection. 
The Court found that there is no evidence that it is obligatory for the 
Court, when it notes the seriousness of a rebuttal on grounds of 
unconstitutionality to abstain from judging on these grounds, the suspension 
of execution of a decision that the premises of seriousness and urgency exist. 
Since, in the Court's opinion, the text in question was most likely to be 
judged unconstitutional and repealed thereafter, the Court saw no conflict 
between the judgement of suspension of execution of the decision and the 
judgement of suspending the case and referring it to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court, since each judicial organ has its own jurisdiction. The 
first judgement was based on the premises of seriousness and urgency, while 
the second, the judgement on the subject of the case, depends on the 
judgement on the question of constitutionality. 249 
Further, in confirmation of the subject Court's findings, the Supreme 
Administrative Court referred to the findings of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court, saying that Law no. 125 has dismissed the elected President and 
members of the Bar Council from their positions before the end of their 
terms of office without the General Assembly of the Bar Council. Therefore, 
the legislator violated the principle of democratic organization, which should 
have been observed in the regulation of syndicates, both at formation and 
dissolution, the principle upheld by article 56 of the Constitution. In the 
Court's view, the reorganization of the associations sphere by Law no. 17 is no 
justification for over-riding constitutional principles, since the legislator's 
object was not to create a Bar Association for the first time, by using 
exceptional texts, since he was dealing with a syndicate created in 1912. 
Even if the state has the right to organize existing syndicates, nevertheless 
this right should not violate the principle of democratic formation of 
syndicates. 
248. In the view of the Court, the principle of legality in administrative decisions is measured by 
their compatability with the law according to which they are promulgated. 
In order that the administrative decision be legitimate, the law which promulgates it should in turn 
be legitimate and that legitimacy cannot be divided. An administrative decision promulgated according 
to a regulation contrary to law, is considered an illegitimate decision. The decision which is 
promulgated according to unconstitutional law is likewise deficient, since the Constitution is the 
first to be respected in the hierarchical legal system- 
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Also of interest to the issue of judicial review of constitutionality of law is 
the Supreme Administrative Court's interpretation of article 1.912 49 of the 
1971 Constitution. The Government had argued that the provisions of Law 
no. 125, although violating the Constitution, would remain in force from the 
date of promulgation (24/7/81) until repealed or amended according to the 
rules and procedures of the Constitution, and that the judgement from the 
Constitutional Court on unconstitutionality did not repeal this law, on the 
grounds that this contradicted the provisions of article 191 of the 
Constitution. 
The Supreme Administrative Court considered this interpretation unsound 
since the constitutional article deals with laws and regulations in force 
hefore the promulgation. of the 1971 Constitution, and therefore not Law 
no. 125 of 1981. 
Further, article 49 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Law promulgated by 
Law no. 48 of 1979, reviewed above, does not, as the challenge alleged, imply 
that the law found unconstitutional remains in force until the day following 
publication of the judgement. Rather, it means that the unconstitutional law 
should not be implemented from the day following the judgement, since at 
this point, knowledge of its unconstitutionality takes place. Nor does it mean 
that this law will remain valid and in force, despite the judgement of its 
unconstitutionality, until the day of publication of the judgement. Since the 
judgement of the Supreme Constitutional Court does not create a new 
situation but rather determines a situation which exists, therefore Law 
no. 125, in the opinion of the Court, was unconstitutional from the day of its 
promulgation, and not from the day following publication of the judgement of 
its unconstitutionality, or else this would mean that the law was 
constitutional in one period and unconstitutional in another, under the same 
Constitution, which does not fit with either legal or logical understanding. 
Therefore, the law judged unconstitutional will be considered so, and 
repealed erga omnes from the day of promulgation. This is not an exception 
limited to the penal sphere, as the objection implied, but a decisive factor in 
the principle that judgements reveal rather than create. 
249. Article 191 of the 1971 Constitution provides that : 'fhe provisions of all laws and regulations 
in force before the issuance of this Constitution will remain appropriate and valid. (hey "ay be 
abrogated or amended according to the rules and procedures established in this Constitution. " 
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Chapter One examined the nature and extent of state of emergency in the 
light of international law, This section examines national legislation 
concerned with the state of emergency in the Arab countries, and its effect 
on the legal order and the rule of law, focusing on the legislation of certain 
states, which represent tendencies within the Arab legal order. 
Although States have the right to declare state of emergency and to take 
the necessary legislative steps 24° in the light of their national and 
international obligations, depending on the nature and scope of the 
emergency situations, it is a fact that states of emergency have often led 
to the undermining of the normal legal protection of human rights, and 
emergency provisions, which should have limited duration, have become the 
norm rather than the exception in many states. In the Arab world, state of 
emergency merits special consideration for its severe effect on the 
protection of human rights and indeed, on the nature of the legal order 
itself. This section will consider only state of emergency declared in 
response to real or perceived threats to internal or external security, for 
its frequent use in the Arab world. In this context, temporary or emergency 
legislation seriously affects the legal order to varying degrees, and the 
extraordinary legal system has a great impact on the legal order, in terms 
of legislation and institutions. 
In most Arab countries, Constitutions or special laws set forth legislation 
dealing with situations of crisis, including war or the threat of war, actual 
disruption or threat to public order, to the integrity of the nation, or to 
the functioning of organs of government, 2S° The use of vague terms such 
as "public security or order" (Egypt), "jeopardise the functioning of the 
constitutional institutions" (Morocco), "serious disturbance to public 
security" (Iraq) represents a potential threat to the rule of law and human 
rights, since they are open to varying interpretation and may be subject to 
abuse. 
As we saw in Chapter one, two important concepts which occur in 
legislation regulating the position of state of emergency are the idea that 
danger or threat must be imminent, and that the measures allowed are 
based on the theory of self-defence, and therefore should be proportionate 
to the threat and last only as long as the existence of the threat. 
Constitutions and other laws in the Arab countries provide for emergency 
measures to be taken in situations which threaten the state territory, 2 s' 
249. This could depend on whether the state of emergency is the outcome of internal or external political 
crisis or force aajeure disasters. 
250. Arab legislation, as in other countries, also provides for state of emergency in other circus Lances 
such as " public disasters or the spread of an epidemic (Egypt); general idea'c or catastrophe (Iraq); 'danger to security or public order ... by reason of . natural 
disasters' Syria). 
251. The Moroccan Constitution, article 5, provides : 'when the integrity of the national territory is 
threatened, ... the King may, , declare a state of emergency ... 
'. 
In Algeria, article 120 of the Constitution provides that when the country is threatened with imminent 
danger to ... its territorial integrity, the President of 
the Republic decrees a state of urgency. The Jordanian Constitution, in article 124 provides that the 'Defence Act' shall be enacted in the event 
of an emergency necessitating the defence of the realm'. 
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security or public Order, 252 and the functioning of institutions. 253 
Some legislation mentions no time-limit on the state of emergency, so that 
the state of emergency can remain in force as long as circumstances that 
warrant it. 2 sa Others include a time limit in several. forms, for example, the 
time limit may be extended without condition other than a requirement for 
renewal, 265 or there may be limited extension, where the limit may depend 
on occurrence of some events. Z6e 
252. The Egyptian Constitution and the Emergency Act no. 161 of 1958, (as amended in 1967 by Act no. 60 
and in 1972 by Act no. 37) allow the imposition of emergency law "whenever public security or order in 
the territory of the republic or in any of its regions is endangered. " The reasons for its 
proclamation are specified as : the existence of dangers resulting from the outbreak of war, a 
situation that threatens to lead to such an outbreak, the occurrence of internal disturbances. 
CERD/C/149/Add. 22 30th January 1987, p. 16. 
In Syria, Decree No 51 of 1962, which is taken almost word for word from the Egyptian Act of 1958, 
lists three conditions which permit the proclamation and application of a state of emergency : (a) a 
state of war; (b) the threat of war; (c) danger to security or public order, in all or part of Syrian 
territory, by reason of internal troubles or natural disasters. 
States of Emergency : their impact on human rights. A study prepared by the International Commission 
of Jurists, 1983 p. 281. 
In Iraq, the Constitution empowers the Council of Ministers to proclaim a full or partial public 
emergency and terminate it by law, according to article 62, paragraph 9. It is regulated by the 
National Security Law no. 4,1965 (amended 1965,1966,1969,1970), which permits the proclamation of a 
public emergency in all or part of Iraq if the danger of hostile raid is imminent, if war is 
declared, or breaks out, or if any situation threatening the outbreak of war arises; if a serious 
disturbance to public security, or a serious threat thereto takes place. 
CCPR/C/1/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, p. 24. 
253. In Morocco, article 35 of the Constitution provides when events of-cur which might 
jeopardise 
the functioning of the constitutional institutions the King may, ... 
declare a state of emergency ... 
" 
Article 46 of the Tunisian Constitution provides for a state of emergency as follows : in case of 
imminent danger threatening the institutions of the Republic, ... and 
impeding the proper functioning 
of the machinery of government, the President of the Republic can take exceptional measures ". - 
" 
Article 113 of the Syrian Constitution provides that martial law may be imposed : in the event of 
grave danger, or a situation ... obstructing state 
institutions from carrying out their constitutional 
responsibilities'. 
In the Republic of Yemen, article 90 of the Constitution stipulates that the Chairman of the 
Reublican Council declares a state of emergency with the approval of the Republican Council, the 
Council of Ministers and the Ma, jlis al-Shura, but does not specify the grounds or the procedures 
involved. 
In Algeria, article 120 of the Constitution provides that when the country is threatened with 
imminent danger to its institutions ... 
the President of the Republic decrees a state of urgency". 
254. In Syria, the duration is unlimited, and there is no requirement for periodic re-submission to 
parliament for approval. Likewise, the decree which institutes a state of emergency is unquestionable. (Decrees No 147 and 148 of 1967) 
States of emergency : their impact on human rights. A study prepared by the International Commission 
of Jurists, 1983, p. 281. 
The Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Emirates does not specify the conditions in which 
martial law may be imposed, but provides that martial law is declared and terminated by decree, which 
must be approved by the Supreme Council. The imposition of martial law must also be approved by the 
President the Federal Council of Ministers, and the Federal Council of Ministers at its first 
meeting, 
larticle 146). 
255. In Egypt, the Emergency Act no. 37 of 1972 provides that the duration of the state of emergency 
must be specified in advance. There is an automatic procedure by which the declaration lapses if the 
National Assembly has been unable to reach a decision. The state of emergency is re-submitted to the 
People's Assembly for renewal. The present state of emergency in Egypt was renewed by the People's 
Assembly for the period from May 1.988 to May 1991 on the grounds of a continuing security threat. 
Impact International vol. 18: 7, April 1988. 
256. Article 46 of the Tunisian Constitution provides that : the President of the Republic can take 
exceptional measures required by the circumstances . These measures cease to be valid after the 
ending of the circumstances which gave rise to them ... 
". None of the measures of derogation provided 
by Decree no-78/50 of 26th January 1978 which specifies the duration of the state of emergency, may 
continue for a period of more than one month. The measures may be renewed only once by a Decree which 
must specifically state its duration. 
CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 of 2nd May 1986, pp. 12-3 and annex. 
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Most systems provide that suspension of guarantees may apply to all or part 
of the territory. In the latter case, the area or locality must be expressly 
stipulated. 2 V. 7 
Though a number of modalities have been identified in municipal law for the 
identification of guarantees subject to suspension or restriction, 266 most Arab 
legislation lists the rights and guarantees to be affected, in positive 
terms, 26' though these lists are not exhaustive. 
As we saw, the Tunisian Constitution authorises the President to declare a 
state of emergency, and since independence, these provisions have been 
invoked on two occasions for internal reasons. 2eo In Morocco, the 
257. In Iraq, National Security Law no. 4,1965 (amended 1965,1966,1969,1970) permits the 
proclamation of a public emergency in all or part of Iraq, issued through a Republican Decree, upon 
the consent of the Council of Ministers. This Decree should state the reasons for calling the state of 
emertency, and specify the area and the date on which it takes effect. 
CCP /C/l/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, pp. 24-5. 
258. The Special Rapporteur who prepared the Study on States of Emergency has identified three main 
cases : no provision expressly defines rights and guarantees subject to derogation or restriction; 
express provisions, listing in negative terms, the rights and guarantees that cannot 
be affected; 
reverse solution of the rights and guarantees to be affected listed in positive 
terms and 
exhaustively. 
Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning 
Situations known as 
States of Siege or Emergency, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1982/15 of 27th July 1982. 
259. For example, the Egyptian Constitution provides, in article 48, that it is permissible during a 
state of emergency or war to impose limited censorship on newspapers, publications, and other 
information media in matters related to public safety or national security in accordance with the 
Iaw'. 
In Jordan, the Constitution provides, in article 15 
(iv), that 'in the event of the declaration of 
martial law or a state of emergency, a limited censorship on newspapers, pamp hlets, 
books and 
broadcasts in matters affecting public safety or national defence may be imposed by law'. 
In Tunisia, Decree No. 78/50 of 26th January 1978 contains the following provisions affecting rights 
in a public emergency : prohibition of the movement of persons or vehicles during specific 
hours of 
the ni ht; prohibition of all strikes or lock-outs; control of people's residence and, in particular, 
local 
banishment 
of any person attempting to interfere with the actions of the public authorities 
in 
any way; power to commandeer persons and property needed for the proper operation of 
the public 
services of vital interest to the nation; power to order that arms and ammunition legally 
held by 
physical persons be given up for the period of the state of einer ency; power to close any public place 
and, in particular, entertainment halls, licensed premises and places of assembly of all kinds; power 
to order the entering and searching of premises by day and by night; control of publication and 
broadcasting. 
CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 2nd May 1986 p. 13. 
In Syria, Article 4 of the Martial Law Decree (Legislative decree number 51 dated 22/12/1962) 
empowers the Martial Law Governor or his deputy to adopt the all or some of the 
following measures 
the placing of restrictions on freedoms of individuals with respect to meetings ... in specific 
places or at particular times. Preventive arrest of anyone suspected of endangering public security 
and order. Authorization to investigate persons and places. (b) the censorship of letters and 
communications of all kinds. Censorship of newspapers, periodicals, publications, drawings, printed 
matter, broadcasts and all means of communication, propaganda and publicity before issue; also their 
seizure confiscation an suspension, the denial of their rights and the closure of the places in 
which they were printed. 
(c) 
the fixing of opening and closing times for public places. 
Report from Amnesty International to the government of the Syrian Arab Republic, 1983, pp. 50-51. 
260. The first was in January 1978, following disturbances which were felt to threaten the lives of 
citizens and the existence of institutions. The decree proclaiming the state of emergency was not 
renewed, and in fact, some of its provisions were not applied, since the country soon returned to 
normal. 
CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 2nd May 1986 p. 13 para. 42. 
The second occasion was in January 1984 after the government's decision to raise the price of basic 
foodstuffs. Decree no. 84/1 proclaimed the state of emergency, but on this occasion, the state of 
emergency was lifted before a month had elapsed. 
The Tunisian Sovernment notified the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations in accordance with article 
4 of the Covenant, of the emergency measures 
taken. 
CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 2nd May 1986 Annex pp i-ii. 
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King exercised his constitutional right in June 1965, when he dissolved 
Parliament, assumed full legislative power and suspended the Constitution. The 
state of emergency lasted until 1970, when a new Constitution was 
promulgated. 26 l In spite of the eight-year war with Iran, Iraq has stated 
that it has not proclaimed a general state of emergency during the period 
since the Covenant entered into force in 1976. However, it must be said that 
the Iraqi legal order, as we have seen, places restrictions on civil and 
political rights, on the grounds of national security, if not explicitly by 
emergency legislation. 
An effect on the legal order of the state of emergency is to transfer power 
from other organs of government to the Executive. During this period, 
concentration of power in the hands of the Executive also undermines the 
principle of separation of powers by tending to encourage Executive 
interference in the judicial process. This is manifested in emergency 
measures which allow the Executive to order the arrest and detention of a 
wide range of groups on grounds of threat to security, and to interfere in 
the process of law by measures which provide that appeals are made to the 
Executive rather than to a higher court. Another way in which judicial 
safeguards are undermined by the state of emergency is by the creation of a 
parallel judicial system, regulated by emergency laws, and exercised through 
extraordinary courts, whether military or security courts, which are not 
bound by the ordinary judicial system. 
To all this must be added the absence of an effective organ to supervise 
the constitutionality of laws passed during this critical period, either because 
it is weakened by Executive powers or because of the extremity of the 
emergency measures taken, for example, suspending parliament, which in 
some countries is the only organ which exercises control of constitutionality 
of laws. 
We saw how emergency law grants the Executive special powers, for 
example, to defend the nation or safeguard internal or external security. 
Examples of the range of powers may be found in the legislation of several 
countries. 202 
In several countries, extraordinary courts have been set up to try those 
261. Morocco : Amnesty International Briefing, 1977, p. 3. 
262. In Jordan, the provisions of Martial Law invest the Prime Minister as Martial Law Governor with 
wide powers to arrest anyone considered a threat to state security, and to suspend a broad range of 
civil and political rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Under Martial Law political prisoners 
are either held without trial or brought before military courts. 
Amnesty International Yearbook 1980. 
In Morocco, the declaration of a state of siege is potentially a threat to human rights as it 
provides that some crimes and offences will be transferred to the jurisdiction of military ... tribunals, according to a Dahir of ist September 1939 
In Syria, Article 4 of the Martial Law Decree (Legislative decree number 51 dated 22/12/1962) 
empowers the Martial Law Governor or his deputy to adopt several measures restricting individual 
rights (as we saw above), and try anyone who violates them in a military court. 
Article 6 of the Decree provides that the following offences shall be referred to military courts: (a) contravention of orders issued by the Martial Law Governor; (b) off nces against the security of the state and public order; (c) offences against public authority;... (e) offences which constitute a 
general danger. 
Report from Amnesty International to the government of the Syrian Arab Republic, 1983, pp. 50-51. In Iraq, article 4 of the National Security Law gives jurisdiction to the Prime Minister to exercise 
the authority specified by law in the area under the state of emergency. 
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accused of crimes against national security and public order. Such organs 
include military courts, Z83 State Security Courts"' and so-called 
revolutionary courts. 265 Often these courts lack legal safeguards, and no 
right to appeal is provided. Revolutionary and military courts in Iraq, for 
example, operate outside national. and international, law, since they are not 
independent of the military and the Ba'th party, and their members have 
little or no judicial experience. A deficiency in such courts is the lack of an 
adequate right of defence, since it is reported that accused persons may not 
have access to lawyers until the day of trial. There is no right of appeal to 
a higher judicial body, even in capital cases, since appeals for clemency may 
only be made to the Office of the President. 
Similarly in Syria286 and Egypt, ze? certain courts have been established 
263. Military courts, for example, in Tunisia consider both infringements of military regulations and 
ordinary crimes by military personnel. They establish competence ratione personae and ratione 
materiae. The composition of the court is four military judges presided over 
by a civilian, and it 
follows the normal Code of Penal Procedure. In contrast with other 
Arab countries, judgements of this 
Court may be reviewed by the Court of Cassation, with the addition of one military 
judge to the bench. 
Military courts also operate in Morocco, under the Code of Military 
Justice of 1956. This Code 
empowers military courts to try civilians accused of offences against the external security of 
the 
state, as well as military personnel. This modification took place by Law no. 
2/71 on 26th July 1971. 
Amnesty International Yearbook 1.983. 
264. For example, a Court of National Security dealing with cases of external or internal security was 
established in Tunisia in 1968. CCPR/C/SR. 714 of 9th April 1987, pp. 10-11. 
265. Courts established outside the ordinary legal framework include the "revolutionary courts set up 
in Iraq. According to Amnesty International, the Revolutionary Court in Baghdad is a permanent special 
court which tries crimes against internal and external security, and the 
Special Military Court in 
Kirkuk is a permanent military court which tries Kurds charged with political offences. 
According to the Iraqi government, the Revolutionary Court in Baghdad was set up under 
Act no. 180 of 
1968. In composition, it is made up of three members, one of whom represents the Public 
Prosecutor, 
appointed by Presidential Decree. It applies the Code of Criminal Procedure, and 
is competent to 
examine cases involving the internal and external security of the state. The 
judgements of this Court 
are not subject to review, though death sentences are reviewed by a legal bureau in 
the office of the 
President, and the final decision is made by the President. 
In Iraq, ' the Minister of Defence has the power, under Law no. 32 (1966), to form Emergency 
Military 
Courts, composed of a President of a rank not below that of Lieutenant-Colonel, and two members of a 
rank not below that of Major. An assistant judicial counsellor, appointed by the Minister shall 
fill. 
the post of Public Prosecutor in such courts. The courts may try persons assigned to 
them by the 
Minister of Defence, or by whoever he authorises to do so. The Minister shall be empowered 
to stop all 
legal investigations and order the closing of a case, for some or all of the defendants. 
Amendment 32 to the National Security Law of 1965 provides, in article 1 that the Minister of Defence 
is empowered during military operations to form Military Inquiry Committees to 
investigate offences 
falling within the jurisdiction of Emergency Military Courts, as set forth in article 
5 of the law. 
The Committees have the judicial power of examining judges. Article 5 of the Law rules that 
Emergency 
Military Courts may examine all offences allegedly committed inside or outside the area of actual 
operations, if they are related to a rebellion or mutiny within the area. 
CCPR/C/1/Add. 45 8th June 1979 pp. 24-26. 
266. Amnesty International comments that there is no legal right to challenge, for example, the 
lawfulness of arrest in court nor make any judicial appeal against wrongful detention, because 
according to Article 4 (a) of the State of Emergency Law, the Deputy Martial Law Governor decides 
whether to hold any arrested person in preventive detention, whether to refer the case to a military 
or state security court, or whether to order release, and appeals may only 
be made to the local 
security force commander, the Deputy Martial Law 
Governor or the President. 
Human Rights Journal Vol 4 No. 1, pp. 20-21. 
267. In Egypt, Law 105 of the Establishment of State Security Courts, published in the Official 
Gazette on 31st May 1980, established that the State Security Court comprises three judges from the 
Court of Appeal, and provided for two officers of the armed forces to be added by Presidential Decree. 
According to Act No. 164 of 1981 which amended some parts of At No. 162 of 1958, concerning the state 
of emergency, those detained under the Emergency Act could submit a complaint to the President 
or his representative, if they had not been released after six months. In the event of rejection, 
another complaint could be made after six months. 
These provisions were later amended by Act No. 50 of 
1982, which transferred responsibility for supervision 
from the President to the Supreme Court / ... 
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during the state of emergency which deal with cases related to national 
security and public order. 
Under emergency regulations in the Arab countries, a wide range of civil 
and political rights may be restricted on the grounds of threat to external or 
internal security. Emergency law provides for the arrest and detention" I of 
those suspected of endangering national security or public order. Other rights 
which are restricted include : freedoms of movement, Z°R assembly, 27° 
association, information and expression, z' z and the right to participate in 
political. life, 2' 2 We can see that the effect of the state of emergency on 
the legal. order is to undermine many of the legal safeguards for people 
whose basic rights may be restricted in the name of security. 
A number of civil rights are violated in practice during the state of 
emergency though they remain. safeguarded in theory by constitutional 
provisions. As well as emergency regulations which restrict civil and political 
rights during the state of emergency, civil rights of persons considered a 
threat to national security or public order are widely violated during state of 
emergency, according to reports received by non-governmental 
organizations. 2'3 
of State Security, and shortened the period before an appeal may be lodged from 6 months to 30 
days, initially. This Act states : 'Everyone arrested or detained under the Emergency Act ... may lodge a complaint against his arrest or detention to the Supreme Court of State Security ... 
" 
CCPR/C/26/Add. 1 of 26th September 1983, pp. 5-6. 
268. In Egypt, Article 8 of Act no. 34 of 1971 regulates detention, as follows: The public prosecutor is empowered to order the retention in custody of any person if there are cogent reasons to believe 
that the said person has committed acts detrimental to the country's external or internal security, 
prejudicial to the economic interests of the socialist society or the socialist achievements of the 
peasants and workers or likely to undermine the country's political life or endanger national unity 
Egypt : violations of human rights An Amnesty International report, 1983, p. 20. 269. In Tunisia, under Decree No. 78/50 of 26th January 1978, the authority assumes : 'power to close 
any public place and, in particular, entertainment halls, licensed premises and places of assembly of 
all kinds; power to order the entering and searching of premises by day and by night; control of 
publication and broadcasting. ' 
CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 2nd May 1986 p. 13. 270. In Egypt, the right to freedom of assembly may be restricted under the Emergency Act, according 
to article 3. 
The Egyptian government has reported that no restriction has in fact been placed on this right, under 
current state of emergency legislation. CERD/C/149/Add. 22 of 30th January 1987 p. 9. 271. As we saw, in Syria, Article 4 of the Martial Law Decree empowers the Martial Law Governor or his deputy to adopt the all or some of the following measures : (b) the censorship of letters and 
communications of all kinds. Censorship of newspapers, periodicals, publications, drawings, printed 
matter, broadcasts and all means of communication, propaganda and publicity before issue; also their 
seizure, confiscation and suspension, the denial of their rights and the closure of the places in 
which they were printed. 
Report from Amnesty International to the government of the Syrian Arab Republic, 1983, pp. 50-51. 272. The right to participate in public life has been restricted under martial law provisions in Jordan, as the Chamber of Deputies has been suspended, and a new body, the National Consultative 
Council, has been formed. At its formation in 1978, it had comprised 60 members, though this number 
was increased to 75 in 1982. Its recommendations are advisory, and the government is not bound to 
adopt the.. CCPR/C/SR. 362 of 15th July 1982, p. 9. 
273. As we have seen, according to Amnesty International for example, there is often breach of 
emergency law procedures in Syria in respect of preventive arrest. Arrest without authorisation or legal warrants is allegedly carried out by the security forces, 
Amnesty International Amnesty International Report 1984. 
Amnesty International also reports the practice of long-term incommunicado detention under Martial, law in Syria, where there seems to be no limit to the period as it may range from a few days / ... 
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The following section draws heavily on discussions which took place with 
respect to state of emergency between representatives of the governments 
of Syria, Jordan and Egypt with the Human Rights Committee according to 
their obligation under article 40 of the Covenant. Bearing certain 
shortcomings in mind. 274 it is nevertheless useful to examine these 
discussions, in order to shed light on both States' attitudes to their 
obligations under the Covenant and to the effect of state of emergency on 
human rights. 
With regard to the status of the Covenant within the national legal order 
of these three states, we have seen, that in Egypt and Syria, the Covenant 
became an integral part of national law. -75 In Jordan, however, the 
Covenant takes precedence over all other legislation, remaining subordinate 
only to the Constitution. 21e 
to several years. 
Report from Amnesty International to the government of the Syrian Arab Republic, 1983 pp. 22-23. In Iraq, it is reported that political suspects are detained in the custody of the state security forces 
without charge or trial, and that arrest and detention procedures contained in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure were disregarded for political suspects. 
Amnesty International Amnesty International Report 1984. 
Under provisions of martial law in Jordan, there has been prolonged detention without trial of political 
prisoners. Under the provisions of martial law political prisoners may be held for long periods without 
trial and Amnesty International has information that some individuals have been held for more than four 
years. 
Amnesty International report that in Morocco, under the procedure known as garde i vve, a detainee 
suspected of endangering internal or external security may be held incommunicado for up to eight days with 
a possible four day extension, as a result of amendments to the Code of Penal Procedure of 19 9. In 
practice, it seems that it  ay be indefinitely prolonged as the courts have often rejected appeals against 
prolonged detention. In 1982, according to Amnesty International, more than two hundred people were held in 
incommunicado detention under provisions of martial law. Amnesty International Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Kingdom of Morocco, 10-13 February 1981,1982 pp. 8-9. 
274. Firstly, it must be stressed that the reports submitted by the three Arab countries of particular 
interest in this section (Syria, Jordan and Egypt) were prepared and considered at a comparatively early 
stage in the life of the Human Rights Committee, while it was still developing its guidelines for the 
preparation of reports, and had not yet prepared the list containing subjects of particular and constant 
interest to the members of Committee. 
These two deficiencies had the unfortunate effect that early reports were not as full as the Committee 
later requested, nor did they contain adequate information on all aspects covered by the Covenant. Likewise, 
the Committee's method of consideration of reports was still developing, with consequent repetition of 
questions and a tendency to focus on some issues more than others. Also, since the reports under 
consideration were the inita1 reports of States Parties (though supplemented in some cases by additional 
reports or oral discussion), the Committee, reasonably, did not press firmly for detailed information, 
consenting that such details could be supplied in later reports, the principal objective in the early stages 
being to establish a constructive dialogue with States Parties. For example, in consideration of its first 
report, the Committee expressed its appreciation of the desire on the part of the Egyptian Government to 
enter into a dialogue, though it stressed the point that the supplementary report within the context of 
Article 40 would require to contain not only the extent to which human rights were enjoyed in the country, 
but should also indicate the factors and difficulties affecting the full implementation of the Covenant. 
CCPR/C/SR. 500, of 4 April 1984, p. 4. 
275. We have seen that the Egyptian Constitution stipulates that conventions to which Egypt accedes have the 
effect of law after they have been signed, ratified and published in accordance with the prescribed 
procedures. In Syria, we saw that it is implicit in the Constitution that international instruments, once 
ratified and promulgated become part of the Syrian legal system. The Syrian government has stated on 
several occasions that there exists no contradiction between the provisions of the Constitution and the 
Covenant and the Covenant has apparently passed into the Syrian domestic legal system, upon ratification by 
the People's Assembly. 
276. As we saw, it seems that the international agreements which Jordan ratifies or accedes to have the 
force of law, and have precedence over all national legislation, with the exception of the Constitution, as 
several judgements of the Jordanian Court of Cassation have indicated, since it seems that the Court applies 
international law in precedence over domestic law, except in certain cases where public order is endangered. 
Jordan signed the ICCPR in 1972 and ratified it in 1975. 
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State of emergency legislation has long been applied in Syria, Egypt and 
Jordan, and remains in force today. 27 Syrian involvement in the Middle East 
crisis carries with it the constant threat of war, and continued occupation of 
her territory by Israel2' e sustains instability. Within this context, it 
seems, 279 martial law is maintained on the grounds that the life of the 
nation is threatened. 280 Similarly, Jordan proclaimed a state of emergency as 
a result of the 1967 war, and the consequent occupation of its territory by 
Israel. 2 81 However, the Egyptian government has stated that the grounds for 
the state of emergency in Egypt are "to insure stability". 282 
Of the three countries, none has informed the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations either of the proclamation of states of emergency or of 
derogations made from the countries' obligations under the Political Covenant, 
according to article 4.283 The present 
Syrian government has not notified the 
277. Martial law has been in force in Syria almost continuously since independence, despite the 
promulgation of several Constitutions, and the state of emergency continues today. 
The present state of emergency in Egypt has been in force since before the adoption of 
the present 
E yptian Constitution in 1971. 
278. It has stated that, owing to the fact that part of the Syrian territory is under foreign 
occupation, the government cannot implement the provisions of the Covenant, since 
it is unable to 
secure and protect the rights and freedoms of the inhabitants of its occupied territories. 
Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, Official Records: 
Thirty-Fourth Session, 
Supplement No. 40 (A/34/40), P. M. 
279. The question of the existence of a state of emergency in Syria is unclear, as 
the government 
stated to the Human Rights Committee in 1979 that no state of emergency existed in Syria, when, 
during 
the Committee's consideration of Syria's report, the Syrian representative asked that the record of 
the meeting show his statement that the President of the Syrian Arab Republic had declared 
before the 
People's Council that there was no martial law and no emergency measures in Syria, except 
for reasons 
of state security. 
CCPR/C/SR. 160 of 8 August 1979, p. 12. In response to questions, the Syrian government stressed that the conditions under which a state of 
emergency could be proclaimed were contained in a decree dated 22 December 1962. In accordance with 
this decree, a state of emergency may be declared in the event of war or in a situation conducive to 
war, when the security of the State or public order 
(ordre public) was threatened. 
Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, Official Records: Thirty-Fourth 
Session, 
Supplement No. 40 (A/34/40), pp. 72-73. 
280. "Having regard to the nature of the enemy, who was threatening the life of the Syrian nation, and 
the escalation of the conflict as a result of Egypt's capitulation, which had destablilized the entire 
region and was endangering the right to life of the nation, groups and individuals. The 
human rights 
of the Syrian people, whether under occupation or not, were being systematically undermined by 
foreign 
occupation and by the plot hatched against the Arab nation by gypt, Israel and the United 
States of 
America. 
CCPR/C/SR. 158 of 6 August 1979, p. 3. 
281. According to the Jordanian government in October 1981, the human rights situation could not be 
understood without an idea of the political, social and economic obstacles that the country had been 
facing since Israel had occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, which had caused an influx of 
many thousands of refugees to the East Bank. This grave situation had obliged the government to 
proclaim a state of emergency in accordance with the Constitution. 
Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, Official Records: Thirty-Fourth Session, 
Supplement No. 40 (A/34/40), p. 41. 
282. In response to questions from the Human Rights Committee during consideration of their country's 
initial report, the Egyptian government pointed out to the Committee that the proclamation of the 
state of emergency was a sovereign right of the State exercised by the People's Assembly", and that 
the measure was introduced 'to insure stability'. 
283. Again, in Syria, it is not clear whether the state of emergency has been officially proclaimed, 
since the Syrian government has stated (CCPR/C/SR. 160 of Bth August 1977, p. 11) that a state of 
emergency was proclaimed by means of an act published in the Official Gazette and the present 
government, being popular, felt itself secure enough to have no need to proclaim a state of 
emergency. This statement does not make it clear whether the state of emergency in fact exists, or has 
been proclaimed through the Official Gazette. As we will see, it seems that a state of emergency does 
exist in Syria, and in the light of this, the failure to fulfil the duty of proclamation thereby 
violates national law, as well as the provision of 
the Covenant. With regard to the Syrian 
government's obligation under the Covenant when availing itself of the right of derogation, / ... 
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Secretary-General of the United Nations of any state of emergency. 28 
Although Syria ratified the Covenant in 1969, the Syrian President has not 
officially informed other States Parties to the Covenant of any derogations as 
a result of the state of emergency. 265 Despite the Jordanian Council of 
Ministers' consideration of the obligation of notification2B° it has not 
informed the Secretary-General of the proclamation of a state of emergency, 
nor of any derogations from its obligations under the Covenant. The Egyptian 
government likewise has not taken steps to notify other States Parties of the 
existence of a state of emergency or of derogations from its obligations. 
It is worrying that the states apparently do not consider themselves bound 
by the clear obligation of notification. Jordan's statement that the issue of 
notification was under review must be seen in the light of its continued 
failure to the present to take action. In these countries, where emergency 
law has been in force for some time, it seems that the governments consider 
that since the Middle East crisis is well. known, the state of emergency 
requires neither proclamation or notification. 
The imposition of state of emergency in these three countries over a long 
period has led naturally to its institutionalization by all governments, up to 
the present. This situation gives rise to grave doubts about the efficacy of 
the Constitution 2"" and other legal safeguards for human rights. 
In particular, questions arise as to the promulgation of special emergency 
legislation, derogation from civil and political rights, and above all, 
derogation from the normal application of the rule of law, with regard to 
arrest and detention, use of special courts and judges, sentencing and the 
right of appeal, as well as the independence of the judiciary and maintenance 
of the principle of separation of powers. 
during consideration of Syria's first report in 1977, neither the Secretary-General nor the Human 
Rights Committee seems to have been notified. This failure of the Syrian government to observe a 
principle of international law, coupled with the apparent failure to proclaim the state of emergency 
at the national level, casts serious doubt on the legality of the state of emergency in Syria. 
284. It is worthwhile to mention that the President who is constitutionally authorised to conclude 
treaties, is also recommended to take steps to ensure the implementation of Syria's international 
obligations. According to Article 104 of the Constitution, 'The President of the Republic concludes 
treaties and international agreements and abrogates them in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. ' 
CCPR/C/1/Add. 31 of 12th July 1978 p. 2; CCPR/C/SR. 160 of 8th August 1979 p. 8. 285. CCPR/C/1/Add. 55 of 7th August 1981, p. 2. 
286. In response to the Committee's enquiry as to whether the state of emergency had been officially 
proclaimed in Jordan since the entry into force of the Covenant, the Jordanian government referred to 
article 124 of the Constitution, explaining that the reason for the emergency was defence of the realm 
in the context of the war with Israel, and that the time was not right for the abolition of the state 
of emergency, though the government kept the situation under review. It also confirmed that no 
notification through the Secretary-General to States Parties had taken place under article 4. The 
Jordanian representative stated that the legal authorities had informed the government of its 
obligation to communicate with the UN Secretary-General and States Parties according to article 4, 
paragraph 3 of the Covenant. 
Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, Official Records: Thirty-Seventh Session, 
Supplement No. 40 (A/37/40) pp. 43-44. 
It seems that Egypt too has failed to meet this obligation, since the Committee commented on the fact 
that, while the state of emergency had been in force before the Egyptians had acceded to the Covenant, 
Egypt had not, in April 1984, notified other States Parties of derogations from the Covenant. 
287. "Certain countries .. 
live under states of emergency which empty the constitutions of their 
content, as is the case in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Syria. " 
A. Youssoufi "Human rights in Arab countries" Review of the International Commission of Jurists, 39/1987, pp. 33-35. 
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The Syrian government has confirmed that, once proclaimed, the state of 
emergency restricts such personal freedoms as those of assembly and 
movement and allows the preventive detention of suspects who may endanger 
the security of the State or public order. 
With regard to judicial institutions, the government has confirmed that 
State Security Tribunals are not bound to conform with the procedures 
provided for in existing legislation in all procedural stages of investigation 
and judgement, though judgements are not executed unless approved by the 
Head of State. 288 This clearly represents a deterioration of legal safeguards 
for those detained under emergency law, through the establishment of 
emergency courts, the extension of grounds for detention, the failure to 
uphold established procedures and the potential for executive interference in 
the judicial process. 
Of particular concern with respect to the state of emergency in Jordan are 
both the promulgation of temporary emergency measures, Z89 extending the 
power of the executive in respect of detention on the grounds of security, 
and the continuing growth of the jurisdictional competence of military courts, 
now widely empowered to try civilians. '"' It is clearly unacceptable for 
military courts to have competence to try civilians, since their proceedings 
often fall short of the requirements for fair trial. However, the Jordanian 
government has confirmed that the military courts will continue to function 
as long as martial law remains in force. z 91 
As in the cases of Syria and Jordan, in Egypt the state of emergency 
introduced by Act No. 162 of 1958, and its amendments of 1981-2 has 
established a special Court of State Security. In addition, it seems that, 
under Act No. 164 of 1981 and Act No. 50 of 1982, concerning the status of 
persons detained under the original Emergency Act of 1958, the President has 
the power to review judgements and order retrials : although the public 
prosecutor may appeal against judgements, the role of the President could 
thus lead to interference in the judicial process in violation of the principle 
288. Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, Official Records: Thirty-Fourth Session, 
Supplement No. 40 (4/34/40), pp. 72-73. 
289. The "martial administrative regulations" of 1977 empower the Military Governor General. (appointed 
by the Council of Ministers) to exercise all the functions delegated to his by the King to safeguard 
the kingdom and guarantee security. He is empowered to issue an arrest warrant without specific 
charge, though if the detainee is charged, he should be brought before a military court within 15 
days, after investigation by the military prosecutor. CCPR/C/SR. 362 of 15th July 1982, p. 2. 
Despite the Jordanian government's statement that such persons suffer no discrimination : they had 
the right to be represented and be defended by a lawyer (appointed by the Court, if necessary), these 
exceptional powers of the Governor-General constitute a severe threat to the rights of civilians. 
290. Military courts decide on crimes against state security, against the protection of state secrets, 
and secret documents, crimes with weapons and possession of weapons, membership of a banned political 
party, dealing with the enemy, infiltration or the sale of property to the enemy. 
291. The Jordanian representative at the Human Rights Committee commented that although calls were 
growing from pressure groups representing professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, and engineers, for 
the abolition of the jurisdictional authority of the military courts over civil courts, this would not 
be possible in the current circumstances. 
CCPR/C/SR. 332 of 13th November 1981, p. 12. 
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of separation of powers. The rule of law is also weakened by the fact that 
appeals against orders under the Emergency Act lie within the competence of 
the Minister of the Interior rather than the Minister of Justice. The Human 
Rights Committee has also commented that the provision that the President 
or Prime Minister might order the retrial before another court of a person 
acquitted by a State Security Court represents double jeopardy and is 
therefore contrary to the Covenant, z9Z 
It seems that the three countries share common characteristics : firstly, 
none of the three states has fulfilled its technical obligation of notification 
under article 4; secondly, each government connects the state of emergency, 
directly or indirectly, to the security of the state; thirdly, in all three 
countries, state of emergency seems to be interpreted in a way which falls 
short of international legal standards. With regard to the first point, there is 
the tendenr'y of Arab governments apparently to consider the Middle East 
crisis as sufficiently well known to make the obligation of notification 
superfluous. The failure to satisfy the principle of publicity does not lie only 
within the belief that there exists a crisis of which international public 
opinion is aware. The intention of the rule of publicity goes beyond a public 
declaration of the existence of an emergency situation to some obligation to 
demonstrate the content of emergency measures imposed, and thereby, be 
subject to international scrutiny. Since it represents the only circumstance in 
which states may derogate from their obligation to protect human rights, in 
return, the international community expected the rule of notification to be 
observed in order to allow supervision of the nature and legality of 
derogation, and the extent to which rights and freedoms might be affected. 
The three Arab states chosen to illustrate this difficulty are legally bound 
by a specific obligation of immediate notification, and even though the states 
may exercise a "margin of appreciation" in declaring a state of emergency 
when they judge it to be necessary, nevertheless in accepting international 
rules, they become bound to submit to international attention. The claims of 
state representatives to the Human Rights Committee that the government is 
popular enough not to need to proclaim a state of emergency, or simply to 
repeat that the fact of the crisis is well known internationally, is not 
supported by international legal understanding, as the comment of the Human 
Rights Committee in the Uruguay case shows, 
The principle of notification is not to be understood merely as a technical 
procedure which may or may not be fulfilled, but it is a measure of the 
legality of the state of emergency, since the international. community, 
represented by the Secretary-General and the Human Rights Committee 
exercise some supervision over the lawfulness of the departure from ordinary 
rules and the substance of derogation. 
292. CCPR/C/SR. 500, of 4 April 1984, pp. 2-4. 
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On the remaining points, although the declaration of state of emergency 
may be understood within the context of the Middle East crisis, whether on 
the grounds of war or threat of war, there is no doubt that the criteria of 
legality are that the situation should contain a real and immediate threat to 
the life of the nation, and the measures taken should be proportionate to the 
danger. While avoiding the argument of the political nature of the conflict, 
one should say that the duration of the conflict no doubt required certain 
amendments to accommodate the dangers on one hand, and the basic rights 
of citizens to enjoy their civil and political freedoms on the other. It is not 
compatible with international legal understanding however to extend the state 
of emergency on the grounds of war to other areas of civil and political life 
which bear little relation to the state of war or a real threat to national 
security. The exercise of legitimate political rights by the population seems 
to be confused by governments to a greater or lesser extent with a threat to 
national security. 
There is a tendency to integrate the extraordinary judicial process set up by 
emergency legislation with the ordinary legal system with the result of 
undermining the basic judicial. order. Likewise, the basic constitutional order, 
which is the fundamental legal safeguard of the normal state mechanism, is 
undermined by the institutionalization of emergency measures, which empty 
the constitutional order of its value. In the absence or suppression of 
democratic institutions, the population finds itself surrounded by legislation 
which provides little protection of its rights. Despite how the government 
justifies emergency measures, the absence of ordinary judicial and other 
institutions of safeguard has led to the concentration of powers in the hands 
of the Executive which has undermined the fundamental principles of any 
democratic society, whether the separation of powers or independence of 
judiciary, undermining the rule of law in general. 
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The discussion of international texts dealing with political rights focused 
on the international understanding, concentrating in particular on 
establishing criteria which may be used to evaluate political human rights in 
Arab national legislation and the extent to which the national legislature 
succeeded in providing legal protection. 
The purpose in this Chapter is on one hand, to demonstrate the degree of 
recognition by municipal law of principles set by international legal 
standards, and on the other to evaluate them, by examining how far the 
Arab legal order responds to these legal conceptions in national legislation. 
This examination highlights the obstacles, in law, which exist within the 
Arab legal order in time of normality, as well as in time of crisis. 
While constitutional provisions in many Arab countries have incorporated 
into the basic charter of government a recognition of political human rights, 
other countries lacking Constitutions instead regulate political life by 
relying on traditional mechanisms. ' 
1. As pointed out in the introduction, Shari'ah as a source of political rights is beyond the scope of the 
present study. The subject has been examined exhaustively by many writers, including S. H. Amin legal and 
political structure of an Islamic state : implications for Iran and Pakistan, Islamic law in the 
contemporary world, 1985; Abdel Karim Zidan, The individual in the Islamic Shari'ah, 2nd ed., 1970" Mohawwed Fathi Authwan, Human rights in the Islamic Shari'ah and western legal thought, 1982; M. Cherif eassiouni, 
Introduction to Islam, 1985. 
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Arab Constitutions, republican, ' monarchical' and traditional, " with the 
exception of Saudi Arabia and Oman, set the principle of freedom of 
opinion and expression. Most constitutional provisions, though mentioning 
the rights together nevertheless explicitly safeguard each element. Some, 
however, mention only one element of the right, for example, Syria, 
which provides explicit protection only for freedom of expression. While 
it might be argued that the right to freedom of opinion is thereby 
implicitly safeguarded, since the international provision explicitly 
mentions the two aspects of the right, and as we saw, the travaux 
preparatoires of article 19 of the Political Covenant highlight the 
distinct nature of the private and public rights, national law which 
fails to protect the right of opinion explicitly must be regarded as 
inadequate in falling short of full protection of the right within the 
context of article 19 of the Covenant. Conversely, the Iraqi Constitution, 
which contains no explicit safeguard of the right of freedom of 
expression, or the freedom of the Press (though this may be implied by 
"freedom of publication"), also falls short of full protection of the right 
as formulated in international law. 
2. For example, the Tunisian Constitution, in article B. guarantees freedom of opinion and expression, 
when exercised in accordance with the law. Article 10 of Act no. 83/112 of 12th December 1983 protects 
freedom of opinion, and it is extended to include agents of the state and officials, '... providing 
that under no circumstances may the personal file of the official contain a reference to his 
political, philosophical or religious opinions'. The same provision appears in regulations relating to 
agents of offices, public institutions of an industrial and commercial nature and national 
corporations. 
In Algeria, while the National Charter "... guarantees public freedoms, particularly the freedoms of 
expression, of opinion, of thought ... 
the Constitution confirms in article 53, its inviolability 
as a fundamental right. The Algerian legislature provided that freedom of conscience and opinion 
shall be inviolable', and article 55 guarantees freedom of expression. 
The Egyptian Constitution, in articles 47,48 and 49, provides that : "Freedom of opinion is 
guaranteed. Every person is entitled to free expression of his opinion and to its dissemination by 
speech, writing, photographs and so forth, within the limits of the law. Self-criticism and 
constructive criticism are a guarantee of the soundness of the national structure. * (article 4? ); 'Freedom of the Press, printing, publication and information media is guaranteed. Censorship of the 
newspapers is forbidIen. Warning, suspending, or proscribing newspapers by administrative means is 
also forbidden .. 
' (article 48); The state guarantees citizens the freedom of scientific research 
and literary, artistic, and cultural creativeness and provides the means of encouraging these 
activities. ' (article 49). 
The Iraqi Constitution, in article 26, guarantees the freedom of opinion and publication, while the 
Libyan Constitutional Declaration of 11 December 1969 provides, in article 13, that : 'Freedom of 
opinion is ensured ... 
In Syria, article 38 of the 1973 Constitution gives the right to every 
citizen freely and publicly to express his views through all means of expression. 
The North Yemeni Provisional Constitution of 1974 provides, in article 12, that 'citizens have the 
right to express their thoughts by means of speech, writing or voting within the confines of the law'. 
3. Article 9 of the Moroccan Constitution guarantees to all citizens ' ... 
freedom of opinion, freedom 
of expression in all its forms ... '. Note " see Report of Human Rights Committee 37th session Supp. no. 40 (A/37/40) - comments of the Committee on article 19 of the 
ICCPR. 
The Jordanian Constitution, articles 15 to 18, contains provisions obliging the state to safeguard 
these freedoms, in particular, freedom of expression in all its forms, within the limits of the law. 4. Here, the rights gay find their protection at the constitutional level, as for example, in the case 
of the Provisional Federal Constitution of the United Arab Emirates, where article 30 provides : "Freedom of opinion and expression and the freedom to express by word of south or by writing and all 
other forms of expressing this ? reedon shall be guaranteed within the framework of the 
lam, ' and Kuwait, whose Constitution safeguards freedom of opinion, the Press and communication, within the 
context of the relevant laws". 
In Saudi Arabia and Oman, absolute monarchies without formal Constitutions, the rights are considered 
as provided for by Shari'ah which Saudi Arabia recognises as the vain source of its legal order. 
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Most Constitutions provide that the exercise of these rights must be 
within the limits of the law. While it is acceptable that municipal law 
should regulate the exercise of freedom of expression to safeguard the 
rights of the community as a whole, nevertheless, according to 
international. criteria, the right to hold an opinion may not be regulated 
or restricted in ordinary times. In the light of this clear understanding, 
the question of the ideological dimension as a factor restricting freedom 
of opinion and expression must be examined as, in the radical Arab 
republics, Constitutions and other legislation set the ideological context, 
socialist or revolutionary, in which such freedoms are exercised. 
The Libyan Constitutional Declaration limits the protection of the right 
of freedom of opinion and its exercise with a vaguely worded ideological 
restriction when it stipulates, in article 13, that freedom of opinion is 
ensured "within the limits of the interests of the people and the 
principles of the Revolution". 
While the "interests of the people" might be a ground on which other 
rights may be legitimately restricted, freedom of opinion cannot 
justifiably be restricted even on this ground. ' The restriction based on 
"the principles of the Revolution" is likewise unacceptable, and in 
addition, is clearly a potential source of abuse, as it is a vague concept. 
Unlike the private right to freedom of opinion, the public right to 
freedom of expression may be restricted on a number of specified 
grounds. However, the vaguely worded ideological restrictions imposed 
on the exercise of this right even at the constitutional level in several 
Arab republics are contrary to international legal standards. For 
example, the article dealing with freedom of expression in the Syrian 
Constitution of 1973, goes on : 
"to help through control and constructive criticism to guarantee the 
security and development of the nation and homeland and to sustain the 
the socialist system. " 
The context thus set in which the freedom may be exercised is 
ideological, and restricts the freedom in a way which does not match the 
restrictions acceptable in international law. In addition, it is clear that 
criticism may be negative as well as positive or constructive, and it is 
unreasonable to restrict the right on this ground alone. The criteria 
should be that a balance should be struck between the right of the 
individual to criticise and the interests of the community as a whole. ° 
The Iraqi Constitution is open to criticism on both of these counts, as it 
links the practice of each of these rights with the "revolutionary" line 
of the state, in article 26, which states: 
"It shall guarantee the freedom of opinion, publication ... 
The State 
shall endeavour to provide the means required for practising these 
freedoms which are compatible with the nationalist and progressive line 
of the Revolution". 
5. The article in the Covenant, as we saw, explicitly provides that the individual should be free to 
hold opinions 'without interference'. 
6. A member of the Human Rights Committee has made a similar point about this provision, and stressed 
that although a balance must be struck between the right of the individual and the legitimate / ... 
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Likewise, the article dealing with freedom of expression in the Algerian 
Constitution goes on to specify that "they may not be used to 
undermine the bases of the socialist revolution". Furthermore, the article 
specifies that the freedom is subject to article 73, which provides for 
the lapsing of rights and freedoms for whoever "uses such rights and 
freedoms to infringe upon ... 
the essential interests of the national 
collectivity, the unity of the people and the national territory, the 
internal and external security of the state and the socialist Revolution". 
Again, the right is restricted on ideological grounds' : although 
restrictions on the right of freedom of expression are permissible on the 
grounds specified in international law, such as infringing on the rights 
and freedoms of others or threat to national security, the lapsing of 
this freedom is a violation of international principles, in the sense that 
the rights cannot be considered guaranteed. Like the Libyan provision, 
the term "undermine the bases of the socialist revolution" is vague, and 
therefore may be subject to abuse, particularly in the light of the lack 
of judicial review. 
Socialist ideology, thus manifested in several Constitutions, leads to the 
undermining of legal safeguards of political rights in a way which is 
contrary to the spirit of the rights. Likewise, the revolutionary ideology 
of a state like Libya leads to weakening of legal safeguards at the 
constitutional level which stands at the centre of the legal framework 
which can protect human rights. This practical weakness leads to the 
self-imposed censorship of individual opinions, as well as undermining 
any mechanism of protection. 
In order to evaluate the position of this right in municipal law, besides 
determining whether the rights to freedom of opinion and expression 
are guaranteed in the Constitution of a State, it is important to examine 
the rules which define the scope of the freedom, for example, by 
regulating the freedom of information. The right both to receive and 
impart information and ideas of any kind is to be found in national 
legislation, within both the republican and monarchy systems. For 
example, in the republic of Syria, freedom of information is safeguarded 
in article 38 of the 1973 Constitution, which provides that views may be 
expressed orally, in writing, and through all the other means of 
expression, and stipulates that the State guarantees the freedoms of 
press, printing and publication in accordance with the law. 8 
The Iraqi Constitution links the practice of this right with the socialist, 
"revolutionary" line of the state, as we saw, and goes on to regulate 
interest of the community an individual should be entitled to criticise his government. CCPR/C/SR. 26 of 18th August 1977, p. 6 para. 31 
7. Article 75 of the Algerian Constitution goes on to provide that 'by his work and behaviour every 
citizen must ... respect the achievements of the socialist 
Revolution'. 
8. This is regulated by the General Law on Printed Matter which provides in article 1 that 'Printing presses, bookshops and printed Patter shall be free, whatever their category may be. This freedom can be restricted only within the framework of this law'. 
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other spheres of the freedom of research and creativity. 9 
Article 8 of the Copyright Law No. 3 of 1971 provides that authors have 
the right to publish, disseminate and produce works, and permits people 
to use, show publicly, transmit or recite them to the public through any 
suitable medium, in conformity with the law. Printing and publishing is 
carried out in Iraq by a number of governmental bodies, which have 
their own rules and regulations and are organized by Act no. 206 of 1968 
concerning publications, which also regulates the activities of the Press 
and journalists, setting penalties for offences. l° This Code also lists 
subjects which may not be published, and are subject to the control of 
the censor. " The Press Code, in article 7 (b), regulates the granting of 
permits to daily and other publications, which must be proposed by the 
Minister of Culture and Information, and issued by decision of the 
Council of Ministers with the approval of the Revolutionary Command 
Council. Such a requirement for prior authorization runs contrary to 
article 19 of the Covenant, as we will see in other legislation, and it is 
clear that the role of the executive in the granting of permits is likely 
to lead to arbitrary interference in the free exercise of this right. 
The Ba'th Party, in its 8th Regional Conference in 1974, reviewed its 
policy on the media, and its report indicates that the Party supervises 
the media with the intention of making its activity serve the objectives 
of the revolution. ' a Freedom of information is regulated in part by the 
Ministry of Culture and Information Act no. 94 of 1981, under which the 
Ministry patronises culture and the arts in all fields of activity, and 
"shall develop them in accordance with the principles of the Ba'th party 
and the aims of the revolution ... 
In the field of media and information, 
the Ministry shall propagate and deepen the ideology, principles, and 
stands of the Ba'th Party". Z" 
9. Article 27, in paragraph C, guarantees 'freedom of scientific research promote and reward 
distinction and creativeness in all intellectual, scientific and technical activities and in various 
manifestations of popular genius'. This is similar to the Egyptian Constitution which, in articles 49, 
guarantees freedom of scientific research and artistic and cultural creativity, and the Algerian 
Constitution which in article 54 guarantees the "freedom of intellectual, artistic and scientific 
creativity ... within the framework of the las 10. CCPR/C/SR. 748 of 22nd July 1987, p. 4. 11. Article 16 of the law includes : criticism of the President, members of the Revolutionary Command 
Council, the President's close advisors or those who act on their behalf; defamation or criticism of the state or its apparatus, or news which may cause the devaluation of the national currency or 
government bonds or discredits their value in Iraq and abroad. Other subjects which require the 
approval of the censor, according to article 17, include statements attributed to the President or 
members of the RCC, discussions or decisions of the Council of Ministers or other officials; 
agreements or treaties concluded by the government of Iraq; criminal investigations; operations orders 
of the armed forces, police or any other national forces and their formation, organization, arms and tactics or decisions concerning price-fixing, importation, custom tariffs or currency exchange. 
Freedom of information and expression in Iraq, Article 19,1987, pp. 19-20. 
12. The report concluded that this objective had not been reached since 'most organs of information 
and culture lack competent and revolutionary executives .. many reactionary elements lurk in these 
organs and are unconcerned about the tasks called for by the Party ... '. Information, freedom and censorship : the Article 19 world report 1988, p. 256. 
13. The Act also gives the Ministry the 'mission to supervise all media' functions and activities, and to exercise cultural supervision over all public and private libraries, and to inspect and license the 
recording on tapes and discs of all music and vocal production used for commercial purposes. ' Information, freedom and censorship : the Article 19 world report, 1988, p. 256. 
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Even these laws, regulations and statements of policy by the leading 
party in Iraq make it clear that freedoms of expression and information 
cannot be said to exist outwith the ideological boundaries set by the 
government and ruling party. This is a clear violation of the letter and 
spirit of article 19 of the Covenant. Other mechanisms of the control of 
information in Iraq make it clear that the right of expression is the 
monopoly of state and party organs. 14 Other procedures make it clear 
that Iraqi government organs and administrative authorities which 
regulate freedom of information and of expression have the power to 
control the free exercise of these rights. ls 
Severe ideological restrictions are imposed on these freedoms in the 
Algerian Constitution which, in article 19, lists the goals of the "cultural 
revolution" as including "(c) the adoption of a lifestyle in harmony with 
... the principles of the socialist revolution as 
defined in the National 
Charter". All these examples of ideological restriction on freedom of 
expression must be considered contrary to international principles, and 
undermine the exercise of the freedom to the extent that it cannot be 
said to exist in law, despite the guarantees at the constitutional level. 
As we saw, freedom of information is safeguarded in the Constitution of 
Tunisia, which guarantees freedom of the Press and publication in 
accordance with the law. Nevertheless, the Press Code (Act no. 71/32 of 
28th April 1975) requires that new periodicals must be notified to the 
Ministry of the Interior. 
Other publications must also be submitted to the Minister of the 
Interior who forwards a copy to the Ministry of Information and the 
Office of the Public Prosecutor. Publication without authorization from 
the Minister of the Interior constitutes an offence. 1iB 
This Tunisian regulation is not in the spirit of the Covenant since the 
applicant must secure permission to practise his right. While the 
international provision does allow for restriction by the state on certain 
grounds, this restriction should be exceptional rather than the general 
rule, since such restriction would tend to jeopardise enjoyment of the 
right itself. 
14. A Censorship Department has been established within the Ministry, and is responsible for all 
printing and publication. By Resolution no. 95 of 1986, the Department's function was transferred to 
the Department of Home Information at the Ministry, which carries out censorship of Arabic and foreign 
publications, pail and cinema. 
Iraqi Official Gazette, no. 3151,25/5/87, p. 287. 
15. The Press Code requires submission of 2 copies of all printed material before sale and 
distribution, in order to obtain a permit. The foreign media are a so subject to a list of restricted 
topics, which include : propagation of imperialism in its old and new forms; 'uglifying the World 
Liberation Move. ents'; propagation of racial movements such as zionism; propagation of animosity, 
hatred and dispersal among the individuals of the society, its national and religious sects. 
Article 19 Freedom of information and expression in Iraq, 1987, p. 21. 
16. However, refusals giving reasons, or lack of response from the authorities may be appealed against 
to the Administrative Tribunal on the grounds of abuse of authority. Under the provisions of Act 
no. 72/40 of Ist June 1972, there exists an administrative requirement which must be fulfilled prior to 
the appeal, namely that an administrative request for review to the authority concerned must be made. Freedom of information and expression in Tunisia, Article 19,1987, p. 14 
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I share the view of Rosalyn Higgins that the condition of prior 
notification is incompatible with the Covenant, unless on one of the 
grounds specified in para. 3, for example, national security. l° Even in 
these cases, restriction should only be applied to certain categories of 
publication, for a given period of time or else the State would be 
exercising a form of control incompatible with the Covenant. In contrast, 
the treatment of foreign periodicals is more compatible with the 
Covenant, as they require no prior notification, though they may be 
prohibited by the Minister of the Interior on the recommendation of the 
Ministry of Information, if they threaten public order or national 
security. These Tunisian regulations have the unusual effect of granting 
aliens a greater degree of freedom than Tunisians. le 
Legislation in force in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and UAE similarly 
regulates freedom of expression, including freedom of publication, the 
Press and censorship. 19 
As we have seen, most of the laws which regulate freedom of 
information in the Arab countries do not restrict this freedom by media, 
but embody the provision "through any media" in law. As for the other 
element distinguished in freedom of information, that its flow should be 
"regardless of frontiers", in Iraq, for example, Act no. 94 of 1981 of the 
Ministry of Culture and Information sets forth principles for the 
exercise of the freedom of information, from the standpoint in which 
culture and information are regarded as a means of dialogue between 
17. CCPR/C/SR. 715 of 11th July 1987, p. 7. 18. This situation may have cote about as a result of the reform of legislation restricting the import 
of foreign material, which led to such restrictions being abolished. Ibid, p. 4. 
19. In Morocco, where article 9 of the Constitution guarantees to citizens freedom of opinion and freedom of expression 'in all its forms', these freedoms are extended to aliens, particularly in 
respect of freedom of the Press, regulated by the Dahir of 15th November 1958. The only restriction 
placed on aliens is that every foreign newspaper printed in Morocco must, under the provisions of 
article 28 of the Dahir, have a permit granted by decree. 
CCPR/C/10/Add. 2 19 February 1981 pp. 4,29. In Egypt, all periodicals must be licensed and licenses may only be issued to organizations or 
parties, who must prove considerable financial assets to qualify. A constitutional amendment of 1980 
established a Press Council to regulate press freedom, censorship and the rights of journalists. Information, freedom and censorship : the Article 19 world report, 1988, p. 247 
In Jordan, freedom of information is safeguarded in the Constitution, by article 15, which also 
obliges the state to safeguard freedom of expression in all its forms, within the limits of the law. 
The right, which may be restricted only within the law, on the grounds of national defence and public 
safety, is regulated by other laws. Article 2 of Act no. 16 of 1955 provides that the Press, printing 
and publishing shall be free and that everyone shall have the right to express his opinion and 
disseminate truthful news and opinions through the publication media. This freedom shall not be 
restricted other than by the law. According to the Act, anyone may issue printed publications, like 
newspapers, provided, in the case of an alien, that he is resident in Jordan, and that there is a 
reciprocal arrangement regarding such matters between Jordan and the country of which he is a 
national. There are other conditions, for example, that the person should not have been convicted of a 
serious felony or misdemeanour. Freedom of the Press and publishing are safeguarded in that suspension 
of publication of a newspaper or suspension of a newspaper's licence must be as provided by law. CERD/C/130/Add. 3 1st April 1987 p. 5. The Court, in cases of Press offences, must deliver judgement within 3 days, and the Appeal Court 
should also deliver judgement within 3 days. CCPR/C/Add. 24 13th April 1978 pp. 1-3 
In UAE, freedom of the Press, printing and publication is regulated by Act no. 15 of 1980. CERD/C/130/Add. 1 of 28th January 1986, p. 13 
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peoples. z0 
Other countries, as we have seen, regulate the flow of foreign 
publications to varying degrees, with Tunisia as most liberal as it does 
not require prior registration for foreign journals. 
As we have seen, the importance of freedom of expression and of 
information is such that it may in principle, bear restrictions on its 
exercise in the light of the duties and responsibilities it carries. Since 
the final. aim of this possible restriction is to strike the right balance 
between the individual's rights and those of the community as a whole, 
certain restrictions might be acceptable if they relate either to the 
interests of other persons or to those of the community, on condition 
that they do not jeopardise the right itself. Thus the boundaries of 
such restrictions are that they should be "provided by law", and 
necessary for the respect of the rights and reputations of others, and 
other public interest, such as public order, national security, public 
safety and so on. 
The Libyan Constitutional Declaration does not mention in the article 
protecting freedom of opinion that restrictions should be provided by 
law, since the legislator seems to be concerned to a greater extent with 
ideological limitation. 21 However, as we saw, the Declaration states 
elsewhere that other legislation in force will continue to regulate rights 
and freedoms save where it contradicts the Declaration. Thus, one can 
say that on one hand, the revolutionary legislator used existing laws 
such as the Penal Code and Code of Penal Procedure, 22 and created 
other legislation on the other. 
The first category of restrictions necessary to protect the rights and 
reputations of others are regulated by laws which deal with libel, 
slander, abuse and defamation. Throughout the Arab world, the law 
regulates the crimes of insult and defamation. 22 
Some countries base these provisions on Shari'ah, in general, the laws 
define insult in Penal Codes, in respect of individuals and organizations. 
20. CCPR/C/37/Add. 3 18th July 1986 p. 40 
It must be noted that this is a statement of the ideology of the Ba'th party, within which the 
Ministry must operate according to Law no. 142 of October 1974 on The Leader Party", which obliges all 
ministries to adopt the Political Report of the 8th Regional Conference of the Bath Party. 
21. Article 13 sets the context as ".. interests of the people and the principles of the Revolution. ' 
22. Existing legislation restricts the freedom of expression for the respect of the rights and 
reputations of others, or public morals. Restrictions may be found in the Penal and Penal Procedure 
Codes in the case of insult, causing offence to persons or their morals, defamation, incitement to 
disobedience of the law and provoking religious hatred and hostility, incitement to commit a crime, 
display of indecent material or indecent acts or obscene speech. 
These restrictions are to be found in articles 438,471 and 472,439,318,317 and 318,500 and 501 
of the Penal Code respectively. 
CCPR/C/1/Add. 20 of 24 January 1978 pp. 9-10. 23. In Algeria, articles 296 and A7 of the Criminal Code define defamation and insult. The latter is 
defined as any offensive remark, term of disparagement or invective which does not involve the 
imputation of any act, according to article 297 of the Algerian Criminal Code. 
CERD/C/131/Add. 3 of 18th June 1985, p. 9. 
The Iraqi legislator outlined the offences of slander and abuse. The law which regulates these 
crimes is the Law of Publication No. 206 of 1968 which prohibits, in article 16, the publication of 
anything that may be regarded as slander or libel against others. Article 15 of the same law provides 
for a right of reply for the person slandered. The crime is also covered by a penal / ... 
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The last category is of concern since in some countries criticism of the 
government or ruling party may be regarded as a crime of insult, and 
criticism of an individual may be regarded as a crime against the state, 
if the person or actions of the Head of State is criticised. 
In Tunisia, restrictions may be imposed on the mass media by law in 
the interests of the rights of others. Act no. 75/32, as we saw, regulates 
publication, and imposes certain obligations. 14 The Code penalises crimes 
committed through the Press, such as defamation and insult, and the 
penalties for such crimes are more severe, when they involve official 
bodies. The effect of Penal Code article 245, which includes in its 
definition of defamation a public allegation impugning an established 
body, is to make criticism of a government body an offence, 25 which is 
a restriction of freedom of expression which goes beyond those 
established and allowed in international law. 2e The offence of libel 
against members of government, provided in the Penal Code, article 50, 
also presents the opportunity for suppression of hostile criticism. 27 
In several traditional Islamic countries, as elsewhere in the Arab world, 
Codes regulate slander and defamation. 28 
... provision, in article 28 of the Penal Code, where the punishment specified may be imprisonment or 
a fine or both Compensation may be sought according to the Civil Code, under article 205. CCPR/ý/1/Add. 45 8th June 1979 p. 74. 
Similarly, libel, defined as the ascription of a certain incident to another person, through one of the publicity media, which would, were it true constitute a punishable offence or lead to despise of 
that person by his fellow citizens', and abuse, defined as the levelling at others of any allegation, 
not necessarily involving an incident, which may soil their honour or dignity, or may hurt their 
feelings',  ay be punished by imprisonment or fine, or both. 
24. For example, directors of periodicals are bound to grant a right of reply or denial of statements 
or acts wrongly attributed. The Code prohibits the publication of indictments before they are heard 
publicly or certain trial proceedings concerning private life, and the defamation of public figures. 
25. Article 50 of the Press Code also contains this definition, but adds that, even if the allegation is expressed with an element of doubt or if the body is not directly named, but is identifiable, it is 
nonetheless defamation. Equally, since it is a crime to disseminate false information, a journalist 
night be prosecuted for publishing information which he did not know to be false. 
26. Mr Mommersteeg, a member of the Human Rights Committee, has consented that the restriction on the 
grounds of the rights and reputations of others should not be extended to include governmental bodies. 
CCPR/C/SR. 715 of 11th July 1987, p. 5. 27. Any insulting expression uttered against the President of the Republic, the President of the 
Assembly a member of the government" is a punishable offence. Libel is defined, in article 54, as 'any oh? ensive expression, term of contempt or invective which does not involve an imputation of a 
specific fact'. 
An Egyptian case which illustrates this approach is briefly discussed in Mark N. Cooper, The 
transformation of Egypt, 1982, p. 173. 
28. For example, in the UAE, where the provisions of existing Criminal Codes remain in force, an 
example may be found in Articles 116-77 of the Criminal Code in force in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi 
which stipulates, inter alia, that: Any person who in any may writes about, publicizes, broadcasts or 
alludes to any occurrences or characteristics likely to bring another person into disrepute commits the offence of defamation ... 
'. CERO/C/130/Add. 1 of 28th January 1986, p. 10. 
Articles 257-259 specify the penalties for libel and slander. For example, article 257 specifies 'Any person who unlawfully disseminates in printed, written, drawn or photographic form, or by any 
means other than a mere gesture, verbal utterance or sound libellous material derogatory to another 
person with a view to bringing the latter in disrepute shall be punished by ... 
A person shall be deemed to have disseminated libellous material if he causes such printed, written, drawn or 
photographic libellous material to be submitted, transmitted or distributed to the libelled person or to any other person. Transmission by open letter or postcard shall constitute dissemination regardless 
of whether the letter or the card is sent to the libelled person or to any other person. CERO/C/130/Add. 1 of 28th January 1986 p. 11. The Kuwaiti Press and Publications Äct no. 3/61 prohibits the publication of any material likely to 
prejudice the dignity or individual freedoms of persons. CERO/C/149/Add. 16 of 14th November 1986, p. 5. 
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As we saw, in some Arab republics, legislation exists which makes 
criticism of the government or ruling party or its aims, a crime, for 
example, Decrees Nos 6&7 in Syria, and RCC Resolution no. 840 in Iraq. 
Likewise, in Morocco, criticism of the King or his family may be 
regarded as a crime. Since this category of legislation also contains 
some reference to threats to national security, it will be examined in the 
following section which deals with restrictions on the grounds of threats 
to the public interest. 
The second category of lawful restrictions which may be imposed on 
the rights in the interests of the community include those providing 
for the protection of national security and public order (ordre public). 
Radical republics impose a range of restrictions on ideological grounds, 
for example, as we saw, the Syrian Constitution places an ideological 
restriction on the rights, in article 38, which allows criticism which will. 
"guarantee the security and development of the nation and homeland 
and ... sustain the socialist system". 
Other Syrian legislation in force 
prescribes severe punishments for "actions ... 
incompatible with the ... 
socialist order", whether oral or written. 2B By implication, criticism 
which is not considered to "guarantee" the development of the homeland 
or "sustain" the socialist system, or statements "incompatible with the ... 
socialist order" are considered to threaten national security and public 
order. This comment could apply equally to any of the republics which 
limit constitutional protection of political rights within an ideological 
framework. 3° Other legislation imposes restrictions compatible with the 
Covenant, for example, according to the General Law on Printed Matter, 
article 39 under the heading "restrictions" : 
"it is prohibited to publish anything which is contrary to public 
morals or public order or which endangers the safety and the freedom 
of citizens and judicial institutions, or anything affecting the security 
of the army, its operations and armaments. Any breach of these 
regulations shall be indictable. " 
29. Decrees Nos 667 of January 1965 - still in force - prescribe a mandatory death penalty for 
certain specified forms of collusion in verbal or physical acts hostile to the aims of the Ba'thist 
revolution ... "a non-mandatory 
death sentence for `actions held to be incompatible with the 
implementation of the socialist order in the state whether they are written, spoken or enacted, or 
cone about through any means of expression or publication'. 
30. In Egypt, Act no. 34 of 1972 concerning the protection of national unity guarantees freedom of 
expression ... provided that such 
is not prejudicial to the freedoms of others or to the constituent 
elements of society'. 
CCPR/C/26/Add. l/Rev. 1 of 16th March 1984 p. 5. 
Legislation in force in Libya imposing severe restrictions on this right includes Law No. 71 of 1972, 
which prohibits any activity which contradicts the aims or principles of the Revolution of September, 
or as Article 2 of this law states _. aims to endanger its constitutional foundations whether 
openly or secret, or whether the concept on which it is based is written or not written". with 
regard to restrictions provided by law for public order and national security there exist the 
Revolutionary Command Council Decrees. Of particular interest is the Decree of 11 December 1969, 
Concerning the Protection of the Revolution, while Law No. 71 of 1972, prescribes the punishment of 
imprisonment for whoever undertakes certain activities against the republican system of Ist September 1969 Revolution. These activities include the incitement of hostile propaganda against the ruling 
revolutionary republic, the provocation of unrest and disunity between social classes, the spreading 
of information or rumours which are different from the political or economic situation of the country, 
and participation in demonstrations or strikes with the aim of opposing or endangering the republican 
system. 
Amnesty International Violations of Human Rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 20 November 1984. 
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It seems, according to the information provided by the Syrian government 
to the Human Rights Committee, that press censorship is imposed only in the 
state of emergency. It must be repeated that state of emergency legislation 
has remained in force in Syria, Jordan and Egypt for a long period, and we 
ha-, e seen the effect of restrictions imposed on freedom of expression in 
these countries. 
We have seen how the Iraqi Constitution sets ideological limitations on 
these rights. It seems that the Iraqi legislator aimed to protect this right 
within the boundaries of the goals of the Revolution, which clearly 
undermines its protection. The legislator also allowed restriction on the 
exercise of this right for the protection of national security, public order, 31 
public health or morals. For example, Law no. 64 of 1973 on censorship of 
classified material and cinema, stipulates that independent film-makers 
require a licence from the Ministry of Culture and Information. In order to 
obtain a licence, film-makers must function within the ideological boundaries 
of the Revolution. 32 
In November 1986, article 225 of the Penal Code was amended by RCC 
Resolution no. 840 to prescribe the death penalty for publicly insulting the 
President of the Republic or the deputy, the Revolutionary Command 
Council, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, the National Assembly or the 
government with the intent of mobilizing public opinion against the 
authorities. 3 3 
31. Censorship (undertaken by a Committee composed of representatives from the Ministries of Information and 
Culture, Defence and the Interior, whose decisions implement the ideological objectives of the Bath party), 
said to be based on the Iraqi concept of public order which 'cannot allow a file or document to be published 
on the pretext of reflecting freedom of thought if, in fact, such a file would be harmful. Iraq's goal is to 
guide instructively individual development'. 
Information, freedom and censorship : the Article 19 world report, 1988, p. 247. 32. It also prohibits the display and sale of imported slides, microfilm, records, recording tape, scripts 
of file stories, cinema films of all kinds, commercial and private video tapes, on certain specified 
grounds. Locally produced files are also subject to censorship, and their display, sale or export is 
permitted only by licence. The Minister of Information is empowered to suspend the display of file or other 
material legally licensed if new circumstances appear. Articles of the Penal Code also penalise possession 
of banned political material, such as leaflets. 
Law no. 64, article 2, a, b, c and d specify among others: 'propagating for reactionary, chauvinistic, 
Sha'ubite /populism), racialism or regionalistic thoughts or favouring of defeatism, serving imperialism and 
zionise and their supporters or not serving the masses' objectives, interests and aspirations; offending the 
Arab nation and its goals and causes of destiny or to brotherly or friendly countries, or deforming or 
offending the National Liberation movements in the world; low intellectual and artistic standard as it may 
offend the public taste and not dealing with a useful subject. ' 
The Penal Code, in article 208, imposes imprisonment or a fine 'for anyone who possesses or obtains 
written, printed or recorded material that contains incitment to, advocacy of, or propaganda for any of the 
offences defined by article 200 of the Penal Code, if such were prepared for distribution, publication or 
viewing by others. For anyone who possesses any means of printing, recording, publicising which is to intend 
to print, record or broadcast calls, songs, or propaganda for faith, an association, a committee or an 
or emir t'on that aims at committing any of the offences mentioned in article 200. 
C PR/C/1/Add. 45 5 of 8 June 1979, pp. 80-82 
Information freedom and censorship : the Article 19 world report, 1988 p. 259 33. 'He sha)l be punished with life imprisonment and confiscation o? movable and immovable properties 
whoever insults by any way of publicity the President of the Republic, whoever acting on his behalf, the Revolutionary Command Council, the 8a'th Party, the National Assembly or the government. The penalty shall be death if the insult was flagrant and aimed to stir public opinion against the authorities. He shall be 
punished with imprisonment for a period not to exceed seven years anyone who publicly insults the courts, the armed forces, or other public authorities or government institutions. 
Official Gazette no. 3124,17/11/86, Decree no. 840 
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Legislation penalising criticism of the government is also in force in 
Egypt, 3° though it must be said that certain types of criticism are 
punished more severely when combined with other violent or illegal 
acts. 35 For example, according to article 98A (bis) of the Egyptian Penal 
Code, imprisonment and a fine may be imposed on anyone who 
propagates opposition to the fundamental principles upon which the 
socialist regime is based. The same punishment is prescribed by article 
98B (bis) for possession of printed material intended for distribution, 
which is considered contrary to the basic constitutional principles of the 
state or its political or social system. "e Other articles of the Egyptian 
Penal Code restrict freedom of expression on grounds more compatible 
with the permissible restrictions in international law, 37 by using the 
term "public security", and providing that the action specified should 
be combined with violent or terrorist action. 38 
In the modern Arab monarchies, certain criticism of the government, 
and in particular, of the King or his family is considered to be an 
offence. For example, in Morocco, parliamentary immunity from 
prosecution is not provided where the views expressed "challenge the 
monarchy or the Muslin faith, or constitute a breach of the respect due 
to the King, " according to article 37 of the 1972 Moroccan Constitution. 
Likewise, article 23 provides that the King's person is "inviolable and 
sacred", and therefore, his actions and statements may not be criticised. 
Article 28 goes on to state that : "the content of his messages [to the 
nation and parliament] cannot be subject to debate". 
34. Under the 1980 Press Law, it is an offence to advocate opposition to or hatred of state institutions, or to publish abroad false or misleading news or information which could damage Egypt's 
interests. 
Information, freedom and censorship : the Article 19 world report, 1988, p. 247. 35. A more severe punishment is prescribed by article 98/B for disseminating or preparing by whatever 
means materials advocating change of the basic constitutional principles of the state or its political 
or social systems or the dominance or liquidation of a social class or the overthrow of the basic 
social or economic order of the State when the use of force or violence or any other illegal means is 
evident. 
36. This penalty applies for possession of printing or recording machinery used for the above purpose. 37. Similarly in Tunisia acceptable restrictions are determined by law, principally, the Beylical decree of 9th February 196, supplemented by the Act of 28th April 1975. 
CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 2nd Nay 1986 p. 37. 
Articles of the Tunisian Penal Code and Press Code, Law 154 of 7th November 1959 and Law 33 of 12th June 1969 prohibit the distribution of false information and the distribution of an illegal newspaper. Article 62 of the Press Code regulates seizure of publications presenting a danger to public order and 
morals, by providing : "Suet interdites la distribution, la uise en vente, I'exposition aux regardes du public et la detention en vue de la distribution, de la vente, de I'exposition daps an but de 
prupagande, de tracts, bulletins et papillons d'origine etrangere ou non, de nature d nuire J fordre 
publice ou aux boanes loeures. ' 
Judicial review of such administrative acts represents the safeguard for this freedom in Tunisia. 38. For example, Article 102 (bis) specifies the punishment for disseminating false news or statements 
affecting public security. 
Article 174 provides the punishment of imprisonment for anyone who commits the following acts : (1) incitement to overthrow the regime in Egypt or incitement to hatred or contempt of it, (2) the 
propagation or dissemination of doctrines ailing to change the fundamental constitutional principles 
or the basic social order by force or terrorism or other illegal means. Punishment is the same for 
whoever encourages the above either materially or financially. The penalty is increased to imprisonment and a fine if the offence is committed in a time of war. the same penalty applies for possession of printed materials relating to the above if intended for distribution and for possession of printing or recording machinery intended for dissemination of the 
above. 
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This restriction is entirely in contradiction not only with article 9 of the 
Constitution, but also with any understanding of freedom of expression, in 
undermining the rights of the nation and its elected representatives to 
debate their affairs. 
In view of the legal provision in Morocco, contained in article 3 of Dahir of 
15th November 1958 (modified by Dahirs of 28th May 1960 and 10th April 
1973), which declares that an association formed with what it describes as 
an "illicit objective ... 
designed to impair ... the monarchical Form of the 
State shall be null and void", the question arises as to whether this implies 
that to express such views would also constitute a crime. Since this 
legislation apparently prohibits any form of expression if it criticises the 
monarchical political order, this is clearly in breach of freedom of 
expression in international law. " 
Article 77 of the Dahir imposes restrictions on the freedom of the Press 
and publication, providing for example, that the Minister of the Interior may 
order the administrative seizure of any issue of a newspaper whose 
publication is "likely to disturb the public order or undermine the political 
and religious institutions of the Kingdom". `° This law also provides that a 
licence must be acquired for publication of newspapers and magazines. 
Although prior censorship is not explicitly mentioned in the Law of Public 
Freedoms of 1958, this law has been used to restrict the publication and 
distribution of information. Prior censorship of the press was carried out 
by the Censorship Branch of the Ministry of Information, and later by the 
Ministry of the Interior. a1 
In Jordan, all political parties were dissolved in 1957, and the government 
claims that it has received no application since then for the formation of a 
political party. "Z The banning of political parties clearly represents a 
restriction on the freedom of expression, as well as on the right of 
association. A more specific ban restricting . 
freedom of information and of 
expression is connected to the banning of specific political parties as we 
will see. These legislative restrictions are undoubtedly in contrast with the 
statement of the authorities in Jordan as far as the right to hold an opinion 
is concerned, " as well as national and international guarantees. 
39. The question has been put to the Moroccan goverment by the Human Rights Committee as to whether this 
provision implies that to express such views would constitute a crime. The Committee has observed that, 'if 
so, this could be considered to be in breach of the provisions of the Covenant'. 
CCPR/C/SR. 328 of 9th November 1981, p. 9. 40. This Dahir was issued by the French authorities during the Protectorate, and was used to repress 
nationalist liberation, according to Dear Bendourou. 
'The exercise of political freedoms in Morocco' in Review of the International Commission of Jurists, 40, 1988 pp. 31-41 41. Information, freedom and censorship : the Article 19 world report, 1988, p. 2? 6. 42. CCPR/C/SR. 362 of 15th July 1982, p. 6 43. The Jor'anian Prime Minister is reported as saying 'that people may not be detained simply for holding 
an opinion (or 'ideoIogy '), but only when they transform this ideology into action`. Annes ty International Yearbook 1985, p. 320. 
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The Kuwaiti Press and Publications Act no. 3/61. empowers the 
government to impose fines and imprisonment for the publication of 
prohibited materials, including material considered "an incitement to 
hatred or overthrow of the system of government. ". 44 Restrictive 
amendments to legislation were decreed by the executive after 1986'46 
empowering the Cabinet to close down any newspaper on certain 
grounds. The minister may suspend any newspaper for three months 
"when necessary". Prior censorship is imposed on all. newspapers, and 
prison sentences are prescribed for violating certain restrictions on 
publication. 48 As in Morocco, direct criticism of the Amir or ruling family 
is prohibited. 
Several traditional states of the Gulf, within the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) have adopted a security agreement, prohibiting any 
country tolerating "hostile propaganda" against another, while the 
Council's "Charter for Honour in Information" commits member states to 
banning any publication prohibited in any other member state, 47 a 
tendency which in itself contradicts international. principles, while 
undermining the enjoyment of freedom of information in the region. 
In Chapter one we saw that restrictions may be imposed on freedom of 
expression to prohibit propaganda for war, and advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred. Law which prohibits acts or statements on 
these grounds may be found throughout the Arab world. 48 In addition, 
several Arab states are party to the International Covention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and have taken 
legislative and other measures to comply with its provisions. 41 
44. The law requires official government approval for the establishment of a periodical and empowers 
the public authorities to prevent distribution of foreign publications 'to preserve public order or 
nor s". Permission is also required before any publication, other than periodic and commercial, may 
be printed. Information, freedom and censorship : the Article 19 world report, 1988, pp. 271-2. 45. In 1986, the A. ir assumed legislative power and suspended parts of the Constitution of 1962, 
dissolving the National Assembly after a period of hostile criticism and disputes between opposition 
deputies and the government. The Middle East, no. 149 March 1987, p. 9. 
46. For example, that it 'serves the interests of a foreign state or organization, whose policy 
conflicts with the national interest, or which receives help, support or benefit in any form and for 
any reason from any other state or source without permission from the Ministry of Information". 
4?. Information, freedom and censorship : the Article 19 world report, 1988, p. 274 
48. For example, propaganda for war is prohibited by article 118 of the Jordanian Penal Code, which 
provides that any person violating measures adopted by the state for the preservation of its 
neutrality in war shall be punished by imprisonment. Article 142 provides that any person who incites 
sectarian strife or civil war is liable to the punishment of hard labour for life. 
CERU/C/130/Add. 3 of Ist April 1987 p. 1 The Libyan Penal Code too, prohibits propaganda for war, while no legislative provision expressly 
prohibiting propaganda for war exists in Tunisia. 
CCPR/C/SR. 715 of 11th July 198?, pp. 39-40 49. Among them are Algeria, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt. 
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The Islamic foundation of legislation in several states forms the basis 
of prohibition of racism or religious hatred. 5° Legislation in most Arab 
countries prohibits incitement of national, racial or religious hatred. 51 In 
some countries, such as Algeria and Tunisia, incitement to racial or 
religious hatred are dealt with according to legislation covering insult 
and defamation. 52 
50. In Qatar, where Shari'ah underlies the legal system, it provides the basis for provisions in the 
Constitution (articles 1,7 and 9) which are considered sufficient in the absence of positive law to 
prohibit racial discrimination. Both the Qatari and the Kuwaiti legal systems also use international 
conventions which have passed into domestic legislation with binding force, and may be used by the 
judiciary to prohibit and punish such crimes. This procedure means that no positive criminal 
provisions exist in Qatari law for the punishment of such crimes, though 
they are treated by the 
Shari'ah courts as offences under the CERD, with the penalty at the discretion of the magistrate. 
CERD/C/156/Add. 2 7th March 1988, pp. 2-3 & CERD/C/149/Add. 16 of 14th November 1986. 
Other states whose legal structure is based on Shari'ah, like the United 
Arab Emirates and Kuwait, 
also prohibit racial discrimination by positive law, such as 
for example, Article 111 of the Kuwaiti 
Penal Code which provides : "Any person who propagates, by any of the public means specified 
in 
article 101, views that ridicule, scorn or belittle a religion or a religious confession by 
discrediting its beliefs, practices, rites or teachings, shall be punished ... 
CERD/C/149/Add. 16 of 14th November 1986, p. 5. 
The Criminal Code of Abu Dhabi, in article 169, stipulates that : "Any person who : 
(a) disseminates 
any printed or handwritten tract, photograph, drawing or symbol likely to offend 
the religious 
feelings or insult the religious beliefs of other persons; 
(bJ utters, in a public place, or within 
hearing of another person a word or sound likely to offend the religious 
feelings or beliefs of other 
persons, or deliberately and publicly commits any act derogatory to the religious 
beliefs of other 
persons, shall be punished ... 
°. CERD/C/130/Add. 1 of 28th January 1986, p. 11 
51. For example, the Libyan Penal Code prohibits incitement of national, racial or religious 
hatred, 
the provocation of a civil war or seeking the elimination or domination of one social class 
by 
another in articles 206,302 and 318 which also set the penalties for these crimes. 
CCPR/C/l/Add. 20 of 24th January 1978, p. 10 
The Iraqi Penal Code prohibits acts advocating racial, national and religious hatred. 
Article 200 of 
the Code imposes a penalty of imprisonment on anyone who instigates others to overthrow, 
hate or 
disdain the declared system of the government in Iraq, or incites sectarian or religious 
hostilities, 
advocates hostility among sects or ethnic groups, or arouses hatred and hostile 
feelings among the 
inhabitants of Iraq. Advocacy of such hostility may be punished by imprisonment or a 
fine, according 
to article 203 of the Code. Article 208 imposes imprisonment of up to 7 years and/or a 
fine on the 
following grounds : anyone who possesses or obtains, in bad faith, written, printed or recorded 
material that contains incitement to, advocacy of or propaganda for any of the offences 
defined by 
articles 200 and 203. The same penalty is prescribed for possessing means of printing, recording or 
publicising intended to print, record or broadcast songs or calls for a faith, association, committee 
or or anization that aims at committing any of the offences in articles 200 and 203. 
CCPR! C/1/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, pp. 83-84 In Egypt, article 98 of the Penal Code, penalises the exploitation of religion to promote or advocate 
extremist ideologies by word of mouth, in writing or in any other manner in order to stir up sedition, 
disparage divinely revealed religion or prejudice national unity or social harmony. 
Article 150 of the Jordanian Penal Code sets restrictions on freedom of expression, where the written 
or spoken expression gives or is intended to give rise to religious or racial bigotry, or seeks to 
eromote strife among the communities and races of Jordan. 
52. In Algeria, the Criminal Code deals with incitement to racial hatred or discrimination under the 
provisions dealing with insult and defamation, examined earlier. The Algerian legislator considers 
racism as based on unfounded ideas and thus treats any racist statement as insult. 
Article 298 
prescribes a more severe penalty for the offence of defamation when it is carried out with the 
intention of inciting 'hatred between citizens or inhabitants'. In Tunisia, advocacy of hatred, 
hostility or violence is punished by law. The Press Code, in articles 44 and 48, prohibits the use of 
the Press for propaganda to provoke racial hatred or offences against a religion, subject to penalty. 
Defamation and insult against a racial or religious group intended to stir up hatred are more severely 
punished than similar offences against individuals, according to articles 53 and 54. 
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This section examines the position of the rights to freedom of assembly and 
association within Arab municipal legislation, where laws have addressed 
these rights at different levels. As pointed out during the examination of 
these freedoms at the international level, there is a deep and fundamental 
link on one hand, between freedoms of opinion and expression, in their 
broad sense, whether is 
assembly and associatior 
find its translation in I 
effective exercise of all 
assemble as a fundamen 
role to play in today's pý 
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tes, it reviews the scope allowed to organizations 
constitutions and programmes. This leads to an 
restrictions on the aims of associations, which are 
,o the restrictions permissible 
in international law. 
ýws dissolution or suspension of associations by 
ailable remedies. 
53. Freedom of assembly is considered important not only as a fundamental human right, but perhaps as vital 
for the life of the whole nation as far as the political life of the Arab population is concerned. Not 
surprisingly, the ri ht to assembly is considered '... an essential part of the activities of political 
parties ... 
' by the 
European Commission. The importance of defining the nature of the right of association 
has been highlighted, in particular, in the case of the right to form and join trade unions, for the 
important role of trade unions and professional associations in the Arab countries, in promoting and 
protecting human rights, where their role extends far beyond economic and social concerns. 
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Beginning as before, with the radical. republics, the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly is recognized at the constitutional level, for example, 
in Syria, 5° and Iraq. 56 Both these constitutional provisions also mention 
the right to demonstrate, which as we saw, may be implied in the 
international provision, though it is not explicitly stated. The Egyptian 
Constitution, in article 54, stipulates that citizens have the right of 
"orderlsr private meetings" and are permitted to organise public 
meetings, processions and gatherings within the limits of the law. 
The Tunisian Constitution recognises freedom of assembly, (article 8), 
which is also protected in the Constitutions of the modern monarchies. " 
In the traditional monarchies, the right of assembly may be proclaimed 
in the Constitution, as in the United Arab Emirates Provisional Federal 
Constitution, " though this right is restricted in practice in Saudi 
Arabia, the most conservative Islamic monarchy, as public demonstrations 
are prohibited. 5 
Constitutional protection of the right is regulated by other laws. 69 The 
two principles of requirement of prior notification and prior 
authorization are found in Aral) legislation regulating freedom of 
assembly. It is a fact that the individual's right to exercise this freedom 
cannot be absolute, since it might threaten the rights of the community, 
and so some limitation must be expected on its exercise. Although the 
application of the principle of notification might be acceptable to allow 
the authorities to maintain public order and public safety, the 
application of the principle of prior authorization may not be considered 
acceptable since it is open to abuse, if the refusal of the authorities is 
not subject to review, preferably by judicial organs. The measure of 
whether the right is unreasonably restricted must be the extent to 
which the right may be enjoyed without undue administrative 
interference. 00 
54. In article 39, which states: "The citizens enjoy the right of assembly and peaceful demonstration 
within the context of constitutional pr inciples. The law regulates the exercise of this right. 
55. The Iraqi Constitution, in article 26, guarantees 'freedom of ... assembly and demonstrations, in 
accordance with the objectives of the Constitution and within the limits of the Iaw. ' 
56. *The (Moroccan) Constitution guarantees to all citizens: ... 
freedom of assembly. No restriction 
may be placed on the exercise of these freedoms save by law. " (art. 9), while the right to hold 
meetings is found in article 16, para. 1 of the Jordanian Constitution. 
57. Article 33 of the Constitution provides : `Freedom of meetings ... shall 
be guaranteed within the limits of the Iaw". 
58. Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, v. 12: 31 1982, pp. 84-5 
59. For example, in Iraq, the Public Assembly and Demonstrations Law No. 115,1959, grants freedom of 
assembly and demonstration within the limitation of the law, while in Tunisia, the Act of 24th January 
1969 (69/4) regulates public meetings, processions, parades, demonstrations and crowds, and in 
Morocco, two Dahirs, of 15 November 1958 and 10 April 1973 regulate the freedom. 
60. As we saw, the case law of the ILD Committee on Freedom of Association on trade union exercise of 
the right indicates that the authorities should not interfere in the exercise of the right of assembly in a way which could restrict their rights as organizations. The lawful exercise of this right should be protected from any arbitrary presence of, or undue interference by the authorities. 
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One of the Arab countries whose laws require prior authorization for 
meetings and demonstrations is Iraq, where the general. limitation is that 
a licence for holding an assembly or organising a demonstration must be 
obtained from the administrative authority prior to holding or organising 
such assemblies. "' The procedure for obtaining a licence is detailed in 
the Act. e Z While some organizations are allowed to hold meetings on their 
own premises without prior authorization, the implication of the 
provision seems to be that only duly licensed organizations in fact enjoy 
the right as legal entities of freedom of assembly in Iraq. Thus, the 
conclusion should be drawn that individuals who are not members of 
such organizations may not freely exercise the right of assembly in 
Iraq. 
In a number of other Arab countries, the requirement is for prior 
notification of meetings to the public authorities. e3 For example, in 
Tunisia, Act of 24th January 1969 (69/4) provides that public meetings, 
processions, parades, demonstrations and crowds may be held without 
prior authorization, but they are subject to certain formalities, such as 
advance notification to the authorities. For each meeting a Committee 
must take responsibility for maintaining order, and preventing breach of 
the law. An official is assigned by the security authorities to attend 
each public meeting, and he may declare the meeting closed at the 
request of the Committee, or if acts of violence occur. "' 
Several grounds are provided by Arab legislation for the restriction of 
the right of freedom of assembly which may be considered generally 
compatible with restrictions allowed in international law, though it must 
be noted that in some countries, ideological bias may be observed. In 
Syria, the limitation on the enjoyment of the right is that it should not 
be used for terrorist or subversive ends, or endangering general 
security to the extent that public gatherings can no longer be 
described as peaceful. e6 
61. Article 4 of the Public Assembly and Demonstrations Law No. 115,1959 
CCPR/C/1/Add. 45 of 6th June 1979, pp. 85-87 
62. Article 3 of the Law provides that : "Parties, trade unions, and other legally licensed social 
organizations are required to inform the competent administrative authorities at least 48 hours prior 
to holding a public assembly or a demonstration of the time, place and purpose of such an assembly. 
Meetings and assemblies held by these organizations in their headquarters of branches are exempted 
from this. ' 
63. In Jordan, as we have seen, the Constitution protects the right to hold meetings, providing their 
objects are lawful and their means are peaceful. In order to hold a public meeting, it is necessary to 
notify the provincial governor 48 hours before the meeting. The notification has to be counter-signed 
by at least five well-known persons, and must specify the time, place and purpose of the meeting. The 
Supreme Court re-affirmed this provision in a judgement on 13th July 1.985, case no. 172/1984 
CERD/C/130/Add. 3 Ist April 1987, p. 6. As we saw, the Dahir of 15 November 1958 and its amendment of 10 April 1973 regulate the freedom of 
assembly in Morocco, as follows: they do not require previous authorisation, but an announcement to 
the local authorities is required, giving the day, time, place and purpose. 
64. CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 of 2nd May 1986, pp. 40-41. 
65. The Penal Code sets the penalty for any person who attends a meeting not classified as private 
and causes a disturbance by shouting, or chanting or by brandishing inflammatory signs or who instigates a demonstration disturbing public order .. and provides some definition of whether a 
meeting is public or private, "either by virtue of its aims and intent or the number of persons invited to participate, or by virtue of the place where it is held if the place in question is a 
public place or if the public has access thereto or if it is in view of the public". 
CCPR/C/1/Add. l/Rev. l of Ist July 1977, p. 6 
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In Tunisia, under Act 69/4, the Minister of the Interior has the power to 
prohibit by decree any meetings likely to disturb public order or safety. 
Apart from armed processions, °° parades and processions may be held 
freely, though prior notice is required. As before, the authorities may 
prohibit any procession on the grounds of public safety or order. °' 
In Iraq, according to the Public Assembly and Demonstrations Law no. 115, 
the authority may refuse permission to hold a meeting or organize 
assemblies, if it believes that it will threaten public safety or is hostile to 
the democratic republican system. °6 While a restriction on the classical 
ground of protecting public safety is acceptable, one must observe that an 
element of the right of assembly may be the expression of criticism against 
any system or its policies, and the second restriction mentioned might be 
open to administrative misuse if it is used to suppress hostile criticism. 
In some countries where legislation provides that prior authorisation or 
notification is required for public meetings, the law may provide for 
administrative or judicial review, or both, of a decision by the public 
authorities to refuse or deny the right to hold a public meeting. In Iraq, 
for example, according to the Law no. 115, the authority's refusal of 
permission to hold a meeting or organise assemblies is subject to judicial 
supervision. °9 
In Tunisia, under Act 69/4, the Minister of the Interior may prohibit by 
decree meetings on the grounds mentioned above, against which appeals may 
he made to the Administrative Tribunal on the grounds of ultra vires 
act ion. ' ° 
Legislation in many Arab states, despite the political nature of each 
system, has incorporated into the basic charter of government a recognition 
of the right to freedom of association, some explicitly using the term 
"association ", others the term "societies". A significant addition to these 
provisions, in some Constitutions, is the declaration that laws protecting 
human rights are regarded as having a supra-constitutional or organic 
nature, and are thereby protected from legislative impairment. " 
66. CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 of 2nd May 1986,4l 67. Likewise, in Morocco, for public assemblies, it is prohibited to carry weapons or explosives. CCPR/C/10/Add. 2 of 19th February 1981, p. 29-30. 
68. Article 5 of the Public Assembly and Demonstrations Law No. 115,1959 CCPR/C/1/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, pp. 85-87. 69. The refusal of the authority to grant permission for a meeting must be communicated within 24 hours of 
the planned meeting. Such a refusal can be objected against within five days, when the objection along with 
the observations of the administrative authority, is submitted to the highest judicial authority in the 
area which gives a final decision within five days. (Article 6 of Law No. 115,1959) 
70. tCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 of 2nd May 1986, . 40-41. 71. For example, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco (See f/n 156, ch. 3) 
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The legislation of a number of countries' z contains definitions of the 
term "association", and these may serve as a starting point for the 
examination. Each of the definitions uses a different term for the 
members of the association : Syrian legislation stipulates "individuals or 
bodies corporate", Algerian law "any group ... among- persons", and 
Tunisian legislation "two or more persons". According to all three 
definitions, the association must not be profit-making in intention, ' 3 
while the Syrian and Algerian definitions differ from the Tunisian in the 
time span of "association", since the former stipulate "over a specified 
or unspecified period" and "an unlimited or finite period" respectively, 
while the latter provides that the "association" is "on a permanent 
basis". Only the Algerian definition goes on to specify details of 
regulations governing associations, such as its statutes, its name and 
object, but similar provisions may be found throughout national 
legislation governing association. Some countries possess separate 
legislation governing political and non-political associations, while others 
regulate freedom of association within the framework of the governing 
ideology. Although some laws apparently do little more than regulate the 
formation of associations and political parties, other laws seem to 
restrict the rights to a greater or lesser extent, as we will see. 
In the Arab republics, the right of freedom of association may be found 
in the Constitutions and other laws. ' ° The Iraqi Constitution, in article 
26, guarantees the formation of political parties and associations in 
accordance with the objectives of the Constitution and within the limits 
of the law, but sets the ideological boundaries in the same article where 
it provides that "the state shall endeavour to provide the means 
required for practising these freedoms which are compatible with the 
nationalist and progressive line of the revolution ". Hence, the right 
cannot be enjoyed outside the ideological framework of the Ba'thist 
revolution. A similar tendency is illustrated in the other Arab republics, 
in differing degrees. 's 
72. In Syria, article 1 of Act no. 93 of 1958 defines association. CCPR/C/1/Add. 31 of 12th July 1978, p. 3. 
In Al eria, Act no. 87/15 of 21st July 1987, article 2 contains a definition of association. CERD/ý/158/Add. 6 of 14th October 1987. 
In Tunisia Act 59/154 of 7th November 1959 defines association. CCPR/C/28/bdd. 5/Rev. 1 2nd May 1986, p. 41. 73. The Syrian Act specifies that it must not be 'organised for purposes of gain'; the Algerian Ordinance 
, that 
it should have "a ... non-profit-making purpose' and 
the Tunisian Act that it should have "a purpose other than sharing the profits". 
74. Article 55 of the Egyptian Constitution gives the right to form associations, providing that 
citizens may form societies in the manner prescribed by law. 
The Algerian Constitution recognises freedom of association, in article 56, exercised in accordance 
with the law. It oust be recalled that, in Algeria, the National Charter is the "fundamental source 
of the laws of the state', and so freedom of association must be viewed within this context. 
Freedom of association is also guaranteed by the Tunisian Constitution, in article B. 75. For example, while article 48 of the Syrian Constitution safeguards the right of 'popular sectors" to "constitute trade union, social, and professional organizations and cooperative production or 
service associations', it goes on to provide that the law determines the framework of these 
organizations and their relationships as well as the limit of their activities'. The ideological difficulties inherent in this last provision become more clear in article 49, where one of the "endeavours of such organizations is defined as the building of Arab socialist society and the 
protection of its regime'. 
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In Algeria, as we saw, the National Charter is the fundamental 
ideological document organising and determining the scope of all 
activities. Again, its effect can be seen in the Constitution, which 
provides in the Chapter headed "The Political Function" that "the 
fundamental principle of the Algerian institutional system is that of the 
single party", (article 94), and that "the National Liberation Front is the 
single party of the country" (article 95). '® As we saw in Chapter 3, the 
FLN, which is described as "the avant-garde force of leadership and 
organization of the people" constitutes the "guide of the socialist 
revolution and the leading force of society" (article 97). Article 97 goes 
on to make it clear that the FLN, like the Ba'th in Iraq, dominates the 
sphere of political association, so that the right can only be said to 
exist within the context of the FLN. This is confirmed by article 100, 
which stipulates that "mass organizations are charged with the 
mobilization of ... the people 
in order to realize the major political, 
economic, social and cultural tasks which condition ... the success of 
socialist construction". Without entering on an evaluation of the Algerian 
ideology, it is clear that the principle of freedom of political association 
does not exist in Algeria, and freedom of association can only be said to 
exist within the social sphere. " 
As for the monarchies, the right is to be found, for example, in the 
Moroccan legal system as article 9 of the Constitution, which guarantees 
to all citizens freedom of association and freedom to join any political 
organization of their choice. Likewise, the Jordanian Constitution 
protects the right to form societies and political parties, (article 1.6), 
which are entitled to address the public authorities on matters 
concerning public affairs. 
In the emirates, the right may be found in the Constitutions, for 
example, article 33 of the Provisional Federal Constitution of the United 
Arab Emirates, which safeguards the right of association, provided it is 
practised within the limits of the law. 7e 
76. Article 95 goes on to describe the FLN as the avant-garde constituted by the Post conscious 
citizens, animated by a patriotic and socialist ideal, Nho freely united within the National 
Liberation Front under conditions determined by the statutes of the Party". 
These statutes, as quoted in Mohammed Bedjaoui's Law and the Algerian revolution (1961, p. 86), make 
membership of the FLN conditional on `fighting for the objectives of the organization". This 
represents a potential restriction on free association and political participation on ideological 
grounds. 
77. This freedom, like all freedoms safeguarded in the Algerian Constitution, is subject to the 
restriction in article 73 which provides that such freedoms lapse, if used to infringe upon the 
Constitution, the essential interests of the national collectivity ... and the socialist Revolution". 78. In the Emirates, there are a number of organisations, covering social and professional fields. 
They are governed by Acts such as Federal Act no. 12 of 1972 and federal Act no. 6 of 1974. 
CERD/C/130/Add. 1 28th January 1986 p. 5. 
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Besides constitutional recognition, most Arab countries have 
promulgated other laws 7° to deal specifically with associations and other 
groupings and institutions pursuing social objectives with., in most 
cases, a vague restriction on their right to engage in political activities, 
which are regulated by other provisions. Most countries" O possess 
separate legislation governing political and non-political associations, 
while others regulate freedom of association within the framework of 
the governing ideology. The formation of political parties in Egypt is 
subject to Act no. 40 of 1977, amended by Act no. 36 of 1979,8' which in. 
article 2, describes a political party as "... organized grouping based on 
common principles and goals which seek to achieve objectives relating to 
the political, economic and social affairs of the state, and to assume the 
responsibilities of government ". 
It must be established in accordance with the provisions of this Act 
and seek to achieve its objectives by democratic means. 82 
79. In Syria, for example, the law grants institutions, organisations, trade unions and private 
committees the right to form associations, by Act no. 93 of 1958, and in Iraq, Act no. 1 of 1960 
governs associations, and contains the regulations, procedures and conditions to be applied. Political 
parties follow the same procedures and must fulfil the same conditions as other associations. 
CCPR/C/SR. 748 of 22nd July 1987, p. 9 In Algeria, the freedom has been subject to several laws, such as Ordinance No. 71-79 of 3 December 
1971. In 1987, the Algerian legislator adopted Act no. 87/15 of July 1987), relating to associations, 
the purpose of which, as stated in its first article, is to determine the framework in which freedom 
of association is exercised, and it goes on to define association, in article 2, which states "an 
association is any group set up for a specific, non-profitmaking purpose among persons who, to that 
end, combine their knowledge, activities and means for an unlimited or finite period. It is an 
agreement governed by the laws and regulations in farce and by its statutes drawn up in conformity 
with model statutes established by regulations. The object of the association must be stated 
unequivocally and its name must be in conformity With it. 
CERD/C/158/Add. 6 of 14th October 1987, p. 1 In Egypt, private associations and institutions pursuing social objectives (stressed in an 
explanatory note 4ttached to the Act, which highlights their social function, and the role they play in social welfare) are regulated by Act no. 32 of 1964, which stipulates that such associations must 
not engage in political activity, since this is the sphere of political parties, whose formation and 
activities are governed by a separate act. 
In Tunisia, Act 59/154 of 7th November 1959 defines and regulates association, as we saw, while 
association in Morocco is regulated by the Royal Charter of 8th May 1958, and by Dahir of 15 November 
1958 (amended 10th April 1973). A new draft Labour Code in Morocco contains a provision permitting 
working married women to belong to professional organisations. It is not clear whether this draft, 
when it becomes law, will also safeguard the right of unmarried women. CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 2nd May 1986, p. 41 & CCPR/C/l0/Add. 2 of 19th February 1981, pp. 3,11 In Jordan, the Social Clubs and Associations Act no. 33 of 1966 regulates the establishment and 
operation of charitable associations, and social clubs. All Jordanians may join associations, and may 
also join with others in their establishment. Despite the constitutional provision in Jordan, which 
protects the right to form and to join political parties, in fact the exercise of freedom of 
association seems to be limited to the social sphere, as no party has been formed in Jordan since their general abolition in 1957. 
80. Although political parties in Tunisia presently derive their authorisation from the Act governing 
association, an Act recently tabled by the government proposed that political parties be subject to 
special regulations, which would impose obligations concerning the rights of the Tunisian community. Parties may be authorised to bring together Tunisian citizens to participate in national affairs under 
a political programme, and to participate in elections. They should act in accordance with the Constitution and the law, shunning violence and fanaticism, and must defend the republican system and the sovereignty of the people, and -safeguard, for example, the principles embodied in the Code of Personal Status, and human rights. CCPR/C/g28/Add. 5/Rev. l 2nd May 1986, p. 41. 81. Article 1 of the Act provides that: 'Egyptians have the right to form political parties and every Egyptian is entitled to join a political party'. 
82. In Egypt, the Constitution gives the right to form associations provided that the activities of 
such associations are not clandestine, of a military nature or directed against the social order. 
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Alongside these laws which regulate the exercise of the right, 
legislation in several Arab countries tends to prohibit membership of 
organizations on certain religious or political grounds. e3 For example, in 
Libya in 1972, the RCC issued a decree prohibiting the formation of 
political. parties other than the Arab Socialist Union. e 4, and according to 
(Art. 206) of the Penal Code (as amended August 1975), it is a capital 
offence to belong to an illegal political organisation which aims to 
overthrow the government. Law no. 71 of 1.972 describes political party 
activities as a "betrayal of the right of the nation", ", and prescribes 
capital punishment for anyone who calls for, sets up or is in any way 
associated with organizations prohibited by this law. This law clearly 
violates the right of free association, undermining organised political life 
in Libya. It also illustrates the striking phenomenon of the 
criminalisation of aspects of political organisation, which prevents the 
development of organised political life in several Arab countries. 
The international legal principle of non-discrimination may be found in 
the legislation regulating association in several countries. 88 Although 
the formation of political parties in Egypt is lawful. provided that their 
membership is not restricted to a particular social class, category, sect 
or geographical area, 87 this legislation has been questioned by the 
Human Rights Committee, since it extends restriction to categories 
beyond those mentioned in the Political. Covenant, perhaps restricting 
the right, for example, of farmers to organise in a political movement. 88 
Clearly, such a provision extends restrictions beyond the scope 
envisaged in international standards. 
Freedom of association in Algeria, as we saw, is regulated by Act 87-15 
of 1987. Specific restrictions on those who may establish, administer or 
direct associations include general requirements of nationality, age, 
possession of civil rights and good morals. 89 However, another specific 
condition has a discriminatory tone which therefore undermines the 
83. For example, in July 1980, the Syrian Peoples' Assembly ratified Decree No. 49 of July 1980 (which 
is retroactive), which makes membership of the Muslim Brotherhood a capital offence. 
Report by Amnesty International to the government of the Republic of Syria 
Similarly, in Iraq, Al Da'wa al-Islariyya (Islamic Call) is banned, and, since 31st March 1980, it 
has been a capital offence to be a member of, or to be affiliated to this party. Revolutionary Command 
Council Resolution no. 1370 re-affirmed the death penalty for several offences, including joining al- 
tia'wa al-Islamiyya. 
84. Gisbert H. Flanz & Ahmed Rhazaoui Libya in Albert P. Blaustein & 6isbert H. Flanz (eds) 
"Constitutions of the Countries of the World', February 1974, p. 12. 
85. The law defines party activities as : 'any gathering, organization or group of whatever kind or 
whatever the number of its members, which is based on a political concept opposed in its aims or means 
to the principles of the Fateh revolution of September, or aims to endanger its constitutional 
foundations whether openly or in secret, or whether the concept on which it is based is written or not 
written, or whose subscribers and supporters have used material or other means'. 
Amnesty International Violations of human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 20th November 1984, 
Appendix C. 
86. For example, in Morocco, the Constitution provides that associations must be open to all Moroccans 
without discrimination as to race, creed or on in. 
87. As we saw, article 1 of Act no. 40 of 1977, as amended, provides that "... every Egyptian is 
entitled to join a political party'. 
88. CCPR/C/SR. 499 of 6th April 1984, p.?. 
89. CERD/C/158/Add. 6 of 14th October 1987, p. 3. 
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right of association, in article 8 of the Ordinance, which states, in 
paragraph 5, that such a person must not "conduct himself in a manner 
contrary to the interests of the liberation Revolution and to the 
------- ----- -- ------------- fundamertal choices and options of 
_the - 
country". Like legislation we 
--- --- -- --- -- ----- --- - have already seen in other countries, this provision contains an 
ideological restriction on the free exercise of the right by excluding a 
category of the society, which undermines its protection in national 
legislation and cannot be considered compatible with international legal 
principles. 
The limitation on the exercise of the right of freedom of association is 
unlike the limitation on the right of assembly in that it specifies 
particular groups in society, and explicitly restricts their exercise of 
this right. A general restriction on the rights of members of the armed 
forces, the police, and, arguably, administrative staff9O, may be found in 
international law. 9' Thus, restrictions on the right of these groups are 
acceptable, and several Arab countries have legislation which provides 
this. In addition, it is common for law to restrict the right to associate 
freely of public employees, 92 which as we saw is also acceptable in 
international law. This is important in the Arab countries since public 
sector employment plays such a large role. This restriction on the right 
of certain categories must be viewed with some concern, since although 
when used in the public interest it should not unduly restrict the right, 
in certain countries, where the scope of "public service" is extremely 
wide, °3 it might be misused to restrict the rights of large sections of 
the population. 
Vaguely worded restrictions may be seen in legislation such as the 
Moroccan Dahir of November 1958 (amended by the Dahir of April 1.973), 
which restricts the right of association of "persons subject to coercive 
measures for activities of an anti-national character". °6 
90. cf. European Convention on Human Rights article 11, para. 2. 
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights ... 
This article shall not prevent 
the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, 
of the police or of the administration of the State'. 
91. GAOR Annexes 20th September - 20th December 1955, p. 56, para 151. 92. According to Dahir of 15 November 1958 (as amended), there is a restriction on membership of 
political associations for members of the armed forces, magistrates, employees of the public 
authorities, police officers. 
CCPR/C/10/Add. 2 19th February 1981, pp. 29-30 
In Tunisia, restrictions are placed on the right to form and to join trade unions of some categories. 
These include the armed forces and internal security forces, who are prohibited from forming or 
joining a political party or association, or forming or joining trade unions. This category may be 
authorised to join social, cultural or sporting associations. 
CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 2nd May 1986 
93. This point has been discussed by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association who have stressed, 
that the scope of 'public service' must not be unreasonably wide. 
94. CCPR/C/10/Add. 2 19th February 1981, pp. 29-30. 
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"Activities of an anti-national character" is again a vague term, which may 
be subject to administrative abuse, and it must be borne in mind that in 
Morocco, as we have seen, "anti-national" activities would include for 
example, calling for the establishment of a republic. Other restrictions which 
are clearly ideological can be found in Arab legislation. For example, in 
Iraq, as well as restrictions on the right of association of the armed forces, 
there are also restrictions on former members of the armed forces and 
former members of the Ba'th party. °6 
As we have seen, several categories of legislation regulate the formalities 
of establishing and organizing associations in the Arab legal order. A 
common tendency is for political associations and trade unions to be 
regulated separately by decree or other laws, while associations of a social 
or sporting nature, for example, are controlled by general provisions. 
Registration may be the first step in the creation of any association, and 
the legislation of several countries requires prior authorisation, 96 a refusal 
of which, in some countries, may be subject to judicial review. 97 
Some countries, like Algeria, °a require that the statutes of an association 
must be drawn up in conformity with model statutes established by 
regulation. As we will see in the examination of trade union freedoms, while 
it is acceptable that such statutes serve as a model for new associations or 
as guidelines for their establishment, if the rules of an organization must 
conform to government specifications, this might constitute a violation of the 
right to associate freely, as it provides scope for administrative 
interference. 
95. Resolution 1244 of 20th November 1976 (Act no. 245) amended article 200 of the Penal Code to make 
membership of, or affiliation to, a political party other than the 8a'th party a capital offence for members 
of the armed forces, for men who retired or left the armed forces after 1968, for members of the Bath 
party, and for former members of the Bath party. 
An official of the Iraqi government has explained that this resolution does not apply the death penalty for 
'differences of opinion, but rather to punish the offence of 'deceiving public opinion by attempting to infiltrate the Ba'th party while belonging to another party'. 
CCPR/C/SR.? 46 of 22nd July 1987, p. 8. 96. In Tunisia, the deposit of a declaration of the nave, purpose and headquarters of the association, as 
well as the full name, date of birth and nationality of each of its officers is required. Copies of its 
regulations oust also be deposited. Their legal existence is subject to authorisation by the authorities. Forei n associat'ons may also obtain permission to operate in Tunisia. (Act 59/154 of 7th November 1959) CCPRIC/28/Add. 51Rev. 1 2nd May 1986, p. 41. 
In Algeria, certain organizations only are subject to prior authorisation, while this is not the general 
rule. CERD/C/158/Add. 6 of 14th October 1987, p. 2. 97. In Iraq, Act no. 1 of 1960 provides that if a request to form an organization is rejected, the founder 
members may appeal against this decision before the Court of Cassation, whose decision is final. CCPR/C/SR. 748 of 22nd July 1987, p. 9. 
98. Act 87-15 of 21st July 1987, specifies, in article 2, that : `(an association] is an ayreement governed by the laws and regulations in force and by its statutes drawn up in conformity with model statutes 
established by regulations. ' 
CERD C/158/Add. 6 of 14th October 1987, p. 2. 
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The laws of some countries merely require that the association satisfies 
certain criteria as to aims and activities. The legislation of most countries 
connects the legality of associations to the nature of their aims, though the 
approach varies. Some merely restrict associations whose aims are contrary 
to law, morals or public order, °9 a category of restrictions comparable to 
those allowed by the international standard, while other legislation goes 
beyond these classical restrictions to connect the legality of associations to 
the state's political policies. Such legislation restricts the freedom, as we 
have seen already, to the ideological framework set by, for example, the 
party or the government. Act 87-15, which regulates association in Algeria, 
specifies that associations may be prohibited for several reasons, including 
restrictions which are acceptable in the light of the international 
p ro vis ion. 100 Other restrictions, which must be examined in the light of 
international standards, include purposes "contrary to the established 
institutional system" or "such as to undermine the ... 
fundamental options 
and choices of the country". While the first restriction appears neutral, no 
more than a reflection of the sovereign right of any state to protect its 
constitutional order and institutions, such a provision must be viewed in 
the light of the ideological nature of the constitutional order and the legal 
remedies available within the Arab legal order. Such a provision may be 
used, in Algeria as elsewhere, to restrict the rights of what could be 
regarded as legitimate political opposition groups. 
The tone of the second restriction is also neutral, but it contains scope 
for the imposition of wide-ranging restrictions on the right of freedom of 
association for political reasons. The "fundamental options and choices of 
the country" must refer to the Algerian population's "choice of socialism" 
administered by the FLN, mentioned in the National Charter. It cannot be 
compatible with the international understanding of freedom of association 
that this right may be restricted on grounds so closely connected to the 
interests of a single ruling party. ' 01 
99. In Tunisia, Act no. 154 of 7th November 1959 provides . 'the cause and object of such an agreement shall, 
under no circumstances be contrary to the law or to corals, likely to disrupt public order or detrimental to 
the integrity of the national territory, or to the republican fora of the state. CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 2nd Nay 1986, p. 41 
The Sprian Constitution restricts the practice of these rights, as we have seen above, footnote 75 
Article 55 of the Egyptian Constitution guarantees freedom of association, provided their 'activities are 
hostile to the social system, secret, or of a military nature'. 
100. Purposes which may be : 'Such as to undermine the integrity of the national territory, national unity, 
the State religion, the national language ... ; 
'Contrary to the laws and regulations in force'; 'Contrary 
to public order and morality'. 
CERD/C/158/Add. 2 of 3rd April 1987, p. 13 'Precautionary' measures may be taken against associations which fall into any of these categories. These include : prohibition of meetings, closure of premises, freezing of accounts, placing of property under 
seal. 
CERD/C/158/Add. 6 of 14th October 1987 p. 2 
101. The openly ideological intent o! provisions elsewhere in the Ordinance which governs association in 
Algeria makes it clear that the rights of association of the FLN alone are to be free. Article 30 states 
explicitly that the provisions of the Act shall not apply to 'associations which have a political purpose 
and whose activity is connected with that of the National Liberation Front party and subsidiary 
organizations and unions'. 
CERD/C/158/Add. 6 of 14th October 1987, p. 6 
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Moroccan law also contains restrictions on the two lines identified in 
Algeria. These are compatible with international law and provide 
explicitly that associations must observe international standards, ' 02 
while others focus on the institutional structure of the state. ' 03A 
member of the Human Rights Committee has rightly commented that this 
law is not justified under any of the restrictions in article 22 of the 
Political Covenant, unless such an association would be a threat to 
national security, bearing in mind that the Covenant is neutral on 
questions of ideology and forms of state or government. " 04 
It is a general principle within most Arab countries that the rights of 
political associations are severely restricted or curtailed, as we will see, 
unless they are in line with the dominant political philosophy. In the 
Moroccan case, for example, we saw that opposition to the monarchical 
form of state would constitute a crime. This cannot be compatible with 
the international understanding of this right. It is also clear that laws 
in Arab countries provide scope for the misuse of concepts such as 
national security and public order, since, as we will see, the rights of 
opposition groups are paralysed for being regarded as a threat to the 
nation, though they would be more correctly described as a threat to 
the ruling authority. 
Some restrictions imposed on the right of freedom of association by 
Egyptian legislation are compatible with those allowed by international 
law. l05 As we saw, the formation of political parties in Egypt is subject 
to regulations which, for example, prohibit the formation of parties 
based on racist or sectarian ideologies. Act no. 40 of 1977, amended by 
Act no. 36 of 1979, provides Egyptians the right to form political parties, 
provided that they are not opposed to national unity and that they do 
not pursue a policy of discrimination, according to article 4.106 
102. Dahir of 15 November 1958 (amended 10th April 1973), provides : that any association entered into for the purpose of furthering illicit cause or pursuing an illicit objective contrary to the law 
and morality, or designed to impair the integrity of the territory of the nation ... shall 
be null and 
void. * It also provides that such associations may carry out activities subject to certain 
conditions : their activities must be open and advance notification given; they must observe Moroccan 
law and regulations; they must have due regard for law and order, and for the rules of morality 
generally accepted in Moroccan society; they must respect the international human rights conventions 
to which Morocco is a party; they must be open to all Moroccans without discrimination as to race, 
creed or ony in. 
103. CCPR/C/10/Add. 2 19th February 1981, p. 30. Dahir of 15 November 1958 (as amended), provides that any association entered into for the purpose 
of furthering illicit cause or pursuing an illicit objective ... 
designed to impair the 
... monarchical form of the state shall be null and void. " 
104. CCPR/C/SR. 327 of 9th November 1981, p. 11. 
105. In Egypt, the Constitution gives the right to form associations provided that their activities 
are not clandestine, of a military nature or directed against the social order. 
06. Anyone who violates the provisions of this article is liable to penalty prescribed by law, 
article 176 of the Penal Code and articles 4,22 and 23 of Act no. 40 of 1977, amended by Act no. 156 
of 1981). 
CERD/C/149/Add. 22 30th January 1987, p.?. 
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Other restrictions seem to be designed to restrict organised opposition 
to the government. 1.07 For example, article 4 of Law no. 40 states that no 
political. parties, their programs or leadership should be opposed to, 
inter alia, the principles of the revolutions of 23rd July 1952 and 15th 
May 1971, or the principles of the referendum on the peace treaty with 
Israel since 2nd April 1979.10 8 
These restrictions cannot be considered compatible with the aim of the 
protection of the right of freedom of association, nor do they fall into 
any of the categories of restriction specified in the international 
instrument, if carried out peacefully. They seem to be designed to 
protect the authorities in Egypt from organised opposition challenging 
the ruling ideology, identified as the "revolutions of 23rd July 1952 and 
15th Afafr 1971". The article in the Penal Code explicitly prohibits 
opposition to the principles on which the socialist regime is based, 
implying that any opposition group which does not share this ideology 
is illegal. Although international law, as noted, is silent on questions of 
ideology and form of state, nevertheless this clearly contradicts the 
principle of individual freedom of choice. 
In most Arab countries, the public authorities exercise the power to 
suspend or dissolve an association on several grounds, such as violating 
public order or morality. Such orders may be the subject of review, 
whether by administrative or judicial organs. Clearly, judicial review is 
the most secure impartial safeguard against abuse, since conciliation 
committees, for example, may not adequately safeguard freedom of 
association. In Morocco, the Dahir of November 1958- as amended in April 
1973 - allows the government to suspend political parties for a limited 
period, unlike the original legislation, according to which parties could 
be dissolved only through the courts. l09 
107. As we have seen, article 98A (bis) of the Penal Code provides the punishment of imprisonment for 
those found guilty of organising an association which aims to oppose the fundamental principles upon 
which the socialist regime is based or incitement to hatred or contempt of it, or going against the 
alliance of the popular working forces or incitement to opposition to the public authorities. Such 
activity is punished more severely when combined with the use of force, terrorism or other illegal 
means. 
If force, violence or terrorism is evident then the punishment is increased. Imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding five years is the penalty for membership of such an association or organization. 
Article 98A of the Penal Code sets the punishment for 'any person who sets up, founds, organizes or 
administers associations or organizations seeking the dominance of one social class, or to overthrow 
the basic national, social and economic orders, or to destroy any of the fundamental orders of 
society, or to favour any of the preceding actions if the use of force or terrorism or any other 
illegal means is evident. ' The term of imprisonment may be up to ten years with hard labour. Paragraph 
3 of the same article provides the punishment of imprisonment for membership of, or participation in 
such an organization. A maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment may be imposed on a person who has 
direct or indirect contact with the organization or its branches. 
108. Under article 22, activity connected with illegal political organisations is punishable by life 
imprisonment with hard labour. 
109. Omar Bendourou, 'The Exercise of political freedoms in Morocco" in Review of the International Commission of Jurists, 40,1980. 
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Recent Algerian legislation illustrates two approaches to administrative 
action against associations. Under Ordinance 71-79 of 1971, the legality 
of an administrative order by the Ministry of the Interior or a judicial 
decision to dissolve an association was subject to the supervision of the 
Supreme Court, by appeal. L1° However, in the present Ordinance (87--15 
of 1987) governing association, there is no provision of judicial 
supervision of an administrative order to dissolve an association, ' 11 
which means that the right of suspended associations is no longer 
safeguarded by the judiciary. One expects, however, that the ordinary 
channel for appeal against administrative decisions remains open to 
organizations. 112 
110. CERD/C/131/Add. 3 of 18th June 1985, pp. 12-13. 
111. CERD/C/158/Add. 2 of 3rd April 1987: p. 13. 
112. Ibid. Annex. 
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Both radical and moderate Arab states lay emphasis on the role of trade 
unions, "' not surprisingly, since workers' and employers' organizations 
represent a significant force within the Arab society. It is notable that 
several Arab countries are parties to ILO instruments guaranteeing the 
rights of workers and employers. ' 14 
The role of trade unions in the Arab world is regulated by law, ll6 with 
recognition at constitutional level in most countries. " Other laws"' 
regulate the formation of trade unions, their activities and scope. 
113. For example, the Iraqi report to the Human Rights Committee lays great emphasis on the promotion and 
encouragement of trade unions in Iraq, since they are 'regarded as one of the important manifestations of the practice and assertion of popular democracy. 
CCPR/f, /1/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, p. 87. 
Article 3 of the Moroccan Constitution also emphasises the role of '. . trade union organizations ... [which contribute to the organization and representation of the citizens". 
114. For example, Iraq has acceded, among other labour conventions, to the I10 Convention on Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, and Tunisia has acceded to and ratified the same 
Convention. 
115. The examination of Arab national legislation begins with the rights of citizens to establish and to 
join organizations, including the extent to which organizations can draw up their own constitutions and 
rules, how far they are free to elect their representatives and organise their administration and 
activities, formulating their own programmes, It examines the extent to which organizations are protected 
against dissolution or suspension by the public authorities, and how far organizations are allowed to 
establish and join federations, including the degree to which Arab trade unions may affiliate with regional 
as well as international organizations. Since this right bears the imposition of restrictions of special 
nature such legislative restriction is also examined. 
116. in Egypt, the Constitution of 1971 and its amendments of 1980, permit the establishment, on a 
democratic basis, of trade unions and syndicates which enjoy corporate personality, (article 56). 
Article 60 of the Algerian Constitution stipulates that trade union rights are exercised within the 
framework of the law, as does article 8 of the Tunisian Constitution, which also provides for syndicalism 
'le droit syndical est garanti. ' 
The Iraqi Constitution, in article 26, guarantees the right to form trade unions within the legal and ideological framework described before, in other words, in accordance with the nationalist and progressive 
line of the revolution', while article 48 of the Syrian Constitution states that: the popular sectors have the right to establish social and professional trade union organisation and production of service co- 
operatives. The framework of these organisations, their relations and the scope of their activities shall be 
defined by law'. The Moroccan Constitution, in article 9, and the Jordanian Constitution, in article 23 (f) 
guarantees all citizens freedom to join or to form unions. 
117. As we saw, Syrian law grants institutions, organisations, trade unions and private committees the right 
to form associations, for example, Act 31? of 1956 on Co-operatives grants consumers' and producers' 
cooperatives the right to form associations. Act 68 of 1968 governs the right to form trade unions or 
professional organisations which have their own statutes. Trade union or nisation in Syria is regulated by 
Legislative Decree 84 of 1b68 
(amended 
by Legislative Decree no. 30 of 1982). 
Trade union rights are regulated by articles 242-271 of the Tunisian Labour Code, promulgated in 1964, 
which lays down maximum working hours, provides for rest days, paid vacations, and regulates a minimum wage, 
social security, pensions and other wage provisions. Equality between the sexes in employment is also 
guaranteed. The right is protected for all categories : public officials have the right to fore trade unions 
under article 4 of Act 83/112 of 12th December 1983. Other workers are aranteed the right to organise 
under the labour Code and the Basic Collective Convention approved in 1973. Article 242 of the Labour Code 
provides that trade unions or professional organisations may be formed freely. The only formality to be 
completed is the deposit of its statutes with the headquarters of the governate or 'delegation', which is 
competent for the territory. 
Aliens may join trade unions, but may not be appointed to administrative or executive posts, without the 
approval of the Minister of Labour, (article 251). Trade unions are represented on the Economic and Social 
Council, a body set up under the Constitution to advise on economic and social matters. They are also 
authorised by law to make labour agreements with egplovers. 
Trade union rights in Morocco are regulated by the uahir of 16th July 1957, according to which they say 
only be prohibited by the decision of a court. CCPR/C/10/Add. 2 of 19th February 1981, p. 3 In Jordan, formation of trade unions is guaranteed by the Labour Act, article 69 a). Legislation has also been enacted entitling the formation of professional associations, and under article 79 of the Act, 
employers are prohibited from making the employment of any worker subject to the condition that he must 
refrain from joining or give up his membership in a trade union. CCPR/C/1/Add. 56 25th January 1982 p. 18 I CERD/C/130/Add. 3 1st April 1987, p.?. 
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In the traditional Arab monarchies, it seems that some legal systems 
safeguard the right, while others do not allow trade unions to be 
formed, instead regulating workers' rights by a Labour Code. An 
example of the first category is Kuwait, where article 43 of the 
Constitution provides freedom to form unions on a national basis in 
accordance with the law. Chapter VIII of the Private Sector Labour Act 
no. 38 of 1964, makes provision for freedom of association, including the 
right to form trade unions, in article 69,118 
In contrast, in the state of Qatar, the right to form trade unions is not 
exercised; nor is the right to strike or to engage in collective 
bargaining. Instead, the Labour Act provides for the establishment of 
committees for the settlement of disputes and consultative committees, 
(article 66 and 67), as well as establishing a Labour Court. ' 19 As in 
Qatar, trade unions and labour federations do not exist in the United 
Arab Emirates. Instead, employment-related rights of workers are 
safeguarded by law. lZo 
As we saw, there is grave cause for concern in countries where the 
law imposes a single trade union system at all levels, and prohibits 
pluralism locally and nationally. Only one organization and national trade 
union may be established for each category of workers, or for each 
region. Such organizations are often compelled to join a single national 
confederation, designated by law. Such systems may be linked to 
different socio-economic and political principles, though the imposition of 
such a system may be achieved through explicit legislation or through a 
set of provisions. This is the case in several Arab countries, including 
Syria, l 21 Egypt, 1z2 Iraq, Libya, i z' Kuwait, Yemen. 
118, this article provides the right of employers to form associations and the right of workers to 
organise trade unions, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, which enjoy corporate 
personality, and the provisions of these articles apply to persons working in the governmental sector, 
similar to Tunisian legislation. 
119, For example, Act no. 4 of 1962 established a Labour Court, which considers affairs between 
employers and employees, and is solely ompetent to rule in disputes. Cases are heard by the Court in 
accordance with its Code of Procedure promulgated under Act no. 5 of 1962). Article 17 of this Act 
states : The judge of the Labour Court shall be independent and, in his administration of justice, 
shall be subject to no authority other than of the law in accordance with which his rulings shall be 
issued and implemented". CERD/C/156/Add. 2 7th March 1988, p. 12. 
120. CERD/C/1301Add. 1 28th January 1986 p. 5. 
The Provisional Federal Constitution of the United Arab Emirates however, provides in article 20, 
that it intends to protect the rights of workers by legislation, with the help of international labour Millation. 
. 
As we saw, trade union organisation in Syria is regulated by Legislative Decree 84 of 1968 famended by Legislative Decree no. 30 of 1992). Like comparable Egyptian legislation, section 7 of the 
Decree imposes the system of single-trade-union structure, and Legislative Decree no. 250 of 1969, 
establishes a single system for the establishment of associations. 
122. In Egypt, despite the constitutional provision, the Trade Union Act No. 35 of 1976 amended by Act 
No I of 1981 imposes a single-trade-union structure at all levels 
CCPR/C/26/Add. 1/Rev. l 16th March 1984, pp. 4-5. 
23. In Libya, it is imposed by Act 107/75, and in Iraq by Law no. 151. In Iraq, Law no. 129 of 1969 Jamended by Law no. 38 of 1983), Law no. 178 of 1969 and Law no. 70 of 1900 establish trade unions for 
artists, journalists, academicians and writers in Iraq respectively. 
These laws specify the aims of the unions, and define their activities and programmes within the ideological principles of the Ba'th party. Writers and artists, for example, may not work independently but must belong to the specified union. On the promulgation of Law no. 70 of 1980, all 
existing non-governmental cultural, artistic or scientific organizations were dissolved. Freedom of information and expression in Iraq, Article 19,1.987, pp_17-18,28. 
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The Egyptian government has explained that the single-union structure 
is "imposed" by the statute of the Organisation of African Trade Union 
Unity of which Egypt is a member, since it specifies the principle of a 
single national trade union structure. This principle conflicts with that 
in the 11.0 Convention that workers must be free to set up organizations 
independent of the established trade union structure. Clearly, in this 
respect, the international provision represents a stronger safeguard of 
the freedom than the statute of the regional organization, which 
restricts this right. While it was never the intention of the ILO 
Convention to make diversity of unions an obligation, nevertheless, as 
we saw, the possibility of diversity must be safeguarded. 124 
A number of laws allow for interference by the public authorities in 
the establishment and administration of trade unions. ' z' The minimum 
number of members required by law to establish an organization varies : 
for example, in Kuwait, the Labour Act of 1964 requires a minimum 
number of members, ' 2e and in Syria, Legislative Decree no. 84 specified 
that an organization might only be set up by fifty members employed in 
the same undertaking. ' 2' Other legislation requires that the law shall 
set the structure of organizations by occupation or branch of activity, 
for example, in Libya by Act no. 107/75, in Iraq by Labour Law no. 151, in 
Jordan, by the Labour Code, and in Sudan, by the Employees Trade 
Unions Act 1977.1126 
Legislation in several Arab countries restrict eligibility for trade union 
office on grounds such as occupational requirements, nationality, 
political views or activities, penal record' 29 and re-election, which may 
prevent qualified persons from carrying out union duties. While such 
regulations may be in the interests of trade union members, in Libya, 
Act No. 107/75, and Syria, Legislative Decree No. 84, seem to go 
124. Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, General. Report and Observations concerning Particular Countries, Report III, (Part 4 A), International Labour 
Conference, 70th Session, 1984, pp. 137-138. 
125. In Kuwait, Chapter XIII of the Private Sector Labour Act no. 38 of 1964 falls short of 
international legal standards in a number of ways. For example, section 72 provides that a certificate 
of good reputation and good conduct must be obtained before a person may join a trade union and 
section 74 provides that a certificate must be obtained from the Minister of the Interior- stating that he has no objection to any of the founding members before a trade union may be established. 
Similarly registration of trade unions is obligatory by law in Libya, according to the Trade Unions 
Act of 19fß. 
126. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining : general survey by the Committee of Experts on the application of conventions and recommendations. International Labour Conference, 69th session, 
1983, p. 36 para. 112. 
127. Legislative Decree no. 30 of 17th September 1982, amending provisions of Legislative Decree no. 84 
of 1968, abolished the provision in section 2 that a minimum of 50 workers was required for the 
establishment of a trade union, and in section 9, for the establishment of an occupational trade union in a province. 
Report of the Committee of Experts ... , 
1984, pp. 157-8. 
128. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining ... , 
1983, p. 41, para. 125. 
129. As we saw, while some legal systems contain provisions disqualifying persons who have been 
convicted of almost any type of criminal offence, the Tunisian Labour Code disqualifies those 
convicted of certain crimes which are incompatible with the position of trust in trade union office. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining ... , 
1983, p. 54, para. 163. 
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beyond this limit, to restrict the right in a way contrary to the 
international legal standard, 130 for example, where some provisions 
stipulate that candidates for trade union office must belong to the 
occupation represented by the organisation or be actually employed in 
this occupation, and in. certain cases, the period of employment 
determines eligibility for office. 
While some Arab legislation may require an additional qualification of 
eligibility for office, like in Libya, i 31 Algeria and Morocco, where trade 
union. laws require that the candidate be a national, '32 others, like the 
Tunisian Labour Code, allow the authorities to use discretionary power 
to grant, exemptions from the statutory conditions of nationality. Allied 
to restrictions on eligibility on the ground of nationality is the more 
serious restriction on trade union membership of non-nationals. This 
question is of particular importance to the Arab countries, in the Gulf 
states above all, where the trade union movement does not exist or is 
strictly regulated, and the work force is predominantly non-national. 133 
Migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to several forms of 
exploitation, and this danger is increased by the denial of the right to 
associate. 
In Syria, trade union affiliation of non-Arab workers is subject to a 
residence qualification of one year, according to Decree no. 84 of 1968, 
while in Kuwait, it is subject to possession of a work permit plus five 
years consecutive resident employment in Kuwait. 134 
As we saw, formalities imposed by national law concerning the 
constitutions of trade unions are not incompatible with international 
standards, as long as they do not impair trade union rights. Though, in 
developing countries, the state may provide guidance neverthless, this 
should not impose an obligation to accept compulsory statutes, as in the 
Egyptian case, where trade union legislation may not be in. conformity 
with this principle, since Law No. 35 of 1976 seems to impose a 
compulsory model constitution on the trade union. 136 
Another aspect of interference by the authorities may be seen in the 
area of union finances and extensive control over the administration of 
funds. This phenomenon manifests itself strongly in national legislation 
where this establishes, for example, in the Iraqi Labour Code, the 
130. Ibid. p. 52, para. 157. 131. In Libya, restrictions  ay be imposed on trade union membership on the discriminatory grounds of 
nationality as, according to the Workers Trade Unions Act no. 107 of 1975, membership is restricted to Arab workers, while non-Arab workers  ay join trade unions in accordance with conditions laid down by 
the Minister of Labour and Public Service in a reement with the Workers Trade Union Federation. 
132. For example, in Libya, Act. No. 107/1975, Algeria, Labour Code, Book III, and the Moroccan Dahir of 16 July 1957. 
Ibid, p. 53, para. 159. 133. Estimates of Arab and other foreign migrant workers in the five Gulf Cooperation Council states in 1980 placed the figure at 2 135 000. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in the Sultanate of Oman, in 1980 the total number of migrant workers in Kuwait was 793 500, in Bahrain 116 400, in Qatar 180 000, in the United Arab Emirates 80 000, and in Oman 265 000. 
Migrant workers in the Gulf. Minority Rights Group Report no. 68, Appendix, p. 19. 134. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining ... , 1983, p. 31, para. 96. 135. Ibid, p. 51, para. 153. 
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minimum contribution of members, or specifies the proportion of union funds 
that has to be paid to federations, or as in Syria, where the law requires 
that the budget, expenditure or investment of a trade union he approved 
by the public authorities. 11" Another type of legislation exists in the 
Libyan Act No. 107/1975, and the Syrian Decree No. 84 and Legislative Decree 
No. 250 and the Kuwaiti Labour Act, where the Ministry of Labour may 
request information or inspect books of account at practically any time. '" 
Since the principle is that organizations should be free to administer their 
own affairs, legislation which allows the authority entire discretion to 
investigate internal affairs of a union cannot be acceptable. 
Legislation in the Arab countries places restrictions on the scope of trade 
union activities, which are not compatible with the 
international standard. 
For example, in Tunisia, the Labour Code provides that the activities of 
trade unions must be limited exclusively to defending the economic and 
social interests of their members. This provision, although identical to that 
in the Economic and Social Covenant, nevertheless falls short of the Political 
Covenant and ILO Convention 87, to which Tunisia is party, '" and which 
set the international standard. Likewise, in Kuwait, the Private 
Sector 
Labour Act no. 38 of 1964, restricts the freedom of trade unions to 
formulate their own programmes, in section 73, which provides that trade 
unions are prohibited from engaging in any political or religious activity. 
"' 
-Restriction of trade unions' 
freedom to organise their activities and 
formulate programmes by legislation which severely controls union 
involvement in political activity may be incompatible with the international 
legal standard since it may in practice considerably restrict the scope of 
trade union activity. As far as Arab unions' political activities are 
concerned, restrictions are the rule, though the legislatures apply 
this in 
different ways and to different degrees, where for example, the Kuwaiti 
Labour Act, explicitly imposes a total ban on political activities in all 
forms, l `o others are less explicit. 
We saw that legislation establishing close links between the unions and 
the 
ruling party, often established by legislation providing for the single-trade- 
union structure, is incompatible with the exercise of trade union 
freedom. 
Such legislation is widespread in the radical Arab republics, as for example, 
in Algeria, `" 1 Libya, 142 Syria and Egypt. 
136. Legislative Decree no. 250 of 1969 provides that the regu a ion of the financial affairs of associations 
are subject to ministerial review, for example, in section 6 
}c), 
which provides that the financial rules of 
associations oust be adopted by ministerial authorities. 
Report of the Committee of Experts ... , 1984, pp. 157-158. 137. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining .,., 1983, pp. 58-59, paras. 185,186. 
138. CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 of 2nd May 1986, p. 42. 
139. Section 73 of the Labour Act no. 38 of 1964. 
Report of the Committee of Experts ... , 1984, pp. 
146-7. 
140. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining ... , 1983, p. 61, para. 193. 141. Ibid. p. 44 para. 135. 
142. CERD/C/172/Add. 2 of 12th January 1988, p. 2. 
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It is clearly illustrated in Iraq, in the rules of the Artists' Union, 
established under Law no. 70 of 1980, which provide that its activities must 
conform to Ba'th party principles. "' 
A general prohibition of strikes, 10 and restriction of the right to 
strikel"s occur in a number of Arab countries. In Libya, trade unions' right 
to strike is potentially restricted severely by the Decree of December 1969, 
concerning the Protection of the Revolution, as article 2, paragraph d, 
prohibits strikes, if the intention is to oppose or endanger the 
"revolutionary republican system". Even though it might be understood, by 
implication, that strikes for other reasons may be lawful, the provision may 
clearly be used to impose far-reaching restrictions. ' " 
The right to strike may also be inhibited by the imposition of compulsory 
arbitration procedures as, for example, in Algeria, by Act no. 82/05 and 
Sudan, by the Industrial Relations Act of 1976, and in Tunisia by the 
Labour Code' 47 
In contrast with the principle that organizations should be protected 
against dissolution or suspension by the public authorities, a number of 
Arab countries have legislation which permits such dissolution by 
administrative authority, as for example, Yemen' °' and Syria. 149 
International principles aimed at securing the benefits of inter-occupational 
or inter-regional association are also violated by legislation in Arab 
countries which prevents federations of unions representing different 
occupations, such as the Kuwaiti Labour Act of 1964, which is incompatible 
with this aim, 's° or by a requirement of prior authorisation of affiliation to 
international organizations, as in Libya, where Act no. 107 of 1975 imposes 
such a restriction, as well as by legislation, often associated with the 
provisions we examined leading to single-union system, allowing the 
establishment of only one federation for an occupation. ls1 
143. Freedom of information and expression in Iraq, Article 19,1987 p. 28. 144. For example, the Syrian Agricultural Labour Code prohibits strikes. 
Report of the Committee of Experts ... , 
1984, pp. 157-8. 
145. Restrictions focus on, for example, the purpose of the strike, or on certain categories of workers. In 
SYria, Lebanon, Morocco and Kuwait, the right of public employees to strike is withheld. 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining ... , 1983, pp. 64-5, para. 211. 146. Violations of human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Amnesty International, App. C. 
14?. In Tunisia, the Labour Code allows the requisitioning of workers on strike. This legislation also 
provides that strikes may be called only as a result of a collective labour dispute. Strikes should be 
preceded by a conciliation procedure, announced ten days in advance and approved by the trade union 
federation. 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining ... , p. 67, para. 215. 148. Ibid, 1983, p. 71, para. 229. 149. In Syria, Legislative Decree 84 of 1968 amended by Legislative Decree no. 30 of 1982, in section 49 (c), 
empowers the General Federation to dissolve the managing body of any trade union on several grounds. 
Ibid. pp. 56-57, para. 176. 
150. Ibid, p. 76. para. 242. 
151. A General Federation of Academicians and Nriters was established under Law no. 70 of 1980 in Iraq, as the only mechanism for exercising trade union rights for artists and writers. Freedom of information and expression in Iraq, Article 19,1987, P. M. 
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Throughout, the Arab legal order, the rights of certain workers' and 
employers' unions to form federations and confederations is restricted. 
In line v it. h international principles which allow the imposition of lawful 
restrictionr on the right`; of certain categories of workers, again, Arab 
legislation restricts the rights of, for example, the armed forces, public 
service employees, 152 and the police is3 
152. Several countries do not recognise the right of public service officials to form trade unions, 
according to the Labour Act in Jordan and the Labour Code in Yemen, while in Sudan, fire service 
personne and prison staff are prohibited from forming trade unions. In Egypt, the right of public 
service employees at higher or managerial levels to join organizations is restricted. 
153. In Morocco, the police and security forces may not join trade unions, although they may form and 
join their own associations. In Tunisia, the police may organize in the same Way as other public 
servants. 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining ... , 
1993, p. 27, paras. 95-9. 
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As we saw, the contemporary Arab political framework has been shaped 
to a large extent both by the legacies of the past' 54 and contemporary 
ideologies. We have already seen the effect of secular and religious 
ideology on the constitutional background of Arab states, and now in 
order to evaluate the participation of the population in political life, it 
is essential to examine how new formula set the structure within which 
political participation takes place. As we saw, besides constitutional 
provisions which establish the framework of political participation, 
ideological texts, ls6 such as the National. Charter in Algeria and the 
Declaration of the Authority of the People in Libya, play a role, while 
religion forms the basis of authority in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. 
Despite the political nature of each system, constitutional provisions in 
most countries incorporate in the basic legal text a recognition of the 
right to take part in political life. Some Constitutions use the system of 
"People's Chamber", while others establish "National Assemblies" and 
others still have a "People's Council". Since independence, Libya has 
moved from a parliamentary monarchy to "direct popular democracy", 
through "the Basic Popular Congresses", all represented again in the 
"General People's Council ". 's e Saudi Arabia"S' and some Gulf States 
maintain traditional forms of political participation and one form or 
another of political consultation, far from any modernity. 
Various measures have been taken in Arab countries to address the 
role of the population in political participation through legislation, 
though the administrative reality and application of laws have been 
severely restricted or limited - as we saw in the case of the other 
rights. Legal measures are to be found in fundamental constitutional 
provisions and other laws dealing directly and indirectly with the right 
to participate in the political life of the nation. In the socialist Arab 
republics, the rights of political participation are organised through 
systems of so-called "popular democracy". The chosen political system 
normally appears in Constitutions, Declarations or Charters, and the 
political formula varies between countries, for example in Algeria, it is 
"socialist democracy" while in Libya, the phrase is "direct popular 
democracy ". 
154. One striking legacy was a political framework, maintained by successive governments, which was 
unable to translate the aspirations of the people to true participation in political life. In the 
absence of a stable constitutional and legal framework, in which all categories of society could 
participate in supervising the development of the new political order, the gap grew between the 
aspirations of the population and the aims of the ruling elite. 
155. As we saw in the section "Ideology', these include the Report of the 5th Congress of the National 
Front Political Organisation in Yemen and the Political Report of the 8th Regional Congress of the Bath Party in 1974 in Iraq. 
156. Libya's political evolution is briefly charted in Jacques Roumani "From republic to Jamahiriya 
Libya's search for political community' Middle East Journal 37 1983, pp. 151-168. A brief description 
of the structure of People's Congresses may be found in Jonathan Bearman, Qadhafi's Libya, 1986, 
ppl49-156. See also, Henry Habib, Politics and government of revolutionary Libya, 1975. 
157. As we saw, legislative responses to political development in the kingdom are reviewed in Aharon Layish "'Ulama' and politics in Saudi Arabia in Islam and politics in the modern Middle East (Metin 
Heper and Raphael Israeli eds. ) 1984, pp. 29-63. See also, Emile Nakleh, 'Political participation and 
constitutional experiments in the Arabian Gulf : Bahrain and Qatar' in Tim Niblock (ed) Social and 
economic development in the Arab Gulf, 1980, pp. 161-76. 
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Iraq and Syria are each led by opposing wings of the Ba'th Socialist 
Party, arid its ideology is reflected in their political framework. 
According to Iraq's government"', the Arab Ba'th Socialist party "was 
able to define the general framework for its theory of democracy as 
direct popular democracy ". " 
", while the Syrian Constitution of 1973 
proclaims the Syrian Arab Republic to be a democratic, popular, socialist 
and sovereign state. The Syrian legislator chose "popular democracy" as 
the system of governing, as the preamble to the Constitution describes 
"popular democracy [as] the ideal formula which ensures for the citizens 
the exercise of their freedom, which makes them dignified human beings 
capable of giving and building ... 
". The Syrian political system is based 
on the People's Assembly as legislative body, and People's Councils, 169 
while executive power is exercised by the President and ministerial 
Cabinet.. 
The Iraqi Constitution of 1970, as others, describes the people as the 
source of power and its legality, and this power is exercised by the 
organs of the Revolutionary Command Council and the National 
Assembly. ' 00 As far as political participation is concerned, this has 
been organised through People's Councils, which have "been regarded as 
an important step towards expanding and developing the democratic 
practices in society". The right to participate in public life is exercised 
through two channels in Iraq the national assembly and the 
participation of representatives of popular organizations in legislative 
and administrative decision-making. According to the National Assembly 
Act no. 55 (1980), subsequently amended, the Assembly, elected 
for four 
years, exercises several functions, including the proposal of draft 
legislation, promulgation of legislation, as well as approval of the Budget 
and the National Development Plan. The second channel for participation 
is utilised by representatives of popular organisations, who attend 
meetings of the Council of Ministers to express their views on general 
issues considered by the Council as well as issues affecting their own 
sectors, and address the National Assembly on legislation affecting their 
sectors. '"' The Iraqi Constitution illustrates a basic limitation imposed 
by the ideological framework, in article 26, which provides as we have 
already seen, that political rights are guaranteed in accordance with the 
objectives of the Constitution ... 
"The State shall endeavour to provide 
the means required for practising these freedoms, which are compatible 
with the nationalist and progressive line of the revolution ". 
158. For example, in its statement to the Human Rights Committee. 
CCPR/C/l/Add. 45 of 8th June 1979, p. 103. 
159. Article 10 of the Syrian Constitution describes the People's Councils as autonomous institutions, 
elected in a democratic manner, through which the citizens exercise their political rights, insofar as 
the administration of the State and the leadership of the society are concerned. 
160. Article 37 provides that the Revolutionary Command Council is the supreme organ of the state, 
which is competent to legislate under article 42. Although the Constitution, promulgated in 1970, 
contains provisions for the function of the National Assembly, this organ was not in fact set up until 
1990, so until that date, the Revolutionary Command Council was in fact the sole custodian of power in 
Iraq. 
161. CCPR/C/37/Add. 3 18th July 1986 p. 48. 
Page 256 POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB LEGAL ORDER 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
The Algerian National Charter describes how the state dynamic gains 
authority from the people's assent, and functions through popular 
participation, stressing that political participation is both the right and the 
duty of every citizen, an emphasis it shares with other radical republics. 
The National Charter emphasises that socialism is the programme compatible 
with Algerian aims and aspirations, as it states . 
"based on socialist 
democracy-, the Algerian State guarantees real freedom of the individual ... 
Socialist democracy ... prepares 
the objective conditions that enable citizens 
to exercise their fundamental freedoms and their rights ... 
". The 
Constitution too, emphasises the Algerians' choice of socialism, as we have 
seen. The population take part in public life through an elected popular 
assembly, which like the Iraqi assembly, exercises the legislative function 
under the provisions of the Constitution. People's assemblies operate also at 
wilaya level, and their members are elected at the local level, though, the 
influence on the political dynamic of the ruling National Liberation Party is 
manifest in the National Charter, and other laws. le2 
Similarly, the Egyptian Constitution describes the political formula as a 
"socialist, democratic system ... 
based on alliance of the working forces of 
the people ... ", and its preamble outlines 
its objectives in similar terms. 
Chapter Two regulates the People's Assembly and section III of Chapter 
Three regulates the local administration structure and ensures citizens' 
public rights, including their right to participate personally in the choice of 
their leaders and representatives, at the national level, through elections to 
the People's Assembly and Advisory Council, and at the local level, through 
elections to the People's Councils. The People's Assembly Act no. 114 of 1984, 
amending Act no. 38 of 1972, introduced the system of proportional lists for 
the election of members to serve in the People's Assembly and the Advisory 
Council. 1 0' 
The ideological framework in Libyan political life has evolved since the 
present leadership came to power in 1969. At an early stage any connection 
with ideology was denied as it was said that in the Revolution's objectives 
of "Freedom, socialism, unity", "socialism" was a local phenomenon, distinct 
from alien ideology. 1 °4 As we saw, article 6 of the Constitutional Declaration 
states "... the Libyan revolution aims to achieve socialism by implementing 
social justice ... 
". Similarly, freedoms are ensured "within the limits of the 
interests of the people and the principles of the Revolution. " A major 
change in the Libyan political order was the announcement in March 1977 of 
the establishment of the People's Authority, 1 e5 from the text of which 
several conclusions may be 
162. CERO/C/158/Add. 2 of 3rd April 1987 pp. 5,16. 
163. CERD/C/149/Add. 22 30th January 1987, p. 8,11. 
164. The Constitutional Declaration describes its inspiration as its 'Arabic and Islamic heritage .., and the specific conditions of the Libyan society'. 
165. 'The Libyan Arab People .., in keepino with the 
first Declaration of the revolution ... guided 
by the 
principles set forth ... the Constitutions Declaration 
issued on 2 Shawwal 1389 A. H. (11th December 19691 
believin' in the ob'ectives of the glorious revolution ... to establish a system of direct democracy ... which embodies the rule of the people over the land of the glorious revolution of Ist September and 
establishes the authority of the people, which is the only authority ... '. 
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drawn. The Declaration, regarded by some as the new Constitution of Libya, 
announces a system of "direct democracy ... which embodies the rule of the 
people "iee and may therefore be more accurately described as a basic 
organizational law. Syndicates and professional associations play their role 
in political life as part of the General People's Congresses. ' °7 Although 
popular direct authority is the basis of the political system, the people 
exercise this authority by law, which defines the function of people's 
organizations. ' °e 
The effect of the Islamic ideology on the political structure is most 
striking in the traditional countries of the Gulf and to a lesser extent, the 
monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, where it forms the background to the 
political structure and legitimises the ruling family. In Morocco, King Hassan 
II exercises authority as leader of the political as well as the religious 
community as ': emir al Afouniine". ' °9 The Saudi regime, for which Islam 
continues to provide the ideological basis and legitimacy, 17° is unique in 
the region as no national assembly or parliament has ever been created as 
in other traditional monarchies or Emirates. "' In the absence of 
parliamentary assemblies, political parties or trade unions, traditional 
channels of tribal authority are the only mechanism through which citizens 
participate in political life. Political participation is principally practised 
through the Afajlis and Shura, and Saudi plans for a consultative assembly 
during the past thirty years have not yet come into being, as we saw in 
Chapter Three. 
In other traditional States, such as Kuwait and Qatar, some measure of 
political participation may be found in Constitutions. For example, the 1962 
Constitution of Kuwait introduced a parliamentary system through an elected 
National Assembly, which has powers to promulgate laws. Potentially, it may 
over-rule the Amir, since, according to article 66, a law must be 
promulgated if it gains a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. Qatar's 
Provisional Constitution describes its form of government as democratic, and 
provides for the election of a Consultative Council, which is in fact only an 
advisory body. l' 2 
166, Article 10 of the Declaration provides that Basic People's Congresses, which meet every three months 
for deliberation, discussion, expression of opinions and voting, are to be the basic institution of direct 
democracy. 
167. Article 11 of the Declaration provides 'the authority of the Ie is comprised of the 
following : (1) People's Congresses, {2) People's Committees and 3 rofessional unions. Together they fora 
the General People's Congresses'. 
168. C. Bezzina, The Green Book : practice and commentary, 1979, pp. 66. 169. Under the 1972 Constitution, the King is the Head of State and Commander of the Armed Forces. He has 
the right to appoint and dismiss members of the Government. This unity in the king's function is proclaimed 
by article 19. 
170. Alain, see J. L. Esposito, Islas and politics 1985, pp. 1 -111, Aharon Layish " Ulaaa' and pol1tics in 
Saudi Arabia' in Islas and politics in the modern 
diddle East'jMetin Heper and Raphael Israeli eds. , 1984, pP. 29-63, and Bryant M. Seaman 'Islamic law and modern overnaent : Saudi Arabia supplements the Shari'ah' 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 18,1980, pp. 410-433. 
171. Like Saudi Arabia, Oman is an absolute monarchy, where all authority is vested in the Sultan. A Consultative Council of appointees of the Sultan was set up by Royal Decree of 19th October 1981. 
See Dale F. Eickelaan 'Kings and people : Oman's State Consultative Council', Middle East Journal 38,1984, 
pp. 51-71. 
172. S. H. Amin Middle East legal systems, 1985, pp. 298-301. 
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Legislation in most Arab countries regulates the right of participation in 
public life directly and indirectly at both national and local levels. The 
Tunisian population, for example, may play a direct role in decision-making, 
through national referenda. Indirect participation through the election of 
representatives to national and local bodies is also regulated by law in most 
countries, as we have seen. For example, representative institutions have 
been established in Morocco at the national and local level. A Dahir of 
September 1976 contains the "Charter of the Communes", to organise local 
political activity. "' 
National assemblies are in general elected by universal and equal 
suffrage, i' ` and in most countries, national and local assemblies, councils 
and committees are elected on a periodic basis. l' S Electoral law also governs 
the process of elections and regulates voting. ' e 
In most countries, Constitutions and laws such as Electoral Codes specify 
the regulations and restrictions on the exercise of the right to participate 
in public life in terms of who is eligible to vote, and who is eligible to 
stand for election, with most electoral law regulating the right to vote by 
qualifications related to age, nationality or citizenship, 
173. The Dahir provides that : 'communes are territorial communities of public law, endowed with legal 
personality and financial autonomy' and that 'the affairs of the commune shall be managed by communal 
councils. ' It also provides that the council shall direct the affairs of the commune, aided by the state 
and other public bodies. Councils may also intervene in other matters to express an opinion, if this is 
required by the re ulations, or at the request of the administration. CCPR/C/10/Add. 2 of 19th February 1981 pp. 34-6 174. For example, the Jordanian Constitution provides, in article 67, that suffrage is direct and secret, 
and in Tunisia, the Constitution, as well as article 1 of the Electoral Code provide that: 'Suffrage is 
universal, free, direct and secret'. In Syria, the Constitution provides, in article 50 (2), that the members of the People's Assembly are 
elected by universal suffrage, indirect, equal secret ballot, in accordance with the provisions of electoral 
law. 
In Iraq, the National Assembly Act no. 25 (1980), provide that the Assembly contains 250 members, (The 
proportion is 1 member to every 50,000 of the population) freely elected by secret public ballot, and 
according to article 3, each member represent:, all the people of the republic of Iraq. In Syria, article 52 of the Constitution contains a similar provision, specifying that : 'A member of the People's Assembly represents the people as a collectivity. 
175. For example, in Iraq, according to Act no. 25 of 1980, the Chamber of Deputies is elected for five 
years, as are municipal councillors. In Norocco, accordin to the Dahir of September 1976 containing the 
'Charter of the Communes', members of the communal councils are elected by relative majority in a single 
round, by direct universal suffrage for a period of six years. 
CCPR/C/10/Add. 2 of 19th February 1§81 pp. 34-6 Chapter five of the Jordanian Constitution deals with the Chamber of Notables in articles 63 to 66, and the 
Chamber of Deputies in articles 67 to 74, Article 68, paragraph I provides for elections to this Chamber 
every four years. 
176. For example, article 57 of the Syrian Constitution states that the electoral law must include 
provisions guaranteeing : '1. freedom of voters in electing their representatives and integrity of the 
elections; 
2. 
the right of the candidates to watch over the voting; 3. punishment for those who tamper with 
the will of the voters. ' 
In Tunisia, electoral campaigns are governed by law : voting, counting of votes, and announcement of 
results are regulated by electoral law. CCPR/C/28/Add. 5 Rev. 1 of 2nd May 1986, p. 48. Sections of the Algerian Electoral Act contain penal provisions coverin7 actions undermining the process of 
voting, such as electoral fraud and the use of violence to influence voting. CEROIC/158/Add. 2 of 3rd April 1987, p. 17. 
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and other legal requirements. "' For example, the Egyptian Constitution 
of 1971 guarantees the rights of citizens to vote without discrimination 
on the grounds of religion, origin or sex', as article 62 states that : 
"Ei-ery citizen shall have the rig-lit to vote _ and to express his opinion by way of referendum in accordance with the provisions of the la 
. 
Participation in public life is a national duty"-18 
The Algerian goy ei nment has made a similar statement, saying that 
participation in political life is "not only a right but a duty of the 
citi en and wor'ker" 1 79 
Restrictions are imposed by law on the right to vote of certain groups 
within Arab society. These fall into several categories : those who have 
been convicted of certain crimes; le° members of the police, armed 
forces 181 and, in some countries, the judiciary. 
177. For example, in article 54, the Syrian Constitution provides that : '411 citizens over eighteen 
years of age, who are listed on the civil status register and fulfil the requirements of the Electoral 
Law shall be electors". 
In Iraq, the National Assembly Act no. 55 (1980), article 12, stipulates that : 'Every , male and female 
Iraqi who meets the conditions specified in this act shall be entitled to vote or stand as a 
candidate. " 
This law is quoted in S. H. Amin Middle East legal systems, 1985, pp. 157-8. In Algeria, constitutional protection of the right to vote in elections appears in article 50, which 
states that : "any citizen fulfilling the legal conditions is entitled to vote ... 
" Act no. 80-08 of 
25th October 1980 constitutes the Electoral Code, which defines the conditions and rules for 
elections. For example, article 4 of this Act provides: 'A11 Algerian men and women who are over 
eighteen years of age on election day enjoy civic and political rights and are not subject to any of the cases of incapacity provided for by the present Act shall be electors. " 
In Tunisia, the qualifications for voting are contained in the Constitution and the Electoral Code. 
Article 20 of the Constitution provides : 'Every citizen who has possessed Funisian nationality for 
not less than five years and is over twenty years of age shall be an elector, " and the second article 
of the Electoral Code specifies that the right to vote is guaranteed to Tunisian men and women in 
possession of their civil and political rights. 
The Moroccan Constitution of 1972, article 8, provides : 'A11 citizens of either sex who are full age 
and in possession of their civil and political rights shall be entitled to vote", and according to the 
Dahir of 1st September 1959, article 1, with amendments, articles 6 and 7 of Dahir of 9th May 1977 
which promulgates an organizational law on the composition and election of the House of 
Representatives, and the Dahir of 19th March 19?? concerning the establishment of new municipal 
electoral registers, every national who is over twenty-one years of age, and listed on an electoral 
register is entitled to vote. 
CIRD/C/148/Add. 2 15th October 1986, p. 10. The right to participate in elections, by voting, is outlined in the Jordanian Electoral Act, of 1960, and the draft amendment to the Act, (prepared in 1985). The new draft Electoral Act permits 
every Jordanian over the age of nineteen to vote, while the 1960 Act restricts this right to persons 
over twenty years. Nomen are permitted to vote, according to an amendment promulgated in 1974. The Municipalities Act promulgated in 1982 gave women the right to vote in elections to the municipal 
councils. 
GERD/C/130/Add. 3 1st April 1987, pp. 2-3. The right to vote in elections is guaranteed to Qatari citizens on a footing of equality, without 
discrimination on the grounds of colour, sex, nationality or national origin. Naturalized citizens of Qatar enjoy the right of voting ten years after naturalization. 
CERD/C/156/Add. 2 7th March 1988, p. 7. 178. Elections to the People's Assembly were conducted on this basis in April 1984. 
179. CERD/C/158/Add. 2 of 3rd April 1997, p. 15- 
180. For example, according to article 3 of the Tunisian Electoral Code, undischarged bankrupts, and those have been convicted of offences and sentenced to unsuspended terms of imprisonment of more than 3 months, or suspended terms exceeding 6 months may not vote. 
Similarly, in Algeria, article 6 of Act no. 80-08 of 1980 lists the main categories of people who are 
not allowed to vote as : those convicted of crimes, (those given suspended sentences or sentences 
committed through negligence are not excluded from the electoral list) those sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 6 months, which prohibits the exercise of their electoral rights, in 
accordance with article 14 of the Criminal Code, persons in contempt of court or bankrupts who have 
not rehabilitated. 
181. Members of the Tunisian armed forces are not permitted to vote. 
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Restrictions on the right of such groups may be compatible with 
international principles, however other restrictions on, for example, 
political grounds are not. The exclusion, for example, of "all individuals 
who adopted a political, economic or intellectual position that was hostile 
to the Revolution and its pc og ramme- ... 
from the democ. rac, y" is a clear 
violation of the principle of access without unreasonable restrictions to 
the political process. ez 
Restrictions in the Algerian Electoral Code also include an extra- 
ordinary provision which excludes from the electoral list "persons whose 
behaviour during the war of national liberation was against the interests 
of the country". This restriction, though not specifying the definition of 
"behaviour during the war .. 
", or "a -ainst the interests of the country", 
adopts two conditions which are prior to the establishment of the legal 
order, and so violates the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. It also 
excludes a category of the population from enjoying an important 
freedom safeguarded by national legislation, whether the Charter or the 
Constitution, which states that it gives Algerians their rights and 
freedoms, through "socialist democracy". 
The right to stand for elections in the Arab countries is likewise 
regulated by laws which impose restrictions on similar grounds, of age, 
sex, nationality, and other legal requirements. ' e3 
182. CCPR/C/SR. 749 of 22nd July 1987, p. 10. 
183. The Iraqi National Assembly in its Act No. 55 of 1980, article 12 provides that: "Every male and 
female Iraqi who meets the conditions specified in this act shall, be entitled to ... stand as a 
candidate. ' 
The Egyptian Constitution guarantees the rights of citizens to stand for elections, in article 62, 
which states that : 'Every citizen shall have the right to ... stand as a candidate at elections ... in accordance with the provisions of the law. Participation in public life is a national duty". 
The Algerian Constitution, in article 58, states that : "any citizen fulfilling the legal conditions 
is entitled to ... 
be elected. ' Article 68 of the Electoral Code states : 'oll electors who are over 
25 years of age on election day shall be eligible for election. ' The same article limits eligibility 
for election to the National Assembly on the grounds of age, since candidates must be over 30 years of 
age. Election to the communal People's Assemblies is restricted on the grounds of original 
nationality, to native Algerians, although those who have acquired Algerian nationality may stand for 
election to the communal and wilaya people's assemblies ten years after acquiring Algerian 
nationality. CERD/C/158/Add. 2 of 3rd April 1987, p. 17. 
In Tunisia, according to the Electoral Code, any voter of the Commune who has reached the age of 25 
may stand for election to the municipal council subject to certain conditions; for elections to the 
legislature, any male citizen over the age of 28, who is a voter and the son of a Tunisian father is 
eligible, subject to certain restrictions; in presidential elections, any Muslim male citizen over the 
age of 40 who is a voter, whose father and grandfather were Tunisian nationals without interruption, 
and who has been a Tunisian national since birth is eligible to stand. 
CCPR/C/28/Add. 5/Rev. 1 2nd May 1986, pp. 47-49. 
Any Moroccan  ay stand for election, provided he or she meets the following requirements : Moroccan 
nationality, be over 25, have no record of convictions, be listed on an electoral roll. In Jordan, the right to participate in elections, by standing, is outlined in the Electoral Act, of 
1960, and the draft amendment to the Act, (1985). The former document affirms the right of Jordanians, 
who have held Jordanian nationality for 5 years, to stand for election to the House of 
Representatives, the latter document increased this limit to 10 years. According to the draft Act, 
public officials may not stand for election to the House of Representatives, unless they resign from 
their posts at least one month before the election. Women are permitted to stand for election to the 
House of Representatives, accordng to the amendment of 1974. The Municipalities Act promulgated in 
1982 gave women the right to stand for election to the municipal councils. 
CERD/C/130/Add. 3 Ist 
April 
1987, pp. 2-3. 
The right to stand as a candidate in elections is guaranteed to Qatari citizens on a footing of 
equality, without discrimination. Naturalized citizens of Qatar enjoy the right of standing for 
election ten years after naturalization. 
GERD/C/156/Add. 2 7th March 1988, p. 7. 
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Restrictions are also imposed on the rights of certain categories to stand 
for election. For example, in Morocco, law enforcement officers, magistrates 
and serving members of the armed forces (police, gendarmerie), may not 
become candidates. While restrictions on the right of such categories is 
compatible with those in the international standard, other restrictions are 
clearly based on ideological grounds and are unacceptable, in that they 
exclude opponents of the governing ideology from participation in political 
life. 
A particularly striking example may be found in the National Assembly Act 
(1980) of Iraq, where it was stipulated, inter alia, that any candidate for 
the National Assembly in 1980 must believe in the principles and objectives 
of the July 17-30 Revolution (1968) as well as being of Iraqi nationality and 
not married to a 184 
In most Arab countries, the right of access to public office, on general 
terms of equality, is recognized by the Constitution, and may be specified 
in other laws, such as the Civil Servants Acts. Certain legislation tends to 
emphasise that public office and participation in the administration is the 
duty of the citizen. For example, the Algerian state, throughout the 
Constitution and other legislation, lays great emphasis on the role of the 
population in decision-making and administration. Two articles of the 
Constitution stress the importance of popular participation in the 
management of public affairs. For example, article 27 describes the active 
participation of the people in the administration and management of the 
State as "an imperative of the Revolution", and article 34 provides that the 
organization of the State is founded on the effective participation of the 
popular masses in the management of public affairs. Similarly, in Iraq, the 
Provisional Constitution stipulates that "Public office is a sacred trust and 
a social service based on faithful and conscious devotion to the interests, 
rights and freedoms of the masses ... 
". 
184. Abida Sauiuddin "The Beginning of Parliamentary Democracy in Iraq, a case study' Middle East Studies 
October, 1982, pp. 400-410. 
Provisions from Law no. 55 are quoted in S. H. Amin, Middle East legal systems, 1985, pp. 224-225. 
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The Yemen Arab Republic Constitution of 1971 describes public service 
as the "duty of those undertaking it", in article 18.185 Likewise, 
legislation in force in the United Arab Emirates stresses that public 
office carries responsibility. According to article 35 of the Provisional 
Federal Constitution : 
"Public office shall be a national responsibility assigned to those holding it. Furtherance of the public interest shall be the sole aim of 
civil . servants in the 
discharge of their functions". tae 
Equality of acccý<, s to public sc>erv ice is safeguarded by law, at the 
constitutional level in general terms, and in other laws, which specify 
qualifications required in some detail. 1R7 Qualifications may be based on 
age, nationality, special aptitudes and so on. 
185. It goes on to provide that, in performing their duties, government employees should aim at the 
public interest and at serving the Nation. 
186. CERD/C/130/Add. 1 28th January 1986 p. 5. Similarly, in Libya, article 4 of the Constitutional Declaration provides that 'public functions are 
the duty of those who are put in charge of them. The goals of the state employees in discharging their duties is to serve the people'. 
In Egypt too, article 14 of the 1971 Constitution provides that 'public duties are a right of 
citizens and responsibility for those who undertake them in the service of the people" 187. For example, the Iraqi Constitution stipulates that: 'Equality of access to public office is 
guaranteed by the law', as does other legislation, which provides for equality of access to public 
office, for example, the Civil Service Act No. 24 of 1960, see CCPR/C/37/Add. 3,18 July 1986, p. 9. In Tunisia, the Civil Servants General Status Act no. 83/112 of 12th December 1983 allows access to 
public service to all citizens over 18, who possess citizen rights, and are of good moral standing. In Algeria, access to public service is regulated by Act no. 78/12 of 5th August 1976, and Decree 
number 85/59 of 23rd March 1985, which regulate conditions for workers in public institutions. Conditions for recruitment, in article 31, include general restrictions based on nationality, the 
enjoyment of civic rights, moral character,, qualifications, age and physical aptitude. Another 
condition is that the candidate should give a satisfactory account of his situation in respect of 
national service'. 
CERD/C/158/Add. 2 of 3rd April 1987, p. 18. According to article 22, paragraph 1 of the Jordanian Constitution, every Jordanian has access to 
public service, while in Morocco, the right to equal access to public service is protected by the Constitution, which states: '411 citizens shall have access to public service, and to public 
employment under the same conditions, " and this is confirmed in article 1 of the Dahir of 24th February 1958, which provides : "All Moroccans shall have access to public office on an equal footing, 
save as otherwise specified in the provisions of this statute or of special statutes, no distinction 
shall be made between the two sexes in the application of the present statute". CCPR/C/10/Add. 2 of 19th February 1981, p. 11. Article 35 of the Provisional United Arab Emirates Constitution provides that : "public office shall be open to all citizens on a equal basis under the conditions and in accordance with the provisions 
prescribed by law'. Legal remedy for the violation of these rights is provided in article 41, which 
states that: 'Every person shall be entitled to file a complaint with the competent authorities, including the judiciary, in respect of any violations of rights and freedoms provided for in this 
chapter'. 
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In the course of this study a number of factors have been identified 
inhibiting the legal order's ability to protect the rights of Arab individuals 
and groups. Among the first of these are factors which shaped the 
emergence of the contemporary legal order. We have seen that the legacy of 
foreign domination of the Arabs was deep and lasting : centuries of foreign 
rule disrupted traditional society, creating divisions in territories and 
communities which remain today. We saw how the political and administrative 
policies of the foreign powers who colonised Arab territory shaped the 
emerging constitutional framework. Their policies had a lasting impact on 
features of traditional society, such as religious and tribal authority 
structures, and gave rise to other such negative results as the poor 
quantity and quality of administrative institutions and personnel at 
independence. 
We have also seen the impact of colonial policies on the political life of the 
region, interrupting the development of political thought and activity, 
retarding the development of political organizations, and inhibiting the 
growth of conventional forms of political participation, in some states. 
The colonial response to nationalist calls contributed to making the new 
constitutional order more authoritarian, as well as bringing about a crisis of 
political leadership. The political favour shown to certain groups meant in 
some countries that minorities came to exercise political power, while the 
failure of the political framework created by the colonial powers to 
encompass all groups deepened divisions between ruler and ruled, and led 
nationalist forces in several countries to seek power in alliance with the 
military, as the only force capable of bringing about reform. Belief in the 
democratic process as a vehicle of change faltered with the failure of 
political institutions to provide a mechanism through which political parties 
could bring about change responding to national needs. 
Some deficiencies in the contemporary constitutional order have their roots 
in its framing by the colonial power, which in some cases confirmed the 
legal status of a ruling minority, or failed to reform the feudal economic 
structure. Continuing external influence after "semi-independence" coupled 
with the radicalisation of Arab politics in the sixties led to the assumption 
of power by radical socialist regimes, whose ideology continues to have a 
striking influence on the legal order today. This ideological influence must 
be regarded as one of the principal factors undermining the ability of the 
contemporary legal order to uphold the rule of law and to protect individual 
and collective rights, in the political sphere as elsewhere. Although this 
study does not address questions of political ideology, it has nevertheless 
repeatedly highlighted the harmful nature of ideological interpretations of 
principles of the rule of law and restrictions on political human rights 
based on ideology. 
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Equally damaging to the full enjoyment of political rights are the legal 
frameworks which give rise to the pre-eminence of executive power, 
whether this characteristic results from the influence of French 
constitutional tradition or is based on an interpretation of Islamic 
doctrine which secures the hereditary power of an elite. Constitutional 
and other provisions which establish the pre-eminent position of a 
single ruling party likewise distort the legal framework and inhibit the 
enjoyment of political rights. 
Naturally, in the years following independence, the ruling groups in 
the Arab countries have been connected to the nationalist movement, 
which retains legitimacy from its struggle for independence during 
colonial rule. The identity of the ruling elite, it seems, is less important 
than its ability to identify itself with these nationalist aspirations. For 
example, the ruling family in Morocco were able to profit from a 
connection late in the day with the nationalist movement. In Algeria, the 
legitimacy of FLN is clearly linked to its role in the War of 
Independence, though the identity of the leading personnel changed, 
shifting from civilian to military leadership. 
We saw how military rule has shaped the emergence of the 
contemporary political order in some countries. While the role of the 
military may not be paramount or even clear in government, in most 
states it continues to be important, and has affected the political order 
and other spheres to a great extent. The constitutional order, in 
particular, has been affected by military intervention, which has also 
precipitated the progress from monarchy to republic in several 
countries. Nationalist programmes implemented by military leaders have 
also deeply affected the new constitutional order, since they stress 
radical elements of nationalist doctrines. 
Weaknesses in the constitutional framework of several countries have 
been identified, ranging from the absence of a Constitution altogether to 
the provisional nature of several Constitutions. We have also seen that 
although military regimes may recognise the rule of law and so do not 
abolish the Constitution itself, martial law or other emergency legislation 
tends to abrogate constitutional provisions. In some cases, martial law 
has become more permanent than Constitutions themselves. We saw how 
emergency legislation tends to focus power in the hands of a strong 
executive, also a common phenomenon in military regimes. 
Within constitutional texts, there is a worrying tendency to enhance 
executive power at the expense of other powers in the state arid, more 
disturbing, the absence or weakness of any mechanism to control or 
counter-act its harmful effects. Coupled with this deficiency in some 
countries, is the lack of or limited judicial review. In particular, many 
of them lack a mechanism for judicial review of constitutionality of 
legislation or acts. The French-inspired system of review by the 
Legislature is not considered appropriate within the Arab context, since, 
among other reasons, legislation often permits the authority's 
interference in the mechanism. 
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A further cause for concern was 
system of several Arab countries 
provisions upholding principles 
independence of the judiciary, t 
phenomenon of the existence of a 
ordinary courts. In several countr 
nature or connected to the grin 
countries, extra-judicial courts lit 
called revolutionary or people's co' 
of military justice, this normall 
personnel, crimes of a military n 
emergency. In some Arab countr 
Alnný-Sidn nrrlinarv c_ourts_ 
legislatl 
identified in the review of the judicial 
Despite the existence of constitutional 
of the rule of law, including the 
.e examination revealed the 
disturbing 
parallel judicial structure alongside the 
es, this parallel structure is military in 
iple of national security, but in some 
ve an ideological nature, with the so- 
rts. While many states operate a system 
has jurisdiction only over military 
ture, or is associated with a state of 
3s however, such courts try civilians 
>n provides for the punishment of acts 
considered to be contrary to the existing ideology, such as crimes against 
the revolution, and such legislation may create special courts and 
prosecutors, which are unable to provide proper safeguards of fair trial. 
If the examination of the emerging legal order indicates its potential 
weakness in upholding principles of the rule of law and 
individual rights, it 
is not surprising that the examination of municipal legislation governing 
political rights likewise illustrates far-reaching weaknesses, 
deficiencies and 
divergence from minimum international standards. 
In some states there is no constitutional recognition of important political 
rights, such as association, while in others, constitutional texts are 
deficient in that they do not give full and unambiguous recognition of 
political freedoms, since even where elements of political rights are 
safeguarded at this level, there are a number of potentially serious 
omissions. For example, while trade union rights are recognised 
to varying 
degrees in most countries, in others trade union rights do not exist, and 
the relation between worker and employer is regulated by ordinary 
legislation. Again, a number of Constitutions and basic laws do not explicitly 
recognise the right of all, on a basis of equality and without unreasonable 
restriction, to participate directly or indirectly in political life. 
Constitutional provisions also limit the scope of political rights on grounds 
which undermine the exercise of the rights themselves, in particular by 
imposing restrictions on ideological grounds. As with the other political 
rights, ideological restrictions undermine the scope of freedom of 
association, particularly in the political sphere, and other legislation 
restricts membership of organizations on religious or political grounds, in 
violation of the principle of non-discrimination. Legislation also imposes 
restriction on political participation on ideological grounds in, for example, 
constitutional provisions which seek to restrict a role in public life to those 
who accept the ideological principles of the ruling authority. 
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In addition, restrictions are imposed which go beyond what may be 
regarded as necessary to secure the right itself, by achieving a balance 
betwe. n individual rights and the interests of the community. For 
example, legislation in radical and conservative countries alike 
demonstrates abuse of restriction on freedom of expression on the 
grounds of protecting the reputation of others, by extending the scope 
of "others" to include not only public bodies, but ruling institutions and 
Heads of State. 
The exercise of certain political rights is also regulated to an extent 
which threatens the enjoyment of the rights themselves. For example, 
systems of censorship operated by administrative organs of the 
governments of all Arab countries severely undermine the freedoms of 
expression and information. Legislation also restricts the enjoyment of 
these freedoms, whether by imposing state control of the media, 
requiring prior authorisation of publication or permitting the Executive 
to order the closure of a newspaper or the seizure of a publication. 
Examples of legislation which unreasonably restricts the exercise of the 
right of freedom of association include the requirement that the statutes 
of an association must be drawn up in conformity with model statutes 
established by regulation, the connection of the legality of associations 
to their adherence to the governing ideology, and requirements 
governing eligibility to stand for trade union office which prevent 
qualified persons from carrying out union duties. 
Other legislation 
provides scope for administrative interference in the internal affairs of 
associations, restricts the scope of trade union and professional 
associations' activities, particularly their involvement 
in political 
activity, and restricts unduly or prohibits strikes, directly or 
indirectly. 
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This research has shown that despite substantial progress, neither local 
nor national objectives, stated in all constitutional preambles, Charters, 
Conventions and Declarations, of freedom and equality for all, regardless of 
faith, race, sex or belief, have yet been achieved. At the national level, 
delay frustrates the legitimate hopes of individuals, impedes important local 
and national programmes, and seriously hinders development of our national 
strength. Internationally, the violation of the basic and fundamental human 
rights of the Arab people confirmed by the Hammamat Declaration, subject 
not only the Arabs but Muslims in general to racist, or more exactly, 
orientalist interpretations, and charges by the international community that 
our nation is not equal to the high promise of our Islamic and Arab 
heritage, which is based in justice and equality. 
The achievement of these principles demands urgent effort, not only from 
the authorities in Arab countries, but also from the people themselves. In 
particular, the intelligentsia has a historic role to play today for the future 
of their peoples, despite the sacrifices demanded. Again, the effort must be 
based on frankness and full understanding of the challenge that confronts 
developing nations. 
This research has attempted to address specific aspects of the authority 
crisis and the stagnation of contemporary Arab political life, and to 
contribute by suggesting some guidelines for action for the development 
toward real democracy and protection of human rights and freedoms based 
on the rule of law and a spirit of cooperation with the international 
community to facilitate their achievement. The research deals separately with 
political human rights problems, suggesting a number of remedies. There are 
also common themes, observations and premises underlying the 
recommendations of several local, national, regional and international non- 
governmental organizations. 
Thus the assertion that the crisis of authority and representation in the 
Arab countries, with its inability to achieve true democracy on the one 
hand, and the stagnation of contemporary Arab political life as a result of 
the violation of human rights on the other, is to a great extent true. This 
study has added another dimension by indicating that many factors have 
contributed to the continuing problems of political development in the Arab 
context. 
This examination has demonstrated the validity of the proposition that the 
contemporary Arab legal order is unable to provide a framework in which 
the rule of law may effectively be upheld and the exercise of human rights, 
political or otherwise, sustained and developed. Political will is required 
along with legislative, judicial and administrative action, to permit the 
Arab nation and its people to shift from their present position to a stage of 
stable and effective development. 
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The roots of the current difficulties lie, as we saw, in the structure and 
content of the emerging legal order, while the contemporary effects of 
secular and religious ideology have also undoubtedly contributed to the 
weakness of legal and political institutions, in part through bringing about 
a decline in public awareness of the functions and duties of citizenship. The 
suspension of the normal legal order in favour of states of emergency in 
several countries also contributes to the weakness of a large sector of the 
population's sense of civic responsibility. Most serious and far-reaching is 
the use of the legal order as the tool of the Arab leadership in the 
maintenance of authority, apparent in the use of law and legal institutions 
to suppress and minimize the effectiveness of popular movements by the 
control of almost every aspect of political life. 
Calls for reform emphasise that without the establishment of a political 
framework which allows the people to express their aspirations, it will 
continue to be impossible for states to achieve their goals in social, 
economic or political development, as events confirm that without adequate 
protection of human rights, no real development can be sustained or 
achieved; that to be effective in sustaining political participation, the legal 
order must be based on the principles of the rule of law, and give 
expression to political rights and freedoms. In this context, the need is 
apparent for securing basic human rights for the Arab people, focusing on 
particular rights, such as freedom of opinion, expression and information, 
assembly and association, including trade union rights, and on the right to 
political participation. 
For these conclusions and the underlying assumptions, it is beyond any 
doubt that far-reaching reforms are essential to ensure the rule of law and 
the protection of rights and freedoms. Essential elements of legal reform 
required throughout the contemporary Arab legal order range from 
fundamental reforms at the constitutional level, which have potentially far- 
reaching consequences in terms of the form of government, to reform of 
other legislation, organs and policy. 
At the constitutional level, there is an urgent need for the promulgation of 
a written Constitution in the Omani Sultanate and the kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, where since the adoption of the Hijaz Constitution of 1926, repeated 
attempts to draft a basic law in the kingdom have been unsuccessful. 
Developments in other traditional countries in the region provide examples 
of Constitutions based on Shari'ah principles. 
Elsewhere, such as for example, in Libya, provisional or interim 
constitutional texts must be replaced as a matter of urgency with formal 
and complete permanent Constitutions. Where Constitutions have been 
suspended as a result of crisis, it is essential that this situation be rapidly 
brought to an end, with the restoration of the permanent constitutional 
order, to as complete a degree as circumstances permit. 
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Within the Constitutions of the Arab legal order, it has become apparent in 
the course of the study, that far-reaching legal reform is required within 
the texts themselves. Such reform encompasses the inclusion of additional 
safeguards, amendment of existing provisions and the repeal of many 
provisions undermining principles of legality. In all Arab Constitutions, 
principles such as the separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, 
provision for judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation and 
administrative acts, and the legality of punishments must be enacted. These 
fundamental texts should include an unequivocal statement of the rights of 
citizens, how these are to be regulated, and establish the mechanism by 
which they are to be protected. Repeal and amendment of existing 
constitutional provisions should include the removal of arbitrary limitation 
and restriction, particularly those based 
in ideology. 
With respect to human rights in particular, an urgent positive reform is 
the explicit adoption and incorporation of the provisions of international 
human rights intruments within municipal law. Constitutions must specify 
unambiguously the mechanism by which 
international instruments are 
incorporated and gain validity within domestic legislation, in particular, 
clarifying the position in case of conflict of laws and specifying explicitly 
how international provisions become available to the judiciary. 
In this respect, besides the Political Covenant, a most 
important 
international instrument, which can only have a beneficial effect within the 
Arab legal order, is the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which many Arab countries are already 
party. These countries are bound, for example, by article 
2 (c) to "amend, 
rescind or nullify any laws and regulations ... 
" which create or perpetuate 
discrimination on racial grounds. Many Arab countries 
have participated 
positively in the work of the Committee established by article 
8, which 
according to article 9, considers reports submitted by States 
Parties 
reporting on "legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures, which 
they have adopted ... 
" to give effect to the Convention's provisions. The 
positive participation of several "traditional" countries, such as 
Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, is particularly welcome, though this 
positive development is to be encouraged across the political spectrum. 
In the broader context of the international legal principle of non- 
discrimination, the recommendation is that a constitutional text 
unambiguously embodying this principle 
be enacted where it does not exist, 
as indispensable to the work of the judiciary in safeguarding individual and 
collective rights. The further recommendation is that such provisions be 
framed comprehensively, encompassing the contents of article 2 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 2 of the Political 
Covenant, with particular reference to the prohibition of discrimination on 
the grounds of political or other opinion. 
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The incorporation of such a provision into the supreme legal text of 
each Arab country is urgently recommended in order to bring about the 
full participation of all members of the community, their organizations 
and other groupings, in political life, enabling them to participate whole- 
heartedly and effectively in development. This is particularly relevant to 
the issue of minorities in the broadest sense, since measures which allow 
all groups to participate should minimise the tendency to secede or 
revolt, since all are secured the opportunity to contribute positively to 
the development of the nation. 
Reform in the Arab legal order must proceed hand in hand with respect 
for the principle of legality and adherence to the rule of law as a 
starting point, and we have seen that an important aspect of this 
principle is that authority must regulate its actions according to law 
and principles of justice. Constitutions must not only uphold the 
principle of separation of powers by explicit text, but this principle 
must not be compromised by other provisions explicitly or implicitly 
allowing interference or undue restriction which could lead to an 
alteration in this balance. As well as controlling the conduct of 
Executive, Legislative and Judicial powers, constitutional provisions must 
not empower the Head of State or highest organ to interfere in the 
legislative or judicial spheres, or where this is unavoidable, it must be 
subject to strict and continuous review as a first step towards true 
legality of the rule of law. 
The judiciary under the legality of the rule of law requires in all Arab 
countries urgent reform at one level or another. The need for its 
independence is not satisfied by a constitutional text recognizing the 
principle alone, but must be embodied in a clear definition of its duties 
and respect to its jurisdiction, as well as by the adherence of the 
executive and legislators to its judgements, decisions and principles of 
case law, and its interpretation of the rule of law in society. Therefore, 
its independence implies the satisfaction of several elements, more 
comprehensive in scope and content than appears to be the case in most 
Arab countries. 
In this connection, consideration of the principles enunciated in the 
Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 
(E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/481/Add. 1 of 4th August 1981) prepared by a Committee of 
Experts drawn from non-governmental organizations is recommended. 
One striking and immediate requirement is limitation of the extent to 
which the Executive as well as the Legislature may claim responsibilities 
on judicial exercise of the judicial function. Secondly, non-interference, 
particularly where the appointment or selection of judges is concerned, 
must be ensured, to avoid risks to the independence of the judiciary as 
a whole and judges in particular, because of the dangers inherent in 
exclusive appointment by the Legislature, Executive or Judiciary. It is 
also important that the proposed reform takes into account the 
necessary steps to safeguard the stability, security and immunity of the 
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judiciary and its personnel, to allow them to assert their independence. 
However, if the exercise of the legislature's responsiblity in fixing the 
general framework is deemed necessary as the safest mechanism, this 
should not, under any circumstances, become an indirect device for the 
Executive to undermine the independence of the judiciary under the 
pretext of ideological or other reasons for appointing, promoting or 
indeed removing judges, in the republics in particular. 
---------------------------------- 
It is essential that the legality of the criminal process as an aspect of 
the rule of law be upheld, in practice as well as by text, through 
observation of the rules regarded as the minimum necessary for fair 
trial. Guidance may be found in article 14 of the Political Covenant, 
which lists what can be regarded as the minimum requirements. 
Countries which lack constitutional recognition of principles such as 
presumption of innocence, habeas corpus, fair and public hearing among 
others, should take immediate steps to enact provisions which give 
effect to them. 
Even though the right of defence may be found in the legislation of 
most Arab countries, in order that this rule is effective, legislation must 
establish a system of legal aid, exercised through the courts, 
particularly in cases where the accused has no access to counsel. 
Legislation should not undermine the freedom of the legal profession in 
exercising its vital function of defending rights. Therefore, the repeal 
or amendment of legislation restricting or abolishing the free legal 
profession, such as Law no. 4 of 1981 in Libya and the amendment of 
laws such as Law no. 39 of 1961 in Syria, are strongly recommended. 
Similarly, the principle of non-retroactivity of legislation should be 
upheld in practice as in law. Most Arab countries set this principle by 
constitutional text, but we have seen that the practice indicates its 
breach, for example, in the policy of criminalisation of acts of a political 
nature. Reports of practices also indicate that the phenomenon of retrial 
of convicted persons or those who have completed their sentences is not 
uncommon, and this is clearly in breach of the principle non bis in 
idem, which requires urgent remedy. 
Again, although we saw that the right to appeal is safeguarded in 
almost all Arab countries, in practice and in specified circumstances, 
this fundamental right is not secured. Immediate steps must be taken to 
ensure the availability to all of full legal remedy, within the judicial 
framework, and without undue interference by the Executive. 
As far as control of executive actions is concerned, it is vitally 
important, not only that constitutional provisions recognize and specify 
the organs which undertake this task but that there should be an 
explicit recognition of the organ and its jurisdiction at the constitutional 
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level. More important is the recommendation that control and review be 
carried out by the judicial power rather than by the legislature, especially 
when clear definition of delegated legislative powers is severely lacking or 
simply does not exist. This proposition undoubtedly represents a stronger 
safeguard, for more than one reason, as was highlighted in Chapter Three. 
This extremely important task should be referred to the highest judicial 
organ in the hierarchy of the courts, where a division of the Supreme 
Court should be the minimum authorized body. Nevertheless, it would be 
more useful if a particular body such as a Constitutional Court is created 
specifically for this purpose, both because the organ would quickly build 
up a body of expertise and could act promptly on issues referred to it. The 
Egyptian experiment of a Constitutional Court has proved successful in its 
early stages, and represents a useful model for other Arab states. 
It is equally important that efficiency in quality and quantity be taken 
into account: thus, the judges of these bodies should be selected from the 
Supreme Courts judges or those at the highest level of the judiciary, 
through elections. Where such organs do not exist, the selection could be 
made from Appeal Courts judges and other legal experts and jurists, such 
as university lecturers and so on. - 
As far as the scope and nature of this control is concerned, it should be 
clear that their power should include review of any existing or proposed 
legislation, its conformity with the Constitution as well as principles of 
justice translated by international treaties, in particular, instruments 
concerned with the rule of law and protection of human rights which set 
the minimum legal standard which all parties are legally obliged to observe. 
This power should include the right of the Constitutional Court either to 
repeal legislation or require from the legislature the necessary amendment. 
Where the repeal of legislation by a judgement depends on its publication in 
the Official Gazette, this procedure is vulnerable to interference where 
other legislation could prevent or delay its publication. In any case, such 
legislation as Law no. 78 of 1977 in Iraq must be repealed as a matter of 
urgency, as it represents a threat to the principle of legality, as well as 
undermining the efficacy of judicial review, 
This control should also include its jurisdiction in all legal spheres, that is 
to say, in individual applications for any alleged violation of rights and 
freedoms, directly or by any other party, and any other form of abuse of 
power, which should include violation resulting from legislation authorising 
any administrative action, despite the decisions of other administrative 
courts, that is to say that this review should permit the Constitutional 
Court the jurisdiction of examining the subject as well as wrong 
implementation or interpretation of laws. 
It is also important that the findings of this organ, judgements, 
interpretations and decisions, are binding on other divisions, civil, criminal, 
administrative and so on, of the Supreme Court itself, as well as other 
courts and institutions. It is also vital that executive or adminstrative 
action be suspended during this review. 
Thus its role cannot be confined to review of constitutionality of 
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promulgated legislation but should be extended to individual and group 
petitions against legislation or acts taken by the Executive and the 
Legislature alike if they constitute assaults on their rights and freedoms. 
It is vitally important in the Middle Eastern context in general and in 
particular in Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, for the Constitutional 
Courts to be empowered in an emergency to exercise all necessary control 
over executive and legislative actions, to provide protection and safeguard 
of the rule of law and individual liberties, and to supervise all legislation 
and organs deemed necessary. It is also vital for the Court. to be 
empowered to monitor any deviation of the executive and other institutions, 
and maintain review of emergency conditions as far as the national security 
and national interest are concerned. The Supreme Court in Jordan has 
already demonstrated the exercise of this vital function. 
In view of the continuing crisis of the Middle East and its implications for 
the region in general, and in particular for the countries of Syria, Jordan 
and Egypt, where external and internal threats have led to the long term 
use of emergency legislation, the effects of the institutionalization of state 
of emergency on the legal order and individual liberties, which became clear 
during this examination, are an obvious cause for concern and call for 
reform at several levels. Most obvious is a re-examination at the political 
level of the continuing need for state of emergency so that, even if 
circumstances prevent the lifting of emergency law, other steps may be 
taken to lessen its impact on political life and the rights of individuals. At 
the level of legal reform, where the causes of state of emergency have 
changed over time, there is an obvious need to review the appropriateness 
of emergency measures. For example, while the initial reason for the 
emergency in Egypt was the state of war, after the Camp David treaty, 
emergency law was retained to deal with threats to internal stability. 
Clearly the legislative measures demanded by the two cases are quite 
distinct, so an immediate safeguard recommended for Egypt is clarification 
in the legislative text of the measures appropriate to each situation. 
Another tendency in the region is the use of emergency measures in 
circumstances of political change. This phenomenon was clearly illustrated in 
Morocco during the seventies, when emergency provisions led to the 
suspension of the Constitution during adjustments of the political 
framework, and in Libya at the Declaration of Zwara of the Abrogation of 
the Laws, which amounted to a virtual state of emergency, despite its 
description. Clearly, a stable and secure legal order, which is able to 
uphold individual and collective rights, is the more appropriate background 
to continuing political change and development in the region, since it allows 
the achievement of effective reform while upholding the rule of law and the 
rights of the population. 
Most Arab Constitutions, as we saw, contain provisions regulating the 
conditions in which a state of emergency may be declared and the 
procedures which accompany such a declaration, however, it is notable that 
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several Constitutions do not adequately specify the powers of the various 
branches of government in this situation. Nor do they make clear the extent 
to which emergency provisions may undermine constitutional safeguards or 
provide a list of inalienable rights, from which no derogation is tolerable in 
emergency circumstances. The minimum list of such rights should comprise 
those regarded as non-derogable in international law, though clearly, within 
the Arab context, the list should be considerably extended to include due 
process of law, legality of punishments, and those political rights which do 
not threaten public order or national security. In this context, the 
protection of non-governmental institutions, such as a free Press, free trade 
unions and professional associations such as independent Bar associations, 
is of paramount importance, as such institutions have a vital role to play in 
counter-balancing the executive monopoly of power. However as we have 
seen in the Arab countries, in the words of the International Commission of 
Jurists : 
"a pattern which is unfortunately familiar is one in which the executive has assumed all legislative authority, purged and intimidated the judiciary, 
forbidden all criticism, banned or assumed control of professional 
organisations and trade unions ... 
", 
as events, for example, in Syria, Libya, Egypt and Morocco have confirmed. 
The constitutional provisions which describe the grounds for proclamation 
of a state of emergency should be clear and explicit, embodying the 
principles distinguished at the international level, of exceptional and 
imminent threat to the nation. Types of emergency should be distinguished : 
natural disasters may not require the same measures as the threat of war. 
Similarly, the measures called for by external threat and internal disorder 
are quite distinct and the difference should be reflected in the 
constitutional provision. For example, the characteristic use of military 
forces in situations of domestic disorder in the Arab countries is not 
appropriate and often leads to excesses, including extra-judicial executions, 
as in Syria in the early eighties. Naturally, the Middle East crisis has 
brought about the development of militarist psychology, but it is clearly 
inappropriate that the armed forces should play the dominant role in 
dealing with domestic unrest. 
In most Arab countries, constitutional provisions determine the procedure 
for the imposition of a state of emergency. The recommendation is that 
ultimate responsibility should fall principally upon the legislature. Where the 
President or King may impose a state of emergency, this should cease to 
have effect if not ratified by the legislature within a specified period. 
States of emergency declared when the legislature is not sitting should 
automatically bring the legislature to session for their consideration and 
ratification. Likewise, requests for renewal or extension should be subject 
to ratification by the legislature, in the absence of which the state of 
emergency should cease forthwith. Few Arab Constitutions or other 
legislation contains provisions which explicitly specify the duration of state 
of emergency and provide for regular review by the legislature, though it 
goes without saying that these must be regarded as essential requirements. 
The experience of parliamentary life in the Arab world is such that a 
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specific fixed period after which the state of emergency ceases if not 
renewed by the legislature must be considered the minimum legal safeguard. 
The judiciary too has a vital role to play during states of emergency, 
although restriction of the jurisdiction of ordinary courts is a common 
practice, in the Arab world as elsewhere, which makes it more difficult to 
control abuse of emergency powers. Judicial review during this period 
remains essential to uphold the rule of law and prevent the concentration of 
power in the executive. Normal judicial remedies should remain for all rights 
not restricted by the state of emergency, and the ordinary judiciary should 
retain competence to review detentions in order to ensure that they remain 
compatible with the aims of the extraordinary measures. This competence has 
been asserted by the Jordanian Supreme Court, but remains unregulated by 
the judiciary in most Arab countries. As already noted, in normal times the 
executive must refrain from interference in the judicial process, and 
naturally, in time of emergency, this restraint is more vital. Likewise, 
ordinary courts rather than military or exceptional courts should retain 
jurisdiction over alleged abuse of power by the security forces, and as the 
Human Rights Committee rightly pointed out to the Jordanian government, 
the ordinary judiciary should retain jurisdiction over the cases of civilians 
charged with security offences. Along with the rights of appearing in 
person, the right to defence, and the recording of proceedings, it is 
particularly important that the right to appeal criminal convictions be 
retained, since more severe punishments may be imposed during the period 
of state of emergency. In that time, as at all other times, the independence 
of the judiciary, in particular in the security of its judgements from 
executive interference, must be upheld in order to protect the rule of law 
and the rights of individuals. 
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB LEGAL ORDER Page 277 
CONTRTBU UTION 
It is clear from the examination of political human rights in the 
previous chapter that urgent legal reform is required to bring the 
legislation which secures and regulates these rights into conformity with 
the minimum international legal standards identified in the first chapter. 
At the basic level of recognition, reform is required of constitutional 
texts, in order to secure full and unambiguous recognition of these 
freedoms at this level. Urgent reform is also required of texts 
regulating these freedoms in order to ensure that constitutional 
safeguards are not emptied of their meaning by other legislation or 
regulations. In particular, the repeal of legislative restriction on 
ideological grounds is a priority. The scope of restrictions must be 
outlined in general terms at the constitutional level, in particular, those 
on grounds of public order, national security and rights of others. 
Restrictions at this level based on ideology, such as "socialist 
aspirations" and "the nationalist line of the revolution" must be avoided, 
as susceptible of abuse. Conventional restrictions, such as on grounds 
of public order and national security, though lacking precise definition, 
are more suitable for judicial interpretation than the revolutionary 
concepts found in radical constitutional texts. 
Another common tendency of Arab Constitutions is the addition to 
constitutional provisions recognising individual liberties of the proviso 
that restrictions are to be applied "by law". Although this represents a 
welcome recognition of the principle of legality, a better safeguard 
would be the inclusion of clauses indicating the scope of such lawful 
restrictions. 
Another disturbing phenomenon in several Arab countries is the 
persistence of legislation dating from as early as the forties and fifties, 
and some from the colonial period, which imposes severe restrictions on 
the exercise of political rights. 
With respect to provisions dealing with emergency, there seems no 
reason why the list of inalienable rights should not include the right of 
freedom of opinion and the rights of political participation. 
Even though the rights of freedom of opinion, expression and 
information are safeguarded at the constitutional level in Arab states, 
there are a number of potentially serious omissions, for example, the 
right to freedom of opinion is not explicitly recognised by the Syrian 
Constitution, while the right to freedom of expression does not find 
constitutional recognition in Kuwait, Libya or Iraq. Clearly, there is an 
urgent requirement for amendment of constitutional articles to add the 
components not yet included. Also urgent is the repeal of provisions 
which qualify these rights and their exercise by ideological restraints, 
to be found particularly in the radical Constitutions, but also in the 
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Constitutions of Morocco and Kuwait. 
As the international understanding is that the right to hold opinions 
may not be restricted on any grounds or under any circumstances, the 
special status of this right should be recognised in the constitutional 
text. 
Clearly, restrictions envisaged by constitutional and other provisions 
should not extend beyond those permissible according to the 
international standard. Restrictions may be imposed on freedom of 
expression in order to achieve the balance between the right of the 
individual and the interests of the community, notably on the grounds 
of securing respect for the reputation of others and on conventional 
grounds such as public order, public safety, national security and so 
on. However, legislation in the Arab countries, radical and conservative 
alike, demonstrates a misuse of this exceptional rule on the grounds of 
protecting the reputation of others, by extending the scope of "others" 
to include not only public bodies, but ruling institutions and heads of 
state. This undermines the ability of Arab public opinion to play a 
meaningful role in developing political life, by stifling dissent and 
constructive criticism by the people and their representatives alike. It 
also contributes to the growth in self-censorship by the Arab 
intelligentsia, even where legislative restriction, such as that in Morocco 
which prohibits debate on the statements of the King, is absent. 
In the light of the vital importance of freedom of information in the life 
of developing nations, in increasing public awareness and civic 
responsibility, all restriction on freedom of information within the Arab 
legal order must be viewed as an obstacle to development of countries 
and population alike. In this context, the systems of censorship operated 
by administrative organs of the governments of all Arab countries 
should be immediately ended, and competence for limited censorship of 
all forms of information and expression on clearly specified grounds be 
transferred to the judiciary, or special organs of judicial nature. 
A first step is to end the requirement for prior authorisation of 
publication, whether of foreign or Arabic materials. Necessary 
censorship, on clearly specified grounds relating to public morality, 
public order, national security and so on, should be exercised by 
judicial organ only after publication, as a rule, or by injunction 
obtained by the government from a judicial organ. Again, an important 
step is to end the power of the Executive in a number of states, Kuwait 
for example, to order the closure of a newspaper or the seizure of a 
publication. Again, legislation throughout the Arab world which provides 
for state control of the media should be repealed, and administrative 
action inhibiting the free flow of information, whether by blocking of 
external radio and television transmissions, restriction of the use of 
telecommunication facilities or the seizure of publications should be 
brought to an end. All requirement for prior authorisation and 
registration of communications equipment such as typewriters, 
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computers, photocopiers and tape recorders should likewise be ended. 
Legislative recognition at the constitutional level of the right to 
freedom of assembly may be found throughout the Arab legal order, with 
the right to hold meetings and processions widel r safeguarded, and 
regulated by other legislation. However, in the light of the growing 
tendency for constitutional provisions to recognise explicitly the right to 
demonstrate, the inclusion of this important mechanism of public 
expression in basic legal texts should be considered by Arab legislators. 
Regulation of freedom of assembly within the legal order is organised 
by the principles of prior notification and prior authorization. Since the 
individual's right of freedom of assembly cannot be absolute, the 
application of the principle of notification is acceptable to allow the 
authorities to maintain public order and public safety. However, the 
application of the principle of prior authorization gives potential for 
abuse, where the refusal of the authorities is not subject to review, or 
judicial review is limited. Where legislation provides that prior 
authorisation or notification is required, judicial review of decisions by 
the public authorities to refuse or deny the right to hold a public 
meeting is preferred. 
As with freedom of expression, legislation imposing restrictions on 
ideological grounds is unacceptable and must be repealed or amended. 
While a restriction on the classical ground of protecting public safety is 
acceptable, an element of the right may be the expression of criticism 
against any system or its policies, so lawful restrictions must not be 
abused to suppress criticism. Administrative requirements for advance 
details of planned meetings should not be such as to restrict the 
exercise of the right, for example, authorization or notification should 
not be required long before the planned meeting. Again, the attendance 
of public officials, such as the police, at public meetings, while 
acceptable on the grounds of maintaining public safety, should not 
impose any restriction on the exercise of the right, and police actions 
taken to safeguard the public should observe the principle of 
proportionality. 
Again, Arab legislation in a number of states safeguards and 
regulates freedom of association within the particular context identified 
in the previous chapter. Clearly, in states such as Saudi Arabia or 
Libya, where political and other association is banned or severely 
restricted, urgent legal reform is required to repeal or amend such 
legislation. 
As with the other political rights, ideological restrictions which 
undermine the scope of freedom of association, for example, in Iraq and 
Morocco, should be amended in order to secure the enjoyment of this 
right in conformity with the international standard, and allow the 
achievement of the true ends of free association, particularly in the 
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political sphere. Likewise, legislation which restricts membership of 
organizations on religious or political grounds must be repealed 
immediately, in accordance with the internationally recognised principle 
of non-discrimination. Legislation upholding this principle should be 
promulgated or maintained at the constitutional level, and observed in 
administrative practice. In. accordance with this principle, legislation 
such as that in Morocco and Algeria, which restricts membership of 
associations on discriminatory grounds should be repealed, since they 
exclude a category of the society unjustly. 
Restrictions on the right of groups such as the police, armed forces 
and public sector are acceptable, and several Arab countries have 
legislation which provides this. However, as noted, the scope of "public 
service" should riot be so wide as to exclude large sections of the 
population. 
Legislation which requires that the statutes of an association must be 
drawn up in conformity with model statutes established by regulation, 
represents a potential violation of the right to associate 
freely, as it 
provides scope for administrative interference. Such 
legislation should 
be amended to ensure the freedom of associations 
to pursue their lawful 
goals. Model statutes which are not obligatory should nevertheless seek 
to encourage associations in pursuing their aims. 
While legislation which 
merely restricts associations whose aims are contrary 
to law, morals or 
public order are acceptable, legislation which goes 
beyond these 
restrictions to connect the legality of associations to 
their adherence to 
the governing ideology, such as Act 87-15 in Algeria and 
the Dahir of 15 
November 1958 in Morocco must be repealed. 
In most countries, the public authorities may suspend or 
dissolve an 
association on several grounds, and such orders may be the subject of 
review, whether by administrative or judicial organs. 
Clearly, judicial 
review is the most secure impartial safeguard against abuse. 
While in most Arab countries, trade union rights are recognised to 
varying degrees, in others, such as United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia, trade union rights do not exist. In contrast with the view 
of certain governments that it is sufficient to regulate the relation 
between worker and employer by ordinary legislation in the light of the 
undeveloped nature of industry in their countries, it cannot be 
considered acceptable in the light of the growing numbers of migrant 
workers, a majority of whom are Arabs, in oil. and related industries. A 
priority therefore, for such states, is to amend constitutional provisions 
explicitly to recognise and safeguard trade union rights to help in the 
development of their national economies. In addition, other legislation 
conforming to international standards is vital to safeguard a growing 
number of Arab workers. Such international standards as the ILO 
conventions on association should be incorporated and upheld in full by 
States Parties to these treaties. It goes without saying that States 
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Parties should respond positively and swiftly to their obligations and in 
particular to the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of 
Association, to modify and enrich labour legislation. Similarly, it is clear 
that States not party to these labour conventions should immediately take 
steps to sign and ratify them. 
As we saw, there is grave cause for concern in countries where the law 
imposes a single trade union system at all levels, and prohibits pluralism 
locally and nationally. Clearly, the priority in states such as Syria, Egypt, 
Iraq, Libya, Kuwait and Yemen is to amend legislation and regulations, and 
bring to an end administrative practises. which impose and enforce the 
single trade union structure. While, as we saw, voluntary association in a 
single organization is acceptable, in contrast, if the only channel for trade 
union association is to be part of a single organization, the international 
legal principle is violated. 
As with all political rights, it is an urgent priority to bring to end by the 
amendment or repeal of legislation and the modification of administrative 
practice any qualification or impairment of trade union rights on ideological 
grounds, such as the constitutional provision in Iraq. 
As we saw, states remain free to provide such formalities in their 
legislation as appropriate to ensure the normal functioning of industrial 
organizations, however, at this level, a number of recommendations can be 
made, Requirements governing eligibility to stand for office should not 
prevent qualified persons from carrying out union duties by imposing strict 
conditions of nationality, which might restrict the rights of migrant 
workers, or other occupational requirements. Although the imposition of 
reasonable requirements is permissible, the principle remains that these 
should not be such as to impair the enjoyment of the right. Legislation 
such as Act No. 107/75 in Libya and Legislative Decree No. 84 in Syria should 
be amended as soon as possible. 
Again, although there may be a requirement that union rules comply with a 
national statutory requirement, the principle remains that unions should be 
free to draw up their own constitutions and rules. Thus, a legislative or 
administrative obligation on trade unions to base their constitutions on a 
compulsory model should be discontinued. It may be appreciated that, in 
developing countries, the state should provide guidance for organizations in 
establishing constitutions, neverthless, as we have seen, such models should 
not be compulsorily imposed. 
Another area where the scope for administrative interference must be 
minimised is that of union finances and extensive control over the 
administration of funds. Legislation, for example, which establishes the 
minimum contribution of members, specifies the proportion of union funds to 
be paid to federations or requires that the budget, expenditure or 
investment of a trade union be approved by the public authorities, should 
be amended. Legislation which allows the public authority entire discretion 
to investigate the internal affairs of a union should be modified to make 
any such investigation subject to judicial review. 
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Again, the activities of the Egyptian Constitutional Court confirm the 
important role of the judiciary in safeguarding trade union rights 
during the transitional period of reform. 
Amendment is also recommended of legislative provisions placing 
restrictions on the scope of trade union activities. The complete freedom 
of trade unions to organise their activities and formulate programmes is 
in practice restricted by legislation which severely controls union 
involvement in political activity. We have already seen that the task of 
repressing possible abuse is best left to the judicial authorities, 
without legislation prohibiting in very broad terms the political activities 
of unions. For example, the action of the Syrian government in 
dissolving professional associations on the grounds that they "exceeded 
their mandate" should have been subject to judicial review. 
Legislation which establishes close links between the unions and the 
ruling party, such as Law no. 70 of 1.980 in Iraq, which provides that the 
activities of the Artists' Union must conform to Ba'th party principles, is 
incompatible with the exercise of this freedom and must be repealed as a 
matter of urgency. 
While recognising the necessity of some restriction of the right to 
strike, particularly of certain categories, the fact remains that in 
developing countries as elsewhere, the right to strike is one of the 
essential means available to workers to promote and protect their 
economic, social and other interests. Legislation which restricts unduly 
or prohibits strikes as well as indirect prohibition by legislation which 
provides that disputes must be settled through compulsory arbitration 
leading to a final binding decision, for example, by a Labour Court, or 
by a decision at the discretion of the public authority, should be 
amended, with appeals against decisions as to the lawfulness of strike 
action passing to the ordinary judiciary. 
Again, there should be immediate repeal or amendment of legal 
provisions which allow dissolution or suspension of trade union 
organizations by the public authorities. In any case, both legislature 
and executive should abstain from suspending or dissolving any 
organization. 
In order to permit Arab trade unions and professional associations to 
benefit from inter-occupational or inter-regional associations, legislation 
which prevents federations of unions which represent different 
occupations, such as the Kuwaiti Labour Act of 1964, or requires prior 
authorisation of such a federation should be repealed, along with 
restrictions which make affiliation to international organizations subject 
to prior authorisation, as in Libya. 
While recognising that questions of political ideology lie beyond the 
scope of this study, it must be pointed out that the phenomenon 
prevalent in the Arab world, of the single ruling party, is a denial of 
the principle of free association, as it removes the possibility of freedom 
of choice, which is inherent in the idea of free association. The 
predominance of a single ideological viewpoint, let alone the exclusion of 
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important sectors of society from participation in the political life of the 
nation, inhibits development at all levels. 
We have seen during this examination a range of political structures, 
styles of government and leadership along with the varying effects of 
ideology. Again, it must be emphasised that the form of government or 
political programme in itself is outwi. th the scope of this research, where 
the 
_ 
concern is to determine the minimum legal safeguards of 
participation in public life. Clearly, constitutional and other legislative 
provisions aimed at securing effective popular participation must 
enshrine the principles of equality and non--discrimination. Other 
legislation, such as Electoral Codes, must likewise ensure access to 
public office and the right to stand and to vote in elections on a basis 
of equality. 
Where Constitutions and basic laws do not explicitly recognise the right 
of all, on a basis of equality and without unreasonable restriction, to 
participate directly or indirectly in political life, needless to say swift 
legislative action must be taken to remedy this situation. This has 
important implications for a state like Saudi Arabia, where political 
participation continues to be organised on traditional lines. In the Gulf 
countries, in particular, where access to public life may not be secured 
to large sections of the population, urgent action is needed to widen 
participation in order to achieve political development and secure 
stability. Again, without going beyond the scope of the study to 
challenge particular forms of government, it is hard to see how the Arab 
political structures based on theocratic monarchical rule can achieve the 
measure of democracy required in order to secure full participation in 
political life. Legislation which assures the extraordinary position of the 
King in Morocco, for example, securing his right to control all other 
constitutional institutions, must be repealed forthwith. 
Clearly, such proposals pose a threat to the short-term interests of 
those who presently hold power, but this threat must be balanced 
against the continuing threat of coup d'etat or violent political change, 
which destabilises the region, and will continue so long as there is 
undue restriction on true popular participation. Continuing political 
instability in the post-independence period in the Arab region has 
illustrated the vulnerability and fragility of governments which do not 
allow scope for popular participation at all levels, or. severely restrict 
the possibility of legal opposition. 
To reiterate once more the theme of this study, the most secure 
safeguard of national security and stability during such far-reaching 
political change is the determination to achieve political reform while 
continuing to uphold principles of legality and respect for the rule of 
law. 
In order to achieve these ends, other steps must be taken. There is an 
immediate striking need for the repeal or amendment of legislation which 
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imposes restriction on political participation on ideological grounds, for 
example, the constitutional provisions of the Arab republics which seek 
to restrict a role in public life to those who accept the ideological 
principles of the ruling authority. In this context, the exclusion in Iraq 
of "all individuals who adopted a political, economic or intellectual 
position that was hostile to the Revolution and its programme ... from 
the democracy" is a clear violation of the principle of access without 
unreasonable restrictions to the political process, which should be 
remedied immediately. Other restrictions which unreasonably exclude 
groups or individuals from political life, such as restrictions in the 
Algerian Electoral Code which excludes from the electoral list "persons 
whose behaviour during the war of national liberation was against the 
interests of the country", should be repealed. 
With respect to the principle of non--discrimination in political life, the 
question of legislation requiring that the Head of State be 
both Muslim 
and male, thus imposing restrictions on grounds of religion and sex, 
must be addressed. In absolute terms, upholding this principle would 
require legislative reform to remove discrimination, however political 
realities in the Arab context, as elsewhere, require a more pragmatic 
approach. In view of the serious issues confronting the 
developing 
political systems of the Arab world, the question is virtually 
irrelevant, 
since the stagnation of political life is due to causes 
far deeper and 
more complex than discrimination at this level. Recent political events 
in 
the Muslim context in any case have confirmed that a woman may 
hold 
the office of Prime Minister in a Muslim country. In the Arab context, 
it 
is extremely doubtful whether legislative provisions securing 
the right 
of women or non-Muslims to hold the highest office in the government 
would in fact secure this position to either category. 
Despite the 
absence of restrictive legislation in western democracies, the fact 
remains that is almost inconceivable that a Muslim or Jew could hold the 
office of Head of State in such developed democracies as the 
United 
Kingdom or the United States. 
Since restrictions on the ground of sex at other levels of political life 
inhibit true participation in government, regulations such as the 
Tunisian Electoral Code, which specifies that only males may stand for 
election to the legislature, should be amended to overcome this 
discrimination. 
In order to secure the absence of discrimination, the establishment of 
administrative organs in the field of elections with the task of constant 
review of provisions and practices which might undermine political 
participation on a basis of equality, is recommended. In addition, the 
task of ensuring full enjoyment of political rights should be assigned to 
the judiciary, through their competence to hear claims and appeals 
against provisions or administrative acts inhibiting individual or group's 
exercise of their rights. 
Legislation securing the right to participate in public life, and to vote 
and stand for election without unreasonable restriction, remains 
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meaningless without periodic and genuine elections in which the 
population may participate. Constitutional and legislative provisions 
which provide for periodic elections to the legislature and to high 
office, such as the Head of State, must be implemented strictly, as must 
regulations which govern the re-election of the same person to this 
office. Where such legislative provisions do not, exist, legislation which 
embodies the minimum legal safeguards identified in international texts 
must be promulgated as a matter of urgency. There is also a pressing 
need for other legislation, which already exists in Algeria and Syria, 
which guards against interference in the electoral process, through 
coercion or corruption, to be promulgated throughout the Arab legal 
order. Provisions which guard against interference by administrative or 
executive actions are essential, and compensation in respect of such acts 
should be capable of being secured from both officials and authority, 
through the judicial process. 
Arab states are party to a range of international agreements and 
treaties, and have indicated on many occasions their acceptance of the 
principles of international law, though this varies in degree. The 
conservative countries of the Gulf have shown their willingness to 
participate positively in international instruments from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights to the draft Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation amongst 
others, and it is to be hoped that they will continue to broaden the 
scope of their international participation. A number of Arab states, 
including Sudan and Egypt, have gone so far as to recognise the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on specified 
issues. 
In particular, most of the countries described in this study have 
signed and ratified international instruments concerned with the 
recognition and protection of human rights. Needless to say, such 
participation in human rights protection at the international level is 
welcomed and further action must be encouraged. Without doubt it 
remains an urgent necessity for those Arab states not party to 
important international instruments such as the Covenants on Human 
Rights or the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination to participate in them. In general, it is preferable that 
Arab states participate in such instruments subject to any reservations 
they may feel are required, than that they continue to hold back from 
such participation. Similarly, states which have signed but not yet 
ratified key international texts should take immediate steps to do so, to 
bring about further integration to international standards. 
A number of specific recomendations must be made for those States 
already party to the ICCPR. Firstly, those states should take every 
action to meet the obligations undertaken by signature of the 
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instrument. Principally, this means that they should, in the words of 
article 2 of the Covenant, "take the necessary steps ... 
to adopt such 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect ... 
" to 
the rights it contains. Such measures which may involve the repeal or 
amendment of provisions of existing legislation, should be taken at once 
to enhance and safeguard the enjoyment of human rights in those 
countries. 
Another important recommendation is the timely fulfilment of the 
obligation of reporting on measures taken to facilitate the enjoyment of 
human rights to the Human Rights Committee under article 40 of the 
Covenant. The record of a number of Arab states is far from positive in 
this respect, as reports long overdue have not yet been received. Arab 
states were among the earliest both to submit and to have considered 
reports on progress in achieving the aims of the Covenant, and this 
factor goes some way to excusing the inadequacy of early reports from 
countries such as Syria, Egypt and Libya, since the Committee had not, 
when these countries' initial reports were submitted, prepared guidelines 
on the preparation of reports. The early reports tend to consist of 
broad descriptions of the theoretical domestic legal framework along with 
references to constitutional and other provisions protecting civil and 
political rights. Little reference is made to restrictions which in practice 
inhibit the enjoyment of these rights, and few early reports make any 
reference to the difficulties faced by governments in achieving the aims 
of the Covenant. 
Early discussions which took place between the Human Rights Committee 
and certain Arab government representatives were also rather 
unsatisfactory since, as noted in the examination of such discussions in 
Chapter Three, the Committee had not at that stage prepared guidelines 
on the consideration of reports. Nevertheless, the comment must be made 
that the response of some government representatives was far from 
satisfactory. Often requests for information were met with a promise to 
supply further information after consultation with the government, and 
in several cases, the information requested was never in fact received, a 
tendency which must be remedied. Discussions between the Human Rights 
Committee and Arab governmental representatives have varied quite 
widely in quality, since some representatives have been willing to make 
detailed and informative replies to the questions posed by members of 
the Committee, while others have replied evasively or simply failed to 
respond. 
Although a number of Arab governments have failed to submit their 
second and third reports under article 40 despite repeated reminders, it 
must be noted that later reports submitted by Iraq and Tunisia in 1987 
have demonstrated a marked improvement in the presentation of the 
required information, where legislative provisions and administrative 
procedures are described in more detail than before. 
Needless to say, immediate recommendations in respect of reporting and 
discussions are that full and timely reports be presented to the Human 
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Rights Committee as requested, and that positive and honest discussions be 
conducted with the Committee as a matter of course. Naturally, an indication 
of the nature of the governments' commitment to human rights is the rank 
of the officials who represent them in such discussions. Clearly, senior 
members of the judiciary as well as senior officials of the Ministry of 
Justice are best qualified to inform the Committee both of progress in 
achieving the aims of the Covenant and the difficulties states may face in 
the process. 
With respect to States' obligations under article 4, we saw in Chapter One 
how notification through the Secretary-General of other States Parties of 
the imposition of a state of emergency is not only a technical obligation but 
forms an essential element of the right itself, because of the importance of 
the principle of publicity for supervision. As we have seen, of the Arab 
states who have experienced state of emergency since the entry into force 
of the Covenant, Tunisia alone fulfilled its international obligation in 1984, 
by informing States Parties of the imposition of a state of emergency, and 
the measures taken thereby. The Tunisian action is in striking contrast to 
that of the other Arab countries currently under a state of emergency, 
none of whom have informed States Parties of its existence or the measures 
taken derogating from provisions of the Covenant. Discussions of the issue 
with the Human Rights Committee indicate serious misinterpretation by the 
governments of Jordan, Syria and Egypt of their international obligations, 
as well as the questionable nature of the grounds for a state of emergency 
in Egypt, where the Camp David peace treaty ended the state of war with 
Israel which was the initial reason for its declaration. There is clearly an 
urgent need in all three countries both for an immediate review of the need 
for state of emergency, as we have seen, and of fulfilment of the obligation 
of notification of States Parties to the Covenant. 
It is particularly important that the provisions recognising human rights in 
the international Covenants as in other instruments be available to the 
judiciary and to the population, in order to serve as a protection, and in 
this context, a particular recommendation is that consideration be urgently 
made of giving international treaties and agreements precedence over 
municipal legislation, including the Constitution, as in Morocco. In several 
countries, the status of such treaties is already higher than all municipal 
legislation save the Constitution, but the recommendation is that this status 
be further enhanced. 
Finally, with respect to the Political Covenant, it is extremely important 
that States Parties give urgent consideration to ratification or accession to 
the first Optional Protocol, since in the absence of national and regional 
guarantees of human rights, it represents an important safeguard for 
individuals. No Arab country has yet acceded to this instrument, though a 
number of countries have indicated that the question is under 
consideration. Claims that signature is not urgent 
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must be rejected, as signature in fact represents a test of the sincerity 
of governments. 
In respect of other activities in the field of international legal 
protection of human rights, it is recommended that Arab governments 
participate in and cooperate fully with the work of international bodies, 
such as the Commission established under the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to examine reports 
submitted under article 9 of the Convention, and the ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association. Full cooperation should also be given to Special 
Rapporteurs appointed by the Subcommission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities to investigate any issue. 
Furthermore, positive cooperation is recommended with international 
non-governmental organizations concerned with 
the rule of law and 
human rights, such as the International Commission of 
Jurists and 
Amnesty International. Of particular concern for the protection of Arab 
human rights is the hostile attitude adopted by Arab government 
representatives, for example, toward the candidature of 
the Arab 
Lawyers Union for consultative status within ECOSOC, since this positive 
development was blocked by the action of an alliance of Arab monarchies 
and republics in 1987. Within the Arab countries too, governments 
have 
proved hostile to the aims of this organization 
in, for example, banning 
its congress in 1987, at which a report on the Arab 
human rights 
situation was due to be adopted. Arab governments are called upon 
to 
end all hostility to this organization, nationally and internationally, and 
instead support the valuable contribution. it renders to the development 
of Arab human rights protection. 
From the first it must be said that all efforts should be made to 
encourage further cooperation and understanding between 
Arab 
countries, particularly at the level of bi-lateral and multi-lateral 
treaties. These may facilitate movement, communication and commerce 
between countries, with a view to the development of the region. 
Nevertheless, Arab governments must not continue to conclude treaties 
or agreements which constitute, in whole or in part, an assault on 
principles of international law 
by, for example, facilitating the return of 
political refugees, or undermine the protection of individual liberties, 
even where national or security interests are involved. The Arab 
legislative powers have an important role to play toward this end, in 
abstaining from ratification of treaties or agreements which could 
undermine the promotion or protection of the people's rights and 
freedoms. Any collective or bi-lateral treaties must observe the 
international undertakings of the Parties, as well as international legal 
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standards requiring States Parties to instruments at the international or 
regional level to observe and respect obligations willingly undertaken. 
Since, in most cases, Arab Heads of State are authorized by constitutional 
provision to conclude treaties and agreements, therefore, an important 
recommendation is that all treaties be subject to review to ensure their 
compatiblity with the Constitution and international commitments. The 
minimum recommended requirement is a degree of control by the Legislature 
through the process of ratification, (verification) preferably carried out by 
a special organ of judicial and legal expertise, such as a constitutional 
commission within the legislative authority and thereafter, to be subject to 
ratification by the latter. 
In addition, the authorities in the Arab countries are urgently demanded to 
abstain from concluding treaties which wholly or partly undermine or violate 
other higher international instruments, but to uphold the principles of their 
declared foreign policy and their international undertakings. For example, 
the Egyptian government's claim that in the light of its obligations as a 
member of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, the single-union 
structure which operates in Egypt is "imposed" by the statute of that 
Organization must be reviewed. This requirement is in direct conflict with 
Egypt's other obligations under international law, according to the 
International Covenants and ILO conventions. This requirement must 
therefore be rejected by the Egyptian government, which should work for 
the amendment of the Statute, as Arab workers must not only be free to set 
up organizations but also be able to exercise a degree of choice in joining 
other associations. These rights are denied by the single trade union 
structure, where the only channel left for trade union association is to be 
part of a single organization in which Arab governments play the dominant 
role in shaping its programme and activities. 
A most encouraging development at the regional level in recent years has 
been the adoption and entry into force of the African Charter of Human and 
People's Rights, which was opened for signature to the members of the 
Organization of African Unity, of which seven Arab states are members. Of 
these, six Arab countries have signed and ratified the human rights 
Charter, which entered into force in 1986. This positive development has 
important implications for the development of protection of human rights 
within these Arab countries, as among the contents of this treaty are an 
undertaking to "adopt legislative or other measures" to give effect to the 
rights it contains and provision for the establishment of a Commission of 
Human and People's Rights empowered to receive communications from states 
as well as from organizations and individuals alleging violation of the 
Charter. Like article 40 of the ICCPR, the Charter establishes a reporting 
procedure by which states undertake to submit reports on legislative and 
other measures taken to 
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give effect to the contents of the Charter. 
The Commission was established in 1987, and Arab members were elected 
to serve in their personal capacity, with the Egyptian representative 
elected to serve as vice-president for two years. The competence of the 
Commission to receive individual or other communications alleging 
violation of the Charter was confirmed by the Commission's Rules of 
Procedure, adopted in February 1988. 
Clearly, these developments represent an important step forward in the 
protection of human rights in the region and Arab governments are 
urged to contribute positively to this experiment, since it is an 
important indication of third world aspirations to promote and protect 
human rights. They are urged to comply fully and honestly with the 
reporting requirements established by article 62 of the Charter, and to 
contribute at all stages to the promotion of human rights. 
Arab governments are also urged to exercise their right under article 
68 to propose amendments to the Charter, for example, in respect of 
article 60, in order to allow the Commission to benefit from the findings 
and interpetations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
and the European Court and Commission of Human Rights, for the 
valuable light they shed on the understanding of such issues as the 
state of emergency. Other recommendations include the enhancement of 
the quasi-judicial function of the Commission in the absence of a Court, 
and measures to ensure the independence of serving members from 
governmental pressure or interference. 
Of immediate striking importance in the light of the circumstances of 
many States Parties to the Charter, is the adoption of provisions 
comparable to those in international treaties in respect of measures of 
safeguard during time of state of emergency. These should include the 
obligation to communicate the decision to impose state of emergency to 
other States Parties along with information on its impact on human 
rights protection. With regard to political rights, the proposal should be 
made to clarify the wording of article 9, which deals with freedom of 
information and expression, in order to secure the right to impart as 
well as to receive information, by any media and regardless of frontiers. 
As we have seen within Arab municipal law, a further important 
safeguard is the recognition of the absolute right to freedom of opinion. 
In respect to freedom of association, immediate clarification must be 
sought of the meaning and scope of restrictions on the grounds of the 
"obligation of solidarity" provided for in article 29. If this restriction is 
incompatible with other obligations imposed by international provisions, 
Arab governments must take steps to seek to amend the regional 
convention, or make reservations in respect of this measure. The 
provisions of article 13 should also be amended to provide explicitly the 
right to vote and stand in elections, and to encompass the requirement 
for "genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot" embodied in international 
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB LEGAL ORDER Page 291 
CONTRIBUTION 
provisions to guarantee the free expression of the will of the people. 
A further development at the regional level of protection of human 
rights, which was touched upon briefly in Chapter One, is the proposed 
Arab Human Rights Covenant. This document, which resulted from Arab 
League Decision no. 2605 of 1970, has suffered what is hoped to be a 
temporary set-back in the decision of the Council of the Arab League 
(Decision no. 4458) in 1985, that the text be set aside pending the 
outcome of the study by the Organization of the Islamic Conference of 
human rights in Islam. The urgent recommendation is that Arab 
governments press on with the proposed Covenant in order to provide a 
regional safeguard stemming from the Arab context and the Islamic 
heritage. 
A number of recommendations may be made as to the substance of the 
draft Covenant. Firstly, it is proposed that the Covenant should be 
legally binding on States, and that it should enter into force on the 
signature and ratification of a simple majority of the member States of 
the Arab League. 
With respect to organs and procedures, provisions should be added as 
a matter of urgency providing for the creation of a Commission and 
Court of Arab Human Rights along similar lines to the American and 
European regional developments. Also extremely important in view of the 
particular circumstances of certain Arab states is the principle that 
communications from individuals, groups and non-governmental 
organizations alleging violation of the Covenant should be admissible as 
well as communications from member states. With regard to the particular 
circumstances of some Arab states, a number of special principles should 
be observed with regard to the right of the individual to communicate. 
These include the principle that the competence of the Commission to 
consider allegations from an individual of violation of the Covenant by a 
state should not be conditional on that state's acceptance of the 
Commission's jurisdiction, as in the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, and the principle that the competence of the Commission should 
not rely on its acceptance by a minimum number of member states. 
Further, it is important to point out that the principle of prior 
exhaustion of local remedies is not wholly appropriate to the 
circumstances of the Arab world. It is suggested that the principle be 
interpreted with a degree of flexibility, allowing, in line with article 50 
of the African Charter, that local remedies where they exist need not be 
exhausted where it is clear to the Commission that the procedure would 
be impossible or unduly prolonged. In some Arab countries, it is 
difficult or sometimes impossible for a individual to practise his right to 
a local remedy, either because there is no such remedy available or 
because he is detained or in exile. This is not intended to replace the 
general principle of exhausting available local remedies, but rather to 
provide an additional safeguard to the rights of individuals at risk. 
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Unlike the African Charter, the draft Covenant is to be praised for taking 
into account the protection of human rights during the state of emergency, 
and in particular for limiting the scope of circumstances warranting the 
imposition of states of emergency to "threats to the life of the nation". Also 
worthy of comment is the inclusion of a list of inalienable rights which may 
not be derogated from in such circumstances. 
It is to be hoped that any Commission or other organ established in 
connection with the proposed Covenant is able to play a more effective role 
than the existing Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights, whose 
activities have focused on investigation of alleged human rights abuses in 
the Occupied Territories. While accepting the importance of such activities, 
it is hoped that this organ will in the future broaden its scope to 
investigate alleged abuse of human rights elsewhere in the region. Perhaps 
a stipulation that any new Commission be composed of persons of legal 
expertise acting in a personal capacity will enable such an organ to 
function more effectively, as its neutrality and independence will be 
assured. 
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